Thursday 15 October 2009

"Whisper it… Iran may have passed the peak of its power"


Link



Emile Hokayem in the National, here

" ..... Since then, however, the controversy over the elections has exposed the reality of a profoundly troubled country, where the legitimacy of the ruling elite is contested and the cost of an aggressive foreign policy questioned. Among the slogans heard during the street protests was “Na Qazeh, Na Lobnan, Janam Faday-e Iran” or “No Gaza, No Lebanon, My life to be sacrificed for Iran”.....


.... Mr Khamenei has moved in recent months to reassert control over key institutions and weaken the opposition. But in doing so he has come to rely on a narrower support base and relinquished the claim that the Islamic republic enjoys decisive popular legitimacy. To save his regime he has sacrificed its founding ideals, and in the process he has transformed Iran into yet another typical military dictatorship with a theocratic veneer.

Why are Iran’s internal conditions so crucial to its regional appeal? Because its charm offensive in the Arab world is built in large part on the notion that it has struck the right balance between Islamist values, popular representation, revolutionary ideals, state modernisation and defiance of the West. But with Iranian society now screaming its anger at electoral fraud, state-sanctioned abuse, economic failure and regime corruption, the Islamic Republic can no longer credibly parade as an inspiring model.


It is unclear how this will play out in the Arab world......


For all, the basic question is the same: will Iran direct its limited resources to placating internal discontent or will it act more aggressively to divert attention and take the fight elsewhere? Indeed, Iran’s internal unrest could be the catalyst that drives the regime to become more adventurist. The leadership always considered the cost of regional overreach bearable because it provides a strategic defence and symbolic returns. Mr Ahmadinejad points to his approval rating in the Arab world to convince his countrymen that his policies are worth the investment.


Beyond the funding and support for Hizbollah, Hamas and Syria, Iranian foreign policy has relied considerably on soft power: championing causes that Iran blames the Arab states for neglecting, such as the fate of Palestine and social justice; mastering nuclear technology; defying western imperialism and Israeli power while accusing Arab states of placing their destiny in US hands.

For these reasons many Arabs have come to romanticise Iran: Mr Ahmadinejad and the Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah regularly rank at the top of the region’s most admired leaders. .........Declaring love for the muqawama costs nothing when talking to a pollster in Egypt or Kuwait, but that is not the same as wanting to live it, which comes at a price. That is the real limit of Iran’s popular appeal.

Iran can of course count on its hard power to protect its regional interests, but cracks are appearing there too. The Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al Maliki, declined to join an Iranian-engineered Shia political alliance and now leads a slate comprising Sunni and nationalist parties (Not going well, though!) for the crucial elections in January. Syria is being courted by Saudi Arabia, France and the US to loosen its alliance with Iran. A weakened Iran could strike a deal with the US at Syria’s expense, so Damascus might be pondering whether to do so first. Tehran cannot even rely on its traditional anti-US tirades, which have been defused by Barack Obama’s diplomatic overtures.

None of that should suggest that Iran’s appeal and activism will fade soon. But the narrative of a mighty, cohesive Islamic Republic has taken a serious hit that should be exploited now."


Posted by G, Z, or B at 1:55 PM

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