Saturday 19 December 2009

When is a dictator not a dictator?

Friday-Lunch-Club

The President and Family by Ammar Abd Rabbo.
Brian Whitaker commenting on the ICG report below, in the Guardian/ here


"Decision-making in authoritarian regimes can be a lot more complicated than it looks. The idea that dictators simply dictate is often wide of the mark: they may not care much about public opinion but they do have to juggle with conflicting demands inside their own power base, and sometimes they can't even be sure their instructions will be implemented.
Syria is one country where the inner workings of the regime can seem baffling. A diplomat in Damascus once told me that although Bashar al-Assad's position as president seems secure, nobody knows how much power he really has.
A report published by the International Crisis Group (ICG) earlier this week – mainly about Syrian foreign policy – sheds some light on this intriguing puzzle. In Syria, it says:

Many decisions witness a contest between various lines of thought that coexist within the regime, each reflecting a slightly different worldview, diverging private interests or personal rivalries. Some decisions ultimately reflect a balance between diverse institutional power centres; others, a more decisive victory by a particular one ... Further confusion arises from the fact that officials occasionally take initiatives or make pronouncements that are inconsistent with the authorised line – in an attempt to influence it; as a means of drawing attention to themselves; in order to express frustration; or, quite simply, out of ignorance.

In theory at least, the president's decision is final but much of the time he sits back, waiting to see which way the wind will blow. One Syrian official told the ICG:
Overall objectives are set by the president with input from those around him. Then, it's up to others to suggest how to achieve them. For instance, if the minister of foreign affairs makes an interesting proposal, the president will give him some leeway – but only up to a point, because he still has to contend with other tendencies. Moreover, the leadership tends to maintain multiple, parallel channels on any given issue. But, in the end, the president always remains in a position to arbitrate and distribute roles. The balancing and real decision-making takes place at the top. No one else is even fully in the picture.

Even the most loyal official, familiar with the workings of the system, can find this confusing. But then there are others who think they know what the policy is – and try to subvert it. In an opaque, compartmentalised and heavily bureaucratised system such as Syria's it's by no means certain that decisions, once made, will stick. "Follow-through often is lacking, as the process creates considerable room for either active or passive obstructionism," the ICG says. "Policies frequently are adjusted or rectified, even after apparently final decisions are made."
One recent example was Syria's association agreement with the EU, which both parties spent years negotiating. Then, just as it was about to be signed, Syria unexpectedly put it on hold – possibly because of objections from local business interests.
This chopping and changing happens at a national level too. A Damascus lawyer told the ICG: "There are several centres of power. Much-needed legislation can be enacted and then, within a few months, is amended and amended again. The reason is that the legislation interferes with the interests of people influential enough to step in and have their way".
Clearly, Syria is not a one-man dictatorship and a senior official quoted in the report sees this as a positive development, a "sign of a dynamic debate". Dynamic it may be, but it's still a closed debate, conducted mainly in private, by those in the loop. The rest of the country is excluded.
On the domestic front, this opacity is likely to slow down the pace of reforms or limit their extent. In order to succeed, such reforms will need buy-in from the public as well as the regime's insiders and the only way to achieve that is through open debate that helps ordinary Syrians to understand the rationale behind them.
Internationally, the opacity makes Syria one of the most difficult countries for negotiators to deal with. Martin Indyk, an assistant secretary of state during the Clinton administration, told a congressional committee last year..."



Posted by G, Z, or B at 10:37 AM

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