Wednesday 22 August 2012

The State of Sinai (I): Surviving on Its Own


A man holds a rocket that allegedly hit his house, after it was fired by an Egyptian army helicopter during a security operation on the outskirts of the small Sinai village of Sheikh Zuweid on 10 August 2012. (Photo: AFP - Mostafa Abulezz)
Published Tuesday, August 21, 2012

The August 5 attack near Rafah, which resulted in the deaths of 16 Egyptian border guards, put Sinai back in the headlines. Rarely does this marginalized region and its mainly tribal inhabitants get any attention, save for in times of war and conflict. Al-Akhbar visits Sinai in this three-part series on the forgotten peninsula.

The Sinai of the bedouins, olive trees, and endless sand is only mentioned when speaking of the October 1973 war, the explosions in Taba and Sharm al-Sheikh, the separation wall on the border with Gaza, and blowing up gas lines to Israel.

In normal times, only the city of Sharm el-Sheikh gets mentioned. It is where deposed president Hosni Mubarak lived and where tourists from Europe flock.

Sinai, almost one third the size of Egypt, is marginalized despite its strategic location as the gateway between Africa and Asia. It is a gathering place for cultures and religions, represented by spiritual sites such as Tur Sinai and St. Catherine’s monastery.

The land is famous for its turquoise mines, mentioned in old Egyptian references. The Pharaohs of old and new exploited this gem and the rest of Sinai’s wealth, while marginalizing the inhabitants.
Its early inhabitants were a mix of Semites and Hamites, who were later dominated by Arabs, well before the Islamic conquest.

When Pharaonic Egypt was at the pinnacle of its power, the Horus military road used to cut through Sinai all the way to the East. Ancient Egypt’s army crossed it to subdue rebellions in Syria.

When Egypt was weak, the same passage was used by successive invaders riding the other way, from the Hexos to the Israelis.

Strategic Importance

Due to its position as a military crossing point, its strategic importance grew as threats on the border loomed. The creation of Israel raised this importance to unprecedented levels and became a curse that befell Sinai and its people.

The peninsula’s growing strategic importance had an inverse effect on its people’s wellbeing and their progress. The Egyptian state began looking at Sinai and its people as a danger. But this was the same view that Israel had taken.

This is why Sinai was the last issue to be addressed in the Suez War of 1956. Israel took its time retreating from the peninsula it had totally occupied at the beginning of the war. It wanted guarantees to protect its security against the hostile regime of Gamal Abdul-Nasser.

When it reoccupied it in 1967, Israel treated Sinai as a deep buffer zone, separating it from the Egyptian danger. It did not build settlements as quickly as it did in the West Bank and the Golan Heights, with the exception of one close to Sharm al-Sheikh in the south.

Israel reinforced this desert ghetto with the Bar Lev Line. It held on to this strategic position even after the 1973 war. During negotiations with assassinated Egyptian president Anwar Sadat between 1978 and 1979, leading to the Camp David accords, Sinai was divided into three zones, restraining the Egyptian military and keeping it on the other side of the Suez Canal.

While neither the 1973 war nor the negotiations that followed were able to liberate Sinai completely, its return to the Egyptian fold raised its media profile. But the state continued to view it as a source of danger.

Its people did not get much out of the liberation spectacle. On the contrary, they were treated almost as if they were under occupation. Sinai went back into the shadows and was only mentioned when bombings and terrorist attacks took place. The latest was at the Karm Abu-Salem crossing south of Rafah earlier this month.

The Egyptian state left Sinai to the mercy of armed groups, intelligence operations, and organized crime, while its inhabitants drowned in state repression.

Human Geography

Sinai is divided administratively into two governorates. Its total population is around 489,000, according to a 2006 census published on the Egypt State Information Service website.

Tribally, the peninsula is divided into three regions containing between 11 and 13 tribes and clans, with 500 to 12,000 members each.

South Sinai is known as the land of Tur. The Tuara tribes are al-Uleiqat, Mazyana, al-Awarma, Awlad Said, and al-Qararsha or al-Sawalha. Numerous clans and families of these tribes are also spread out in the rest of the peninsula.

Central Sinai, or Bilad al-Tih, is inhabited by al-Tiyaha, al-Ahiwat, and al-Turabin. The latter extends into Gaza and southern Palestine.

The north is Bilad al-Arish where al-Sawarka, Sinai’s largest tribe, lives. Made up of a total of 13 clans and families centered around the city of al-Arish, al-Sawarka extends east to Sheikh Zoueid and west to the airport region.

There are other smaller tribes such as al-Akayla on the Mediterranean coast in the north and al-Bayadiya in the region between al-Qantara and Port Said. Al-Akharsa, on the other hand, is a large tribe living in the Rummaneh region, but extends into al-Sharqiya and al-Ismailia, the eastern edge of mainland Egypt.

History of Marginalization

Massad Abu Fajr, an activist from the region, says that Sinai has a diverse and complex society, despite being majority tribal. He explains that the regime had upheld this tribalism, even bolstering it, as part of its security and marginalization policies.

The regime kept the major tribes, such as al-Sawarka, al-Tiyaha, and al-Turabin, from participating in the political process or from managing the affairs of Sinai. None of the members of the major families were ever appointed to a position in local or regional councils, or even within the ranks of the former ruling party, the National Democratic Party (NDP).

At the same time, the regime deliberately favored smaller tribes and created a network of informants from the different clans.

Activist Ismail Iskandarani, from the blog I Love Sinai, believes it is necessary to look at the tribal makeup in Sinai. The tribes range in number and historical roots, but they coordinate on development and national issues.
He says that tribal affiliation is strict on two matters. The first being rights. And the second is local development in terms of land acquisition and similar matters.

Iskandarani maintains that the tribes of central Sinai regard smuggling as an economic system, not as a security breach. The tribes in the south depend on tourism, while the ones in the north make a living from agriculture and hunting.

Most of the smuggling operations, which pass through the center of the peninsula, depend on the Tiyaha tribe. According to Iskandarani, smuggled goods arrive from the south through the Red Sea or the north from the Suez Canal ferries.

He points out that the al-Azazma tribe, around 2,000 people living near the border, are without identification papers. They are known as bedoon (stateless).

Iskandarani indicates that the South Sinai governorate is less populated and less educated. It is difficult for external forces to influence them. But the south has less security problems than the north, which borders Palestine. Politics, in the traditional sense, is thus more prominent in the north.

Revolution in the Tribes

Despite the political focus on the north, Said Atiq, member of the Youth Revolution Coalition in Sinai, indicates that none of the traditional parties have a strong foothold in the region.

Massad Abu Fajr, an activist from the region, says that Sinai has a diverse and complex society, despite being majority tribal. He explains that the regime had upheld this tribalism, even bolstering it, as part of its security and marginalization policies.

He says that the Sinawiya youth, who joined the January 25 revolution, are the most prominent now. They worked on reforming their tribes and clans to be able to confront the state.

The young revolutionaries are convinced that Sinai needs to be linked to the Egyptian framework. They refuse to be marginalized and isolated, and are insisting on their full political and social rights.
They were able to embarrass more traditional forces in the tribes, such as the tribal and clan sheikhs. The latter number around 50 and are linked to the security forces. They are incapable of providing a vision or producing action.

The Sinawiya youth proposed changing the method of appointing tribal and clan sheikhs through a democratic system and free elections, supervised by the National Council for Human Rights. But the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the presidency, even under president Mohammed Mursi, rejected this idea.

Atiq explains that this suggestion could have pumped new blood into the leadership and brought back some of the lost stability and security in the peninsula.

The rebellious youth of Sinai are a force to be reckoned with as they press forward with their demands, putting them in a confrontation with the tribal sheiks, the Muslim Brotherhood, and SCAF.


The Poorest Egyptian Governorate
A few years ago, a study by the International Crisis Group revealed that the rate of population growth reached 62 percent in the north and 22 percent in the south.

It classified the northern Sinai governorate as the most impoverished area in Egypt.

The report concluded that Cairo’s focus on the security situation led to the neglect of economic development projects. The only exception are the tourist resorts in south Sinai. But the people of Sinai cannot use them because of the security cordon.
River to Sea Uprooted Palestin
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