
21 August, 2012
Countercurrents.org
By Chandra Muzaffar
Muslims and Muslim governments are
angry with Bashar al-Assad. They hold him responsible for the massacre of
thousands of people, many of them innocent civilians, in Syria. They want him to
go.

The rebels are not only well equipped with a range of weapons
and communication apparatus but are also supported by logistical routes
developed by the CIA and intelligence provided by Mossad. Their weapons are
delivered through “a shadowy network of intermediaries, including the Muslim
Brotherhood,” and “are paid for by Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.” Since April
2012, hundreds, perhaps even a few thousand, militants, some linked to Al-Qaeda
and its affiliates, from Iraq, Libya, Tunisia and Jordan have crossed over into
Syria to fight the Bashar government in what they perceive as a “jihad.” It is
reported that out of 200 rebels captured in Aleppo recently, 70 were foreign
fighters.
The picture was actually from the war in Iraq in 2003.
The
photographer himself, Marco Di Lauro of Getty Images, came out in the open to
expose the fabrication. In fact, the Houla massacre itself was “committed by
anti-Assad Sunni militants, and the bulk of the victims were members of the
Alawi and Shia minorities, which have been largely supportive of the Assad”,
according to the leading German daily, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(FAZ).
Worse, Syria which was suspended from the OIC at the summit was not even invited
to the meeting and given a chance to defend itself. It was denied the most
elementary principle of natural justice. It is a right that is fundamental to
Islamic jurisprudence.
Why has the Muslim world as a whole, especially its elites and
its intelligentsia, adopted such a blatantly biased and starkly unjust position
on Syria? Is it because many are ignorant of what is really happening in that
country, given the orientation of the mainstream media? Or is it because Muslims
revere the Saudi monarch so much --- he is after all the custodian of the two
holy mosques--- that they are convinced that in seeking the elimination of
Bashar al-Assad he is doing what is morally right? Or is it because many Muslim
elites are beholden to Saudi wealth --- and Qatari largesse ---- that they are
prepared to acquiesce in their wishes? Or is it also because of certain
sectarian sentiments that Muslims appear to be incensed with the Bashar
government?
It is these sentiments that I shall now explore. For many months
now a segment of Sunni ulama (religious elites) in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and
certain other states have been attacking Bashar as an Alawite leader who is
oppressing the Sunni majority. Since Alawites are a branch of Shia Islam, the
target has been Shia teachings and the Shia sect. Given the standing of these
ulama, their vitriolic utterances have succeeded in inflaming the passions of
some Sunni youth who view Bashar and his circle as infidels who should be fought
and defeated at all costs. Even the spiritual guide of the Muslim Brotherhood,
Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, has now joined the bandwagon and accuses Shias of
theological deviance and malpractices.
It is important to observe in this regard that in the context of
Syria there is no rigid Shia-Sunni dichotomy. The Sunnis given their numerical
strength dominate the army, the public services and the private sector. Some of
the most critical positions in Syrian society are held by Sunnis. The Grand
Mufti of Syria for instance is a Sunni of the Shafie doctrinal school. Indeed,
sectarian, or for that matter, religious affiliation has very little weight in
society. In many ways, Syria is a society that has sought to de-emphasise
religious and sectarian loyalties and nurture a notion of common citizenship.
Since the beginning of the conflict, it is the Western media that have been
preoccupied with the so-called Sunni-Shia divide and appear to be deliberately
stoking sectarian sentiments. The Arab media has followed suit.
The way in which Sunni-Shia sentiments are now being manipulated
convinces me that geopolitics rather than sectarian loyalties is the motivating
force. If sectarian loyalties are really that important, how does one explain
the close ties that the Sunni Saudi elite enjoyed with the Shia Shah of Iran,
Reza Pahlavi, in the sixties and much of the seventies?
In spite of the relentless opposition to it, Iran, much to the
chagrin of its adversaries in the region and in the West, has continued to grow
from strength to strength, especially in the diplomatic and military spheres.
One of its major achievements is the solid link it has forged with Syria, on the
one hand, and the Hezbollah in Lebanon, on the other. It is the most significant
resistance link that has emerged --- resistance to Israel and US hegemony--- in
West Asia and North Africa (WANA) in recent decades.
Israel, the US and other Western powers such as Britain and
France, and actors in WANA like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, are worried. The
Iran helmed resistance has increased their apprehension in light of five other
related developments.
One, Iran’s nuclear capability. Though Iranian leaders have
declared on a number of occasions that they regard the manufacture and use of a
nuclear bomb as haram (prohibited), there is no doubt that the country’s nuclear
capability has been enhanced considerably in recent years.
Two, the inability of Israel to defeat Hezbollah and gain
control over Lebanon which it regards as its frontline defence. This was proven
again in 2006 and today Hezbollah is in a more decisive position in Lebanese
politics than it was six years ago.
Three, the Anglo-American invasion and occupation of Iraq in
2003 and the introduction of electoral democracy which has led to the rise of
Shia political power. Shia political elites in Iraq are by and large inclined
towards Iran, which the US sees as a huge setback for its hegemonic ambitions in
the region.
Four, the Arab uprisings, especially those that are mass based,
like in Tunisia and Egypt, have raised questions about the shape of democratic
politics in the region in the coming years. Will it give rise to the emergence
of Islamic movements that challenge the legitimacy of Israel, US hegemony and
the role of feudal monarchies in WANA? Or, would it be possible to co-opt the
new Islamic actors into the status quo?
Five, how will all these changes unfold in a situation where US
hegemony is declining? How will Israel and the other states in WANA that are
dependent upon US power for the perpetuation of their interests fare when the US
is no longer able to protect them as it did in the past?
For Israel in particular all these developments in WANA portend
a less secure neighbourhood. Total control and predictability are crucial
elements in Israel’s notion of security. It is because of its obsession with
security that guarantees control over its neighbourhood that it is determined to
break the link between Iran, Syria and the Hezbollah. It reckons that if Bashar
is ousted that link would be broken.
Netanyahu made it clear that
Israel preferred “the Somalisation of Syria, its break-up and the elimination of
its army.” Bashar’s successor ---- after his ouster--- he stressed “must break
with Iran.” Netanyahu gave the impression that Israel was in a position to
“influence the rebels.”
Since this is Israel’s agenda for Syria, all the moves and
manoeuvres of states like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey to eliminate Bashar
would be very much in line with what Israel wants. Any wonder then that both
Israeli leaders and its media welcomed the suspension of Syria from the OIC.
In
this regard, Israel would have been thrilled to read a pronouncement by
Al-Qaradawi in May 2012, widely reported in the WANA media that
“If the Prophet Muhammad was alive today, he would lend his support to NATO.”
More than endorsement from within the region, what Israel has always been confident about is the patronage and protection of the US and most of Europe. On Syria, and in the ultimate analysis, on Iran, the Israeli political and military elites know that the centres of power in the West share its diabolical agenda. Indeed, it is Israel that determines the US’s position on critical issues pertaining to WANA. It is the tail that wags the dog.
Israel’s relationship with a major Arab state like Saudi Arabia,
(with whom it has no formal diplomatic ties) on the one hand, and the US, on the
other, tells us a great deal about who is in charge of who. The Kenyan- American
scholar, Professor Ali Mazrui, once described the Saudi-US nexus this way: the
problem with the custodian of the Holy Mosques is that there is a custodian of
the custodian.
If I may add, since it is Israel that decides US foreign policy
in WANA, it may not be inaccurate to say that there is a custodian of the
custodian of the custodian.
Dr. Chandra Muzaffar is President of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST). Malaysia.
Dr. Chandra Muzaffar is President of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST). Malaysia.
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