Cohen at CSIS
In the first
video (see below), whose format essentially is a one-on-one interview between
Zarate and Cohen, we have the latter providing an initial overview of his
responsibilities and how he goes about carrying them out, letting it be known that his powers extend far beyond the boundaries of
the United States.
We now are able not only to be much more effective in combatting illicit
finance domestically, be we’re able to
take it internationally in a way that is, I think, quite useful in pursuing US
foreign policy and national security goals. We’re able to talk to foreign
finance ministers, foreign regulators, foreign financial institutions, foreign
ministries about the importance of combatting illicit finance, and being able
to use that to address our most important foreign policy and national security
goals, whether—again, whether it’s terrorism, weapons proliferation,
transnational organized crime.
The power that we are now able to sort
of extend internationally and the ability to attract sort of complementary
actions by foreign governments and foreign institutions like the EU, and
through FATF [Financial Action Task Force-ed.] also, has led to, I think, a very happy
consequence, which is that when the most difficult foreign policy problems are
being addressed and the most difficult national security issues are being
debated, we are looked to increasingly as a tool that can be used to help—to
help solve these problems and help promote US interests.
In his reply to Cohen’s comments, Zarate describes the Treasury official’s
endeavors as lying on a spectrum somewhere “between diplomacy and military
power,” likening it also to “kinetics,” and defining all of this more or less
as a “full range of financial tools and suasion.” In other words, the US is
able, through Cohen’s powers of “suasion”, essentially
to dictate to others—other countries
as well as individual businesses and financial institutions—who they may or may
not do business with. Contract with Iran or Syria to offer products or
services of some sort, even though these may not be military-related, and you
will suffer punitive measures. How this is specifically applied to Iran is
discussed later in the interview and in the quoted passage below. Notice what
Cohen says about rising unemployment in Iran and the devaluation of the Iranian
currency, the rial, perhaps taking pleasure
in the fact that, as he notes, the
people of Iran “are feeling this pressure themselves.”
The path that we’ve been on began in sort of the ’05, ’06 time frame,
designating financial institutions that are involved in Iran’s nuclear program,
working through the UN to get UN Security Council resolutions adopted
highlighting Iran’s failure to comply with its international obligations, and
also designating people at the UN level and working with foreign partners, both
in the private sector and in governments, to have similar actions taken to
isolate and put pressure on Iran.
The last, you know—it’s three years we have been pursuing what has been known
as the dual-track strategy of, on the one hand, offering the Iranians the
opportunity for meaningful, substantive, sincere engagement, but, on the other
hand making it clear that they will face increasing pressure as long as they
don’t accept the offer of engagement. And we have, you know, as the engagement
track wasn’t bearing any fruit, steadily
and aggressively increased the pressure: additional designations [i.e.,
more people on terrorist lists-ed.]; using new authorities that Congress has given us to apply even greater pressure on the financial
sector in Iran, which has, you know, culminated most recently the in the
legislation that the president signed at the very end of last year, that
focuses on Iran’s exportable oil and transactions with the Central Bank of
Iran.
We have seen this combined effort of our authorities and working with the
international community. And I—and I
cannot overstate the importance of the effect that we are able to generate when
we have our international partners working with us—you know, the EU working
with us, Papan, South Korea, Australia, Switzerland. I mean, you name it, we
have a—and the United Nations as well—a very, very broad-based coalition of
countries not doing exactly the same thing, but all pushing in the same
direction of applying pressure on Iran really as part of this dual-track
strategy. And the—you know, the impact of that that we have seen, particularly
sort of through the fall of last year and into the spring of this year, is
really, you know, a very significant
deterioration in the Iranian economy.
The value of their currency, the rial,
has you know dropped like a rock, and that has, you know, significant impact on
Iran’s ability to, you know, pay for the material that it needs for its nuclear
program, and, more broadly, just puts pressure on the leadership because the
people in Iran are feeling this pressure themselves. And you see that in,
you know, Iran’s GDP, which is—lags well behind its peers. As you know, other
countries that are oil exporters have been, frankly, doing well in an
environment of increasing oil prices. Iran hasn’t. You can see it in the unemployment rate in
Iran, which is, you know, steadily increasing and is actually quite high today.
And you can see it in just the overall difficulty that Iran has today in
interacting with the international financial community, the international
business community. They are increasingly isolated.
Cohen also discusses a policy enacted under the National Defense Authorization
Act of 2012 under which any country that purchases oil from Iran—and pays the
Central Bank of Iran for its oil—will face sanctions. The sanctions will apply
not only to the countries, but also to any of their financial institutions and
businesses that may be involved in the transactions with Iran. (Some exemptions
are given to countries which significantly reduce their Iranian oil imports, he
says, with the overall goal being “to drive down the amount of oil that Iran is
able to sell.”)
We can of course imagine how policies of this nature are looked upon by people
in Iran. But what about elsewhere? What about the countries and businesses that
have formed profitable relationships with Iran, and there are probably lots of
these? Iran, after all, is the third largest oil supplier in the world. And
what about the billions of people around the planet who have nothing to fear
from Iran and whose daily obsession is not the welfare of the Jewish state? Can
you image the anger such policies could, and likely are, engendering toward America throughout the world? And might we also posit that this hostility
isn’t directed specifically toward America alone, but also—to the extent the
adage that “Jews run America” is applicable—toward Jews? Do US policies
like this contribute to “anti-Semitism”? The answer to that might be obvious,
and perhaps the better question is: Do
Jews like Cohen even care that this may be the case?
Cohen and Zarate also discuss similar efforts aimed at Syria and its own
central bank, with the former asserting (bragging?) that “the macroeconomic
indicators in Syria are much like what you see in Iran.”
You know, their GDP in 2009, I think,
was growing at 6 percent. I think the last year it declined by 3 percent, and
expected to contract 6 percent this year. You know, their currency has
devalued, I think, 25 percent on the official rate and anywhere from 50 to 75
percent in the—on the unofficial market.
You know, their budget deficit is widening substantially because the sources of
revenue for the Syrian government, which are largely oil exports and tourism,
and taxes from tourism, have almost completely dried up. They’re not
earning—it’s basically not earning any money from their oil or from their
tourist industry. That is, you know, obviously, on the revenue side, they are
not—they’re not earning, and on the expenditure side, they’re spending money to
try and keep inflation down by subsidizing food and fuel, and they’re spending
a lot of money, frankly, pursuing the violence against their own people.
Note, of course, the presumption: that the violence is being directed by the
Syrian government “against their own people,” and not by the terrorist Salafist
gangs armed and backed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, NATO, the US and Israel. But in
the next passage Cohen lets the veil slip to a degree, and we see who the real targets of US policy are—the people
of Syria.
And the combined effect of this is that the economic situation in Syria today
is quite perilous. The objective of that is to encourage the business class in
Syria to recognize that their future prosperity, the preservation of their
wealth, their children’s future economic stability, depends on Assad leaving power. And peeling away that business community
support from the regime is one of the, you know, sort of important objectives
that we’re pursuing through these—through these sanctions.”
Or in other words, impoverishing the
people of Syria is, “one of the, you know, sort of important objectives that
we’re pursuing.”
At this point, I recommend that you scroll back to the top of this page, and
look again at Cohen’s picture, look deep
into his eyes. I mean—really deep.
I would recommend readers of all nationalities do this, but especially any who
may be from China, for in the next stage of the interview Cohen discusses what
he has in store for China. The exchange starts with Zarate inquiring of Cohen,
“How do you deal with the Chinese, in part when they are not as cooperative as
we’d like them to be on some of these issues, whether it’s North Korea or Iran,
Syria? And how do you contend with the fact that their economy is rising, their
banking sector is powerful, and they in some way are becoming a force in this
financial battle space?” Note the inherent arrogance: How do you “deal with the
Chinese”, who are not being “as cooperative as we’d like them to be.” Cohen
responds:
At one level, we deal with the Chinese the exact same way we deal with
everybody else on these issues, which is that we explain what our laws are,
explain how it is that, you know, our laws operate so that the government can
instruct its financial community and so that the financial community itself
understands where the—where the lines
are, where they can get crosswise with us.
Yet having said this much, Cohen also implies there are limits to his, and US
government, power, confessing that the options, short of starting a nuclear war
or some other form of conflict, are pretty much limited to “talking” and
“communicating.”
And so part of what we do is, you know, in addition to dealing with governments
and talking to governments and trying to coordinate with governments, is to
communicate directly to the financial sector about the importance of combating
illicit finance, the importance of financial integrity, you know, and the
importance of maintaining reputation, because that is what, you know, will
assist them as they want to be, you know, players on the international
financial stage.
Cohen at NYU
In the second video (see below) Cohen describes his job as combatting “illicit
finance, such as fundraising by terrorist organizations and their supporters,
money laundering by drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations, and
illicit financial transactions that facilitate nuclear and ballistic missile
programs.” Obviously combatting Israel’s illicit nuclear missile program is not
on the agenda; Cohen doesn’t mention it. In fact, much of the same ground is
covered here as in the first video, including the goal of advancing “core
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.”
The speech was given at NYU’s Center on Law and Security, which coincidentally
is under directorship of yet another Jew, Zack Goldman, to whom Cohen pays
tribute. “You are all very lucky to have him,” he says.
While the US has for many years employed sanctions as a means for achieving its
foreign policy goals, Cohen informs the NYU audience that the past several
years “have seen a burst of intensity
and creativity” in this arena—and from this point forward the main focus of
the speech is Iran.
“No one questions that Iran is one of
the most pressing national security issues of our day,” he claims (falsely), adding that “Iran remains the world’s
leading state sponsor of terrorism (also false).”
The issue of Jews projecting their own behavior onto others has been discussed
before (see here, here, and here ), and we certainly seem to see
a bit of that going on in the NYU speech as Cohen remarks, “The Iranian regime
routinely abuses the human rights of its citizens,” adding that “it exports
repression” and that “its nuclear program threatens the peace and security of
the entire Middle East and beyond.” Again, there is no mention of Israel’s
nuclear program.
Cohen also presents data on the impact that sanctions are allegedly having on
the Iranian economy, asserting that in 2011 Iran exported approximately 2.4
million barrels of oil per day to about 20 countries, making it the third
largest oil exporter in the world. However, “as a result of actions taken since
the beginning of this year (2012), Iran’s crude exports have plummeted to
approximately one million barrels per day—a dramatic 55 percent decrease.” He
said this loss of oil revenue is costing Iran about $5 billion per month, and at
this point, the effect on the Iranian economy, as in the previous video, is
discussed at length. But perhaps it
isn’t only the Iranian economy that has suffered:
For close to two decades, American banks
have been largely forbidden from transacting directly with all Iranian banks,
including the central bank of Iran. American businesses
have been forbidden from buying just about anything from, or selling just about
anything to, Iran. And American oil companies have been forbidden from
importing oil from Iran.
Cohen also discusses specifics of applying sanctions upon Iranian banks,
including passage of a UN Security Council resolution in 2010, Resolution 1929,
and steps taken that same year by the EU, UK, Japan, South Korea, Canada,
Australia, Norway and Switzerland to restrict and curtail transactions by
Iranian banks in their respective countries.
“Other nations took less formal or public, but still very strong steps against
Iranian financial activity in the wake of Resolution 1929,” he adds.
At the same time, summer of 2010, Congress passed the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act, or CISADA, which gave the
Secretary of the Treasury (currently another Jew, Jacob Lew) the power to
“require US banks to terminate corresponding banking relationships with foreign
banks that knowingly engaged in significant transactions with those designated
Iranian banks.”
So in other words, with passage of CISADA, we have progressed from targeting solely Iranian banks, to
targeting the banks of other countries as well. This is an important consideration, and indeed as
Cohen frankly admits, “This is a particularly powerful provision.”
(And of course, again [see above], we must consider the resultant “anti-Semitism,” with its accompanying anger directed
towards America.)
From the perspective of the other banks
throughout the rest of the world, the problem is of course compounded by the fact
that the US dollar is the world’s reserve currency. In which case access to US
banks is not simply important—it is vital. And it is here Cohen provides us
with a small glimpse into what his power is capable of achieving:
After CISADA’s enactment, my colleagues and I fanned out around the globe to
explain the new law, visiting or talking to government counterparts in over 50
countries and representatives from more than 150 foreign financial
institutions. As we explained in these conversations, CISADA offered foreign
banks a choice: they could do business with banks in the US, or they could do
business with designated Iranian banks. But they could not do both. The impact was dramatic. Nearly everyone we
spoke with readily recognized that there really was only one choice—to
terminate relationships with designated Iranian banks. And those that did
not appear to recognize this, like Kunlan Bank in China and Elaf Islamic Bank
in Iraq, both of which have now been cut off from the United States banking
system, have learned that we are quite serious about the choice to be made
under CISADA.
Again, and I know I’m sounding redundant here, but imagine the anger this
provokes towards the US. Are these measures really in America’s interest? Does bullying the rest of the world on
Israel’s behalf truly serve America’s best interest? Or are all these
actions solely in the interest of the Jewish state? Who is the real benefactor
here?
But it doesn’t stop even there. Cohen also discusses a presidential executive
order signed in July 2012—punishing anyone who might assist Iran in acquiring
gold or other precious metals, among other things—as well as yet another Congressional measure, the Iran Threat Reduction Act, signed into
law by Obama in August of that same year. The latter includes even more
stringent measures, measures that presumably will, in effect, force Iran to
leave the money it makes from its oil sales on deposit in banks within the countries that purchase their oil.
“As I’ve tried to sketch out, we have in place now an enormously powerful set
of sanctions, at home and around the world,” says Cohen in what is perhaps an
understatement.
But despite all these punitive measures, it is Iran, Cohen insists, not the US,
which rejects “the path to a negotiated resolution.”
Cohen describes US measures against Iran so far as a “combination of diplomatic
and economic efforts,” but of course, should these ultimately fail to force the
Islamic Republic into compliance, “all options remain on the table,” he informs
us.
Nowhere in the entire video is the word “Israel” mentioned. Cohen
discreetly omits any reference to the Jewish state during his speech—this we
would certainly expect. But there is something perhaps even more telling than
that: at the end of the video comes a Q
and A session of approximately 16 minutes duration in which not a single member
of the audience at this institution of higher learning raises the issue either.
What
additional US laws will peoples around the earth find themselves infringing
upon and called to account for? How much more “intensity and creativity” in the
application of sanctions is the world prepared to accept? Where does this all
stop?
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, said
exerting efforts to end the crisis was a "moral obligation" and "essential to
preserve global peace and global security".
Uprooted Palestinian
Thursday, March 14, 2013 at 11:42PM
Friday March 15, 2013 11:08
by PCHR Gaza
Speaking to “Israel's” Channel 2, only one week before his
first visit to the occupied territories since his election as president, Obama
said “my goal on this trip is to listen. I intend to meet with Bibi
(Netanyahu)... I intend to meet with (Premier Salam) Fayyad and Abu Mazen
(President Mahmoud Abbas) and to hear from them what is their strategy, what is
their vision, where do they think this should go?"![nasrallah[1]](https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/blogger_img_proxy/AEn0k_svGTWZhH9QbFNgKEB_2Hd_6aUq7IXOsCJMyZa6JkOfEMIPB81XusWIt2O4z7VH6Iu64mgUN0jBP8pZ9AgeRlecaRb_-e3BLbx0_w9wyY0GaLXgq1VbsAtMownih2Mtq88Jh0SAE5BYrdKJ=s0-d)
