Ben White, The Electronic Intifada, 30 April 2009
Last week, less than two weeks after I had talked with him in his an-Najah University faculty office, Abdel Sattar Qassem was arrested by the Palestinian Preventive Security forces in Nablus, occupied West Bank.
Qassem is a 60-year-old professor of political science, and has been at an-Najah University since 1980. Imprisoned several times by the Israeli occupation, he is the author of dozens of books and papers, as well as hundreds of articles, on Palestinian politics and Islamic thought. But Qassem is also an eloquent and prominent critic of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and he has been arrested, and targeted by politically-motivated attacks, on a number of previous occasions.
The most recent of these was in January of this year, when his car was set alight. According to a news report from the Palestinian news agency, Ma'an, claim of responsibility was circulated by an unknown group who accused Qassem of being a "mouthpiece for the Iranian and the Syrian regimes." As reported by Asharq al-Awsat, Qassem pointed out how the statement was a "hoax," and thus a cover for individuals who did not want to openly identify themselves. The attack was condemned by a variety of public figures "in the harshest possible words," according to Ma'an.
This time, the official line is that his arrest was a civil, criminal case, the result of litigation proceedings against Qassem by two figures within the PA's security forces. The Palestinian Information Center reports that Qassem, who according to his family was arrested hours after he gave an interview to al-Aqsa TV to discuss the shooting of West Bank Hamas leader Hamid al-Bitawi, insists that the charges are groundless and politically motivated. Speaking to me on the telephone after his release, Qassem noted:
"It was evident that they didn't want to arrest me on a political basis, so they decided to fabricate something against me. Last Thursday, in court, there were many lawyers trying to represent me, because they feel like this is a national issue. They see that this is intimidation, not a genuine civil case."
The attempts to intimidate a critic of the Palestinian Authority into silence is disturbing, but is only one incident in a growing trend. The Ramallah-based political leadership, dominated by Fatah, and the PA security forces, are becoming increasingly authoritarian, encouraging a culture of militarized policing and a lack of respect for human rights and the rule of law. Now, nonviolent resistance leaders against the Israeli occupation like Sami Awad, based in Bethlehem, are saying that they "have to be ready to face any injustice even if caused by our own people, within the PA."
One aspect of this phenomenon is an assault on the freedom of the press. Back in December of last year, the Ma'an news agency carried out an investigation into what it described as "an unprecedented campaign of censorship and intimidation against West Bank and Gaza Strip journalists," carried out by the Palestinian Authority.
The report detailed how independent news agencies had become targets for "President Mahmoud Abbas's security establishment, particularly the PA's Office of the Attorney General." The same month as Ma'an's investigation, the Palestinian Journalists' Syndicate demanded that the PA release journalists from West Bank prisons, noting that "some journalists had been in prison for more than three months."
Criticizing the PA, or even affording Hamas coverage, now seems enough to get on the blacklist, or become a target for the PA's security apparatus. In fact, a Nablus-based journalist "found himself in a prison cell" in January for reporting the torching of Professor Qassem's car, according to The Jerusalem Post. In February, the Post reported that "the PA's crackdown on the local media was aimed at intimidating Palestinian reporters and stopping them from reporting about financial corruption and human rights violations by Abbas's security forces."
Another worrying trend in the PA-administered areas is an increasing militarization of civilian policing. During my recent visit to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, one of the first things several of my friends told me about was an energetic campaign by the PA to clamp down on car-related crime. There were now impromptu checkpoints thrown up on the main roads where drivers' licenses were checked and the special permission required to drive Israeli yellow-plated cars was requested.
Nobody minded, in theory, increased efficiency in law enforcement; what was troubling was the way the PA forces were going about it. It can seem like a small thing, a friend told me, but "it's this militarization, this way of asserting a kind of domination over the people." Many complained of the disrespectful behavior of the gun-toting men checking the cars.
This focus on "law and order" has become a repeated theme in the last few years, particularly in cities like Nablus and Jenin. Just recently, in a fairly typical episode, Ma'an news agency reported that PA forces conducted a "sweep" in a village three kilometers from Nablus, arresting apparent "fugitives" and checking the registration of some 250 cars.
Consistent, genuine complaints about lawlessness and corruption in Nablus had already emerged in 2004-05, but it wasn't until the end of 2007 that the current campaign was launched by PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, appointed by Mahmoud Abbas, whose official term as PA president expired in January. Beginning in Nablus, the law and order drive was replicated in Jenin in the summer of 2008. Residents have undoubtedly welcomed the increased security, but the nature of the campaign -- and the context -- is not so straightforward.
For example, the PA's infrastructure (largely destroyed by Israel in 2001-02) is completely ill-equipped. In April 2008 in Nablus, for example, Reuters reported that only 13 percent of the prison's inmates had actually been convicted; the restrictions of occupation and the inadequacy of the PA's legal system mean that many face a long wait before their guilt or innocence can be determined in a court of law.
Meanwhile, the Israeli military continues to invade PA-controlled areas, particularly at night, an arrangement which was actually a joint Palestinian-Israeli agreement. Moreover, while a weary Palestinian population is grateful for small economic upturns in their occupied cities, they are well aware that the PA's law and order focus is a welcome part of Israel's strategy in the West Bank; the BBC noted in December last year how the Israeli army was pleased with the "good job" Palestinian forces were doing.
One of the reasons for Israel's complimentary report card is the extent to which PA forces have been arresting members of groups who oppose the official "peace process," and in particular, detaining those who are either openly, or simply suspected, members and supporters of Hamas. According to the International Middle East Media Center, estimates give the number of detainees in Palestinian security forces' custody at between 500 to 600, many of whom have had no trial.
The secretary general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Ahmad Saadat, himself a prisoner in an Israeli jail, noted just last week in a public statement that it was "impossible" for the PA "to demand freeing the detainees [from Israeli prisons] while the Palestinian prisons are full of prisoners jailed for resistance background or internal disputes."
On 4 December of last year, Reuters reported on the claims being made of torture at the hands of Mahmoud Abbas' Preventive Security forces and General Intelligence. The article cited Ghandi Rabei, a lawyer from the Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR) in Hebron, who told the news agency that "hundreds of civilians have been transferred to military courts without legal procedures in breach of Palestinian law and international norms." The ICHR's annual report for 2008 recorded 111 complaints of torture or mistreatment in detention in the West Bank, according to Agence France-Presse.
On 31 January, the British Daily Mail ran a story under the dramatic headline: "Financed by the British taxpayer, brutal torturers of the West Bank." The paper reported how the British government's Department for International Development had given 76 million British pounds in 2008 to the PA for what it called "security sector reform." Once the figure is broken down, 3 million pounds went directly to the PA police, while "17 million [pounds] pays the salaries of the PA's array of security organizations -- including the Presidential Guard intelligence service and the feared Preventive Security Organization."
One of the most important factors shaping these developments is the US strategy as directed on the ground by Lieutenant General Keith Dayton. Dayton started work with the Palestinian security forces at the end of 2005. While ostensibly charged with general reform of the PA security forces, it became apparent that the US was intent on building up Abbas-loyal PA forces in order to directly confront Hamas should the need arise.
Dayton's plan involved giving the PA forces an increase in funding, manpower, training and weaponry. In October 2006, The New York Times reported that the US intended to expand Abbas' Presidential Guard at a cost of $26 million. At the time, it was clear that any such plan -- which also included "the transfer of thousands of guns from Egypt" to the Presidential Guard -- would only go ahead with a "positive response from Israel," according to the Israeli daily Haaretz.
According to The San Francisco Chronicle, this "systematic effort to bolster Abbas and his Fatah loyalists to counter the political success of Hamas" suffered an embarrassing setback, of course, when Hamas forces easily triumphed over Fatah in the Gaza Strip in June 2007 and thus "inherited thousands of guns, equipment and vehicles supplied by the United States."
The only lesson learned, however, seems to have been that the US, Israel and the PA could ill-afford a similar debacle in the West Bank -- and therefore Dayton's work was to be intensified, rather than reconsidered. This, then, is what has been happening with increasing fervor in the West Bank in recent months.
On 27 February 2009, The New York Times' Ethan Bronner wrote about the 1,600 Palestinians who "have been through American-financed courses in Jordan." Dayton, the article said, "hopes to have a well-trained battalion based in each of eight West Bank cities" (plans to expand the program were also reported by Reuters this week). The Israelis, needless to say, are content to cooperate: an Israeli officer "inaugurated the firing range" at one of the US-funded Palestinian training camps.
Whether it is the "top brass" training provided by the US for Palestinian security officials in Ramallah, or the special "SWAT" team organized by Dayton, Salam Fayyad and the Jordanians, it is clear that the primary purpose of these forces is not neighborhood crime-busting. As the World Tribune reported in the case of the SWAT team, the "elite" forces can be used against "Hamas squads" and help "protect the PA." As one critic put it, the PA's security agencies in the West Bank are trained to "persecute resistance elements and provide Israel with intelligence with which to arrest or assassinate resistance leaders."
Shawan Jabarin, general director of the Palestinian human rights group Al-Haq, agrees that these training programs are more about internal suppression than "law and order":
"If the senior officers who train them taught a respect for the rule of law, I'm sure we would feel that -- but our feeling is completely different. I'm not saying they are training them how to torture people, but they don't put any mechanism in place for monitoring these things. For political reasons, the Palestinians are trying to show that they are strong, that they are doing exactly what the others are asking them to do -- this happened during [Yasser] Arafat's time, and it's also [happening] these days."
If there was any doubt about the real purpose of these forces, one just needs to listen to Dayton himself. Dayton stressed to The Jerusalem Post in December that "the trainees are taught over and again that 'you are not here to learn how to fight against the Israeli occupation.'" That's why Dayton could affirm that he, the Israeli Ministry of Defense and his "IDF [Israeli army] colleagues" are of one mind: "something new is out there" and "it's worth encouraging."
It may not be new -- one only has to go back to the mid-1990s to find something similar happening -- but PA forces are certainly being encouraged to suppress dissent. While Israel was attacking Gaza in January, The Jerusalem Post described how the PA's crackdown on the opposition in the West Bank was "being carried out in coordination with the IDF and under the supervision of US security experts."
These were the very same police officers who had "received special training in Jordan and the West Bank as part of a security plan engineered by the US," and were apparently reporting directly to Salam Fayyad. Israeli "security officials" "praised" Mahmoud Abbas' "iron-fist policy" in the West Bank, reported The Jerusalem Post and "expressed satisfaction with the coordination between the PA security forces and the IDF and Shin Bet [Israel's internal intelligence agency]." Sometimes, "Hamas members were detained by the IDF only hours after they were released from PA detention centers."
So why have key elements within Fatah and the PA decided to go down this path? It seems like the Ramallah-based political and intelligence elite are primarily driven by fear; fear of losing their power and privileges, and fear of Hamas. More specifically, there is a real sense that Hamas' popularity has not suffered any kind of significant fall since 2006, and if anything, has been consolidated or increased.
At the same time as Hamas has emerged intact and uncompromising from Israel's recent Gaza onslaught, the Fatah-dominated PA has nothing to show for its strategy of softly-softly negotiations; just an entrenched, apartheid-like Israeli occupation. The "peace process" has brought Israel a degree of peace, but left the Palestinians trapped between Israel's colonies and wall. The PA's only card is that it continues to pay the salaries of thousands of desperate Palestinians -- money that is only forthcoming from the international community with strings attached.
Meanwhile in Nablus, Professor Qassem, who is considering a run for president in the future as an independent, feels like the PA "is reflecting its inner crisis against the population":
"So instead of going back to their own people they are trying to punish their own people. Why? Because there is Dayton, and the money of the donor countries, which they cannot sacrifice. If they want to go back to their own people, they will lose their salaries, and the situation in the West Bank will be similar to that in Gaza."
This is a deal that was made many years ago, but it has meant that there is a class of political leaders in the PA who are seemingly eternally wedded to the idea that the international community is directing the peace process in good faith. For reasons of self-interest, they are desperate to keep the PA, and all the assumptions of Oslo, alive -- even while sometimes admitting that in terms of obtaining basic Palestinian rights, there is, and will continue to be, nothing to show for meeting the "benchmarks" and "roadmaps."
If the US/Jordanian-trained PA security forces are the "stick" in the West Bank, then the manipulation of foreign aid is the "carrot." This is beyond the scope of this article, but it is worth mentioning in passing two recent Reuters reports on how "ventures backed by President Abbas's allies have received loan guarantees, grants and agricultural assistance."
At a critical moment for the Palestinian people, and the prospects for the region as a whole, it is arresting that many in the Palestinian leadership can sound like they are reading from Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman's speech notes, when he said that "the path forward" lay in "security" for Israel, an "improved economy" for the Palestinians, and "stability for both," as reported by The Jerusalem Post. As Shawan Jabarin said to me, "for political reasons you make a compromise and sacrifice human rights. This is what is going on these days."
These are dangerous developments, something that Professor Qassem was quick to highlight in an interview with the Palestinian Information Center after his recent arrest: "Freedom of speech and expression is a paramount issue over which there can be no compromise ... If we tolerate violations of our human rights and civil liberties, then we will be jeopardizing our future as a people."
Ben White is a freelance journalist and writer whose articles have appeared in the Guardian's 'Comment is free', The Electronic Intifada, the New Statesman, and many others. His book, Israeli Apartheid: A Beginner's Guide (Pluto Press), will be published this summer. He can be contacted at ben A T benwhite D O T org D O T uk.
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