WINEP: "Regrettably for Washington & its Lebanese allies, the return of March 14 to power in Lebanon would defer a checkmate..."

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For the delightful reading of SFM of FLC, David Schenker, WINEP, here

"... Ideological divisions between these camps notwithstanding, Lebanese campaign the old-fashioned way. In the south, for example, Amal leader Nabih Beri has spent the last few months dipping into a regional development slush fund, the Council of the South, to lay cornerstones for schools and municipal buildings in Baalbak and Shaath. At the same time, current prime minister Fouad Siniora, facing a tough race in Sidon, unveiled his own $20 million Saudi-funded project targeting the perennial problem of the municipal dump.

The election season has also been punctuated by several surprise developments, which could have an impact on voting -- particularly among the Christian swing vote:

Hizballah operatives in Egypt and Yemen. ...Egyptian criticism of Hizballah, an organization that Cairo is now comparing to al-Qaeda. This was followed in May with Yemeni president Ali Abdul Salih's accusation that Hizballah was training Shiite rebels in Yemen. .....that could hurt the organization at the polls.

Israeli spy network roundup. In May, Beirut heralded the arrest of several alleged Israeli spies in Lebanon. Weeks later, detentions numbered in the dozens. The arrests -- bona fide or otherwise -- are being exploited by Hizballah to support its demand to retain an independent military arm, outside the control of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

Release of the four generals. The release was demoralizing to March 14, which viewed the release as a sign the tribunal will not reach convictions.

Der Spiegel article. .... if the tribunal holds Shiites responsible for assassinating the Sunni leader of Lebanon, it could lead to a resumption of the civil war.

Visit of Vice President Biden. ... "Whether you [the United States] interfere or not, you're too late. Your project is collapsing and the bloc you're betting on will lose." ...

Despite concerns in the Middle East and Washington, recent March 14 polling shows it will retain a slim parliamentary majority, despite losing ground in the vote. But even March 14's best-case scenario would not fundamentally change the status quo on the ground: a pro-West majority would still be limited in its ability to effect policy changes by virtue of the opposition's "blocking third" in the cabinet and its military prowess. ...Moreover, if the majority is only one or two seats, election results could be reversed by assassination. ...

Although Hizballah would derive unprecedented international legitimacy from an electoral victory, the organization and its allies would face significant challenges in governing the state....

One obvious implication of a Hizballah electoral victory would be a change in Israeli policy toward Lebanon. In October 2008, then prime minister Ehud Olmert said that Israel "did not use all means to respond [during the 2006 Summer war], but if Lebanon becomes a Hizballah state, then we won't have any restrictions in this regard." On May 27, Defense Minister Ehud Barak confirmed this policy, stating that a Hizballah takeover would "give us a freedom of action that we did not have completely in July 2006." ...Based on Israel's declaratory policy, the next round promises to be even more costly for Beirut. Even if there is no resumption of hostilities with Israel, Washington would be sure to revise its policy toward a Lebanese government led by Hizballah. ...

Less tangible, but perhaps equally important, would be a change in administration attitude toward a Lebanese government headed by a terrorist organization. Unlike the UK and other European states, Washington is unlikely to subscribe to the fictitious disaggregation of Hizballah into political and military wings, so the United States would not be able to meet with the power behind Lebanon's next government. (Hizballah could appoint nonparty figures to the cabinet in order to avoid such a showdown.) Given the existence of the executive order "Blocking Property of Persons Undermining the Sovereignty of Lebanon or Its Democratic Processes and Institutions" -- widely viewed at the time as targeting FMP leader Michel Aoun -- it is not clear whether Washington would establish contacts with Aoun. Absent a dramatic change in U.S. policy, Washington's ties to a March 8 government in Beirut almost certainly would be downgraded.

....Regionally, however, the consequences of a March 8 victory would be more pronounced. Washington's moderate Arab allies -- Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco -- already concerned about the Iranian nuclear threat and ongoing subversive activities, could see a March 8 victory as another sign of Iran's growing influence and be tempted to seek accommodation with Tehran, diminishing U.S. leverage at a critical juncture.... Regrettably for Washington and its Lebanese allies, while the return of March 14 to power in Lebanon would defer a checkmate, it would do little to alleviate the ongoing tension there or assuage the regional face-off between the United States and Iran."

Posted by G, Z, & or B at 10:30 AM