"It is possible that years ago, the problem of Iran's nuclear project could have been solved by one tough blow and with relatively minimal risk. At that time, the project was dependent on one facility: the uranium conversion plant in Isfahan. If it had been bombed, Iran would have lost large quantities of raw material for uranium enrichment, and its nuclear program would have been set back years.........
Netanyahu has promised to do everything in order to prevent the Iranians from acquiring military nuclear capabilities, but if he fails, he can pin the blame on his predecessors, who flinched from attacking at the propitious moment. Perhaps that is what National Security Adviser Uzi Arad was getting at when he blamed previous governments for leaving Netanyahu "scorched earth" in advance of further confrontation with the Iranian threat.
People who spoke about the Iranian nuclear project with Netanyahu after last February's election, but before he took office, got the impression that he is determined to act against Iran and for this reason returned to power....
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In every public reference to the subject, Defense Minister Ehud Barak emphasizes that "all the options remain on the table." For his part, former prime minister Ehud Olmert relied on the advice of Mossad chief Meir Dagan, head of the "forum for the political prevention of the Iranian nuclear project." Olmert and Dagan believed the Iranian bomb could be delayed by a few years by diplomatic or other means, without incurring the tremendous risks entailed in a war. Barak, in contrast, sought even then to cultivate an option within his field of responsibility.
In May 2008, when then-U.S. president George W. Bush visited Israel, Barak (who was defense minister at the time) and Olmert met with him at the Prime Minister's Residence in Jerusalem. They smoked cigars and talked about the Iranian threat. Barak surprised Olmert - whose relations with him were strained - by asking Bush to discuss military matters. Bush refused. Some time later, when he met with Barak in Washington, the president told the minister: "You really gave me a scare" (the actual wording was less diplomatic).
When Netanyahu took office, however, Israeli officials even gave foreign media briefings and leaked details about an attack in the works.
Struggles over power
Today Barak and the Israel Defense Forces chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, believe that Israel needs to create capabilities to deal with every scenario. Their stance is partly explained by considerations related to a struggle over power and influence. The defense establishment received a large budget increase for deployment in the face of the Iranian threat, and if that money is to be invested in the IDF and not elsewhere, the army has to persuade the political echelon that it can do the job. If it is impossible to deal with Iran, it would be better to invest the money in secret operations.
This is also an inter-organizational struggle: If the Iranian nuclear project is described everywhere - including in a speech that the director of Military Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, gave this week at the Institute for National Security Studies - as the No. 1 threat to Israel, the identity of the person who formulates the response to it is of crucial importance. Once the army presents a plan to solve the threat, Ashkenazi will be in the game, too, and not only Dagan, whose relations with the chief of staff have turned hostile in the past year......
There has been more than one instance in which strategically important decisions were made mainly because the defense establishment put forward a persuasive operational solution that fired up the imagination of the political leaders. Prime examples are the assassination of the Fatah terrorist Raed Karmi in 2002, the assassination of Hezbollah secretary general Abbas Musawi and the plan to assassinate Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Operation Bramble Bush), which was curtailed mainly because of the "Tze'elim 2" training accident (the last two cases, by the way, took place in 1992, while Ehud Barak was IDF chief of staff).
It is also hard to ignore the part played by the air force "lobby," consisting of past and present pilots. Many seem to have a "can do" mentality: If there are bombs, a flight route and targets, all that needs to be done is to move the munitions from point A to point B. Their enthusiasm and persuasiveness can be infectious.
The preparations under way in Israel have a mirror image in Iran, which this week tested a long-range missile and signed a defense pact with Syria. Every few weeks a senior Iranian official threatens a painful and destructive response if Israel dares to attack.
But despite the growing tension around the world, senior experts on security and strategy believe that there is little likelihood of an Israeli attack. In not-for-attribution conversations, they say Israel will not act without a green light from the White House......
Year of decision
Maj. Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland, a former head of the National Security Council, said this week that in his view, Israel will have to decide in the year ahead whether to attack or not. "The question of a decision on attacking Iran's nuclear capability is liable to be very much not theoretical but very practical in 2010," Eiland said at the same conference at which Yadlin spoke. According to Eiland, an Israeli attack will be feasible only in the event that a crisis occurs in nuclear-related talks between Iran and the great powers, followed by a cessation of negotiations altogether and the failure by the United States to cobble together an international coalition against the Iranians.
Iran can be expected to retaliate against such an attack with Shihab missiles. Ben-Israel, who specialized in operations research in the air force and took part in planning the attack on the Iraqi reactor in 1981, estimated that Israel would be hit by about 80 Iranian missiles - twice the number that Saddam Hussein fired at Tel Aviv, Haifa and Dimona during the 1991 Gulf War. According to Ben-Israel, the Iranians would also make use of Hezbollah, which serves them to deter Israel from attacking their nuclear facilities ....
Only on paper
Another critical question in this discussion concerns the deployment on the Israeli home front. In the wake of the Second Lebanon War, the political and military echelons understand how exposed the civilian population is to a massive missile and rocket attack. The summer of 2010 has already been earmarked by the IDF as an in-principle target date for completion of repairs on essential lacunae. But despite the massive media coverage given to the multilayer defense system against missiles, it is worth recalling that most of its components still exist only on paper. .....
...... what will Israel gain from an attack? A three- to five-year delay in the manufacture of the Iranian bomb, according to the optimistic estimate. Is that worth the certain price that will be paid and the risk entailed in a complicated air mission so far from home? Do Netanyahu and Barak have what it takes to make that decision? It's not certain. And these doubts lead the experts to assess that Israel will agonize and will talk about a strike, but will do nothing. In their view, it is more reasonable that the U.S. and Iran will continue their dialogue, with "controllable" crises erupting from time to time. As long as Obama sees to it that Israel does not feel isolated and abandoned in the face of the Iranian threat, Netanyahu will not dare attack. ..........The president prefers to reassure Israel on the Iranian front and exact concessions from Netanyahu on the Palestinian front. .......... it's likely there will be enough experts in the administration and in American research institutes who will recommend that Israel take a deep breath and adapt to the new situation. In other words, learn how to stop worrying and love the bomb.
Despite the experts' assessments - and as MI head Yadlin hinted this week - no scenario promises that the year ahead will be quiet and tranquil. Most of the wars in the past broke out by surprise, because of mistaken risk assessments or seemingly irrevocable political commitments. The same could happen between Israel and Iran...."
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