... The Turkey-Middle Eastern Drift Red Herring...

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The Turkish Red-Herring is loved especially by the likes of Soner Cagaptay of WINEP... Hugh Pope rightly sees the 'realignment' having more to do with "show-me-the-money" than dreams of a Caliphate redux! But Pope does not delve enough on Israel's role in the anti-AKP campaign ... in a Transatlantic paper, here

".... However they are transmitted, the U.S. messages should be founded on an assessment which starts by heavily discounting the swirling commentaries calling into question Turkey’s relationship with the Middle East, its modernizing ambitions, its interest in the EU and commitment to NATO, and the nature of its democracy. And, given the damage done to the relationship by neglect under the previous U.S. administration, any action agreed upon should be backed up with frequent visits to Ankara by senior American officials.

It is true that Prime Minister Erdogan and his foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu in particular are interested in creating a new role for Turkey in the Middle East and among other Muslim countries. One reason is certainly the great interest the Middle Easterners now show in Turkey’s successes – partly because of its democratic legitimacy and progress in reconciling religion, ethnicity and patriotism in the national ideology, partly because of the success of Turkish sitcoms on prime time Arab television and partly because of the way Erdogan has publicly spoken up for the Palestinians. A much larger reason, however, is the way Turkey has reached the closest of any large Muslim country to Western standards of prosperity.

Any lingering doubts about Turkey’s popularity in the Middle East should be put to rest by polling data of more than 2000 respondents in seven key Arab countries published in November. The survey by the reputed Turkey Economic and Social Studies Foudantion (TESEV) shows that for Arabs and the Arab world Turkey represents a potential model (61%); a successful integration of Islam and democracy (63%); has a daily growing influence (71%); has the potential to make intra-Arab peace (76%); should play a bigger role (77%); is a friend of the respondent’s Arab government (78%); and should play a mediating role in the Israel-Palestine problem (79%).

However Erdogan and Davutoglu would do well to take note that 64 per cent of Arabs believe EU membership makes Turkey a more convincing partner for the Arab world. Indeed, for many Middle Eastern countries, and even a far-flung Muslim country like Indonesia, it is above all Turkey’s strong recent economic performance that has impressed Muslim countries. And the key to that prosperity is a huge wave of foreign investment in the mid-2000s, in which EU countries led the way. This followed Turkey’s move to start negotiations on full EU membership, and which signaled that Turkey was heading inexorably towards an era of greater stability and rule of law. The other leg of international confidence in the country is a sense of continuity and predictability in Turkey’s relationship with the U.S. Therefore, however bitter Prime Minister Erdogan may be about European negativism, and however hypocritical some Western positions may be, each time that he gives into the populist temptation to pour scorn on the Western consensus on Iran, Sudan or Israel, he is sawing off the branch on which Turkey sits.

Even so, the fact is that Erdogan’s statements are mainly rhetorical. Following in the steps of Turgut Ozal in the 1980s, his main goal in foreign policy is doing business, namely the encouragement of deals with nearby countries and to support the hundreds of businessmen who typically travel with him. This is a natural refocusing on Istanbul of regional trade between the Balkans and Middle East, ending the unnatural hiatus of the Cold War and the iron curtain that sealed Turkey off from almost all of its historical hinterland. This is a reversion to the geographical commercial patterns of the Ottoman Empire, or indeed the Byzantine Empire before it.

It has little to do with Islam or neo-Ottomanism. Indeed, the biggest beneficiary has been trade with Russia, now Turkey’s biggest single trading partner, a relationship that in Ottoman times was chiefly characterized by a dozen terrible wars. It’s worth recalling too that the richest part of the Ottoman Empire was not the Middle East, but the Balkans, then known as Turkey-in-Europe.......

Erdogan’s sharp-tongued criticism of Israel is however problematic for Turkey in Washington. But it is unfair to see such talk as being unique to him or his party, since Turkish politicians of all stripes have used harsh language against Israel in their day. Turkey has not withdrawn its ambassador to Israel, as past governments have done, and is still hosting Israeli ministers. There are also notable overall changes in the climate since 1996, when Turkey signed a landmark agreement on military cooperation with Israel. Back in those days of chaotic Turkish internal politics, Turkey’s military-dominated security establishment judged it needed an alliance with Israel against Syria; with Israel’s defence establishment to acquire new technology hard to get from the U.S.; and with pro-Israel lobbyists to face down Armenian genocide resolutions in the U.S. Congress. Now Turkey has a remarkably close relationship with Syria; is in dispute with Israel over supplies of military equipment; and it has initiated its own normalization with Armenia that promises to be the best avenue yet for Armenians and Turks to achieve closure on the events of 1915. Perhaps most importantly, today’s Turkish government now in power is responsive to – and occasionally exploits – a high degree of Turkish public anger about Israeli policies towards the Palestinians, while back in the 1990s there was a hope that the Oslo process meant that peace was on its way.

It is also worth noting that there is a different dynamic in Turkey relationship with almost every Middle Eastern country, as in the wider region. The bottom line is usually not Islam but is more about business, and Iran and Sudan have long been discrete areas of interest of fast commercial growth to Turkey. .... The West may not have a clean record on supporting dictators, initiating wars and deploying weapons of mass destruction, but as a practical matter, Erdogan is unnecessarily feeding arguments to his and Turkey’s enemies in key centers in Washington and Brussels.

Erdogan and Davutoglu’s new fashion of appeals to the Middle East on the basis of a supposed common religious identity is also a double-edged sword in the region.Their misconceived talking points about their role as “leaders of 1.5 billion Muslims” recall to other Middle Easterners the hegemonic attitudes of Iran’s early Islamic Republic, are offensive to other Muslim powers, and do not truly reflect Turkey’s broader ambition to integrate with Europe and be an all-round regional champion. Talk of an Islamic world – whether by Erdogan or by critics in Washington – is also overblown. Quite apart from a wide variety of ethnic differences, majorities of Iran and Iraq’s populations adhere to two or more varieties of the Shia Muslim rite, not the Sunni Muslim majority rite of Turkey. The isolated government of Syria, led by members of the Alawi sect, welcomes the short-term political relief of strategic support from Turkey, but is already worried that in the long term the current influx of small Turkish businessmen and their religious organizations could empower the long-oppressed Sunni majority of the country.

To sum up, Turkey is far from heading off for the rogue badlands of the East, as more than one administration official has privately worried in recent months. In many ways it is a far more liberal and self-assured country than it was a decade ago. In fact, Erdogan and Davutoglu’s recent rhetoric represents a new self-confidence, sometimes bordering on the foolhardy, which may be disturbing to Washington because it is partly the same self-confidence being displayed by many regional powers as they move up to fill the space left by a weaker United States.

In such circumstances, the best partner for the United States to foster is a Turkey integrating with EU norms and standards, just as at heart Turkey should know that its best options are by open- heartedly pursuing the path towards the EU – without prejudice to the eventual decision in a decade or two about whether it actually wants to join. It is unlikely to be able to sustain reform momentum on its own. Just as importantly, any real floating away from its main transatlantic allies could be extremely damaging – making its existing dependence on Russian energy into a strategically vulnerability to its northern neighbor, undermining its credibility in financial centers, and decreasing confidence in Turkey’s overall momentum of greater partnership with the U.S. and Europe. "

Posted by G, Z, or B at 5:24 PM