Indirect Peace Talks - Stalling for Time

Abdelbari Atwan,

4 May 2010

Senator George Mitchell, US envoy for peace, starts a new round of talks today with the Palestinian and Israeli representatives to prepare for indirect negotiations sponsored by the US admnistration, with support from the so-called Follow-up Committee of the Arab peace initiative.

All parties, those who support these negotiations and those who reject them, have openly stated that the prospects for their success are extremely limited, if non-existent. Therefore, the question that forcefully poses itself is: What is the use of engaging in these negotiations?

Obviously, the US Administration believes that the current stagnation in the peace process must not continue because it will lead to a political vacuum that might be filled by Palestinian forces opposed to the negotiations.

The US Administration also believes that this vacuum might create a situation on the ground that might develop into an intifada, undermine the standing of the Ramallah-based PNA and the plans of its substitute, that is to say, Prime Minister Dr Salam Fayyad.

Arab officials who participated in the Arab follow-up Committee meetings and responded to the US request to green light indirect negotiations for a second time justified their action by saying that there are encouraging signals coming from the Obama administration which should be acknowledged, consolidated and offered every chance of success.

But when we quite innocently enquired what exactly these signals were, the answer comes as follows: The US Administration presented the Arab side with guarantees that Israel will halt the settlement activities in occupied Jerusalem.

When we rephrase the question and ask where these guarantees are, they tell us: They are verbal and not written. In any case, they are sufficient for us, and you must stop poking your nose into things that do not concern you.

We were quoting there a senior Arab official.

Experience with the Americans under their various administrations has taught us that these guarantees are always a big "lie", especially if these guarantees are given to the Arabs. But, most regrettably, such guarantees are fully binding and turn into a pledge in the form of a contract if they are issued in favour of the Israelis. The same thing applies when such guarantees are issued to explain some US stands, as was the case with the letter of guarantees, which the administration of former President George Bush Junior sent to Ari'el Sharon on the annexation of major settlements in occupied Jerusalem.

If these US guarantees on halting the settlement activity in occupied Jerusalem are true and serious, why are they secret? Why are they not written like the guarantees that are given to the Israeli side? Is it reasonable for the Arabs to buy "fish in the sea?"

The Arab teams - specialists in issuing justifications - are these days promoting a statement indicating that the Obama administration will publicly announce which party blocked the negotiations if they fail. They add that afterwards, the administration of President Obama will go to the UN Security Council to secure a resolution condemning Israeli settlement activity in occupied Jerusalem and the West Bank.

This is nice talk. But it is a kind of illusion and self-delusion. The question was not about passing a resolution. The question is: What will we gain from such a resolution? What will happen afterward? Will US and British fleets move to the shores of Haifa and Jaffa to implement that resolution by force?

I feel insulted when Arab League Secretary General Amr Musa threatens to take the Palestinian issue to the Security Council, as if this issue has not been there in the past 60 years. Lengthy discussions were held, fiery speeches were delivered (who remembers the rifle and olive branch?), and more than 50 or 60 resolutions were passed on this issue in that period.

The experts on coining phrases and providing justifications - there are too many of them in the PNA and Arab League - tell us that indirect negotiations are more important than direct negotiations. When we ask how, they give a sly smile and say, as if they found a miracle: Search for the US role. This is the first time the US mediator will oversee these negotiations and convey the ideas that are under discussion to the two sides.

This is a futile effort. These negotiations are more like shaking water to make butter, as the Israelis do not want to halt the settlement activity in occupied Jerusalem and the PNA is unable to make new concessions because it has nothing left to give up.

The Israelis want the land. They seized most of the lands that they want and are now looking for ways to get rid of the people. As a first step, the Israelis might leave this people to govern themselves on "their land", which they took, in the framework of a limited self-rule with undefined borders. If the Palestinians want to call it a state or even empire, let it be. There is no harm in that.

Did they [the Palestinians] not call the self-rule council members ministers, with the phrase "his Excellency" preceding the title? Was the legislative council not originally a municipal or self-rule council under the Oslo accords? The name changed, but the powers did not. Then the council disappeared altogether after its speaker and a large number of its members were arrested.

Binyamin Netanyahu goes to Sharm al-Shaykh and meets with President Husni Mubarak at a closed meeting limited to the two men. Why should the meeting be closed if the aim is to discuss a public peace process? There must be issues, other than direct and indirect negotiations, that we might know about later when Israeli planes attack south Lebanon or when Israeli tanks move into the Gaza Strip again. We do not want to go further and say when Syria and Iran will be attacked. The current incitement in the Gulf area and by its media against Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah reminds us of the period that preceded the invasion and occupation of Iraq.

Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas, who will negotiate with the Israelis, lacks the Palestinian constitutional legitimacy that would authorize him to engage in these negotiations or reach any agreements.

His authority [the PNA] does not control all Palestinian territories, and his term in office officially ended in January last year. Even the legal decrees, which were issued by the PNA jurists who ruled that his presidential term ended with the end of the legislative council's term in January this year, are now absolutely of no use to him, because the extended period has ended too.

The PNA president, the legislative council, the national council, and the PLO Executive Committee lack legitimacy. Accordingly, the provisional government of Salam Fayyad, which has become a permanent one, enjoys no legitimacy. Some people are talking about a reshuffle of that government. What is more ironical is that they speak about "key" ministries and forget that when President Abbas himself wants to leave his office in Ramallah, he needs permission from an Israeli corporal in the Coordination Office.

These are futile negotiations intended to provide a cover for a US administration that might have good intentions but is unable to translate them into action on the ground. Perhaps it will be a great disaster when we find out that the main and true aim behind these negotiations is to provide a "cover" for an imminent Israeli aggression against Syria and Lebanon on the pretext of the Scud missiles [allegedly supplied by Syria to Hezbollah], which has apparently altered the balance of power in the region and which now threaten the entire existence of Israel.

Congratulations to the Arabs and to the follow-up committee on this great achievement of resuming indirect negotiations. The Arab foreign ministers showed unprecedented courage when they insisted on fixing a timeframe of 120 days for these negotiations. In our opinion, this timeframe is sufficient - if it was not decided beforehand - for Israel to complete its preparations for war.

River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian