11/08/2010
August 11, 2010
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Why didn’t this security apparatus arrest him?
Who is the Israeli spy who was at the Antoine Ghanem crime scene two hours before it was committed?
In the world of counter-espionage, Ghassan Al-Jidd is not an unknown figure. The Resistance security body had since the end of 2005 monitored his movement in different locations. In 2006, Hezbollah handed the “Information Branch” of the Internal Security Forces, data about Al-Jidd to verify and then arrest him.
The Resistance security then collected advanced Information about Al-Jidd. At the same time, the Military Intelligence gathered information related to telephone calls that indicated to Al-Jidd’s involvement in spying for Israel. That was in May 2009.
When Military Intelligence conducted surveillance on the retired Brigadier General’s residence, it was concluded that the man was not at home. Investigations showed that Al-Jidd had left for Paris, and has never returned ever since.
In his press conference last Monday, Sayyed Nasrallah did not want to reveal the name of the “Lebanese security apparatus” that received Hezbollah’s information about Ghassan Al-Jidd. Responding to a question by Al-Akhbar correspondent, Sayyed Nasrallah said with a smile: “We don’t want to start a problem in the country.”
However, a little scrutiny shows that the official security apparatus which Sayyed Nasrallah meant is the “Information Branch.”
(The Al-Liwa’a newspaper, which is closely related to PM Saad Hariri’s political group, said Tuesday that the apparatus was the Military Intelligence.)
In the first half of 2006, the relationship between Hezbollah and the “Information Branch” leadership (and PM Saad Hariri behind it) had not reached this low level of mutual mistrust.
Al-Hasan said that the “Information Branch” was unable to reach information that enable it to arrest people working for the Israeli intelligence. He then asked for Hezbollah’s assistance.
Safa said he would give Al-Hasan his response within a couple of days. Indeed, contact was established between the two men in the few days that followed the meeting and Safa handed Al-Hasan information pointing at five Lebanese individuals suspected of working for the Israeli intelligence.
Among the names were Ghassan Al-Jidd, the retired army Brigadier General, and Internal Security Forces First Sergeant Haitham Sahmarani.
People acquainted with the “Information Branch’s” modus operandi say that Branch investigators had looked into the telephone calls data of the five people listed in Hezbollah’s report, “and they found nothing suspicious.”
In the following months, the 2006 war started and political division followed. The “Information Branch” ignored the information it had and took no measures to verify them, besides relying on a “primitive” analysis of the telephone calls data.
According to officials in the Branch, the body had not yet received information software that would have enabled it to carry out a sophisticated analysis of the calls. However, what is beyond justification until this very day is that the Branch did not put Sahmarani under surveillance, even though they had information that his sister had a few years earlier, fled to occupied Palestine with one of (Antoine) Lahd’s collaborators.
In countering espionage, the Information Branch relies mainly on analyzing telephone calls. Moreover ,according to one of those acquainted with the “Information Branch’s” modus operandi, the “Information Branch” thought that Hezbollah was “trying to test it through worthless files, and that suspicion around the individuals was very weak.” This is what one of those acquainted with the “Information Branch’s” modus operandi, had been saying until May 2009. During that time, the Military Intelligence requested from the “Information Branch” that they arrest ISF First Sergeant Haitham Sahmarani for suspicion of working for the Israeli intelligence.
The “Information Branch” arrested Sahmarani and according to sources concerned with the investigation, Sahmarani confessed to spying for Israel, “and his confessions matched Hezbollah’s data provided to the Information Branch.”
One day after his arrest, the Information Branch referred Sahmarani to the Military Intelligence, where he was interrogated for long hours, before revealing the details of his relation with the Israeli intelligence.
Surprises in this dossier were not limited to Sahmarani.
One month later, the Military Intelligence had technical information that can link retired Brigadier General Ghassan Al-Jidd, to the Israeli intelligence. They tried to arrest him, but he had fled outside Lebanon.
According to a well informed source, the escape took place after the suspect received specific signs, and it was not known whether this was an intentional leak or information provided to him by Israel.
Since then, telephone data analyzed by “Information Branch” and Military Intelligence investigators showed that Ghassan Al-Jidd was an executive collaborator.
According to security officials concerned with counter espionage dossiers, spies are divided into many classes, mainly information gatherers and executive spies. The first class works on gathering information either through human efforts or through devices and tools provided to them by the Israelis. The Israelis indirectly make use of some of those agents who carry out related logistic operations, in security operations or assassinations executed by the Israelis.
At that time, Al-Alam had no information about the assassination. His Israeli operators had asked him to monitor the coastal highway in the city of Jbeil and determine whether there was any suspicious movement or military or security patrols. Concerned security officers linked between Al-Alam’s mission and the confessions of Israeli spy Mahmoud Rafea who took part in the assassination of the Majzoub brothers. Rafea said that he had transported an Israeli officer from the southern border the day before the crime. He added that after the assassination, he transported the same officer to the Jbeil shore, where an Israeli commando had arrived to pick him up.
The second class of spies includes the executives whose missions include information gathering. However, their main job is to carry out security operations like assassinations, explosives, surveillance, and logistics, not to mention transporting and housing Israeli officers and securing them to ground and sea evacuation points.
They also plant dead mail; like Mahmoud Rafea (arrested in 2006) and Jawdat Hakim (arrested in 2009).
Ghassan Al-Jidd belongs to the executive spies class. According to available information to security forces on him, he used to plant dead mail in rough and smooth terrains. He used to place explosives, cash, and communication devices for other spies to collect. He also used to buy prepaid mobile cards and send them to his Israeli operators.
The “coincidences” of finding Israeli spies on the crime scenes of a number of murders are not limited to Al-Jidd being in the Saint George area.
When Al-Alam was asked about this “coincidence”, he said that he had taken his wife to a nearby beauty salon. His wife, also accused of being an Israel spy, confirmed her husband testimony. The interrogation over this particular point was terminated.
A strange “coincidence” for an agent whom the Israelis had commissioned to monitor the Jbeil shore area in a prelude to evacuate one of their officers from the same area, only two years before Ghanem was assassinated.
(Al-Akhbar Daily)
Update:
Evia Friday-Lunch-Club
المفاجآت في هذا الملف لم تقتصر على السحمراني. ففي الشهر التالي، توصلت مديرية استخبارات الجيش إلى معطيات تقنية يمكن من خلالها ربط العميد المتقاعد من الجيش، غسان الجد، بالاستخبارات الإسرائيلية. حاولت توقيفه، إلا أنه كان قد فرّ إلى خارج لبنان. وبحسب مصدر مطّلع، فإنّ عملية الفرار جرت بعد حصول المشتبه فيه على إشارات معيّنة لم يُعرف ما إذا كانت تسريباً مقصوداً أو معلومات وفّرتها له إسرائيل.
ذلك أنه عندما تقرر توقيف الجد، أبلغ قائد الجيش العماد جان قهوجي وزير الدفاع إلياس المر بالأمر، فطلب الأخير التمهّل لبعض الوقت، لكنّ الجد سافر في اليوم التالي إلى خارج لبنان
We just learned that the author of this Al Akhbar article has been summoned to the Ministry of Defense for 'investigations'... 
The 'article' in question reported that the LAF's commander, Jean Kahwaji, informed Murr of the spy's (retired general Ghassan al Jedd) intentions, but that Murr 'took his time', allowing al Jedd to leave Lebanon...
It took Murr over 15 minutes to plead to the media to let him "live in peace"... Until he finally went to the crux of his press conference: that he will prosecute journalists who dishonor the Military with insinuations and falsehoods ...
Posted by G, Z, or B at 9:43 AM
الزميل علّيق في مكاتب الجريدة (مروان طحطح)
استدعت مديرية الإستخبارات في الجيش اللبناني الزميل حسن عليق بناءً على إستنابة من المدعي العام التمييزي سعيد ميرزا على خلفية مقال كتبه الزميل ونُشر اليوم في
"الأخبار". وما زال الزميل في المديرية يخضع للتحقيق.
وعلّق محامي جريدة "الأخبار" على الأمر فاعتبره "انتهاكاً للأعراف المعتمدة مع نقابة الصحافة، والتي تفرض أن لا يتمّ الاستماع الى الصحافي إلا من قبل قاض وبحضور محامٍ، وهذا ما رفضته مديرية الاستخبارات بعد مراجعتها من قبلنا".
"الأخبار"
River to Sea
Uprooted Palestinian
Uprooted Palestinian
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