Lebanese Army & Hezbollah: "Collusion in 06', 'Coordination' in May 08' Beirut 'foray, ...& 'tipping off' about UNIFIL visits ..."

Via Friday-Lunch-Club

WINEP's Schenker:

" ... In 2005, the Bush administration boosted previously minute levels of U.S. assistance to the LAF in response to the Cedar Revolution, ..... however, Damascus has reestablished itself as a force in Beirut, and Hizballah is again ascendant....

Washington's revitalized Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program for Lebanon had two goals. In the long term, the objective was to build sufficient capacity in the LAF in order to counteract militias and enhance state sovereignty. (The Bush administration did not believe the LAF would be able to supplant Hizballah anytime soon). In the near term, U.S. funding would enhance the LAF's counterterrorism capabilities against al-Qaeda affiliates, a critical need given the lack of state control throughout much of the country.

The program hit a high note early on when the military had based troops near the border with Israel,.....

But there have also been disappointments. During the 2006 war, for example, LAF elements colluded with Hizballah, allowing the group to use Lebanese navy radar to track and nearly sink the Israeli warship Hanit. Likewise, in 2008, the LAF coordinated with Hizballah during the militia's foray into Beirut, offering no challenge to the offensive and later relieving the militiamen and taking up the group's positions following withdrawal. The deployment to the South has been problematic as well. At the time, few expected the LAF to fully implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701 by interdicting Hizballah weapons. Yet aside from LAF troops being present in the area, the operation has proven mostly cosmetic. Worse, if Israeli claims are true, the LAF has been tipping Hizballah off about UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) site visits, protecting the militia's assets and undermining UNIFIL's mission....

In general, FMF programs are designed to accomplish three goals: build the military capabilities of friendly states; help Washington understand and gain influence with these militaries ...

First, it is difficult to determine how much influence Washington has cultivated with the LAF since 2005. Beirut's response to the August 3 incident was not reassuring. .... LAF chief of staff Jean Kahwaji likewise dismissed reports of the freeze as "only ideas suggested by some U.S. Congress members who are [influenced by the] pro-Israeli lobby." Moreover, the $100 million in U.S. FMF slated for 2010 may not prevent Lebanon from accepting Iranian or Russian military assistance....

To be sure, there is merit in Washington's desire to avoid abandoning its allies, .... But it is also clear that the bar defined by Vice President Biden has been lowered considerably over the past fifteen months....

The key metric is the relationship between the LAF and Hizballah. While some connection between elements of the two institutions is to be expected, especially given the Shiite plurality within the LAF, several indicators would provide useful insight into the depth of the relationship. Specifically, going forward, the FMF program should be contingent on a close assessment that measures, among other things:

• LAF response to officers who share intelligence with Hizballah, "go rogue," or demonstrate other problematic conduct with regard to the group (e.g., are they disciplined or congratulated?)
• LAF's role in harboring or otherwise protecting Hizballah weaponry (e.g., does the LAF play a role in preventing the import of weapons from Syria or their flow south of the Litani or in facilitating it?)
• Flow of personnel between Hizballah and the LAF (e.g., do officials of Hizballah's militia transfer directly into the LAF?)
• Flow of weapons and other material between the LAF and Hizballah (e.g., does LAF weaponry end up under Hizballah control?)
• Quality of LAF cooperation with UNIFIL (e.g., do LAF units seem to follow Hizballah guidance in obstructing the operations of UNIFIL?)
• LAF response to the anticipated indictment of Hizballah members by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,(e.g., will the LAF arrest and transfer indicted Hizballah officials or refuse to implement the tribunal's request?).

......... Washington's military assistance program with Lebanon has a bleak future."

Posted by G, Z, or B at 12:12 PM

River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian