Nir Rosen sent us a glimpse of his upcoming book “Aftermath”, release due in October 10′. Below are excerpts dealing with the May 2008′ ‘events’, and the sectarianism that prevailed.
“….. As Nasrallah explained at a press conference, Hizballah had used its weapons to defend its weapons. By the morning of May 9 all of west Beirut was in the hands of Hizballah or its armed allies. The government headquarters, called the Sérail, was surrounded, as were the homes of key March 14 leaders like Hariri and Jumblatt. It was the coup that never happened, but it galvanized the more militant Sunnis of the Beqaa and northern Lebanon….
….That evening I interviewed (Mosbah) Ahdab in his ostentatious Tripoli apartment. He had a small militia of dozens of ?t armed men protecting him. One of his security guards belonged to Afwaj Trablus, the Tripoli Brigades. He was paid by Secure Plus. There were six or seven thousand men like him, he told me, who had been trained but not in the use of RPGs. A few had received advanced training in Jordan. “It would be better if the Syrians were here,” he said ruefully. “At least there was security.” Ahdab’s eyes were bloodshot and wide in near hysteria. His breath smelled strongly of alcohol. An Iranian militia had taken over an Arab capital, he told me. As we spoke, we got word of clashes in the slums of Bab al-Tabbaneh…..
Shadi thought Prime Minister Siniora was an in?del, apostate, and ally of the Americans. But the Hizballah-led siege of Siniora’s government was not about Siniora, he said; it was about the sect...
… When Nabil and the men in his network were arrested (they were found with ?fty kilograms of TNT and ?ve kilograms of C4), they were tortured by members of the Interior Ministry’s Information Branch. During the interrogations Nabil was hit in the back of his head with a club; his legs were bruised for months after the beatings. Nabil was accused of being the number-two man in the group. Ismail was tortured to death, and his funeral in Majd al-Anjar was an occasion for massive demonstrations. With Ismail’s death, Nabil lost his connections to Iraq and no longer smuggled on behalf of the jihad. Nabil bragged about those days. “We are Al Qaeda,” he told me. “We had connec- tions to Abu Shahid.”…….
He did not want ?tnain the Muslim community, he said; he wanted to ?x the problems of arms in Lebanon and the dangers they posed for Sunnis. After seeing what happened in Beirut, Sunnis understandably wanted to arm themselves too. The Future Movement had no creed, he said. Its people worked only for money, unlike Hizballah. Sunnis were looking for a leader to repre- sent them, but the Mufti Qabbani was too close to the Saudis and the Future Movement, and he was weak, having done nothing in response to the events in Beirut. There was an opening now for Islamist movements,…..
“Before May 8 I used to love life,” said Hossam. “I would never sleep. I was into women, drugs, alcohol—I was living life to the fullest. ….“I should be doing martyrdom operations too,” he told me, his eyes darting to Nabil, look- ing for approval. “I would like to blow myself up during Nasrallah’s speech when there is a large group of people.” He got so much pleasure from shoot- ing, he said, and he surmised that if he went on a martyrdom operation his soul would feel even better. Nabil expected suicide operations like those in Iraq to occur in Lebanon, targeting Shiites. “I won’t be surprised if it happened,” he said.
… Sunnis had lost their trust in the security forces, especially after seeing the Lebanese army side with Hizballah. “We will defend ourselves, ….The Sunnis of Beirut were hit, but we will hit back one hundred times.” They were disappointed in Saad al-Hariri, who hadn’t supported the sect enough. Dhaher added that they were coordi- nating with Sunnis in the Beqaa and in Arsal.
I went to Arsal, a town bordering Syria that I had not heard of before talk- ing to Dhaher. I saw more posters for Saddam Hussein on the walls than for Ra?q al-Hariri.… “We are all yours, glorious Saddam, …All the Muslim community is for Saddam,”…..
Hujairi had been mayor for four years. He was a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, he told me, but he admitted that in the recent ?ghting the Brotherhood had not had a strong stand. Only the Sala?s had been strong…..
Only three of?cers in the army were from Arsal, though many townsmen were enlisted. There were no government services in town. Electricity was four hours on, four hours off. I was thus surprised to learn that townspeople from Arsal still identi?ed enough with the state to go down to Beirut and demon- strate so often. They had gone to protest the Danish cartoons and to show sup- port for Saad Hariri. Although many Western journalists live in Beirut, and many others descend on it whenever there is a crisis, few venture outside Beirut. This is despite the fact that Lebanon is such a small country. So the neglected Sunni population and the anger of that community are relatively unknown…… there was no party equivalent to Hizballah that could provide social services to poor Sunnis……
All Sunnis felt threatened and were uniting, he said, whether with the Muslim Brotherhood or the Future Movement. The Brotherhood was gaining in popularity in town because Sunnis felt marginalized. When they asked the Future Movement for weapons, they were turned down, he complained. “The Islamists will protect the Sunnis,” he said, and the Sala? movement would emerge stronger after these events. Dabaja’s brother agreed. “People are moving to extremism,” he said. “Before they were supporting Future, which is moderate, but now we cry for Nahr al-Barid. We could have used those people.” Dabaja agreed: “Last year we supported the army in Nahr al-Barid, but now we regret killing the extremists. People are thinking of weapons. We are threatened now. Are we going to sit with our hands tied?” Hizballah was afraid of the Sala?s, they said…….
Fifty men from the town had gone to ?ght in Beirut, but they had only been given sticks. There was a strong sense of Sunni solidarity now, he said, and they wanted weapons. “Shiites exposed that they are against Sunnis,” he said. He cursed Hariri for betraying Sunnis’ trust and humiliating them. “If Hariri wants to gain Sunnis back, he has to arm us….
I continued visiting Tariq al-Jadida in late May and early June……“We don’t want Shiites here!”
“The shabab are upset,” said Fadi, the local militiaman I had befriended. “Future brought us down to the street but could do nothing. Future is popular because there is no Sunni alternative.” Fadi and his men had asked Secure Plus for weapons but were told they didn’t have any. It seemed as though the leadership had sold the weapons for pro?t. …….“This battle changed our thoughts. We returned to our religion, to our sect. I won’t die for the [Future Movement]. I will die for my home, my sect. I am a Sunni. Now, there is no Sunni living who likes Shiites.” But Fadi still drank and didn’t pray ?ve times a day. Like many other Sunnis, he was proud of the Halba massacre……”
River to Sea
Uprooted Palestinian
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