"US officials indifferent to the consequences to Saad's political or physical well being and possible Hezbollah retribution..."
The Obama Administration is trying desperately to keep the Israeli-Palestinian talks from collapsing. Since the end of last month when Israel's ten month partial freeze on new settlement activity ended, the Palestinians have refused to meet face-to- face with the Israelis and the Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu has resisted repeated entreaties from the US to resume the freeze, even briefly. Actively working the "back channel" on this issue is veteran Middle East negotiator Dennis Ross, who, according to well-informed sources has been in regular contact with Netanyahu confidante, Yitzhak Molcho.
Meanwhile, frustrated Palestinian officials are threatening to take an "international route" whereby they would seek recognition of their state in the absence of an agreement with Israel .....
However, US officials are adamant in their opposition to this unilateral Palestinian move. If such an approach is mooted at the UN Security Council, it is certain to be met with a veto by the US, say well-placed Administration official. These officials say that ultimately the Palestinians will back off these attempts, including one which the US could not prevent -- a UN General Assembly vote in favor of a Palestinian state.
Instead US officials are betting that Ross and others working this issue will gain a temporary halt to new Israeli construction, although they expect the price to be high for Israeli acquiescence. Among the "rewards" Netanyahu is reportedly seeking is the release of Jonathan Pollard ....
Should a Pollard or other more substantive inducements [such as increased military aid] succeed in enticing Netanyahu into reviving a settlement freeze, the Administration is expected to "force the deal down the Palestinians" throats, to use a less than felicitous phrase uttered by a veteran State Department insider this week. But as this official and other observers then ask, if rhetorically, "What next?" For many inside the Administration who follow this issue closely, there really is no long range plan. As one key State Department official put it this week, "All we are trying to do is keep the ball in the air."
A lack of detailed Administration planning is also a salient feature these days of US policy towards Lebanon. Despite efforts by a number of Administration officials to downplay the significance of Iranian President Ahmaninejad's highly publicized visit to Lebanon ["He drew smaller than expected crowds," said one US official. "His Israeli-bashing scored just a few transient points," said another], the Administration quickly diverted its top Middle East expert, Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman to a brief stopover in Beirut.
Unfortunately this "showing of the flag' (one Administration official's phrase) did little to dispel the high anxiety felt by many Lebanese over the expected issuance of indictments by an international tribunal for the arrest of Hezbollah operatives for complicity in the murder of former Lebanese President Rafik Hariri. His son, Saad, currently Lebanon's Prime Minister is expected to feel Hezbollah's wrath, should members of their powerful organization be indicted.
While the Administration is far from indifferent to the outcome of the months long deliberations in Baghdad over the formation of a new government there, here to, they do not seem to be focused on a well-defined "game plan." Similar to its approach to Lebanon, the Administration has been quick to offer political bromides, such as repeated calls for an "all-inclusive" government. This refers to the US preference for a government in which the Sunnis would have a substantive role. .....
However, recently Iran "made its move" [to quote one European diplomat] by successfully enlisting the support for Maliki by the party of the radical anti-American cleric, Muktada al-Sadr. The US responded by publicly stating its opposition to the "Sadrists" gaining an important foothold in any incoming Iraqi government. Privately, say US officials, newly installed Ambassador James Jeffrey as well as other US officials including, notably Vice President Biden have been actively lobbying for an "acceptable" government. Their goal, it seems, has been to promote the creation of a power sharing agreement that would see Allawi as President and Maliki returning as Prime Minister, but with reduced powers. Yet, State Department insiders consider that outcome as having about a one in three chance of success, with the more likely result being the one most feared -- a government without significant Sunni participation.
Should an overwhelmingly Shia dominated government emerge, it will be seen as a victory for Iran, admit key US officials. And this would come at a most inopportune time for the Administration. Currently, US officials are still in a self- congratulatory mood over the increased political isolation and economic pressure the regime in Teheran has come under. Despite reports that talks in Beijing have not resulted in any progress in gaining support from the Chinese for additional economic pressure on Iran, US officials note that there have been no signs that Chinese companies have been "back filling " or taking advantage of European and Japanese cutbacks in business with Iran.
Key US officials argue that Teheran's willingness to engage in talks about Afghanistan is another sign of political unease among its leadership. And shortly, the US expects to get a definitive answer from Teheran to a proposed meeting to discuss Iran's nuclear program. Likely to be held in Geneva, perhaps as early as next month and limited to the issue of its uranium enrichment program, Iran would face the US, the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany in moving to this, the next planned step towads reining in Iran's nuclear ambitions.
Uprooted Palestinian
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