Thursday, 30 July 2009, 10:23
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001688
REF: GRUBB-MILLER 07/22/09 E-MAIL
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
2. (SBU) On July 22, A/S Shapiro met with MOD Director General Pinchas Buchris, MOD Political-Military Director Amos Gilad, Defense Export Control Directorate Chief Eli Pincu, and participated in a roundtable discussion led by J5 Strategic Division Chief Brigadier General Yossi Heymann. At the MFA on July 23, A/S Shapiro met with Director General Yossi Gal and participated in a roundtable discussion led by Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar and Export Control Director Roey Gilad. A/S Shapiro also participated in a strategic tour of Israel, and visited Israeli defense company Plasan-Sasa.1. (S) Summary: Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro met with a number of GOI officials on July 22-23 to stress the importance of the U.S.-Israeli political-military relationship, and to discuss among other issues Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). GOIinterlocutors continued to press for the opportunity to review the QME report prior to its submission to Congress, and presented an official response to a U.S. non-paper on potential arms transfers to Arab countries. In that respect, the MOD proposed technical discussions in Washington on August 3 to further discuss GOI concerns over the potential F-15SA transfer to Saudi Arabia. GOIofficials continued to express reservations regarding U.S. arms transfers to Lebanon, and requested the opportunity to further discuss U.S. strategy and intentions with respect to the Lebanese Armed Forces. GOIinterlocutors raised continued concerns over the Iraniannuclear weapons program, noting that any policy of engagement be done in conjunction with tougher sanctions and for a finite period of time before turning to other "options on the table." Other issues raised by GOI officials included the Peace Process, Israel's export control system, and potential Israeli exports to China. Both sides agreed in principle to the next session of the Joint Political Military Group (JPMG) in October or early November in Israel. End summary.
U.S.-Israeli Relationship
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3. (SBU) A/S Shapiro stressed the importance of the U.S-Israeli political-military relationship, noting the significance of visiting Israel on his first overseas trip in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for the Political-Military Affairs Bureau. GOI interlocutors appreciated the opportunity to resume dialogue on this important aspect of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. MOD DG Buchris noted the two still relatively new administrations in the United States and Israel, and the importance of limiting the number of misunderstandings in the future.
Qualitative Military Edge
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4. (S) GOI officials reiterated the importance of maintaining Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). They said that Israel understands U.S. policy intentions to arm moderate Arab states in the region to counter the Iranian threat, and prefers such sales originate from the United States instead of other countries like Russia or China. However, Israel continues to stress the importance of identifying potential risks that may become future threats or adversaries, and for this reason maintains several objections as indicated in the official GOI response to the QME non-paper on potential U.S. arms sales to the region (ref e-mail to PM/RSAT separately).
5. (S) GOI officials also expressed continued interest in reviewing the QME report prior to its submission to Congress. A/S Shapiro reiterated that the report was based on an assessment from the intelligence community, and therefore not releasable to the GOI. He referenced previous points made to the Israeli embassy in Washington regarding the report, and welcomed any comments the GOI might have -- although such comments should be delivered as soon as possible as the report is already overdue. Israeli interlocutors appreciated the classified nature of the report, but also made clear it was difficult to comment on the report's results without reviewing its content or intelligence assessment. In that respect, Buchris and other GOI officials requested that the QME process be reviewed in light of future QME reports.
6. (S) GOI interlocutors attempted to make the argument that moderate Arab countries could in the future become adversaries -- and that this should be taken into account in the QME process. During a roundtable discussion led by the MFA's Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar, the MFA's Center for Policy Research gave intelligence briefs on Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Lebanon to further support the argument that these countries could become future foes. Policy Research Center interlocutors reviewed succession concerns in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Bar argued that a perceived closure in the capability gap between Israel and Arab states, coupled with a nuclear-armed Iran, could compel moderate Arab states to reassess the notion that Israel was a fixture in the region.
7. (S) Typically frank, MOD Political-Military Chief Amos Gilad was not certain how much longer Egyptian President Mubarak would live, and questioned whether his son Gamal was ready to assume command. Gilad said the Egyptian military led by Defense Minister Tantawi continues to train and exercise as if "Israel was its only enemy." He added that there were disturbing signs on the Egyptian streets, as women are dressed more conservatively, and that peace with Israel "is too thin, too superficial." On Saudi Arabia, Gilad said that King Abdullah does not hate Israel, but his chief priority is the survival of the regime.
8. (S) The GOI official response to the arms transfer non-paper includes several objections, such as the potential transfer of systems for the F-15SA to Saudi Arabia, including the Enhanced Paveway II, Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, and AESA radar. Buchris said the GOI is ready to establish a working group to discuss the F-15SA transfer, and proposed an Israeli technical team accompany BG">BG Heymann to Washington (in town for a missile defense meeting) on August 3 to discuss the issue further. Buchris said the sale of the F-15SA was not the problem, but rather the weapons systems included on the planes and the location of the planes in Saudi Arabia.
Lebanon
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9. (S) The GOI remains concerned about U.S. arms transfers to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and has requested the opportunity to discuss further U.S. intentions regarding the LAF. A/S Shapiro said the results of the Lebanese elections represented a turning point, and rejection of Hizballah and its Iranian sponsors. The need to build up Lebanese institutions, including the army, was now more important than ever, he argued. A/S Shapiro said the LAF has thus far demonstrated a solid record of accounting for U.S. systems transferred to Lebanon.
10. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the elections in Lebanon were positive, but countered that Hizballah's influence remains strong. He argued that items such as the Cessna Caravan and the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) lack sufficient mitigation measures, which creates the potential for an incident along the Israel-Lebanese border. Amos Gilad said the GOI does not believe the LAF will attack Israel. However, given the ties between Hizballah and the LAF, he was certain the IDF would eventually face the LAF in any conflict with Hizballah.
11. (S) Analysts from the MFA's Center for Policy Research argued there has been no dramatic change in the political arena despite the March 14 coalition's significant victory in the elections. They said the fragile political situation in Lebanon is currently stable, but Hizballah still possesses an unofficial veto over policy. Long term prospects will be tested by the Hariri Tribunal and Hizballah's desire for a reprisal to the 2008 Mughniyeh assassination....
12. (S) A/S Shapiro asked if the election results might be the result in part of a backlash in the Christian community against Hizballah; the Policy Research analysts countered that the results were indicative of several factors, including the influx of Saudi money and an unstable opposition camp. They agreed that Hizballah leader Nasrallah might be a bit chastened following the elections, as suggested by A/S Shapiro, but that Hizballah continues to try and undermine the March 14 coalition.
13. (S) During the MOD roundtable discussion, BG">BG Heymann also acknowledged the positive results of the elections. However, he feared the outcome did not represent the real power of the Shi'ites in Lebanon. He agreed that moderates and the LAF must be strengthened, but expressed deep concerns about ongoing cooperation between Hizballah and the LAF. He also said that such aid to Lebanon be paired with efforts to halt smuggling and directly weaken Hizballah.
14. (S) BG">BG Heymann also cited concerns regarding mitigation measures for the Caravan and Raven in order to prevent an "accidental engagement" by the IAF. Overall, he was skeptical that these systems would benefit the LAF, and said the GOI would appreciate a more in-depth conversation regarding U.S. intentions and overarching strategy with respect to the LAF. Heymann suggested further talks to coincide with the August 3rd F-15 technical discussion in Washington; MFA DDG Bar echoed this request. A/S Shapiro offered to take that back to Washington for review. If it proved too difficult on short notice to bring together interagency experts to discuss US intentions with the LAF, A/S Shapiro suggested it be included in the Joint Political Military Group talks later in the fall.
[Click here to continue on IRAN & 'Peace Process]
26. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared this cable.
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SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/30/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, EG, CH, IR, SA, LE, IS
SUBJECT: PM A/S SHAPIRO'S JULY 22-23 VISIT TO ISRAEL
River to Sea
Uprooted Palestinian
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