OXAN; Excerpts;
"... the political situation has been paralysed since the outbreak of Syrian protests. There are fears that increasing sectarian tensions will spill over to Lebanon, or that Syria will export its crisis to Lebanon by igniting a regional conflict with Israel.... The likelihood that Syria will drag Lebanon into a war with Israel to ease its domestic crisis is relatively small as long as the regime remains in control: the tactic carries considerable risks, and will remain an absolute last resort. However, should the threat escalate, there is a risk that the regime would rather go down fighting Israel than in the face of popular protests.
In view of the regional and political ties between the two countries, the latest events in Syria inevitably have an effect on political developments in Lebanon. While major political spill-over has so far been avoided, the crisis weighs heavily on the minds of Lebanon's politicians.
'Siniora, McCain & Mdallali ...not very 'quiet'!'
Yet the political class in Lebanon has stayed relatively quiet. Apart from the expected comments of some pro-Syrian politicians and the support to the Syrian opposition by a minor Salafi group in the northern city of Tripoli, the main political players have reached an implicit consensus not to comment on the crisis. However, the uncertainty brought about by the recent events is likely responsible for the inability of Prime Minister-designate Najib Mikati to form a government. Moreover, some politicians appear to be positioning themselves for possible shifts in alliances in case of a serious threat to the Syrian regime. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, for instance, has re-centred his position, calling for a moderate government....
The major repercussion of the recent events has been on a military and security level. In the early days of the uprisings, the borders between Syria and Lebanon were closed and subjected to heavy scrutiny by the Syrian authorities looking for smuggled weapons.... A sectarian deterioration in Syria threatens to disturb the precarious status quo in Tripoli
The Lebanese security services have tightened their grip on Syrians in Lebanon, to avoid the formation of an opposition group there or the use of Lebanon as an opposition launch pad. Tensions between Sunnis and Alawites in Tripoli have increased, although are still under control. Yet a sectarian deterioration in Syria threatens to disturb the precarious status quo between these two groups.
A more serious risk relates to border tensions with Israel. The threat of initiating a regional conflict with Israel has been one of the assets of the Syrian regime. Should Syria choose to do this to divert attention from the crisis at home, southern Lebanon would be the main arena ... The Syrian regime would have to be much closer to collapse before it, and its allies, would be willing to make such choices.
The best-case scenario for Lebanon, in the event of a persistent Syrian crisis, would be an increase in moderation ... The formation of the government might therefore be further delayed ... A survival of a weakened Syrian regime would alter the political dynamics in Lebanon, but the shape of this would depend on the price that the regime would have to pay for its regional and international rehabilitation. In the wake of international condemnation, US sanctions, and damage to regional alliances such as those with Qatar and Turkey, such rehabilitation could well require a change in political interventions in Lebanon. Topics that might be part of a rehabilitation package include the issue of Hizbollah and its weapons, and the return of Hariri to the premiership. (In my view, not in a million years)
Regime collapse in Syria is not likely in the short term, but the longer-term outlook depends on the strength of the probable resurgence of protests in later months or years. Given that the regime has been one of the main, if not the main, powerbroker in Lebanon for four decades, its fall would have a deep impact on the political dynamics in this country. Drastic transformations in political alliances would be expected, with Hizbollah weakened considerably. Whether the loss of a key regional supporter would lead to its radicalisation or moderation could depend significantly on regional and domestic developments and the nature of the regime's fall.
Posted by G, M, Z, or B at 11:44 AM
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