Harirism: Undermining the Lebanese Army

By: Jean Aziz

Published Thursday, September 8, 2011

The army is able to preserve, to a certain extent, pluralism and democracy in
Lebanon, as long as it is not implicated in internal strife. (Photo: AFP - Ali Dia)

Recent verbal attacks by Lebanon’s Future Movement parliamentarian Khaled Daher on the country’s military establishment are not surprising. Lebanon’s assassinated Prime Minister Rafic Hariri was known to travel outside Lebanon each year on the eve of August 1, which is Lebanon’s Army Day. Hariri’s tense relationship with the military leadership went beyond formalities and celebrations: the two were in open conflict. In one instance, Hariri refused to sign a decree for the promotion of army officers. In another Hariri’s ‘treasurer,’ Lebanese Finance Minister Fouad Siniora refused to pay soldiers’ salaries until an army force surrounded him in his ministry. Hariri media outlets and his Future Movement have always sold the idea of a clash between two projects for Lebanon, Hariri’s project of a civil state and the army’s project of a security state.
Some argue that this tense relationship existed during the days of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon, when Syrian intelligence was in charge of the Lebanese-Syrian security apparatus. Antagonism between the two camps could only be expected. However, at the time, at that time, Hariri was staunchly pro-Syrian. He bragged about playing the role of Syria’s de facto “foreign minister” and his attitude towards the Syrian presence in his country was perhaps best symbolized by his honoring Ghazi Kanaan, the head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon. Hariri infamously awarded Kanaan the “Key to Beirut,” an honor never offered to a Syrian military official, except by President Michel Suleiman. Suleiman, while commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces during Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, honored Rustom Ghazali, another head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon. It is safe then to say that the conflict between Hariri and the army were unrelated to the Syrian issue. Each group indeed forwarded different projects, but were there deeper reasons behind their antagonism?
On an individual level, there may be quite a psychological divide between the two. Hariri’s side belongs to the world of finance and business, while the military command has a security mentality. Hariri’s group is profit driven, privately owned, and has employees, while the military leadership strives for victory, serves the public, and commands soldiers. Hariri’s side is publicly outspoken but maneuvers behind the scenes, and the military is circumspect but direct with their actions. Hariri pays secretive agents for services rendered, whereas the military combats clandestine operatives. Hariri’s institutions are inherited by his son, family, or other relatives, while the military belongs to the nation, or so it should be. These differences highlight the divide between the two parties. But there are deeper reasons behind this conflict stemming from Lebanon’s political system and regional politics.

Hariri media outlets and his Future Movement have always sold the idea of a clash between two projects for Lebanon, Hariri’s project of a civil state and the army’s project of a security state.

A holdover from the colonial period, the military institution is by law headed by a Lebanese Maronite. The Hariri camp fears the army’s top commander, whoever it might be, may rival their power and leadership. Even if the army commander is not a potential presidential candidate, his mere presence in a position outside the Hariri camp’s sphere of influence appears to violate the post-Taif Accords constitution and reminisces ‘Greater Lebanon’ and the ‘First Republic.’ The camp wants to bury any references or reminders of that period, even through the purchase of palaces belonding to former Lebanese presidents of that bygone era. The Hariri camp’s school of thought interprets the Taif constitution as meaning that the prime minister is absolute ruler of the country and should be able to bring one of his associates to the military top command.
The Constitution, according to this interpretation, dealt a blow to the position of army commander with its stipulation that top-level public positions would rotate among the different sects instead of designating them for a particular sect. This provision, it is thought, would eventually undermine or tame the position of army chief.
Another source of tension between the two sides is related to the size of the army and its influence on Lebanon’s political life. The military and security institutions enlist nearly 100,000 Lebanese from different regions and sects. Counting the families of these individuals brings the total to almost half a million. By its sheer sized, the Lebanese army prevents one group, party, or movement from controlling the country. The army is able to preserve, to a certain extent, pluralism and democracy in Lebanon, as long as it is not implicated in internal strife. This situation subverts the Hariri camp’s political project seeking to replicate the obsolete system where one community dominates Lebanese politics, as the Maronite once did.
The military establishment and Hariri camp also have dramatically divergent views on regional issues. The army’s political culture, after the Taif Accords and after Lebanon’s wars with Israel, has grown more averse to the idea of co-existence with Israel. Of course, as part of the Lebanese state, the army is committed to the international consensus for a just and comprehensive peace based on international law. However, psychologically and practically speaking, the army is closer to resisting Israel, while the Hariri camp, since the early 1990s and the Oslo Accords, has ascribed to the theory that an imminent peace deal would follow by a prosperous period. It is not coincidental that around the time of the Oslo Accords, two attempts were made to embroil the army in a conflict with Hezbollah, in July 1993 and in September 1993, respectively. Back then, the army opened fire on protesters in Beirut during a Hezbollah demonstration decrying the Accords. The story between the Hariri camp and the army therefore is one of chronic tension between a corporate mentality and those who are not supposed to be incorporated into a united Lebanon.
Jean Aziz is an al-Akhbar Columnist and Lebanese political commentator.
This article is translated from the Arabic Edition.

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