Netanyahu’s move to negotiate with Hamas over a prisoner swap may be clearing the decks for a regional showdown with Iran.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently agreed to a prisoner exchange with Hamas. The deal promises the release of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier captured by Hamas in 2006, in exchange for 1,027 Palestinians now detained in Israel. The timing of the agreement has raised many questions, especially since Netanyahu’s administration has effectively blocked similar deals with the Palestinian faction since his term began two and a half years ago.
While the move is widely expected to boost Netanyahu’s domestic political standing, Israeli analysts have suggested that he may have acted with other motives in mind. In particular, the move signals Israel’s preparations for a long-planned confrontation with Iran.
Shalit’s detention has been a major item on the Israeli political agenda since his capture in 2006 on June 25 by Hamas fighters on the Gaza border. At the time, Israel’s political establishment had experienced a shakeup. Newcomers Ehud Olmert and former trade union boss Amir Peretz received top posts in the government, as prime minister and defense minister, respectively. Both were desperate to prove their credentials: Olmert wanted to project himself as a security hawk, while Peretz wished to show a skeptical Israeli public that he could run a war.
The pair accordingly authorized a military assault on the Gaza Strip, Operation Summer Rain, aimed at recovering the Israeli soldier. Olmert quickly promised Shalit’s return. At the start of the operation, he declared “we will not occupy Gaza and we will not negotiate with murderers.” But Shalit did not materialize out of the intervention.
The drama reached a heightened state after July 12, when Hezbollah captured two more Israeli soldiers on Israel’s northern border. Prime Minister Olmert responded with military engagement in Lebanon, which effectively entangled Israel in wars on two fronts for the three elusive soldiers.
By the time the Second Lebanon War ended in September 2006, Olmert recognized that his political career was headed for a cliff, and that he had no choice but to “negotiate with murderers” if he wanted Shalit back. He backtracked from his earlier position and sent shadowy go-betweens on behind-the-scenes negotiations with Hamas. Germany, which had brokered prisoner exchange deals between Tel Aviv and its enemies in the past helped in the process. They dispatched Gerhard Conrad — the Arabic-speaking head of the Middle East section of Germany’s national intelligence agency — to attend to the situation. Conrad was soon dubbed by the media as “the German mediator.”
Negotiations began in October 2006, with Ofer Dekel – the former deputy head of Shabak, Israel’s internal security agency – negotiating on behalf of Olmert. It was reported that a deal was being discussed under which Shalit would be exchanged for 800 Palestinian detainees being held by Israel. There were further reports that an agreement had been reached in May 2007, but the deal fell apart.
According to Israeli intelligence analyst Yossi Mellman, the current deal is very similar to the one Dekel had negotiated under Olmert. Both provided for the release of around 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in two stages.
After Netanyahu had become prime minister for a second time in March 2009, he replaced Dekel with former Mossad officer Haggai Hadas. Hadas facilitated another prisoner exchange deal, but the negotiations suddenly collapsed. The Israelis accused Hamas of refusing compromise. Israeli newspapers published photos of Palestinian prisoners whose release was considered a ‘red line’ that Israel would not cross. When Hadas quit his post in April 2011, he complained that the government had not given him the political support needed to conclude a deal. In June, Netanyahu named another former Mossad man, David Meidan, as his envoy in the negotiations.
According to military analyst Alex Fishman, six rounds of ‘proximity talks’ were held in recent weeks. Egyptian negotiators shuttled between Meidan in one room and Ahmad al-Jaabari, the head of Hamas’s military wing, in another. On Thursday, the Israeli government decided to summon the necessary “flexibility” to complete the deal.
Netanyahu’s second term has been marred by political paralysis, and he faces a mounting number of problems. Negotiations with the Palestinians are completely deadlocked, and he has been a complete failure on the international stage. He has lost Israel a long-time friend in Turkey, and the Arab Spring has planted uncertainty in the minds of Israeli’s about the future, especially after the storming of Israel’s embassy in Egypt. Israel also continues to have ongoing external conflicts, from tensions along its shared border with Lebanon to its impasse with Iran.
Against this backdrop, the release of Shalit is likely to provide Netanyahu with an unprecedented jolt in the eye of Israeli public opinion. Yet Netanyahu has been able to weather the domestic political crises he faces, and his position as prime minister is not under threat. Hence questions about the timing.
Netanyahu may be acting with his eye on the big picture, in anticipation of imminent developments in the region. Perhaps the public should take notice of Fishman’s lead, when he writes “It’s All About Iran.”
This article is an edited translation form the Arabic Edition.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently agreed to a prisoner exchange with Hamas. The deal promises the release of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier captured by Hamas in 2006, in exchange for 1,027 Palestinians now detained in Israel. The timing of the agreement has raised many questions, especially since Netanyahu’s administration has effectively blocked similar deals with the Palestinian faction since his term began two and a half years ago.
While the move is widely expected to boost Netanyahu’s domestic political standing, Israeli analysts have suggested that he may have acted with other motives in mind. In particular, the move signals Israel’s preparations for a long-planned confrontation with Iran.
Shalit’s detention has been a major item on the Israeli political agenda since his capture in 2006 on June 25 by Hamas fighters on the Gaza border. At the time, Israel’s political establishment had experienced a shakeup. Newcomers Ehud Olmert and former trade union boss Amir Peretz received top posts in the government, as prime minister and defense minister, respectively. Both were desperate to prove their credentials: Olmert wanted to project himself as a security hawk, while Peretz wished to show a skeptical Israeli public that he could run a war.
The pair accordingly authorized a military assault on the Gaza Strip, Operation Summer Rain, aimed at recovering the Israeli soldier. Olmert quickly promised Shalit’s return. At the start of the operation, he declared “we will not occupy Gaza and we will not negotiate with murderers.” But Shalit did not materialize out of the intervention.
The drama reached a heightened state after July 12, when Hezbollah captured two more Israeli soldiers on Israel’s northern border. Prime Minister Olmert responded with military engagement in Lebanon, which effectively entangled Israel in wars on two fronts for the three elusive soldiers.
By the time the Second Lebanon War ended in September 2006, Olmert recognized that his political career was headed for a cliff, and that he had no choice but to “negotiate with murderers” if he wanted Shalit back. He backtracked from his earlier position and sent shadowy go-betweens on behind-the-scenes negotiations with Hamas. Germany, which had brokered prisoner exchange deals between Tel Aviv and its enemies in the past helped in the process. They dispatched Gerhard Conrad — the Arabic-speaking head of the Middle East section of Germany’s national intelligence agency — to attend to the situation. Conrad was soon dubbed by the media as “the German mediator.”
Negotiations began in October 2006, with Ofer Dekel – the former deputy head of Shabak, Israel’s internal security agency – negotiating on behalf of Olmert. It was reported that a deal was being discussed under which Shalit would be exchanged for 800 Palestinian detainees being held by Israel. There were further reports that an agreement had been reached in May 2007, but the deal fell apart.
According to Israeli intelligence analyst Yossi Mellman, the current deal is very similar to the one Dekel had negotiated under Olmert. Both provided for the release of around 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in two stages.
After Netanyahu had become prime minister for a second time in March 2009, he replaced Dekel with former Mossad officer Haggai Hadas. Hadas facilitated another prisoner exchange deal, but the negotiations suddenly collapsed. The Israelis accused Hamas of refusing compromise. Israeli newspapers published photos of Palestinian prisoners whose release was considered a ‘red line’ that Israel would not cross. When Hadas quit his post in April 2011, he complained that the government had not given him the political support needed to conclude a deal. In June, Netanyahu named another former Mossad man, David Meidan, as his envoy in the negotiations.
According to military analyst Alex Fishman, six rounds of ‘proximity talks’ were held in recent weeks. Egyptian negotiators shuttled between Meidan in one room and Ahmad al-Jaabari, the head of Hamas’s military wing, in another. On Thursday, the Israeli government decided to summon the necessary “flexibility” to complete the deal.
Netanyahu’s second term has been marred by political paralysis, and he faces a mounting number of problems. Negotiations with the Palestinians are completely deadlocked, and he has been a complete failure on the international stage. He has lost Israel a long-time friend in Turkey, and the Arab Spring has planted uncertainty in the minds of Israeli’s about the future, especially after the storming of Israel’s embassy in Egypt. Israel also continues to have ongoing external conflicts, from tensions along its shared border with Lebanon to its impasse with Iran.
Against this backdrop, the release of Shalit is likely to provide Netanyahu with an unprecedented jolt in the eye of Israeli public opinion. Yet Netanyahu has been able to weather the domestic political crises he faces, and his position as prime minister is not under threat. Hence questions about the timing.
Netanyahu may be acting with his eye on the big picture, in anticipation of imminent developments in the region. Perhaps the public should take notice of Fishman’s lead, when he writes “It’s All About Iran.”
This article is an edited translation form the Arabic Edition.
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