A supporter of Lebanese former Prime Minister Saad Hariri's Future Movement holds an anti-Syrian regime placards reading: "Our spring is Syria's spring," during a rally to mark Lebanon's Independence Day, in the northern city of Tripoli, Lebanon, Sunday 27 November 2011. (Photo: AP - Hussein Malla)
It is not yet known whether the leaders of the Future Movement really are pleased with how Sunday’s rally in Tripoli went. Due to their extreme openness – purely a by-product of disorganization – we will soon find out.
A few thousand people gathered in the hall of the Rashid Karami International Fairground, and a few hundred outside it. The only speaker actually worth listening to was Mohammed Kabbara, who best expresses what goes on in the minds of the movement’s leaders and grassroots supporters.
Khaled Daher, the chief fixer, seemed preoccupied with wondering how to get back at those who promised to come from Akkar but didn’t. The other speakers – and the smiles, songs, and flags – were of little consequence. None saw fit to come clean, to themselves as much as to the audience, about why they’d been apprehensive about inviting Lebanese Forces leaders to the festival or giving one of them a speakers’ slot.
Whatever the case, the rally did not manage to create new realities as hoped. Since they were cast into the political wilderness, March 14 have been trying to recast every event as a historic turning point, using terms like ‘pre- and post- the Tripoli Rally.
What Samir el-Jisr had to say was thoroughly routine, though he did try to raise his voice to avoid being automatically likened to the prodigal son Mustafa Alloush. Marwan Hamadeh is not the most engaging speaker. One can tell a month in advance what he’ll say in his statements and speeches, and he can express it more clearly in what we read daily on the pages of an-Nahar and L’Orient-Le Jour.
As for Boutrous Harb, it was enough for ‘comrade’ Georges Bkassini to introduce him to know where this USA-friendly deputy stands. That left the keynote speech which former premier Fouad Siniora sought to deliver on behalf of former premier Saad Hariri. They would have done better to replace it with Hariri’s Tweets: they are clearer and more effective.
The Future Movement, specifically, is being required to work at night – especially in Akkar and the Northern Beqaa, where support bases are being prepared for the gunmen of the Free Syrian Army who commit sectarian massacres against Syrian civilians and conduct military operations against official targets and the army and security forces.
Whatever the case, the rally did not manage to create new realities as hoped. Since they were cast into the political wilderness, March 14 have been trying to recast every event as a historic turning point, using terms like ‘pre- and post- the Tripoli Rally.’
But the coalition knows that its work schedule has not been drawn up with festivities of this kind in mind. The Future Movement, specifically, is being required to work at night – especially in Akkar and the Northern Beqaa, where support bases are being prepared for the gunmen of the Free Syrian Army who commit sectarian massacres against Syrian civilians and conduct military operations against official targets and the army and security forces. The other March 14 groups are not required to do anything but incite.
They had expected to be able to use Sunday’s rally to put pressure on Prime Minister Najib Mikati. But the latter did not simply deny them a pretext, as his supporters would have it. He obliged them before they even asked him to take up the fight for STL funding. Mikati, who has decided to quit his alliance with Syria and March 8 as fast as possible, knows that he will not be moving to the other side. There would only be room for him on the backbenches there. He will have to seek some political role in which he can apply his new theory: abstinence from burning issues – local, Arab, and international.
Mikati, who has decided to quit his alliance with Syria and March 8 as fast as possible, knows that he will not be moving to the other side. There would only be room for him on the backbenches there.
Tomorrow being another day, the Hariri family’s media along with some of the House of Saud’s outlets are busy running news, reports, and analyses about Sunday’s rally. But they will soon fall back to earth when they look at Tripoli itself, and see it move further away from their speeches, policies, and plans. Their only means of countering this trend, whatever its scale, is to malign Hezbollah and accuse it of turning the city into security enclaves and the like.
Kabbara scaled new heights in this regard when he charged that the murderer of the young girl Myriam al-Ashkar on the beach at Alma was an intelligence officer sent by Hezbollah and Syria to spy on the Maronite Church!
The conclusion that can be drawn from Sunday’s Tripoli speeches is one that has been apparent since Hariri’s government fell. March 14 can find no place for itself in domestic or regional politics until the situation in Syria becomes clearer.
By siding fully with the Turkish-Gulf-Western axis actively seeking to topple President Bashar Assad, it has clearly shown that it sees no way of regaining power – or even shoring up the loyalty of it supporters – unless there is a major transformation on the regional level. That is what Hariri explained to his visitors in Paris recently, who quoted him as saying he was convinced that the Assad regime would soon fall, and its allies in Lebanon would then come apart.
This means, quite simply, that we should expect more political, propaganda, and paramilitary activity on the Syrian front by the main groups in March 14, using all available means.
This means, quite simply, that we should expect more political, propaganda, and paramilitary activity on the Syrian front by the main groups in March 14, using all available means. If these things were done discreetly in the past, the group now intends to elevate them to the status of a patriotic duty or even a religious obligation.
That calls for a campaign against the Lebanese state and its institutions, especially the army, to prevent them from taking actions that hamper the gunmen. This outfit will also produce more fabrications about Hezbollah’s operational role in Syria, so as to say that March 14’s support for the opposition is no different (though the US, France, and Saudi Arabia have informed them there is no evidence of any Hezbollah fighters in Syria).
March 14 is not interested in engaging in the other element of the debate – what happens to the state after the Mikati government resigns. A protracted period of caretaker government would entail difficulties and complications for the country. The same applies if March 8 gets an opportunity to form a new government, which is by no means assured.
All the signs point to tense political times ahead. One can only hope they are not accompanied by security incidents or communal clashes. It is evident that the risk of tensions rising is greatest in areas that March 14 deems to be it strongholds, especially if the political split reaches a stage where words, discussion, and dialogue are deemed useless.
Everyone is now in the position of waiting for the next step. And as usual, it will be taken beyond our borders. Eastward, turn!
Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of al-Akhbar.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
A few thousand people gathered in the hall of the Rashid Karami International Fairground, and a few hundred outside it. The only speaker actually worth listening to was Mohammed Kabbara, who best expresses what goes on in the minds of the movement’s leaders and grassroots supporters.
Khaled Daher, the chief fixer, seemed preoccupied with wondering how to get back at those who promised to come from Akkar but didn’t. The other speakers – and the smiles, songs, and flags – were of little consequence. None saw fit to come clean, to themselves as much as to the audience, about why they’d been apprehensive about inviting Lebanese Forces leaders to the festival or giving one of them a speakers’ slot.
Whatever the case, the rally did not manage to create new realities as hoped. Since they were cast into the political wilderness, March 14 have been trying to recast every event as a historic turning point, using terms like ‘pre- and post- the Tripoli Rally.
What Samir el-Jisr had to say was thoroughly routine, though he did try to raise his voice to avoid being automatically likened to the prodigal son Mustafa Alloush. Marwan Hamadeh is not the most engaging speaker. One can tell a month in advance what he’ll say in his statements and speeches, and he can express it more clearly in what we read daily on the pages of an-Nahar and L’Orient-Le Jour.
As for Boutrous Harb, it was enough for ‘comrade’ Georges Bkassini to introduce him to know where this USA-friendly deputy stands. That left the keynote speech which former premier Fouad Siniora sought to deliver on behalf of former premier Saad Hariri. They would have done better to replace it with Hariri’s Tweets: they are clearer and more effective.
The Future Movement, specifically, is being required to work at night – especially in Akkar and the Northern Beqaa, where support bases are being prepared for the gunmen of the Free Syrian Army who commit sectarian massacres against Syrian civilians and conduct military operations against official targets and the army and security forces.
Whatever the case, the rally did not manage to create new realities as hoped. Since they were cast into the political wilderness, March 14 have been trying to recast every event as a historic turning point, using terms like ‘pre- and post- the Tripoli Rally.’
But the coalition knows that its work schedule has not been drawn up with festivities of this kind in mind. The Future Movement, specifically, is being required to work at night – especially in Akkar and the Northern Beqaa, where support bases are being prepared for the gunmen of the Free Syrian Army who commit sectarian massacres against Syrian civilians and conduct military operations against official targets and the army and security forces. The other March 14 groups are not required to do anything but incite.
They had expected to be able to use Sunday’s rally to put pressure on Prime Minister Najib Mikati. But the latter did not simply deny them a pretext, as his supporters would have it. He obliged them before they even asked him to take up the fight for STL funding. Mikati, who has decided to quit his alliance with Syria and March 8 as fast as possible, knows that he will not be moving to the other side. There would only be room for him on the backbenches there. He will have to seek some political role in which he can apply his new theory: abstinence from burning issues – local, Arab, and international.
Mikati, who has decided to quit his alliance with Syria and March 8 as fast as possible, knows that he will not be moving to the other side. There would only be room for him on the backbenches there.
Tomorrow being another day, the Hariri family’s media along with some of the House of Saud’s outlets are busy running news, reports, and analyses about Sunday’s rally. But they will soon fall back to earth when they look at Tripoli itself, and see it move further away from their speeches, policies, and plans. Their only means of countering this trend, whatever its scale, is to malign Hezbollah and accuse it of turning the city into security enclaves and the like.
Kabbara scaled new heights in this regard when he charged that the murderer of the young girl Myriam al-Ashkar on the beach at Alma was an intelligence officer sent by Hezbollah and Syria to spy on the Maronite Church!
The conclusion that can be drawn from Sunday’s Tripoli speeches is one that has been apparent since Hariri’s government fell. March 14 can find no place for itself in domestic or regional politics until the situation in Syria becomes clearer.
By siding fully with the Turkish-Gulf-Western axis actively seeking to topple President Bashar Assad, it has clearly shown that it sees no way of regaining power – or even shoring up the loyalty of it supporters – unless there is a major transformation on the regional level. That is what Hariri explained to his visitors in Paris recently, who quoted him as saying he was convinced that the Assad regime would soon fall, and its allies in Lebanon would then come apart.
This means, quite simply, that we should expect more political, propaganda, and paramilitary activity on the Syrian front by the main groups in March 14, using all available means.
This means, quite simply, that we should expect more political, propaganda, and paramilitary activity on the Syrian front by the main groups in March 14, using all available means. If these things were done discreetly in the past, the group now intends to elevate them to the status of a patriotic duty or even a religious obligation.
That calls for a campaign against the Lebanese state and its institutions, especially the army, to prevent them from taking actions that hamper the gunmen. This outfit will also produce more fabrications about Hezbollah’s operational role in Syria, so as to say that March 14’s support for the opposition is no different (though the US, France, and Saudi Arabia have informed them there is no evidence of any Hezbollah fighters in Syria).
March 14 is not interested in engaging in the other element of the debate – what happens to the state after the Mikati government resigns. A protracted period of caretaker government would entail difficulties and complications for the country. The same applies if March 8 gets an opportunity to form a new government, which is by no means assured.
All the signs point to tense political times ahead. One can only hope they are not accompanied by security incidents or communal clashes. It is evident that the risk of tensions rising is greatest in areas that March 14 deems to be it strongholds, especially if the political split reaches a stage where words, discussion, and dialogue are deemed useless.
Everyone is now in the position of waiting for the next step. And as usual, it will be taken beyond our borders. Eastward, turn!
Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of al-Akhbar.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
Uprooted Palestinian
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