'Understanding Hizbullah’s Support for the Asad Regime'

Via FLC

"... The movement’s ability to dismiss the more problematic features of Syria’s past is facilitated by the Asad leadership’s refusal to reach a settlement with Israel in contrast to its capitulatory Arab brethren. For many Arab progressives though, this negotiating stand alone does not qualify the regime for “confrontational” status given that Syria remains “Israel’s quietest front”. 11 Hizbullah rejects this line of reasoning as intellectual absolutism. In the first place, it does not evaluate Syria’s actions according to the same benchmark used for non-state (resistance) actors. Nasrallah admitted as much in a 2009 Al-Quds Day speech when he distinguished between Syria “as a regime” and resistance movements who do not have the same “economic, social and political responsibilities and international affairs’ [obligations].” 12

Second, Hizbullah does not adopt a similar all-or-nothing logic as Asad’s progressive critics do. In the above-mentioned speech, Nasrallah responded to this same group of “people who always talk about opening fronts” by lauding Syria’s rejectionism: “It is true it [Syria] did not fight and close a front but still, it did not surrender.” For the past 30 or 40 years, Syria did not “concede one grain of soil or one drop of its waters,” and even obstructed an imminent deal at the Geneva Summit “over a couple of cubic meters of water”. 13

Moreover, although the Asad leadership was not engaged in armed resistance to

liberate the Golan, “it is enough that Syria stood beside the resistance in Lebanon, and the resistance in Palestine and the resistance in Iraq.” 14... ...

... Echoing Hizbullah’s stance on the Iran protests is Nasrallah’s characterization of the US’ role in the Syrian uprising as an extension of the July War and the Gaza War. Since the resistance in Lebanon and Palestine had foiled the “New Middle East” scheme in both these military aggressions, Washington was “trying to reintroduce [it] through other gates,” such as Syria. 20 With this in mind, attempts to overthrow the Asad regime are considered a “service” to American and Israeli interests. 21 While Hizbullah has not directly accused the Syrian opposition of serving or collaborating with the US and Israel, Nasrallah recently chastised it for pandering to Washington’s political sensitivities by omitting the Palestinian cause from its discourse. 22 The anti-Hizbullah slogans raised by some elements of the opposition, as well as their accusations concerning the movement’s alleged involvement in government repression, have done little to assuage its fears. These fears have been lent further credence by Israel’s public pronouncements on the uprising.... ....

A point often overlooked, is Hizbullah’s own experience of repression at the hands of the Syrian regime. One such instance was the ‘Fathallah Massacre’ of 1987 when Syrian forces gunned down twenty-three Hizbullah fighters in cold blood, in Beirut. Again in 1993, the Lebanese army, acting at the behest of Syria, killed several Hizbullah supporters protesting the Oslo Accord in September 1993, otherwise known as the ‘September Massacre’. In both these incidents, the movement merely licked its wounds so as to avoid obstructing its resistance activity. The resistance priority clearly took precedence over confronting Syria’s forces in Lebanon. If Hizbullah itself was willing to overlook the Syrian regime’s violence against it, for the sake of a higher cause, it stands to reason that it would expect the same of the Syrian protesters. According to Hizbullah’s strategic logic, exerting one’s efforts on the removal of an oppressive regime deflects attention from the priority of resisting Israel and confronting US military and political imperialism. 10

In 1997, in the midst of the Algerian civil war and a series of violent incidents executed by Egyptian Islamists, Nasrallah launched an initiative aimed at reconciling opposition Islamist groups with their autocratic regimes. In Egypt, militant Islamists were exhorted to refrain from taking up arms against the state and to opt for dialogue with the Mubarak regime instead. Part of Hizbullah’s rationale for this policy was its aversion to chaos which it considers “more oppressive” than the oppressive regimes ... ....

... As a political party which has always subordinated its political role to its military one, Hizbullah has never pursued the political rights that it is entitled to, such as greater political representation in Lebanon. Both in 1992 and 1996, the party allowed itself to be pressured by Syria into an electoral alliance with AMAL, although it could have won more seats on its own. As with the killing of its fighters and supporters, Hizbullah once again adhered to the “saqf al suri” (Syrian ceiling) in order to protect its resistance. Similarly, even when it has pursued political power, it has only been to shield its resistance from external pressures - as in 2005 following the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon - and in 2011 when it ousted the Saad Hariri government over the issue of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Even then, Hizbullah has always contented itself with minimal government representation. Nor has the movement pursued communal rights for its Shi’ite constituency, such as a larger share of political power commensurate with the community’s size.

Indeed, Hizbullah sacrifices its political rights in order to safeguard its resistance, but it is also willing to deprive others of their perceived right to terminate it. As illustrated by the events of May 2008, Hizbullah did not hesitate to turn its arms against its domestic rivals who sought to paralyze its resistance activity. It has been similarly intransigent in less provocative setting such as the National Dialogue talks. While Hizbullah is willing to dialogue with its foes over its arms, its conditions are effectively nonnegotiable insofar as it rejects the notion of disarmament outright as well as rejecting any proposals to place the resistance under the command of the Lebanese army. Nasrallah admits as much when he describes the movement’s resistance as “a controversial national issue” which never was “an object of national consensus.” 37 Popular legitimacy is undoubtedly desirable for Hizbullah but by no means necessary. In this connection, resistance is not a right because it was launched by the people; rather, it is a right because it is a freedom-seeking action. More than this, it is a duty: “The resistance does not wait for national or popular consensus, but must take to arms and press ahead with the duty of liberation.” 38... .... To be free is not to be left alone, but to continually struggle for justice. It is for this reason that Hizbullah is inherently antagonistic to liberal uprisings like Syria’s which focus their efforts on freeing themselves from state control at the expense of the struggle against US and Israeli colonialism"

River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian