Iraqis inspect the damage after a wave of attacks in Baghdad killed at least 57 people on 22 December 2011. (Photo: AFP - Khalil al-Murshidi)
Power rivalries, deception, and political improvisation by several of Iraq’s top leaders were behind the levelling of terrorism charges against Vice President Tariq Hashimi
Baghdad- Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, was in his stronghold of Suleimaniya when the story of Hashimi’s arrest broke. He summoned Hashimi and his other vice president, Khudeir al-Khuzai, to confer with him there.
Talabani made two significant points in his initial reaction. First, he stressed the gravity of the crimes to which Hashimi’s bodyguards had confessed. Secondly, he faulted Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s aides for making the confessions public via the official media. Talabani revealed that this ran counter to an agreement he had reached with the parties concerned, and deemed it an affront to his authority as president.
Hashimi, for his part, blundered badly by calling a press conference on that same highly–charged day. It was a fiasco. Obviously distraught and angry, he failed to present an effective and coherent case, even when he had strong points to make regarding the government’s interference with the judiciary and its corruption scandals.
Hashimi did himself no favors by demanding the transfer of the investigation and trial to the northern Kurdish region. He knew that would be politically inconceivable, as it would give the provincial authorities jurisdiction over the federal centre. Equally counter-productive was his charge that he had been indicted because of his refusal to do “certain things” that “certain foreign parties” had requested of him. To many observers, that merely left his credibility hanging on whether he would reveal what and who these “things” and “parties” were, or provide supporting evidence.
Iyad Allawi’s intervention in the crisis was seen by many commentators as excessive and unrelated to the issue at hand. The Iraqiya Bloc leader demanded that the ruling National Alliance coalition remove Maliki from the premiership and replace him with another of its members – as though it were all a personal squabble between the two men.
Allawi did not go as far as Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq in branding Maliki “the worst dictator in Iraq’s history”. But he lambasted his authoritarian ways.
Perplexed observers wonder why just a few days earlier, the Iraqiya leader had been publicly proposing a “genuine reconciliation” to Maliki. The latter paid no heed to that call, and reportedly sent word to Allawi via a junior aide that if he were serious about seeking reconciliation, he would not do so via the media but by submitting a written communication to the parties concerned. One analyst believes that Allawi’s demand for Maliki’s removal was his way of retaliating for that perceived insult, while also trying to burnish his own much-tarnished public image.
The handling of the crisis on the government side by Maliki and his advisors has been equally incoherent, ill-tempered, and short-sighted.
Initially, they reached agreement with the Supreme Judicial Council and Talabani that the confessions made by Hashimi’s bodyguards would not be broadcast for the time being. But they then proceeded to release them on the Internet and on state TV.
Moreover, Maliki and his team have treated the allegations against Hashimi as incontrovertible and proven fact, in complete contempt of the judiciary and legal process.
Maliki’s response to Mutlaq’s remarks meanwhile served to heighten the sense of crisis. He first said he would ask parliament to withdraw confidence in Mutlaq as deputy premier. It then transpired, according to the government’s legal advisor Muhammad Fadhel Jawad, that Maliki had submitted no such request. Rather, he sacked Mutlaq himself in accordance with Article 78 of the Constitution, and sent a note to parliament informing it of the matter.
Another aspect of the Hashimi affair concerns the role of the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. In accordance with the “who benefits?” theory, some Iraqis wonder why such serious crimes – some dating from the sectarian violence of 2006-2007 – have been brought to light now, just days after the US occupiers packed their bags and left.
The real mystery here, Iraqi and foreign analysts concur, is not whether the confessions of Hashimi’s bodyguards were genuine or fabricated. The legal process should be able to determine that. The mystery is who uncovered all this, and why did they choose to do so at this particular moment?
Some Iraqis wonder about the role of the Kurdish leadership in fuelling sectarian tensions. In the aftermath of the withdrawal of their US allies, the thinking goes, the Kurdish leadership can only hope to retain its political clout in Iraq if the country’s Arabs are weakened by sectarian infighting.
In this regard, it is noted that the Kurdistan Front wields enormous influence over the federal army and security forces – including via the army chief of staff, General Babaker Zibari, and the undersecretary of the interior ministry, General Hussein Kamal. The latter has close ties to US intelligence, and was previously linked by opposition groups to death squads.
The reaction of Talabani and his aides to the Hashimi affair has further fuelled such suspicions. Some Iraqi politicians charge that Talabani’s handling of the crisis so far, and his remaining in Suleimaniya, have done nothing to defuse it – and only raised more questions.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic edition.
Turkish FM: Doors Open to Hashemi though He Should Stay in Iraq
Baghdad- Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, was in his stronghold of Suleimaniya when the story of Hashimi’s arrest broke. He summoned Hashimi and his other vice president, Khudeir al-Khuzai, to confer with him there.
Talabani made two significant points in his initial reaction. First, he stressed the gravity of the crimes to which Hashimi’s bodyguards had confessed. Secondly, he faulted Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s aides for making the confessions public via the official media. Talabani revealed that this ran counter to an agreement he had reached with the parties concerned, and deemed it an affront to his authority as president.
Hashimi, for his part, blundered badly by calling a press conference on that same highly–charged day. It was a fiasco. Obviously distraught and angry, he failed to present an effective and coherent case, even when he had strong points to make regarding the government’s interference with the judiciary and its corruption scandals.
Hashimi did himself no favors by demanding the transfer of the investigation and trial to the northern Kurdish region. He knew that would be politically inconceivable, as it would give the provincial authorities jurisdiction over the federal centre. Equally counter-productive was his charge that he had been indicted because of his refusal to do “certain things” that “certain foreign parties” had requested of him. To many observers, that merely left his credibility hanging on whether he would reveal what and who these “things” and “parties” were, or provide supporting evidence.
Iyad Allawi’s intervention in the crisis was seen by many commentators as excessive and unrelated to the issue at hand. The Iraqiya Bloc leader demanded that the ruling National Alliance coalition remove Maliki from the premiership and replace him with another of its members – as though it were all a personal squabble between the two men.
Allawi did not go as far as Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq in branding Maliki “the worst dictator in Iraq’s history”. But he lambasted his authoritarian ways.
Perplexed observers wonder why just a few days earlier, the Iraqiya leader had been publicly proposing a “genuine reconciliation” to Maliki. The latter paid no heed to that call, and reportedly sent word to Allawi via a junior aide that if he were serious about seeking reconciliation, he would not do so via the media but by submitting a written communication to the parties concerned. One analyst believes that Allawi’s demand for Maliki’s removal was his way of retaliating for that perceived insult, while also trying to burnish his own much-tarnished public image.
The handling of the crisis on the government side by Maliki and his advisors has been equally incoherent, ill-tempered, and short-sighted.
Initially, they reached agreement with the Supreme Judicial Council and Talabani that the confessions made by Hashimi’s bodyguards would not be broadcast for the time being. But they then proceeded to release them on the Internet and on state TV.
Moreover, Maliki and his team have treated the allegations against Hashimi as incontrovertible and proven fact, in complete contempt of the judiciary and legal process.
Maliki’s response to Mutlaq’s remarks meanwhile served to heighten the sense of crisis. He first said he would ask parliament to withdraw confidence in Mutlaq as deputy premier. It then transpired, according to the government’s legal advisor Muhammad Fadhel Jawad, that Maliki had submitted no such request. Rather, he sacked Mutlaq himself in accordance with Article 78 of the Constitution, and sent a note to parliament informing it of the matter.
Another aspect of the Hashimi affair concerns the role of the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. In accordance with the “who benefits?” theory, some Iraqis wonder why such serious crimes – some dating from the sectarian violence of 2006-2007 – have been brought to light now, just days after the US occupiers packed their bags and left.
The real mystery here, Iraqi and foreign analysts concur, is not whether the confessions of Hashimi’s bodyguards were genuine or fabricated. The legal process should be able to determine that. The mystery is who uncovered all this, and why did they choose to do so at this particular moment?
Some Iraqis wonder about the role of the Kurdish leadership in fuelling sectarian tensions. In the aftermath of the withdrawal of their US allies, the thinking goes, the Kurdish leadership can only hope to retain its political clout in Iraq if the country’s Arabs are weakened by sectarian infighting.
In this regard, it is noted that the Kurdistan Front wields enormous influence over the federal army and security forces – including via the army chief of staff, General Babaker Zibari, and the undersecretary of the interior ministry, General Hussein Kamal. The latter has close ties to US intelligence, and was previously linked by opposition groups to death squads.
The reaction of Talabani and his aides to the Hashimi affair has further fuelled such suspicions. Some Iraqi politicians charge that Talabani’s handling of the crisis so far, and his remaining in Suleimaniya, have done nothing to defuse it – and only raised more questions.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic edition.
Turkish FM: Doors Open to Hashemi though He Should Stay in Iraq
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