The crisis is sure to be protracted. It is delusional to speak of calm being restored to Syria in the foreseeable future.
In the meantime, as the country continues to haemorrhage and the status quo persists in the absence of any substantive political changes, Syrians are being faced with a fresh set of questions, in addition to those posed during the long months since the crisis began. The latter concerned freedom, democracy, change, toppling the regime, the foreign war of intervention, and related matters. These are now increasingly to be joined by daily concerns related to communal coexistence, and the severity of the political schism, sectarian divisions, the economic crisis, and living conditions.
The outside world, near and far, will in turn increasingly find itself having to live with the new realities in Syria – irrespective of all the assessments made by Western embassies and intelligence agencies, so widely quoted in media and political circles, that the regime’s end is nigh (while taking care to avoid giving any time-frames).
It is only to be expected for Syria’s foreign detractors to do what they can to advance their plans to topple the regime and install in power a political group beholden to them.
But the debate within the Syrian opposition itself has now turned into one about how to best support those Western plans – rather than how to formulate an independent program that would attract international support. We are referring here to the offshore opposition, as the internal opposition seems incapable of pronouncing a unified position that would carry the support of the street. The offshore opposition quickly exhausted whatever policies, slogans and ideas it set out with, and has begun to operate in accordance with the foreign agenda.
Thus, when the Arab states opted to convene an emergency Arab League meeting to up the pressure on the regime, the offshore oppositionists performed on cue: raising the rhetoric about the exceptional circumstances warranting intervention in Syria, and producing huge casualty figures attributed solely to the regime. (The daily funerals of members of the army and security forces are somehow ignored; or else they are counted as demonstrators killed by the regime’s forces).
But are decision-makers in Syria changing their way of thinking? By way of a caveat, nobody can tell for sure how their handling of developments will progress. Yet ideas are being discussed which could be said to reflect a change in the Syrian leadership’s approach to the crisis. It is being stressed that this should not be seen as the taking of dramatic steps in response to pressure. On the contrary, considerable calm is being maintained, yet with heightened apprehension about the forthcoming period, and with a number of considerations in mind. These include:
- The Syrian leadership knows that the domestic crisis is real. President Bashar Assad met a great many Syrians at the series of gatherings he held, and a large proportion of them harbored fundamental grievances. He reached the firm conclusion that what the Syrian people want – and want badly – is political pluralism. Pluralism that would enable the exercise of more freedoms and the rotation of power, rid state institutions of one-party control, regulate the security establishment and halt its massive intrusion into people’s lives, and thereby overcome the pervasive wave of corruption.
- The Syrian leadership knows that this obliges it to cancel Article VIII of the Constitution, and seek to bring others from outside the Baath Party into government. Those considering the matter propose striving to form a Government of National Unity. This would comprise both supporters and opponents of the current regime, as well as independents who neither see themselves as regime insiders nor are involved in any opposition groups. Such a government would have sweeping powers that would enable it to institute real administrative and economic reforms, and genuinely keep the security agencies out of people’s daily lives.
- The Syrian leadership believes that the oppositionists gathered under the banner of the offshore Syrian National Council (SNC) cannot, in their current condition, become real partners. The regime has therefore apparently resumed discreet contacts with home-based opposition figures. According to some officials, however, the latter remain highly wary, fearing they could lose public support. The regime is also open to efforts being made by some external parties to mediate with certain groups and figures within the SNC.
- The Syrian leadership is in no doubt that it is facing a concerted onslaught by an alliance that includes a number of Arab and Western states alongside Turkey. It is energetically seeking to counter this by cementing its relations with Russia, China, Iran and other countries such as Iraq, without closing the door to other players. It is particularly interested, in this regard, in ongoing mediation efforts with Saudi Arabia.
It will take a while for the picture to become clear. Pending that, attention inside Syria will increasingly focus on the effects of the economic and financial embargo, and its impact on the people as well as the government. The talk of sectarian and military flashpoints, meanwhile, suggests that moves should be anticipated from the Syrian leadership in its confrontation with its armed opponents.
Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of al-Akhbar.
In the meantime, as the country continues to haemorrhage and the status quo persists in the absence of any substantive political changes, Syrians are being faced with a fresh set of questions, in addition to those posed during the long months since the crisis began. The latter concerned freedom, democracy, change, toppling the regime, the foreign war of intervention, and related matters. These are now increasingly to be joined by daily concerns related to communal coexistence, and the severity of the political schism, sectarian divisions, the economic crisis, and living conditions.
The outside world, near and far, will in turn increasingly find itself having to live with the new realities in Syria – irrespective of all the assessments made by Western embassies and intelligence agencies, so widely quoted in media and political circles, that the regime’s end is nigh (while taking care to avoid giving any time-frames).
It is only to be expected for Syria’s foreign detractors to do what they can to advance their plans to topple the regime and install in power a political group beholden to them.
But the debate within the Syrian opposition itself has now turned into one about how to best support those Western plans – rather than how to formulate an independent program that would attract international support. We are referring here to the offshore opposition, as the internal opposition seems incapable of pronouncing a unified position that would carry the support of the street. The offshore opposition quickly exhausted whatever policies, slogans and ideas it set out with, and has begun to operate in accordance with the foreign agenda.
Thus, when the Arab states opted to convene an emergency Arab League meeting to up the pressure on the regime, the offshore oppositionists performed on cue: raising the rhetoric about the exceptional circumstances warranting intervention in Syria, and producing huge casualty figures attributed solely to the regime. (The daily funerals of members of the army and security forces are somehow ignored; or else they are counted as demonstrators killed by the regime’s forces).
But are decision-makers in Syria changing their way of thinking? By way of a caveat, nobody can tell for sure how their handling of developments will progress. Yet ideas are being discussed which could be said to reflect a change in the Syrian leadership’s approach to the crisis. It is being stressed that this should not be seen as the taking of dramatic steps in response to pressure. On the contrary, considerable calm is being maintained, yet with heightened apprehension about the forthcoming period, and with a number of considerations in mind. These include:
- The Syrian leadership knows that the domestic crisis is real. President Bashar Assad met a great many Syrians at the series of gatherings he held, and a large proportion of them harbored fundamental grievances. He reached the firm conclusion that what the Syrian people want – and want badly – is political pluralism. Pluralism that would enable the exercise of more freedoms and the rotation of power, rid state institutions of one-party control, regulate the security establishment and halt its massive intrusion into people’s lives, and thereby overcome the pervasive wave of corruption.
- The Syrian leadership knows that this obliges it to cancel Article VIII of the Constitution, and seek to bring others from outside the Baath Party into government. Those considering the matter propose striving to form a Government of National Unity. This would comprise both supporters and opponents of the current regime, as well as independents who neither see themselves as regime insiders nor are involved in any opposition groups. Such a government would have sweeping powers that would enable it to institute real administrative and economic reforms, and genuinely keep the security agencies out of people’s daily lives.
- The Syrian leadership believes that the oppositionists gathered under the banner of the offshore Syrian National Council (SNC) cannot, in their current condition, become real partners. The regime has therefore apparently resumed discreet contacts with home-based opposition figures. According to some officials, however, the latter remain highly wary, fearing they could lose public support. The regime is also open to efforts being made by some external parties to mediate with certain groups and figures within the SNC.
- The Syrian leadership is in no doubt that it is facing a concerted onslaught by an alliance that includes a number of Arab and Western states alongside Turkey. It is energetically seeking to counter this by cementing its relations with Russia, China, Iran and other countries such as Iraq, without closing the door to other players. It is particularly interested, in this regard, in ongoing mediation efforts with Saudi Arabia.
It will take a while for the picture to become clear. Pending that, attention inside Syria will increasingly focus on the effects of the economic and financial embargo, and its impact on the people as well as the government. The talk of sectarian and military flashpoints, meanwhile, suggests that moves should be anticipated from the Syrian leadership in its confrontation with its armed opponents.
Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of al-Akhbar.
The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of this Blog!
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