Published Thursday, November 15, 2012
Israel has dealt a harsh blow to the resistance in Palestine. Its
assassination of the prominent Hamas military commander Ahmad al-Jaabari was a
vengeful move, which will affect Hamas in several ways.
The immediate impact is on the running of the movement’s military apparatus.
In the short term, it is on the command of that apparatus, given that its top
commander, Mohammad al-Daif, was heavily reliant on his aide Jaabari. The long
term impact relates to Jaabari’s official position in the Hamas leadership, the
choice of his successor, and the considerations and outlook which govern that
choice.
Regardless of how the Palestinian resistance responds on the ground, or
whether Israel’s claim to have destroyed its strategic missile infrastructure in
the Gaza Strip is true, the answers needed today are less about Palestine than
Egypt.
No amount of evasion can prevent a succession of questions from being asked
about the real strategy of the worldwide organization of the Muslim Brotherhood
(MB), and of its Egyptian and Palestinian branches, which control the Egyptian
state and the Gaza Strip respectively.
Israel’s government – as well as its security and military establishments –
has ample reason for wanting to unleash all kinds of aggression on Gaza. But
Israel’s audacity in deciding to go after such a heavyweight target as Jaabari
remains puzzling.
On the ground, Israel was relying on its intelligence and operational prowess
to counter the Palestinian resistance’s improved capabilities. Its announcement
that it destroyed some 20 key missile sites presents a challenge in this regard,
after Israel tried the same thing in Lebanon in 2006, but fell into a trap that
made its “operation” to establish decisive deterrence come to nothing, even
after the “operation” turned into “war.”
The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of this Blog!
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