Uprooted Palestinians are at the heart of the conflict in the M.E Palestinians uprooted by force of arms. Yet faced immense difficulties have survived, kept alive their history and culture, passed keys of family homes in occupied Palestine from one generation to the next.
– ليس جديداً على لبنان واللبنانيين حجم الاهتمام الدولي والإقليمي بما يجري في بلدهم، وهو الواقع على الحدود مع سورية الدولة الإقليمية الأهم في الجغرافيا السياسية للمنطقة من جهة، وعلى حدود فلسطين التي أقيم فيها الكيان الاستيطاني الأشدّ أهمية في حسابات الغرب لمفهوم المصالح الاستراتيجية وحمايتها. ولا بجديد على اللبنانيين اكتشاف توزّعهم الدائم بين معسكرات دولية وإقليمية تحاول كل منها فرض رؤيتها للمنطقة وتوازناتها وتبادل الأحلاف اللبنانية الداخلية مع الأحلاف الخارجية بعضاً من المكاسب والخسائر. وقد اعتاد اللبنانيون على رؤية هذا المشهد وتصالحوا معه واعتباره غير مخالف لمفهوم السيادة، وحصروا في مصطلحات السياسة الرائجة منذ تشكّل الكيان السياسي اللبناني بعد الاستقلال، تسجيل المواقف والإدانات بتحوّل هذا النوع من التموضع والتحالفات والتأثر والتأثير إلى صيغة مباشرة لإدارة خارجية للشؤون الداخلية اللبنانية.
– لا يُنكِر حلفاء سورية في لبنان أنّه في فترة ما بعد الطائف وبتغطية دولية وإقليمية مثّلها الرضا الأميركي والسعودي تمّ تكليف سورية بإدارة ملف إعادة تكوين السلطة في لبنان. ولا ينكرون أيضاً، كما لا تنكر القيادة السورية نفسها، أن هذه الإدارة قد ضاعت فيها الحدود بين إعادة بناء مؤسسات الدولة بسماعدة سورية، وهو أمر لا يجب التنكر لمساهمة سورية حقيقية فيه خصوصاً في المؤسسات العسكرية والسياسية، وبين توظيف الدور السوري في حسابات الزواريب اللبنانية الطائفية والحزبية والشخصية أحياناً، وصولاً لتدخلات لا علاقة لها بضبط الأداء السياسي أو السقوف الإقليمية المتفق عليها للمعادلة اللبنانية. وتداخل هذا الدور أحياناً مع شبكة مصالح تقوم على صرف النفوذ، الذي لا يمكن تسميته بغير الفساد، وصولاً لما يمكن وصفه بتلازم الفسادين اللبناني والسوري، وتنكّر بزيّ لا يشبهه هو تلازم المسارين المتصل بالصراع مع «إسرائيل»، والذي جسّدته القوى الملتزمة بالمقاومة، وقد كانت الأبعد عن مكاسب السلطة المحميّة بقوة الحضور السوري.
– أطلقت القوى التي ناوأت سورية، خصوصاً بعد خروجها من لبنان على هذا الدور السوري وحقبته زمن الوصاية السورية، رغم إدراكها أنه زمن وصاية مثلث سوري سعودي أميركي. وقد انتهى مع نهاية التفاهمات التي جمعت سورية بكل من السعودية وأميركا وذلك معلوم أنّه عائد لتمسّك سورية بخيارات إقليمية رفضت التسليم بما توافقت عليه السعودية وأميركا، من مقتضيات الأمن الإسرائيلي لكن يبدو أن البعض تقصّد تبرئة أميركا والسعودية من الشراكة حماية لانتقاله إلى وصاية ثنائية أميركية سعودية حكمت لبنان بين عامي 2005 و2008، مع عودة التوازن الداخلي والإقليمي بعد حرب تموز 2006 وما نتج من تفاهمات الدوحة عام 2008. وربما كانت المرّة الوحيدة التي تفرّدت فيها سورية، هي التمديد لرئيس الجمهورية السابق إميل لحود، ومنذ عام 2008 بدأ مصطلح النأي بالنفس عن أزمات المنطقة بالرواج، بصفته علامة على الموقف السيادي والخروج من كل أنواع الوصاية والتدخلات.
– دون العودة للسنوات العشر وما فيها، تكفي الإشارة إلى واقعتين نافرتين:
الأولى
أن مفهوم النأي بالنفس لم يكن إلا السلاح السياسي الذي أُريد من خلاله منع حزب الله من المشاركة في مواجهة تنظيم القاعدة وتنظيم داعش في سورية. وهي مواجهة لا يمكن لأحد إنكار عائدها اللبناني المباشر في حماية لبنان من الإرهاب.
والثانية
أن الدور السوري خلال هذه الفترة كان يعادل صفر تدخّل في السياسة اللبنانية واستحقاقاتها الرئاسية والنيابية والحكومية.
وبالمقابل واقعتان،
الأولى
أنه للمرة الأولى يُحتجز رئيس حكومة لبنان في دولة عربية يجري الإصرار على نفي تهمة الوصاية عنها هي السعودية، وأن الموضوع كان على صلة مباشرة بكيفية إدارة السياسة اللبنانية وإجبار رئيس الحكومة على طاعة ولي الأمر السعودي،
والثانية
أن السعودية مارست علناً وبصورة نافرة تدخّلاتها في مراحل الاستحقاق الرئاسي. فكان الفيتو السعودي علنياً، مانعاً تفاهمات باريس التي جمعت الرئيس سعد الحريري بالتيار الوطني الحر وجمّدتها عامين، ومن ثم الاستحقاق النيابي. وكان كلام وزير الخارجية السعودي علنياً حول رفض قانون الانتخابات، كما كان الكلام السعودي علنياً عن ربط التمويل الانتخابي لتيار المستقبل بتحالفات تعيد إنتاج جبهة لبنانية بوجه المقاومة، وصولاً للاستحقاق الحكومي الذي يعيش لبنان تعقيداته اليوم.
– ليس خافياً أن زيارة الرئيس الحريري إلى الرياض ليست عائلية ولا للاستجمام، بل هي على صلة مباشرة، بتشكيل الحكومة الجديدة والسعي السعودي لفرض حصة متضخّمة لحساب القوات اللبنانية، واستثنائها من كل معايير التشكيل التي ستحكم تمثيل القوى الأخرى بما فيها كتلة التيار الوطني الحر. وهو التيار الذي يترأس البلاد زعيمه ومؤسسه، ويملك الكلمة الفصل في توقيع مراسيم تشكيل الحكومة. وهو التيار ذاته الذي بنى رصيده على كونه رغم تفاعله مع المناخات الإقليمية والدولية، بوقوفه بعيداً عن التموضع الكامل في ضفة من ضفافها، محتفظاً بهامش أتاح له أن يكون قادراً على الحديث عن زمن وصاية سورية، من موقع سيادي لبناني، يوضع اليوم على المحك في مواجهة ما هو أبشع من الوصاية، وهو طاعة ولي الأمر. فالتشكيلة الحكومية الجديدة إذا ضمنت تلبية للطلب السعودي بحجم تمثيل القوات ستكون إعلان انتقال للبنان إلى مرتبة أقلّ من المشيخة. ويبقى السؤال مشروعاً هل سنسمع خطاباً سياسياً عن خطر الوصاية المستفحلة التي تبدو التحدي الأهم الذي يواجهه لبنان، حتى صار للنأي بالنفس معنى واحد، هو مهاجمة إيران وسورية ومديح السعودية.
The US State Department and congressional hawks are taking a second look at US support for the Lebanese Armed Forces after Hezbollah and its allies won a parliamentary majority in May’s elections.
Relatively, Mike Pompeo used his first official appearance before Congress as secretary of state to call for a review of US military assistance for Lebanon following the results of Lebanon’s 2018 parliamentary elections in which Hezbollah made sweeping gains.
Washington has long relied on the Lebanese Armed Forces as a bulwark against the resistance’s paramilitary group’s influence in Lebanon. But critics of the army’s unwillingness to confront Hezbollah, a key factor in Lebanese politics, are gaining traction as US President Donald Trump’s administration pursues a more aggressive stance against Tehran.
“We need a review … to make sure that we’re using American tax dollars right in supporting the groups that can most likely achieve our outcome there,” Pompeo testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee today as the Trump administration weighed in on a simmering debate about Lebanon.
“That’s the first time the administration openly mentioned some things related to a review of the use of the LAF [Lebanese Armed Forces] aid,” Joseph Gebeily, the president of the Lebanese Information Center, a think tank critical of Hezbollah, told Al-Monitor.
“The Lebanese Armed Forces have been a very useful partner to the US military. They’ve built a good relationship,” he confessed.
The United States announced at a donor conference earlier this year that it was providing the Lebanese Armed Forces with three transportation helicopters worth $30 million. Since 2006, Washington has given the Lebanese Armed Forces more than $1.7 billion.
Proponents of the Lebanese Armed Forces point to the army’s recent deployment to secure the Lebanese border and its success last year in pushing Daesh [the Arabic acronym for terrorist ‘ISIS/ISIL’ group] and al-Qaeda militants out of the country. Hezbollah, however, also participated in the offensive, lending further ammunition to the Lebanese Armed Forces’ critics in Washington.
Still, some Republican lawmakers who have voiced similar concerns nevertheless cite the Lebanese Armed Forces as an important tool in curbing Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon.
“We have worked closely with the Lebanese Armed Forces over the years to try to strengthen that institution because basically you have the formulation of a … state within a state,” House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce, R-Calif., told Al-Monitor following Pompeo’s testimony. “So we want to make certain that there is distance between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the capability of … [Hezbollah] to get their hands on any material. And that is what I believe [Pompeo’s] referring to.”
However, Gebeily claimed that while the Lebanese Armed Forces have been effective in ensuring Lebanon’s security, a review of their objectives is warranted as they have failed to disarm Hezbollah.
“The taxpayer is asking: Is my assistance, the money I’m giving … to the LAF, disarming Hezbollah?” said Gebeily. “It’s not, so maybe we should review the objective of this assistance to make it more in line with what’s being achieved. If it has the purpose of disarming Hezbollah, then we should see how this can be implemented.”
While Pompeo himself has a reputation as a hawk, singling out Hezbollah in a hardline Iran strategy speech earlier this week, his stance on the Lebanese Armed Forces has historically been more nuanced.
Gebeily, who said he formed a relationship with Pompeo during his time as a congressman from Kansas, said that while Pompeo has always been “very tough on Hezbollah and Iran,” he was also “supportive of the LAF, strengthening state institutions overall – of course with the objective of weakening Hezbollah.”
As a member of Congress, Pompeo’s district included Wichita, which boasts a sizable Lebanese American population. During that time, he made at least two trips to Lebanon, in 2014 and 2015, as a member of the House Intelligence Committee.
A readout of that first trip says Pompeo “reaffirmed US support for Lebanon’s security and political institutions.” And on his second trip, Pompeo met with Michel Aoun, now the country’s president who has since been a Hezbollah-allied member of parliament.
Despite calling for a review, Pompeo still reaffirmed, in his testimony today, the US support for the Lebanese Armed Forces “to help us achieve the security element of our efforts.”
And although he expressed concern about Hezbollah’s strength in the Lebanese government, he conceded that “ultimately it’s our assessment at this point that the overall balance of power won’t be materially changed” by this month’s [May’s] elections.
Hundreds of Palestinian prisoners currently being held in Israeli jails and detention facilities are expected to launch a hunger strike next week in protest against their detention without charge or trial.
Head of the Palestinian Authority’s Committee for Prisoners’ Affairs, Issa Qaraqe, said in a statement that some 500 Palestinian inmates have been boycotting Israeli courts since February, and demanding an end to Israel’s policy of administrative detention – a controversial form of imprisonment that allows Israeli authorities to detain individuals indefinitely without charge, trial or access to counsel.
Qaraqe added that the detainees would be “escalating measures” in early June, and would be launching a widespread hunger strike.
The administrative detainees are calling upon people from all walks of the Palestinian nation to support their action, the Palestinian official said.
Qaraqe further noted that he expects Israeli authorities to “exercise unprecedented repression and isolate the inmates” during the strike.
More than 7,000 Palestinians are reportedly held at Israeli jails. Hundreds of the inmates have apparently been incarcerated under the practice of administrative detention, a policy under which Palestinian inmates are kept in Israeli detention facilities without trial or charge.
Some Palestinian prisoners have been held in administrative detention for up to eleven years.
In parallel with testing paths led by Washington and its allies; the occupation entity and the Saudi entity about the results of the recognition of Jerusalem as a capital of the occupation entity and how to adapt to the stage of negotiation and path of settlements as well as the results of the withdrawal from the nuclear understanding with Iran, in addition to the European clarity of the surrounding international and regional balances and in the confrontation arenas in the region, and the course of negotiation between Washington and North Korea led Washington and its allies to put the option of bartering in front of Iran, Syria, and their allies in the axis of resistance waiting for months for the results of tests to become clear. The barter is between a Lebanese government that is convenient to the resistance versus Iraqi government that is convenient to America and Saudi Arabia including a reassurance to Israel of a Kurdish role otherwise the birth of the two governments will be disrupted and will remain on the waiting list.
The parties of the resistance axis and their allies in Lebanon and Iraq each in his country will refuse such barter. They will not get embarrassed for the disclosure of the impossible conditions of the Lebanese Forces as the seeking to make Lebanon a hostage to the Saudi swap versus big share of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in the Iraqi rule. Those who commit to the resistance in Iraq will succeed in managing that conflict in the light of the confused balances thus this will prevent Iraq from falling prey to the US-Saudi-Israeli alliance, while the Lebanese people will succeed in having a government that expresses faithfully the changes impacted by the parliamentary elections on the nature of the local balances despite the success of disruption in sparing time and waving of long vacancy.
The important endeavor to set balance is taking place in Yemen. Washington, Riyadh, and Tel Aviv depend on the equation of the impossibility to stop the progress of the Syrian Army in restoring the Syrian geography from the armed groups starting from Aleppo. The military resolving is taking place where there is no left room for political gains and where the recognition of the Syrian state through settlement is accompanied with humiliated recognition of the victory of the Syrian President and the Syrian Army. Therefore, the attempts to affect the compromises and to distort them with media are prepared, as posing questions about the meaning of an acceptance of a Turkish role or what Turkey did in the war on Syria and showing that the acceptance of the Syrian army depends on conditions as the non-deployment of Hezbollah and the Iranian forces with the Syrian army which is not real. It is known that the allies support the Syrian army in the war; they are not escorts of its sovereign spread. Because these riots will not change the origin of the new progressive Syrian equation that moves from one region to another, so the work is going on to impose new military reality in Yemen and to seek to employ it by creating similar compromises in which the group of Mansour Hadi is included consensually.
In the past two years the bet was on Taiz to achieve that balance, but all the tests failed. In fall last year the most important bet was on the coup against the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in order to make Sana’a the goal, but the bet failed despite the preparation which preceded Sana’a battle. Today the bets are on the west coast towards Al Hodeida port, the attack has succeeded in achieving a remarkable progress. It is necessary to show the progress relationship between the open geographic territories and the type of force which was deployed by non-resistance groups in Yemen on the other hand. At the same time it not forgettable that the Yemenis are fighting for more than three years against the Saudi army, Saudi money, UAE army, UAE money, US weapons, and the Israeli experience and intelligence. Their steadfastness is a legend, but this does not mean to expect the success of the completion of the Saudi plan after new plans and new capacitates and forces have been allocated for its confrontation.
The forces of the resistance axis are demanded to grant more focus on the unfair war on Yemen and to organize solidarity activities with the Yemeni people, especially because Al Hodeida port is a sole marine port to provide Sana’a areas and others with the basic elements of life. The former Security Council has already issued presidential statement to stop any military action that targets Al Hodeida, calling to open the port to commercial navigation and lifting the blockade on it, but we must say to the Russian ally that the diplomatic movement in the Yemeni issue is no longer bearing taking into consideration and the cold calculations. The humanitarian massacre committed against that people worth loud voice in the Security Council as in every time the Americans and the Europeans do whenever the Syrian army advances to an area that was under terrorism despite the difference between this and that, between real massacre in Yemen and real famine that kills people and false claims of using chemical weapons in Syria and the hypocrite pretention of caring about the life of the civilians and the lies of the White Helmets.
– بالتوازي مع مسارات اختبارية تقودها واشنطن وحليفاها كيان الاحتلال والكيان السعودي، حول نتائج الاعتراف بالقدس عاصمة لكيان الاحتلال وكيفية التأقلم مع مرحلة سقوط التفاوض ومسار التسويات، كما حول نتائج الانسحاب من التفاهم النووي مع إيران وتبلور التوازنات الدولية والإقليمية المحيطة به أوروبياً وفي ساحات المواجهة في المنطقة، وكذلك ما تستكشفه واشنطن في مسار التفاوض مع كوريا الشمالية، تضع واشنطن وحليفاها أمام إيران وسورية وحلفائهما في محور المقاومة خيارات للمقايضة، بانتظار شهور لازمة لتبلور نتائج الاختبارات: المقايضة بين حكومة لبنانية مريحة للمقاومة مقابل حكومة عراقية مريحة لأميركا والسعودية، مع تطمين لـ»إسرائيل» بدور كردي من الحلفاء، أو عرقلة ولادة الحكومتين معاً وبقائهما على لائحة الانتظار.
– سيتكفل أطراف محور المقاومة وحلفاؤهم في لبنان والعراق، كل في بلده برفض هذا الجمع للمقايضة، ولن يُحرجهم، ولا يجوز أن يُحرجهم كشف شروط القوات اللبنانية التعجيزية كسعي لجعل لبنان رهينة للمقايضة السعودية من أجل حصة دسمة للحزب الديمقراطي الكردستاني في الحكم العراقي، وسينجح الملتزمون بخط المقاومة في العراق بإدارة الصراع في ظل التوازنات الملتبسة بما يمنع وقوع العراق فريسة للحلف الأميركي السعودي الإسرائيلي. بينما سينجح اللبنانيون بانتزاع حكومة تعبّر بأمانة عن التغييرات التي حملتها الانتخابات النيابية على طبيعة التوازنات المحلية، رغم نجاح التعطيل بإضاعة الوقت والتلويح بالفراغ المديد.
– السعي الأهم لإقامة التوازن تشهده ساحة اليمن، حيث تنطلق واشنطن والرياض وتل أبيب من معادلة استحالة وقف مسار تقدّم الجيش السوري في استرداد الجغرافيا من أيدي الجماعات المسلحة، وفقاً لما بدأ من تحرير حلب ولم ينفع كل ما بذل للعرقلة في وقفه. وحيث يحلّ العناد مكان الواقعية يجري الحسم عسكرياً بصورة لا تبقي مجالاً لمكاسب سياسية، وحيث يتمّ التسليم للدولة السورية عبر التسوية يقترن ذلك بإذلال الاعتراف بانتصار الرئيس السوري والجيش السوري، لذلك تجري محاولات للعب على حبال التسويات وتشويهها بالضخ الإعلامي، على طريقة رمي التساؤلات عن معنى القبول بدور تركي والتذكير بما فعلته تركيا في الحرب بحق سورية، وبالتوازي تصوير القبول بالجيش السوري أنّه محاطٌ بشروط كعدم انتشار حزب الله والقوات الإيرانية مع الجيش السوري، كأن هذا مطروح أصلاً. حيث المعلوم أن الحلفاء يساندون الجيش السوري في الحرب وليسوا مرافقين لانتشاره السياديّ، حيث يسلّم له الأعداء بالانتصار، ولأن هذه المشاغبات لن تغيّر في أصل المعادلة السورية الجديدة التي تتقدّم وفق روزنامتها، وتنتقل من منطقة إلى منطقة، يجري العمل لفرض واقع عسكري جديد في اليمن والسعي الموازي لتوظيفه بتصنيع تسويات مشابهة تنتشر فيها جماعة منصور هادي بالتراضي.
– خلال عامين ماضيين كان الرهان على منطقة تعز لتحقيق هذا التوازن، لكن كل الاختبارات فشلت، وفي خريف العام الماضي كان الرهان الأهم على انقلاب الرئيس السابق علي عبدالله صالح لتكون صنعاء هي الهدف. وفشل الرهان رغم كل التمهيد الذي سبق لمعركة صنعاء والتبشير بالإنجازات فيها، واليوم تجري الرهانات على الساحل الغربي وصولاً لميناء الحديدة. وقد نجح الهجوم بتحقيق تقدم ملحوظ، وهنا لا بد من تسجيل حقيقة علاقة التقدم بطبيعة المناطق الجغرافية المفتوحة التي تمّ التقدم فيها من جهة، وبطبيعة القوة التي كانت تنشر فيها مجموعات ليست من النواة الصلبة لقوى المقاومة في اليمن من جهة مقابلة، لكن أيضاً لا يجوز للمتابع والمحلل أن ينسى أن اليمنيين يقاتلون باللحم الحي منذ أكثر من ثلاث سنوات، بوجه كل الجيش السعودي والمال السعودي والجيش الإماراتي والمال الإماراتي، والسلاح الأميركي والخبرة والمخابرات الإسرائيليين، ومجرد صمودهم أسطورة، من دون أن يعني ذلك توقع نجاح تتمة المخطط السعودي بعدما وضعت للمواجهة خطط جديدة ورُصدت لها قوى وإمكانات جديدة.
– قوى محور المقاومة مطالبة بمنح المزيد من الضوء للحرب الظالمة على اليمن، وتنظيم الفاعليات التضامنية مع الشعب اليمني، خصوصاً أن ميناء الحديدة منفذ بحري وحيد لتزويد مناطق صنعاء وسواها بأبسط مقوّمات الحياة، ومجلس الأمن الدولي سبق وأصدر بياناً رئاسياً يدعو لوقف أي عمل عسكري يستهدف الحديدة، داعياً لفتح المرفأ أمام الملاحة التجارية ورفع الحصار عنه، لكن يجب أن نقول للحليف الروسي إن التحرك الدبلوماسي في القضية اليمنية لم يعد يحتمل المراعاة والحسابات الباردة. فالمجزرة الإنسانية المرتكبة بحق هذا الشعب تستحقّ صوتاً مرتفعاً في مجلس الأمن الدولي أسوة بما يفعله الأميركيون والأوروبيون في كل مرّة يتقدّم الجيش السوري إلى منطقة تحت سيطرة الإرهاب، مع حفظ الفارق بين هذه وتلك، بين مجزرة حقيقية في اليمن ومجاعة حقيقية تقتل شعبه، وادعاءات كاذبة باستخدام السلاح الكيميائي في سورية والتباكي المنافق على حياة المدنيين وألاعيب الخوذ البيضاء.
President al-Assad: We will liberate every part of Syria…The Americans should leave; somehow they’re going to leave …Israel is losing the dear ones of al-Nusra and ISIS and that’s why it is panicking
President Bashar al-Assad has said that with every move forward for the Syrian Army, and for the political process, and for the whole situation, forward in the positive meaning, towards more stability, our enemies and our opponents, mainly the West led by the United States and their puppets in Europe and the region, with their mercenaries in Syria, they try to make it farther, either by supporting more terrorism, bringing more terrorists to Syria, or by hindering the political process.
In an interview given to RT, President al-Assad added that after the liberation of Aleppo and later Deir Ezzor, and before that Homs, and now Damascus, actually the United States is losing its cards where the main card was al-Nusra that was called “moderate.” But when the scandal started leaking, that al-Nusra is part of Al Qaida that was supposed to be fought by the United States, they looked for another card. This card is the SDF now.
President al-Assad said: We’re going to deal with SDF by two options: the first one, we started now opening doors for negotiations, this is the first option. If not, we’re going to resort to liberating by force, to liberating those areas by force. We don’t have any other options, with the Americans or without the Americans.
The Americans should leave; somehow they’re going to leave. They came to Iraq with no legal basis, and look what happened to them. They have to learn the lesson. Iraq is no exception, and Syria is no exception. People will not accept foreigners in this region anymore, President al-Assad added.
Following is the full text of the interview:
Question 1: Mr. President, thank you very much for inviting us here, for giving us this opportunity, having spent years now traveling to and through Syria reporting from here, it is an honor to finally meet you. But, Mr. President, since time is short, first question: your latest victories in Ghouta, in Yarmouk, they have drastically changed the situation on the ground in Syria. How much near the end of this war are we now in your estimation?
President Assad: First of all, you’re most welcome in Syria. With every move forward in the battlefield, with every victory, with every liberated area, we are moving closer to the end of the conflict, and I always said without external interference it won’t take more than a year to settle the situation in Syria. But at the same time, with every move forward for the Syrian Army, and for the political process, and for the whole situation – forward in the positive meaning, towards more stability – our enemies and our opponents, mainly the West led by the United States and their puppets in Europe and in our region, with their mercenaries in Syria, they try to make it farther, either by supporting more terrorism, bringing more terrorists coming to Syria, or by hindering the political process. So, our challenge is how can we to close this gap between their plans and our plans, and I think we are succeeding in that regard, but at the same time, it’s difficult for anyone to tell you when. But it is getting closer, that’s self-evident.
Question 2: Your latest military victories, they have been – objectively speaking – spectacular; the speed at which rebel defenses that have withstood for years have collapsed. Are you planning on retaking all of Syria by force? We’re talking about Idleb, the borders with Israel, SDF-controlled territories.
President Assad: The war is the worst choice. I think every Syrian agrees upon this fact. But sometimes you only have this choice, especially when you talk about factions like Al Qaida, like ISIS, like al-Nusra, and the like-minded factions – actually most of them have the same ideology; Jaish al-Islam, Ahrar al-Cham, and so on – they’re not ready for any dialogue, they don’t have any political plan; they only have this dark ideological plan, which is to be like any Al Qaida-controlled area anywhere in this world. So, the only option to deal with those factions is force. At the same time, in other areas, we succeeded by implementing reconciliations, especially when the community in those different areas made pressure on those militants to leave those areas. So, I think the best choice is to make reconciliation. This is our plan. But when it doesn’t work, the only method to resort to is the force. Question 3: With regards to reconciliation, how wise is it to send all of these veteran jihadists with their small arms to Idleb? By now, tens of thousands have gone to Idleb, they have consolidated, they have built defenses. Eventually, as you say, you’ll have to fight them. On the other hand, are you perhaps planning on building an area that is outside of government control?
President Assad: Actually, we always say we’re going to liberate every area, so it’s impossible for us to intentionally leave any area on the Syrian soil outside our control as government. This is natural. And as you know, Idleb was captured by the terrorists in 2015 with the Turkish support. It was mainly captured by al-Nusra and some other supportive factions. Actually, we started the reconciliations before that time, but every reconciliation that happened after that time, after 2015- it was, I think, May 2015- every faction wanted to leave the city or the village, they choose to go to Idleb. This is a very good indication that they have the same ideology, because they choose to go to al-Nusra area, they didn’t choose to go to any other area. So, we didn’t send people to Idleb; they wanted to go there, because they have the same incubator, they have the same atmosphere, way of thinking, and so on. This is one part, the other part, which is the military aspect of your question; the plan of the terrorists and their masters was to distract the Syrian Army by scattering the different units all over the Syrian soil, which is not good for any army. Our plan was to put them in one area, two areas, three areas. Let’s say, if you have two or three or four frontiers, better than having tens, or maybe more than one hundred frontiers at the same time. So, militarily, it is better. They chose it, but it’s better for us from the military point of view.
Question 4: On the other hand, talking about similar mindsets, Idleb is predominantly… the rebels there overwhelmingly are Sunni. As a Sunni myself, I have a long distant relative who came to Syria to fight against you, to resist you, because he was told that you were targeting… you were killing Sunnis, and that is what many people in Idleb believe. Why is it that so many people in all these different countries, in America, in Russia, these Sunnis, these Muslims, they believe that you are oppressing them?
President Assad: Because the first narrative when it started, internationally – mainly in the West, of course – and within Syria and in some mainstream medias in our region and in the West, their plan was to create this rift within the society. That will make things easier for them; “when you have such a civil, kind of civil war between sects or ethnicities,” and it failed. Now, they keep using the same narrative, at least to encourage some fanatics in different places in the world to come and defend their “brothers” in this area, because that’s how they imagine; they imagine that there is conflict between sects. So, because of their narrow-minded way of thinking, maybe, or their ignorance, they came here just to support their “brothers”. Now, if I’m going to tell you this is right or wrong, your audience doesn’t’ know me, they don’t have any idea maybe about my credibility, but I’ll tell you, you know Syria very well, it’s better to go and see the reality on the ground. Now, if there’s such a narrative, let’s say, in reality, sect killing another sect, Syria should be divided now according to sectarian lines. You should come to this area under our control and see one color or a few colors of the Syrian society, you should go to the other area where you have the terrorists, you should have different colors, and the reality is not like this. Now, in Damascus, in Aleppo, in Homs, in every area under the Syrian government’s control, you’ll see every spectrum of the Syrian society, with no exceptions. So, this reality will debunk this narrative. I mean, how could they live with each other while the government is killing them according to sectarian basis? It doesn’t work.
Question 5: Fair enough, but with regards to negotiations and reconciliation, there have been efforts to start talks to achieve a result in Geneva, in Astana. There has been limited success, but it hasn’t been all that great. Now, let’s be honest, you’re winning, you’re winning on the ground, your forces are advancing, the rebels are in retreat. Why would you negotiate with them now, that they’re losing?
President Assad: Since the very beginning, we said whenever we can save Syrian blood, we have to go forward and deal with any initiative, any kind of initiative, even if they have bad will. Some initiatives have bad will, but in spite of that, we dealt with them. And the reality now, if you go around Syria, the reality, the results that’s been embodied by the reconciliations is proof of what I’m saying. Without this policy, without this intention of saving blood, negotiating, talking to people, we couldn’t have reached these reconciliations. This is one thing. The other thing, not everyone who fought the government have the same basis; some of them have ideological background, some of them for financial background, some of them they made a mistake in the very beginning, they were forced to go in that direction, and they couldn’t withdraw, so you have to open the doors, and you have to distinguish between different kinds of people. And the most important than this, is the majority of the people who were against the government – apparently – in the different liberated areas, actually, in their hearts they are with the government, because they could tell the difference between having government and having chaos.
Question 6: Well, with regards to talks and, you know, retaking areas by force, let’s take for example SDF-controlled territories in Deir Ezzor. There have been clashes there between troops who are loyal to you and the SDF itself, the United States’ partners, and the United States brought to bear force, to stop troops loyal to you from taking territories. This has happened with al-Tanf as well. How are you going to deal with the United States’ presence, military presence, in Syria?
President Assad: After the liberation of Aleppo and later Deir Ezzor, and before that Homs, and now Damascus, actually the United States is losing its cards. The main card was al-Nusra that was called “moderate.” But when the scandal started leaking, that they are not moderate, they are Al Qaida that was supposed to be fought by the United States, they looked for another card. This card is the SDF now, because when as it seems, as you just mentioned, we are moving forward in the different areas to defeat the terrorists, the only problem left in Syria is the SDF. We’re going to deal with it by two options: the first one, we started now opening doors for negotiations, because the majority of them are Syrians, and supposedly they like their country, they don’t like to be puppets to any foreigners, that’s what we suppose, so we have the same basis. We all don’t trust the Americans for decades, not because of the war, because they always say a thing and do the opposite, they tell daily lies. So, we have one option is to live with each other as Syrians, like forever. This is the first option. If not, we’re going to resort to liberating by force, to liberating those areas by force. We don’t have any other options, with the Americans or without the Americans. We don’t have any other option. So, this is our land, it’s our right, and it’s our duty to liberate it, and the Americans should leave, somehow they’re going to leave. They came to Iraq with no legal basis, and look what happened to them. They have to learn the lesson. Iraq is no exception, and Syria is no exception. People will not accept foreigners in this region anymore.
Question 7: But with regards to retaking territories, it seems inexplicably whenever you eliminate one threat, say, be in Ghouta, another threat seems to materialize, and this has happened repeatedly. Now, we have the Israeli energy minister who is threatening that his country could, quote, “liquidate you and your government.” Are you afraid, and how do you take that threat?
President Assad: Since we were born – I’m talking about my generation and most of the generations now in Syria – we lived under the threat of the Israeli aggression. This is something in our unconscious feeling, so to say that you’re afraid while living with the same threat for decades, this is nonsense. The Israelis have been assassinating, killing, occupying for decades now, for around seven decades, in this region, but usually they do all this without threatening. Now, why do they threat in this way? This is panic, this is a kind of hysterical feeling, because they are losing the “dear ones,” the dear ones al-Nusra and ISIS, that’s why Israel is panicking recently, and we understand their feeling.
Question 8: Well, Israel is now seemingly striking across Syria, airstrikes, at will. They’re boasting publicly on camera again and again that your defenses, they’re powerless to stop them, that they can do in Syria whatever they want. Is that true, is there anything you can do to stop Israel carrying out its airstrikes in Syria?
President Assad: Actually, the first target of the mercenaries in Syria was the air defense, before attacking any other military base, it was the air defense, and you would be surprised at that time; why do they attack the air defense? The air defense will not deal with the “peaceful demonstrators” as they say or the “moderate forces,” and it cannot deal with extremists anyway. It’s another thing, it’s built to defend the country. This is the other proof that Israel was in direct link with those terrorists in Syria. So, they attacked those bases, and they destroyed a big part of our air defenses. Now, in spite of that, our position, let’s say, our air defense is much stronger than before, thanks to the Russian support, and the recent attacks by the Israelis and by the Americans and British and French proved that we are in a better situation. Now, my answer to your question, the only option is to improve our air defense, this is the only thing we can do, and we are doing that. Question 9: Israel says that its strikes are, so far, that they aren’t targeted against you, the President or the government, that they’re targeted at Iran, and they’re to keep Iran – which is your ally – weak in Syria. It’s strange, but Iran being here, they are your allies, it’s no secret, they have helped, but them being here now puts you at threat. Would you ever consider asking Iran to leave?
President Assad: The most important fact regarding this issue, is that we don’t have Iranian troops. We never had, and you cannot hide it, and we’re not ashamed to say that we have, like we invited the Russians, we could have invited the Iranians. We have Iranian officers who work with the Syrian Army as help, but they don’t have troops. And the starkest fact about their lies about this issue, the Iranian issue, that the recent attack a few weeks ago, they said that they attacked Iranian bases and camps, as they said, allegedly, and actually we had tens of Syrian martyrs and wounded soldiers, not a single Iranian. So, how could they say that we have it? So, it’s a lie. We always say that we have Iranian officers, but they work with our army, we don’t have troops.
Question 10: Changing subject now, with regards to chemical attacks. There are now regular alleged chemical attacks happening in Syria. Your government and your allies have said that you had nothing to do with this. Your allies have backed your claims, denying any responsibility, saying they have no knowledge of you carrying out these attacks. The question is: in whose interest is it to gas opposition to you?
President Assad: That is the most part of the answer: in whose interest? That is the question. Is it in our interest? Why, and why no? Because the timing of this alleged strike was after the victory of the Syrian troops in Ghouta, let alone the fact that we don’t have chemical weapons anyway, and let the other fact is that we are not going to use it against our people, because the battle in Syria was about winning the hearts of the civilians, this is the main battle, and we won it. So, how can you use chemical weapons against civilians that you want them to be supportive to you? This is first. Second, if you want to use it, let’s suppose that you have it and you want to use it, do you use it after you finished the battle, or before, or during? It’s not logical. Second, if you go to that area, it was a very cramped area by armies, by factions, and by civilians. Whenever you use such armaments or weapons in that area, you’re going to harm everyone, something that didn’t happen. And if you go to that area and you ask the civilians, there was no chemical attack by anyone. Even the Western journalists who went there after the Ghouta was liberated, they said “we asked the people and they said we didn’t see any chemical attack.” So, it was a narrative, it was just a pretext in order to attack Syria.
Question 11: Well, it may have been a pretext, but we don’t have proof that, you know, even we have rumors on Twitter, a few videos of… confusing videos showing allegedly the aftermath of an attack, is enough to justify for the United States, its allies, launching cruise missiles at Syria. What if, conveniently, there is another attack, alleged attack? Could there be a lot more missiles aimed at Syria?
President Assad: Of course, it could, because when the Unites States trampled over the international law, on daily basis sometimes in different areas for different reasons, any country in the world could have such an attack. What’s the legal base of this attack, what’s the legal base of their aircrafts, with their alliance, the so-called “anti-terrorist alliance” that supports the terrorists actually, what’s the legal base of that alliance? Nothing. What’s the legal base of the attack in Yemen, in Afghanistan, on the borders with Pakistan, etc.? There is no legal base. So, as long as you don’t have an international law that could be obeyed by the United States and its puppets in the West, there is no guarantee that it won’t happen. That happened a few weeks ago, and it happened last year, in April 2017, and that could happen anytime, exactly, I agree with you.
Question 12: But the response Trump promised was going to be extreme and severe, according to his words early on. The response that we saw, the strike that we saw after the latest alleged chemical attack was, it seems to be much more symbolic, much smaller in scope, and there was unexpectedly again a delay when Trump promised the attack and when it came. Why was there a delay? Did it have something perhaps to do with Russia?
President Assad: It has two aspects, as we saw it. The first one is they told a story, they told a lie, and the public opinion around the world and in the West didn’t buy their story, but they couldn’t withdraw. So, they had to do something, even on a smaller scale. The second issue is related to the Russian position, that time, as you know, that the Russians announced publically that they are going to destroy the bases that are going to be used to launch missiles, and our information – we don’t have evidence, we only have information, and those information are credible information – that they were thinking about a comprehensive attack all over Syria, and that’s why the threat pushed the West to make it on a much smaller scale.
Question 13: Well, with regards to the United States’ relation towards you, President Trump has called you, quote, “Animal Assad.” Do you have a nickname for the US president?
President Assad: This is not my language, so, I cannot use similar language. This is his language. It represents him, and I think there is a very known principle, that what you say is what you are. So, he wanted to represent what he is, and that’s normal. Anyway, it didn’t move anything, and this kind of language shouldn’t move anything for anyone. The only thing that moves you is what people that you trust, people who are level-headed, people who are thoughtful, people who are moral, ethical, that’s what should move anything inside you, whether positive or negative. Somebody like Trump will move nothing for me. Question 14: With regards to the United States’ presidency, there is an interesting thing, you know, I came up with, thought up of a while ago; there are now in Syria forces from five nuclear powers, five nuclear powers directly engaged in military operations in Syria, be it boots on the grounds or airstrikes. Some of those countries are on different sides. How Syrian is this civil war still?
President Assad: The word “civil war” has been used widely since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, even by our friends, and by our allies by mistake, without understanding the content of this meaning. Syrian “civil war” means there are sectarian lines based on either ethnicities or sects or religions or maybe political opinion or political currents, let’s say, something we don’t have in Syria. In reality, in the area controlled by the government, which is now the majority of Syria, you have all these diversities. So, the word “civil war” is not correct. What we have actually from the very beginning are mercenaries, Syrians, and foreigners being paid by the West in order to topple the government. This is the reality, the mere reality, the very stark reality. Everything else is just masks to cover the real intentions. Talking about political differences, moderates, peaceful demonstration; we don’t have civil war in Syria. If we had civil war for seven years, we should have been divided by now. You cannot have one country, united country, united society, it’s not geographically because now of the Unites States’ puppets and the Turkish puppets. If there were a civil war, then you should have a divided society. Go by yourself, deal with different spectrums of the Syrian society, and you can answer that question in the same way I’m answering it.
Question 15: But with regards to potential escalation. Okay, there are proxy forces from all these five nuclear powers, as well as the other forces engaged in Syria, but you, as the President, again, you must have information. How close have we come during this civil war… during this war to an escalation between these nuclear powers?
President Assad: In reality, we were close to have direct conflict between the Russian forces and the American forces, and fortunately, it has been avoided, not by the wisdom of the American leadership, but by the wisdom of the Russian leadership, because it is not in the interest of anyone, anyone in this world, and first of all the Syrians, to have this conflict. We need the Russian support, but we need at the same time to avoid the American foolishness in order to be able to stabilize our country.
Question 16: And just briefly, one last question. The closer we get to the end, is the danger of an escalation, in your estimation, is it decreasing or is it, on the other hand, increasing?
President Assad: As I said at the very beginning, the more we get closer to the end, the more they want to make it farther. What does it mean? The more stability you have, the more escalation we will have. The more reconciliation you have in one area, the more killing and destruction and trying to capture more areas by the terrorists we’ll have. That’s why within the reconciliation, when we started reconciliations in many areas, the other factions in the same area tried to destroy it, because they have the orders from the outside not to go toward any reconciliation, of course, you have the orders with the pocket of money. So, what you say is correct, but the more escalation we have, the more determined we’ll be to solve the problem, because you don’t have any other choice; either you have a country or you don’t have a country.
Journalist: Mr. President, thank you very much for your insights, and thank you very much for welcoming us here and giving us so much of your time. We wish you all the best, the Syrian people all the best, and a swift conclusion to this awful conflict. Thank you very much, Mr. President.
President Assad: Thank you, thank you for coming to Syria again.
The Green Line disguises the fact that Palestinians in Gaza are no longer being oppressed outside the Israeli state, but are being caged and brutalized inside it.
Palestinian protesters inside the Gaza Strip throw stones in the direction of an Israeli military position on the other side of the border fence, Gaza Strip, December 8, 2017. (Ezz Zanoun/Activestills.org)
Palestinian activists have long criticized the use of the word “border” to describe the 1949 armistice line that divides Gaza and Israel, and which protestors in the Great March of Return have been trying to cross at great risk to life and limb. By invoking the term, Israel insists that its open-fire policy toward the march is part of its legitimate right to defend its sovereignty and security. It further claims that, because the government dismantled its settlements in 2005, it no longer occupies the Strip and therefore bears no responsibility for its conditions.
These are disingenuous arguments. Israel’s blockade and control of Gaza stretches from its eastern and northern land crossings to the Mediterranean Sea in the west, with Egypt controlling the south. What it calls a “border” is actually a militarized network of naval ships, barbed wire, electronic barriers, lethal no-man zones, and surveillance systems that operate as the fence of an open-air prison. In legal terms, Israel retains “effective control” of the Strip (including people’s movement, its airspace, flow of goods, and other needs of daily life), and therefore remains its occupying power.
An Israeli warship approaches a Palestinian skiff, as photographed from the observation boat Olivia (photo: Rosa Schiano/Civil Peace Service Gaza CPSGAZA)
The human rights community has spent years articulating the nature of Israel’s occupation under international law and the responsibility of third-parties to end it. The law, however, is only worth as much as the will to enforce it; and half a century later, these efforts have failed to produce meaningful outcomes. It is not that the law is incorrect, but that it has been unable to mobilize political action or make Israel’s military rule less sustainable.
The Palestinians’ own ambiguities about the Green Line have further complicated matters. We focus on the military structures that have spawned since 1967, yet emphasize that the real problem is 1948. We cite Israel’s obligation to abide by international law, but chastise the law for being useless in practice. We combine settler colonialism, occupation, and apartheid as lenses to explain the ongoing Nakba, but arrive at different conclusions for what the solution entails. These debates are natural, but they also muddle the struggle’s priorities and the discourse it promotes.
Exploiting these uncertainties, Israel has turned Gaza into an area that is simultaneously separated from and annexed under Israel’s control. It is a purgatory designed to provide whatever answer is most convenient for shirking responsibility and justifying violence at any given time. This has obscured a controversial but perhaps inexorable fact: after 51 years, Gaza can hardly be described as “occupied territory” anymore. It is now a segregated, debilitated, and subjugated part of Israel; a replica of the districts, townships, and reservations that imprisoned native populations and communities of color in apartheid South Africa, the United States, and other colonial regimes. In other words, Palestinians are no longer being oppressed outside the Israeli state; they are being caged and brutalized inside it.
Israeli soldiers look on at protests in Gaza. April 13, 2018. (Oren Ziv / Activestills.org)
The Green Line has been key to disguising this complex system. Like the de factoannexation of the West Bank – where Israel’s growing settlements and military presence have similarly made the “border” there non-existent – Gaza has effectively been absorbed into Israel’s political jurisdiction. Hamas, like the Palestinian Authority, is viewed as a pseudo-government of hostile “enemy aliens,” but one that can be managed in Israel’s domain so long as it is contained behind the fence. The thousands taking part in the March of Return are not “infiltrators” trying to breach a sovereign state, but displaced and disenfranchised “citizens” breaking out of a state-built ghetto. The army is not holding off “foreign invaders,” but is killing and suppressing its own native subjects.
This framing is crucial to understand the scale and severity of Israel’s policies, and to devise stronger paths to correcting their injustices. By tearing off the mask of the Green Line, Palestinians and their allies can reverse Israel’s efforts to isolate Gaza from the West Bank and to deny its people’s rights to their ancestral homes. What Israel fears more than a Palestinian state is a Palestinian population it cannot disown, and the myth that Gaza is “separated” from Israel helps it to balance that fear. That myth must be broken, and that racist fear must be exposed. Doing so would also reveal the political solution: if Palestinians cannot win their independence along the Green Line, they will demand their full equality beyond it. The March of Return is doing just that
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