EGYPT/US: Succession could cloud improving relations

EGYPT/US: Succession could cloud improving relations

OXFAN excerpts:

"..... Despite positive intelligence and security relations, the diplomatic relationship suffered from perceptions of US interference in Egypt's internal affairs, particularly in two areas, Political reform and, succession. Relations have improved since President Barack Obama's election, due to Washington's renewed focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (a long-held demand of the Egyptians), and Obama's different tone towards the region. With regard to Egypt, this is reflected in:

• his decision to place Mubarak among the first few leaders he called after assuming the presidency;
  
• his choice of Cairo for his speech to the Muslim world, which also boosted Egypt's wavering standing in the region; and
  
• greater talk of the need for US humility and reduced pressure on Egypt in the areas of political reform and human rights.

The task has been made easier by Egyptian gestures, such as the release of opposition politician Ayman Nour from prison. Thus, despite a poor (and arguably worsening) human rights record, Cairo's relationship with Washington has improved as talk of democracy promotion has been toned down.

Funding shifts. There have been some important behind-the-scenes changes too, notably in regard to US democracy promotion policy in Egypt:

• Despite continued verbal commitment to democracy promotion, Washington has dramatically curtailed the amount of funding assigned to such projects. Notwithstanding early intentions to dedicate 54.8 million dollars, as in 2008, to democracy and governance projects, the amount was subsequently reduced to 20.0 million dollars.
  
• Congress, unlike in 2008, is no longer threatening to withhold military aid in part because of a lack of reform. While the combined military and civilian aid budget has remained the same, the civilian portion has decreased.....
  
• For the first time the United States has agreed to allow grant funding only to organisations approved by the Egyptian government -- thereby excluding some of the most effective and critical non-governmental organisations.

These moves may reflect the increased influence of 'realists' (ie those who believe in balance-of-power politics) at the State Department who consider the Bush administration's pressure on Mubarak to have been largely counter-productive and damaging to US interests. This group argues that behind-the-scenes pressure may be more productive than public initiatives. However, thus far it is not clear that any pressure is being applied.

Regime security. The sharp reduction in civilian aid could be reversed in 2010, and may be negotiated during and after the upcoming summit. However, for the Egyptian establishment, protecting military aid is much more important to regime stability, since much of that aid is used to boost the military core of the regime.

Since the beginning of the year, Egypt has played a leading role in brokering between Palestinian factions, negotiating prisoner releases, and monitoring the Gaza border to prevent Hamas rearming after the recent Gaza war. This has domestic costs, as it is used as political fodder by the pro-Palestinian Islamist and leftist opposition. However, so far it seems the foreign benefits -- most notably the upturn in Egypt's regional stature after a steady decline over the past decade -- are worth it to Mubarak.

Additional cooperation. The relationship goes further than a preferred partnership in Obama's regional initiatives:

1. Strategic Dialogue. A 'Strategic Dialogue' has been established between the two states. Senior officials on both sides are meeting twice a year to discuss issues including counter-terrorism and intelligence collaboration, the Middle East peace process, bilateral economic relations and political reform issues.

2. QIZs. The highly successful Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) programme, which grants Egyptian companies manufacturing products with an 11% minimum of Israeli content duty-free access to the US market, was expanded in March to include new industrial areas.....

Thus, the diplomatic relationship appears to be back on track to the pre-Bush era.

Succession. What is less clear is whether the Obama administration will address what is perhaps the most crucial question regarding Egypt's future: how Mubarak, now 81, is preparing for his succession. In May, the death of his twelve-year-old grandson deeply affected Mubarak, who is widely believed to have suffered a mild stroke .......despite efforts to provide flattering lighting on television, it is clear that Mubarak is now quite frail.....

For Omar Suleiman to succeed Mubarak, he would have to:

• be appointed as vice-president and successfully hold the position; or
• run as an independent, requiring endorsement by a majority of National Democratic Party MPs, and overcome a rule stating that active military officers cannot be members of political parties; or
  
• seize power unconstitutionally, probably through a 'soft' coup, in which some of these rules are ignored -- the most likely scenario.....

Whoever succeeds Mubarak, the succession could bring a period of instability during which it may not be clear who holds the reins of power. A new leader may have to appease strongly anti-US popular sentiment, and Washington will have to deal with the prospect of either a superficially democratic inheritance of power through rigged elections or a military takeover. However, in either case, Egypt is likely to remain strongly aligned with US interests."

Posted by G, Z, & or B at 9:52 AM