By Guest Post • Jan 5th, 2009 at 9:51 • Category: Analysis, Counter-terrorism, No thanks!, Dateline, Documents, Human Rights, Israel, Newswire, Palestine, Resistance, War, Zionism
WRITTEN BY Alberto Terenzi, issued on January 1 2009
Translated by Diego Traversa and revised by Mary Rizzo for www.tlaxcala.es
Like any fact risking being spread to the extent of undermining world peace, it’s necessary to see who should be considered accountable for what’s happening in Palestine.
In fact, the western media accept all too easily, for reasons that cannot be analyzed here, the Israeli version according to which the operation “Cast Lead” is supposed to be nothing but a retaliation against Hamas launching several dozen rockets towards Israeli-populated areas close to the Gaza Strip.
First of all, it’s worth stating that Hamas’ military strength is by far lesser than the Jewish State’s. Against about 15 thousand armed militants reported as being Hamas members, Israel can deploy some 3,630 heavy tanks (1,350 of which are new models), 6,870 armoured, 896 pieces of heavy artillery, 250 mortars, 48 multiple launchers of 227-mm missiles, 520 crafts and 180 fighting helicopters, 13 warships and 3 submarines, 630 thousand soldiers (reservists included), 500 thousand of which belong to the army, as well as 7,650 men from the border police. Moreover, the Jewish State is presumably thought to have 150 nuclear bombs, some of which can possibly be launched by submarines.
At the end of the day, the sheer quantitative relation between the victims of the conflict has for years presented figures totally unfavourable to the Palestinians: as matter of fact, since 28 September 2000, that’s the beginning of the Second Intifada, 5,302 Palestinians and 1,082 Israelis died, that makes it a 5-to-1 ratio (source: “Internazionale”, issue 775, December 2008).
This blood-curdling body count isn’t uncalled for since these quantitative relations are highly held into account by the Israeli military officers when reckoning the outcomes of this typical low-intensity conflict: this is proved by the fact that the Israeli Shin Bet’s chief Yuval Duskin set forth, in January 2008, the “results” achieved by its organization just by claiming 810 Palestinians killed during the last two years (G. Levy, “Strong in numbers”, Haaretz, 21 January 2008).
For more details over the ghastly facts that have produced this bloodshed between 2007 and 2008, we refer you, without any pretension of completeness, to the chronology of events in the appendix.
Hence it’s reasonable to state that there is no strictly military reason that may account for the Israeli attack against the Gaza Strip, since Israel proved to be pretty able to handle, with satisfactory results, this kind of conflict that the experts define “asymmetrical”.
Even as regards the second element of “blame” placed on Hamas, namely its liability for breaking the truce, a simple and unbiased reconstruction of the events in the last months, provided that it is depending on facts, actually shows Israel’s blatant responsibilities that originate from a clear, wanton and lasting strategy.
As has been observed by authoritative Israeli figures (interview with the Israeli general Shlomo Gazit, “The aim? It’s political, not military”, Il Messaggero daily, 29 December 2008), the Israeli attack’s reasons are merely political, leaving out of consideration the level of military intensity and the risks of a still possible extension of the conflict that might come in the future.
The truce between Hamas and Israel was reached on 19 June 2008 by virtue of Egyptian mediation: the aim was that of favouring an agreement between Al Fatah and Hamas, as a result of the internecine clash that had been going on for months, as indispensable promise to achieve an accord with the Jewish State, according to the expectations of Egypt and Saudi Arabia who are lined up with the western countries in demanding a partition, albeit unequal, of Palestine between Israel and Palestinians.
What is clear is that the truce was necessary to Hamas which had just taken over the control of the Gaza Strip, having to cope with, on one side, the Israeli army’s pressure and, on the other, the sealed Egyptian border and the civil conflict with Al-Fatah. After all, this is maintained, without mincing his words, by what today seems to be the Israeli strong man, Minister of Defence and former chief of staff of the Jewish State, Ehud Barak. To the Italian correspondent who interviewed him, during the truce, by asking: “The Israeli government has agreed on a truce with Hamas. Does this mean the failure of the political/economic embargo policy?”, he clearly replies: “Quite the contrary. Hamas demanded the ceasefire due to the embargo’s pressure and the military operations against the Qassam rocket launches. We won’t negotiate with Hamas, we are only dealing for having the kidnapped soldier released (translator’s note, Gilad Shalit). And we won’t negotiate until they accept the Quartet’s conditions: the recognition of Israel, acknowledgment of previous agreements and the giving up on violence. In short, until Hamas stops being Hamas.” (Corriere della Sera, 7 August 2008).
As gesture meant to prove its good will, on 30 October Hamas released all of the 19 Al-Fatah members it had been keeping in detention, in consideration of the opening of direct talks, which were to start on 8 November in Cairo. On Monday 3 November, Hamas dispatched beforehand a delegation to study Egypt’s and Al-Fatah’s proposals.
Wednesday 5 November an Israeli paratrooper unit carried out a “targeted” attack over the little town of Deir-al-Balah in the Gaza Strip, reportedly at the aim of destroying a tunnel used for introducing men and materials in Palestinian territory: a Palestinian fighter died during the operation. Hamas’ answer was a mortar shell towards Israeli territory. Israel then launched an air attack during which a further five Hamas fighters died.
Under the pretext of the rocket launches following the killing of the six militants, at that point Israel started closing all the border crossings thanks to which all the food, fuel and medicines could enter to bring relief to the 1.5 million Gazans.
“The attack comes shortly before a key meeting this Sunday in Cairo when Hamas and its political rival Al-Fatah will hold talks on reconciling their differences and creating a single, unified government. It will be the first time the two sides have met at this level since fighting a near civil war more than a year ago”, is the comment by Rory McCarthy, Jerusalem-based correspondent from the Guardian.
According to the Associated Press, the decision of the attack came directly from the Minister of Defence Ehud Barak: hence, not a mere routine operation but a military one which was politically motivated, since it infringed the truce standing since June 2008 and just at a time when the Palestinians had the first serious chance, after a year, of re-establishing a unified government to negotiate, in a united way, with Israel.
Yet, the importance of the attack didn’t only lie in making a détente between the 13 Palestinian fighting factions impossible: the political stakes for Israel were much higher, by investing a strategic element, preventing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from getting internationalized and to keep handling the negotiations within the Jewish State.
As a matter of fact, on 9 November in Sharm-al-Sheik, Egypt, a meeting of the so-called Quartet composed of US, EU, Russia and UN was expected to take place. Their main task was to keep the Annapolis peace process alive, after it had been started without any outstanding result by the American President Bush. The target, announced in November 2007, was in fact that of reaching an agreement between Israel and Al-Fatah within 2008, in order to avoid the definitive failure of the peace process.
Actually, the 9 November 2008 talks do nothing but bring about an outright empasse: considered that the US and Israel have a change of leadership ahead of them, the only new fact might just be a re-uninified Palestinian leadership that might exert a strong international pressure in favour of the peace process, since only the Palestinians had a concrete interest in reaching an agreement by the end of the year, well aware that otherwise Israel would settle the question on its own.
Therefore, the Israeli attack warded off this risk as well. Actually, Israel’s Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni would later say unmistakably: “We have taken steps so as to assure that the [peace] process will go on being bilateral and that the world won’t interfere with the contents of the talks but will back them without trying to impose solutions or to come up with frail ones”. Putting the international initiative off until an unspecified time, maybe to spring 2009 in Moscow, Israel therefore won again enough political manoeuvring room to take up the initiative in Palestine without any international interference.
On 11 November, the Israeli Premier Ehud Olmert claimed the inevitability of a clash with Hamas and, the following day, Israel carried out a raid provoking the death of further 4 Hamas militants in order to make the message clear both to Hamas itself and to the international community.
On 23 November, Hamas, urged once again by Egypt, stopped launching rockets and decided to resume talks with Al-Fatah, on condition that Israel would open the crossings in Gaza.
On 8 and 9 December, Israel achieved another fundamental international result, in which the role of the EU (under France’s Presidency) assumed particularly serious importance, considered the context in which it was acting, after the vain Sharm-el-Sheik talks and the Israeli breakdown operations in Gaza. As a matter of fact, EU Foreign Ministers passed a statement entitled “ Council Conclusions Strengthening of EU bilateral relations with its Mediterranean partners - upgrade with Israel”.
Actually, the aspect of particular interest of this statement is that the document was passed by the EU Ministers without taking into account the fact that a few days before, on 5 December, the European parliament, in spite of the personal intervention by Tzipi Livni, pronounced itself against the strengthening of relations with Israel precisely because of the complicated situation in Gaza (“Israël devra attendre", Le Monde, La valise diplomatique, 5 December 2008).
Yet, what was worth noting were the guidelines of the annex of the document, in which the main activities ensuing from the strengthening of the political dialogue with Israel were specified: holding regular joint summits between EU and Israeli Heads of State and Government, a privilege until then granted only to the US, China and Russia; Israeli experts joining EU committees dealing with issues such as the peace process, human rights, combating terrorism and organized crime; informal talks over strategic problems and exchanges dealing with matters of human rights and anti-Semitism; involving Israel in the EU common foreign and security-defence policies (CFSP-ESDP), including also Israeli experts into EU’s extra-European missions, such as in Africa and elsewhere. Moreover, since Israel can’t join the activities by Asia Group within the institutional system of the UN, the EU would seek to get the Jewish State joining the WEOG (“Western European and other Groups”), so that Israel, pursuing its old aspirations, could take part in several UN Councils, amongst which the Security Council!
Thus, thanks to France’s initiatives, Israel attains an extraordinarily important result on a strategic level, since in this way it gets the maximum from an unusual privileged relation with the EU, with huge implications for its international consequences in the Middle East and in the rest of the world. Along with the Sharm-el-Sheik failure, in a few days Israel had therefore achieved an extremely favourable international situation that grants it carte blanche as regards handling the Hamas matter and the Occupied Territories on the whole. This is proved by the fact that on 14 December the Jewish State could afford to stop at Tel Aviv airport and send back, in the general silence by the media, Prof. Richard Falk, Special Rapporteur of the UN, on behalf of which he had drawn up a highly severe report over Israel’s infringements of international law performed in the Palestinian Occupied Territories (scroll down this page for the document: http://www.clarissa.it/documenti/scarica.php?id=44&file=20090101174903FALK_SR_Report_GA_Palestine.pdf).
In consideration of the information he had gathered between January and July 2008, Falk accordingly claimed “the evidence of persisting and deliberate violations by Israel, in its occupation of Palestinian territory,” of the 4th Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of civilians in wartime and of the 1977 Protocol Annex to the 1949 Geneva Convention relating to Protection of victims in armed conflicts, which are fundamental international laws concerning human rights of civilian populations during armed conflicts.
On 17 December, just on the eve of the truce’s expiration, Israel launched another air strike against Gaza to which Hamas responded by firing eight rockets and five mortar shells against small Jewish towns in the south. At the same time, Hamas’ official spokesman Ayman Taha stated that, as Israel had been no longer complying with the truce since November, Hamas wasn’t going to prolong the truce beyond its expiration term, at 6 a.m. of 19 December.
In the meantime, since 4 November, Israel had killed in different operations at least 18 Palestinians altogether, mainly but not only fighters, while Hamas had launched about 200 between rockets and mortar shells, claiming no lives.
Just on 17 December, owing to the renewed hostilities, Israel again closed the crossings preventing the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees) from delivering food to the approximately 750 thousand Palestinians looked after in the Gaza Strip.
In spite of the truce not being prolonged after the expiration date of 19 December, on 20 December Hamas, still on Egyptian proposal, claimed its willingness to concede a further extension of 24 hours, provided that Israel would again open the crossings in order to let humanitarian aid in, while seeming to be willing to reconsider drawing out the truce.
Israel replied by closing the crossings and launched several air attacks against different posts in the Strip: on December 20, during the strike against Beith Lahiya, it killed a Palestinian militant, Ali Hijazi, while wounding four civilians, two of which were children.
On 21 December Italy itself was dragged into question since the Israeli authorities stopped the distribution by the PNA of Italy-raised funds for 20 million euros in favour of 47 thousand Palestinian families, with 9.36 million destined to the poorest ones. The Israeli-blocked funds were needed to pay social grants allotted to the Gaza population, grants distributed by the EU and financed by the Italian government in favour of 24 thousand poor families who should get their own monthly subsidy (Il Messaggero daily, 22 December 2008).
As far as we know, it doesn’t seem that the Italian government raised any protest against this clear violation of the international accords.
On 22 December, upon Egyptian suggestion, Hamas, please take note, unilaterally decided a 24-hour truce and didn’t any longer launch rockets against Israel in expectation of a meeting between Mubarak and Mahmud Abbas, due to take place on 23 December, as well as with Tzipi Livni, expected in Cairo for 25 December. In the meantime, the Israelis went on keeping the borders shut, worsening the problem of the Gazan population’s survival.
Yet, according to the press, at this date, the outgoing Premier Olmert, Defence Minister Barak and Foreign Minister Livni “were said to have already agreed on timing and methods for an eventual escalation that will be preceded by diplomatic and media campaign on international scale.” (Il Messaggero daily, 23 December 2008).
The same day, a Hamas leader, Mahmoud Zahar, released to the Israeli TV station “Channel 10” a statement according to which Hamas was set to restore the truce with Israel, since “this is the price to pay for the Palestinians’ lives”, while demanding in return that food and electricity supplies be allowed in and the military operations in Gaza and West Bank be stopped (Associated Press, 23 December 2008). The following day these statements would be repeated to other press agencies, for instance by Zahar himself to the authoritative France Press (23 December 2008) and by another Hamas spokesman, Fawzi Barhoum, to the BBC (23 December 2008).
Meanwhile, Israel went on carrying out manoeuvres with heavy weapons at the borders of Gaza Strip, started on 22 December. Then, on 23 December Israel killed, in other raids over the Strip, three Hamas militants and a fourth one on 24 December, the 23 year old Yahi Al-Shaaher, hit along with another three Palestinians in Rafah, while the Palestinian mortar shells and rockets started again being launched against Sderot. In this way, the chance for a new truce and a development of any negotiation was definitively torpedoed.
The talks in Cairo with Tzipi Livni on 25 December were of no other use but to repeat the accusations against Hamas, while on 26 December Olmert told the TV station Al-Arabya that “I will not hesitate to use Israel's strength to strike at Hamas and Islamic Jihad”.
Through international coverage duly set in the meantime, there was enough room to carry out the military operation, for which the Israeli government and “its” international press sources had the internal and world public opinion gradually prepared, placing the “blame” for the new offensive on Hamas, as imparted by the Jewish State’s Foreign Ministry to all its world diplomatic branches.
Yet, as any other good military operation, the great deal of information, spread through the media and the diplomatic talks underway, carefully preserved some kind of margin for a surprise attack operation: indeed, according to the Israeli site Debka which is specialized in strategy matters and linked Israeli military circles, it seems that Hamas leaders felt reassured due at least to two elements:
First, on Friday 26 December the press news from official Jerusalem sources gave the impression that the military operation approved of by the Israeli government was momentarily being called off, at least until the government held a new meeting for an update about the situation.
Second, Egypt led Hamas astray by reporting, from the “horse’s mouth”, the news according to which Israel wouldn’t attack on Saturday.
Well, these are the bare facts clearly stressing that the Jewish State, 60 years from its foundation and in a very delicate international situation, has simply decided to start a new bloody military operation in Palestine so as to settle the question represented by the Hamas hostile entity, carrying on a long-standing power strategy in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean area that in the next months might bring even more devastating effects on the international euqilibrium: as a matter of fact, it’s hard to think that Israel, in planning its showdown, hasn’t taken Iran into account.
Chronology of the major bloody events in the Palestinians territories occupied by Israel
The record includes the whole of 2007 and 2008 until the truce between Hamas and Israel (June 2008), since the following facts are discussed in the text above.
The news is drawn from press sources and may therefore be incomplete and be characterized by inaccuracies and mistakes. The reported facts mainly bear on Gaza Strip, even though also the main events that occurred in the West Bank have been recalled. Political facts have been reported only as far as they help understand the facts: in this respect, the chronology has no claim to completeness.
2007
4 January: clashes between Hamas and Al-Fatah go on in the Gaza Strip
15 Jan: two members from the Popular Resistance Committees killed by the Israeli army in the Strip
24 Jan: an unarmed Palestinian killed in Kissufim, at the border post between the Strip and Israel
25 Jan: at least 35 dead during clashes in Gaza between Hamas and Al-Fatah. On the day following the proclamation of a truce, a Hamas member, Hussein al Shubassi, is killed
4 February: after the break of the truce between Hamas and Al-Fatah, 28 Palestinians die during the 5 day-long clashes in Gaza
8 Feb: through Saudi Arabia’s mediation, Hamas and Al-Fatah reach an agreement in Mecca over a national unity government. Premier Olmert threatens to boycott the new executive unless it will comply with the Quartet’s demands
21 Feb: the Israeli army kills the leader of Islamic Jihad’s military wing in Jenin, Mahmud Qassem Abu Obeid
Three activists of the Islamic Jihad killed by Israeli soldiers in Jenin
12 March: the BBC correspondent Alan Johnston is kidnapped in the Gaza Strip
(15 April: the kidnapping is claimed by an unknown Palestinian group)
14 Mar: Hamas and Al-Fatah agree on the new national unity government (with 9 ministries to Hamas and 6 to Al-Fatah). Israel repeats its position
17 Mar: the new Haniyeh-led government takes office. Israel proclaims a total boycott until Hamas openly recognizes the Jewish State
21 Mar: an armed commando kidnaps Adham al Sufi, professor at the Islamic university of Gaza
27 Mar: two militants from Al Aqsa Brigades killed in Nablus by the Israeli army
4 April: Israeli strike against Beit Hanoun in the Strip: an Islamic Jihad member, Ramez Awad al Zaanin, is killed
7 Apr: Israeli air raid over Gaza Strip kills a member from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Fuad Nabil Maaruf
15 Apr: two Palestinians died during fights between rival factions in Khan Yunis, in the south of Gaza Strip
17 Apr: an Al Aqsa Brigade member, Ashraf Hanaysha, is killed by the Israeli army near Jenin, in the northern West Bank
21 Apr: three Palestinian militants, a policeman and a 17 year old girl are killed by the Israeli army in Jenin, West Bank. An Islamic Jihad militant killed in Jabalya, in the Gaza Strip
22 Apr: two members of Al Aqsa Brigades killed in Nablus, West Bank
24 Apr: due to the Israeli operations in Gaza and in the West Bank that have provoked 9 dead amongst the Palestinians, the Ezzedin al Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ armed organization, call off the ceasefire being in force since November 2006 and claim the rocket launches against southern Israel
28 Apr: three militants from Ezzedin al Qassam Brigades killed by the Israeli army in the Gaza Strip
16 May: at least 38 Palestinians died in the clashes in Gaza between Hamas and Al-Fatah; the fights burst following an agreement between Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh over a security plan in the Occupied Territories. Qassam rockets fired against the town of Sderot. Three Palestinians died after two Israeli strikes in Gaza Strip
19 May: the Palestinian factions reach a truce after 9 day-long fights that caused 50 dead in the Gaza Strip
23 May: 36 dead Palestinians in the Gaza Strip following a series of Israeli air raids against Hamas. An Israeli woman from Sderot is killed by the rocket launches by Palestinian groups
24 May: the Israeli armed forces arrest 30 members from Hamas in the West Bank, amongst which there is the Minister of Education Nasser al Shaer and some members of Parliament
27 May: the Israeli government has ordered further air strikes against the Gaza Strip: since May 16, 50 dead Palestinians and 2 dead Israelis in Sderot due to rocket launches
1 June: two Palestinians, aged 12 and 13, killed by the Israeli army near the former Jewish settlement of Dugit, northern Gaza Strip
9 June: a Palestinian dies in an attack against a military post in Israeli territory near the Gaza Strip
13 June: 67 Palestinians died in clashes between Hamas and Al-Fatah in the Strip
18 June: Hamas takes over control in Gaza Strip
27 June: 9 dead Palestinians and at least 40 wounded during Israel’s military operations in northern Gaza Strip; amongst the dead, there is Raed Fanuna, one of the Islamic Jihad organization’s leaders
30 June: two Israeli air raids cause the death of 7 Palestinians, amongst which Ziad al Ghanam, one of the chiefs from Al Quds Brigades, Islamic Jihad’s military arm
5 July: a set of Israeli air raids over Gaza Strip kills 11 Palestinian militants, amongst which 6 Hamas members
20 August: six Hamas militants killed in an Israeli raid in Gaza
21 Aug: two children killed by Israeli soldiers in Gaza Strip
22 Aug: two Hamas’ and two Islamic Jihad’s members killed in Israeli raids against Gaza Strip
25 Aug: two Palestinian militants from the Gaza Strip are killed during an attack in Israeli territory; four Palestinians killed by Israeli soldiers in the Gaza Strip (one Palestinian and one Israeli-Arab in the WB)
29 Aug: two Palestinian children killed by the Israeli Armed Forces in Jabalya, Gaza
6 September: 6 Palestinian militants killed by IAF soldiers during the attack against an Israeli military outpost in the Gaza Strip
11 Sept: 69 Israeli soldiers wounded in the blast provoked by a Qassam rocket against the base of Zikim, near Ashkelon
19 Sept: the Israeli government declares the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip a “hostile entity”
26 Sept: 7 Palestinians killed by the IAF in northern Gaza Strip
17 October: an Israeli soldier and a Hamas member die during fights in the south of the Gaza Strip
18 Oct: 4 dead Palestinians during clashes in Gaza between Hamas’ security forces and Al-Fatah’s supporters
25 Oct: the Israeli government sharpens sanctions against Gaza Strip’s population; cuts on fuel and electricity supplies are broken off on demand by Jewish State’s Attorney General Menachem Mazuz
12 November: Hamas’ police fires at the crowd gathered in Gaza during an Al-Fatah-called demonstration: seven dead and over two hundred arrested
20 Nov: 3 Palestinian militants killed by Israeli soldiers in the Gaza Strip
27 Nov: Annapolis conference, during which Ehud Olmert and Mahmud Abbas commit themselves to reaching a peace accord by the end of 2008
27 Nov: in Hebron, West Bank, Al-Fatah’s police stifles a demonstration against Annapolis conference. One dead and 35 wounded
4 December: three Hamas militants killed during an Israeli air strike over the Gaza Strip
11 Dec: six Hamas militants died in a series of Israeli raids in the Gaza Strip
18 Dec: 13 Palestinian militants died in various Israeli raids in the Gaza Strip, amongst which there is Islamic Jihad’s military chief Majed al Harazin
2008
1 January: 8 Palestinians killed during clashes between Hamas and Al-Fatah supporters in the Gaza Strip
3 Jan: Israeli air raids and destruction of houses in northern Gaza Strip: 11 dead Palestinians, among which two women
15 Jan: 17 Palestinians killed during an Israeli air raid over Al Zeitoun in the Gaza Strip; Hamas launches rockets and mortar shells against Sderot provoking four light wounded amongst Israeli civilians; two Palestinians killed after Israeli air raid over Beit Hanoun
16 Jan: Islamic Jihad’s leader Walid Obeidi is killed by the IAF near Jenin, West Bank
17 Jan: the Israeli government enjoins to close all the borders around Gaza Strip
20 Jan: Gaza’s power plant shut down due to lack of fuel
23 and 25 Jan: the dividing fence between Gaza Strip and Egypt is partly pulled down to let tens of thousands of Palestinians take supplies in Egypt and then go back to the Strip
27 February: five members from Hamas’ military wing are killed during air raid over Khan Yunis in Gaza Strip. A Qassam rocket launched from Gaza Strip kills an Israeli in Sderot
3 March: in response to the Israeli killed in Sderot, an Israeli offensive starts against Gaza Strip: 123 dead Palestinians altogether, among which at least half of them are civilians; it’s the bloodiest offensive in the last eight years
12 Mar: Hamas’ leader Ismail Haniyeh proposes a cease-fire to Israel, on condition that the Jewish State will stop economic sanctions and open the borders again
4 April: two Israelis and two Palestinians die during an attack at the border post of Nahal Oz in the Gaza Strip
9 Apr: five Palestinians killed in retaliation by the IAF; an Israeli soldier and a Palestinian died during an IAF’s raid in southern Gaza Strip
16 Apr: three Israeli soldiers killed near Nahal Oz border post; during the Israeli air force’s retaliation at least nine are killed, amongst which there are some children and a cameraman from Reuters press agency
18 Apr: 3 Hamas militants killed in the attack against the border post of Kerem Shalom in the Gaza Strip
23 Apr: the Israeli government let a million litres of fuel be delivered to Gaza’s power plant, by now run out of supplies; the UN claim that they will have to suspend the humanitarian activities underway in Gaza due to lack of provisions
27 Apr: a Palestinian woman and her four children are killed during an Israeli raid in Gaza Strip
14 Apr: a rocket launched by Hamas from Gaza causes dozens of wounded in a shopping center of Ashkelon
5 June: an Israeli is killed in the kibbutz of Nir Oz by a Qassam rocket launched from the Gaza Strip; in the following retaliation, the IAF kill a 4 year old little girl; Premier Olmert threatens a large scale offensive
http://www.clarissa.it/editoriale_int.php?id=240&tema=Divulgazione
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