Jamil Al-Sayyed: On Miqati resignation and the war on Syria

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Mikati’s Resignation: The End of Dissociation

While everyone will now be busying themselves with analyses and anecdotes about the domestic aspects of the crisis, the consequences of Mikati’s resignation for the tragedy in Syria are no less serious. (Photo: Haytham Moussawi)

 

By: Ibrahim al-Amin

 

Published Saturday, March 23, 2013

 

There are many details, and a lot has happened over the past few days. From Prime Minister Najib Mikati and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri’s trip to Rome, to President Michel Suleiman becoming persuaded that the domestic political set-up needs changing, to the contacts made in connection with the two cabinet sessions convened in the past couple of days.

What is clear is that Mikati’s resignation was essentially part of the crisis in Syria.

Regarding the domestic issues that prompted the move, which are inextricable from developments in Syria, a number of things can be noted.

One is the growing hold of the US and certain European and Arab governments over a great many Lebanese politicians, including Suleiman, Mikati, and Walid Jumblatt.

These countries wanted to block the adoption of a new election law that would deny the March 14 coalition a parliamentary majority and jeopardize the “balance-tipping” power of Jumblatt. So they went into action to ensure that no agreement would be reached on legislation that does not suit their strategy. Even the confused position of the Phalangists and Lebanese Forces was insufficient to enable the Orthodox Gathering Law to be approved.

Given Suleiman, Mikati, and Jumblatt’s insistence on involving Berri in the ploy to thwart the Orthodox Law, the speaker may have erred by not referring it to parliament earlier, rather than allowing the trio to mount their pre-emptive strike aimed at keeping the 1960 election law in place.

The trio assumed that pressure from the president and prime minister would suffice to achieve this goal. Their aides insist they had they cooperation of the speaker -- why else would he have agreed not to convene parliament to debate the Orthodox Gathering law? But it did not cross their minds that the people who matter would be unwilling to submit to blackmail once again.

The other directive that was issued relates to the security situation in the country.

For the West and its Arab clients, it is not enough to neutralize the Lebanese army, prevent it from acting decisively to bring the security breakdown under control, and threaten to split or scrap it. They also want direct control over the Internal Security Forces (ISF), so decided there is a pressing need for General Ashraf Rifi to be kept in his post as ISF head following the assassination of Wissam al-Hassan.

No opportunity was missed to press this point, whether in repeated remarks by the US ambassador to Lebanon, or in the Saudi ambassador’s claim to have been given an undertaking by the president of the republic that Rifi’s term would be extended. The French prime minister even raised the subject with Mikati, telling him within earshot of accompanying ministers that “President Hollande recommends” that Rifi be retained.

But the trio were unsure they could get that done. When Mikati failed to secure a direct promise from Berri, he sought at least to obtain one from Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). The big surprise was when Hezbollah’s reply, delivered to the prime minister minutes ahead of the resignation announcement, was “do what you deem appropriate.”

While everyone will now be busying themselves with analyses and anecdotes about the domestic aspects of the crisis, the consequences of Mikati’s resignation for the tragedy in Syria are no less serious. In this context, it would help to note the following:

– The sharp escalation of political and military pressure on the Syrian regime by its Arab and Western detractors. They have acted to foil any efforts by opposition figures to pursue a political settlement, such as by sidelining Moaz al-Khatib. This while running a massive scheme to arm and train thousands of fighters inside Syria, Turkey, and Jordan, ahead of what the Turks have been saying will be a decisive showdown in three months.

– The real results of US President Barack Obama’s visit to Palestine and Jordan. While urging the Palestinian president to keep praying, he was firm with the king of Jordan about the need to fall fully in line with the anti-Assad camp. More importantly, Obama obliged Israel’s leaders to keep quiet, refrain from action against either Iran, Syria, or Hezbollah.

– The American, European, and Gulf mobilization against Hezbollah, which has taken several forms: reactivating the issue of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL); putting pressure on the EU to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization; directly pressing the prime minister to do what is necessary to weaken Hezbollah’s influence in the government; and contriving a new controversy called “Hezbollah’s role in Syria.”

In light of the above, some worrying conclusions can be drawn:

– The slogan of dissociation from the Syrian crisis, even if it was never fully realistic, is being finally abandoned. The resignation of the government means involving Lebanon directly. In parallel, more pressure will be exerted on the army to prevent it from taking preventive measures, while the ISF will likely head toward disintegration, rendering it ineffective.

– The architects of this move are betting that change in Syria is inevitable and will come soon. One security veteran says it amazes him how time after time, world capitals behave as though the end of the war in Syria and the downfall of the regime are imminent. This wager requires waves of tension to be unleashed in Lebanon, in the belief that this will unsettle Hezbollah and prevent it from aiding the regime in Syria.

– The political chaos will be protracted, the elections are as good as postponed, and the political tilt of Suleiman-Mikati-Jumblatt will revive the fortunes of the March 14 camp. Some of its leaders made calls yesterday evening to arrange their affairs in anticipation of new ministerial and security posts.

God protect us.

Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

نهاية النأي بالنفس

‏السبت‏، 23‏ آذار‏، 2013

ابراهيم الأمين

تفاصيل كثيرة، والوقائع أكثر عن الأيام القليلة الماضية. من رحلة الرئيسين نبيه بري ونجيب ميقاتي إلى روما، إلى قناعة الرئيس ميشال سليمان بضرورة تعديل الوقائع السياسية الداخلية، وصولاً إلى الاتصالات الخاصة بجلستي الحكومة خلال اليومين الماضيين، لكن الاكيد ان استقالة الرئيس نجيب ميقاتي، تقع في صلب الأزمة السورية.

اما ما خص الجوانب الداخلية المرتبطة عضويا بما يجري في سوريا، فيمكن ملاحظة عدة أمور:

داخلياً، اتضح تعاظم الوصاية الأميركية والأوروبية ودول عربية على فريق سياسي كبير في لبنان، بما في ذلك الرئيسان سليمان وميقاتي والنائب وليد جنبلاط. وبدت هذه العواصم معنية برفض أي قانون جديد للانتخابات يطيح أكثرية فريق 14 آذار، ويهدد حجم «بيضة القبان» التي اسمها وليد جنبلاط. وبالتالي، حشدت هذه العواصم بقوة، لأجل منع حصول توافق على قانون جديد لها يناسب استراتيجيتها. وحتى الارباك الذي أصاب فريقي الكتائب و«القوات اللبنانية»، لم يكن كافياً لخوض معركة إقرار القانون الأرثوذكسي.
ومع إصرار الثلاثي سليمان، ميقاتي وجنبلاط على إقحام الرئيس بري في مناورة اسقاط الأرثوذكسي، فإن رئيس المجلس ربما يكون قد أخطأ في عدم التعجيل بإحالة اقتراح قانون اللقاء الأرثوذكسي على الهيئة العامة، لكن الثلاثي بادر من دون انتظار، إلى خوض المعركة الوقائية الهادفة الى التعامل مع قانون الستين على أنه أمر واقع. وافترض هذا الفريق، انه بالإمكان من خلال ضغوط رئيسي الجمهورية والحكومة، تحقيق هذا الهدف. ومرة جديدة يقول أركان «الثلاثي» انهم عملوا باتفاق مع رئيس المجلس، والا فلماذا وافق الأخير على عدم دعوة مجلس النواب إلى مناقشة اللقاء الأرثوذكسي، لكن فات هؤلاء ان القوى صاحبة الامر والنهي، ليست في وارد الخضوع مجددا للابتزاز.

أمر العمليات الآخر، كان متصلاً بالواقع الأمني في البلاد. لم يكتف الغرب وعرب الغرب بالعمل على تحييد الجيش اللبناني، ومنعه من القيام بدور حاسم لضبط فلتان أمني خطير، والتلويح بتقسميه وتخريبه، بل طالبوا بإبقاء مؤسسة قوى الأمن الداخلي تحت الوصاية المباشرة، ووجد هذا الفريق ان بقاء اللواء أشرف ريفي في منصبه، ضرورة ملحة، بعد اغتيال العميد وسام الحسن. ولم يترك الغربيون والعرب فرصة إلا أشاروا فيها إلى هذه النقطة. من الكلام المكرر للسفيرة الأميركية في لبنان، إلى زعم السفير السعودي حصوله على تعهد رئيسي الجمهورية والحكومة بالتمديد لريفي، وصولاً إلى قيام رئيس الحكومة الفرنسية بفتح الموضوع أمام الرئيس ميقاتي، وعلى مسمع الوفد الوزاري، قائلاً له: إن الرئيس هولاند يوصي بالتجديد لريفي.

في هذه اللحظة الداخلية، أظهر الثلاثي المتمرد اليوم، قلقاً إزاء مسار الأمور، وانطلقت وساطات بلغت حد المقايضة من أجل تمرير ملفي هيئة الإشراف على الحملة الانتخابية والتمديد لريفي. وكان ميقاتي على وجه الخصوص، يسعى إلى الحصول على وعد مباشر من رئيس المجلس. وإزاء فشله، سعى إلى الحصول، أقله، على وعد من حزب الله والتيار الوطني. وعنصر المفاجأة البارز كان في أن حزب الله رد بعبارة وصلت إلى رئيس الحكومة قبل دقائق من إذاعته بيان الاستقالة: «افعل ما تراه مناسباً!».

وإذا كان الجميع سوف يُشغل في تحليلات وروايات تتعلق بالعناصر الداخلية للأزمة، إلا أن الواقع الأكثر صعوبة، يتصل بموقع خطوة استقالة الرئيس ميقاتي، في سياق المأساة السورية. وفي هذا السياق، من المفيد ملاحظة الآتي:

ـــ مسارعة الفريق العربي والدولي المناوئ للنظام السوري إلى خطوات عملانية هدفها زيادة الضغط السياسي والميداني، من محاصرة أي مبادرة من جانب شخصيات في المعارضة، مثل عزل معاذ الخطيب، إلى مخالفة عناصر التوافق الأميركي ـــ الروسي، وتعيين رئيس حكومة انتقالية سوف تنقل لها كل مصالح سوريا في العالم، مروراً بأوسع عملية تدريب وتجهيز مع أسلحة نوعية لآلاف المقاتلين، في داخل سوريا، وفي تركيا والأردن، لأجل إعداد خطة يتولى الأتراك الحديث عنها، باعتبارها المعركة الفاصلة ضد النظام خلال الأشهر الثلاثة المقبلة.

ـــ تبيان النتائج الفعلية لزيارة الرئيس الأميركي باراك أوباما إلى فلسطين والأردن، اذ تمنى على الرئيس الفلسطيني الاكثار من الصلاة والدعاء، فهو كان حازما مع ملك الأردن ازاء ضرورة الانضواء الكامل في الجبهة العاملة ضد بشار الأسد. والاهم إلزام اوباما قيادة اسرائيل الصمت، والامتناع عن أي مبادرة، لا ضد إيران، ولا ضد سوريا ولا ضد حزب الله، والتصالح مع تركيا والانطلاق نحو مستوى جديد من التنسيق بين الدولتين، وخصوصاً انهما باتتا اليوم أمام عدو واحد هو بشار الأسد.

ـــ استنفار أميركي وأوروبي وخليجي ضد حزب الله، تمثل أولاً في تنشيط ملف المحكمة الدولية، والضغط لأجل اعتبار أوروبا حزب الله منظمة إرهابية، وتعميم أجواء التحريض على الحزب بوصفه مصدر خطر على أرزاق اللبنانيين في العالم العربي، والضغط المباشر على رئيس الحكومة للقيام بما يلزم لأجل إضعاف حضور حزب الله داخل الحكومة، وتعزيز الحملة ضده من جانب قوى إسلامية الطابع لاجل ترهيبه بالفتنة السنية ـــ الشيعية. وصولاً إلى اعداد ملف خاص اسمه: دور حزب الله في سوريا.
وعلى قاعدة ما سبق، يمكن المسارعة إلى وضع بعض الاستنتاجات المقلقة:

التخلي نهائياً عن شعار النأي بالنفس عن الأزمة السورية، واذا كان الشعار ليس واقعياً من حيث المبدأ، الا ان خطوة استقالة الحكومة، تعني اقحام لبنان مباشرة، ما يعني توقع توترات أمنية ليس فقط على الحدود مع سوريا، بل ربما داخل الأراضي اللبنانية. بموازاة ضغوط إضافية على الجيش لمنعه من القيام باعمال ردعية، واعتبار قوى الأمن الداخلي، مؤسسة سائرة نحو الانشقاق أو التشرذم، وبالتالي انعدام الفاعلية.

ـــ ان من يقف خلف هذه «الخطوة الغبية» يراهن بقوة على متغيرات حتمية في سوريا خلال وقت قريب. ويروي مرجع أمني بارز، أنه يفاجأ مرة تلو الأخرى، بأن عواصم عالمية تتصرف على أساس ان الحرب في سوريا على وشك الانتهاء لمصلحة سقوط النظام. وهذا الرهان يعني، إفلات الساحة اللبنانية امام موجات من التوتر، على خلفية أن هذا الأمر، قد يمثل عنصر ازعاج لحزب الله، وذلك بقصد منعه من مساعدة حكم الأسد.

ـــ ان الفوضى السياسية سوف تطول، وان الانتخابات صارت في حكم المؤجلة، وإن الانحياز السياسي الثلاثي، سليمان ـــ ميقاتي ـــ جنبلاط، سوف يعيد الحيوية إلى فريق 14 آذار، الذي بدأ بعض أركانه مساء أمس، يجرون الاتصالات لترتيب سيارات وياقات جديدة، أملاً في مناصب رئاسية ووزارية وأمنية...
الله يستر!

River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian  
The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of this Blog!

Italian newspaper: Wesam al-Hassan held a secret meeting with a delegation from the "Hamas" in Berlin one day before he was assassinated

 

Source IL FOGLIO and Syria truth

"What interest had the Lebanese general to talk to Hamas in what would become his last trip?"

The meeting was attended by the commander of the German police, “Joerg Ziercke” and German intelligence officers to discusses how to use the "Hamas" as a fifth column in Syria

The Italian newspaper "IL FOGLIO" in its release today revealed that the Lebanese General Wesam al-Hassan, the head of the intelligence, one day before his return to Lebanon, held a secret meeting in Berlin, attended by the President of the German Federal Police, "Joerg Ziercke" and representatives from the German intelligence (BND) and a delegation from the "Hamas" Palestinian movement.
Wesam al Hassan was killed by a car bomb on October 19 in Beirut after his return from Paris, where he was visiting family who moved there since 2005 for safety reasons.

Before flying to the French capital for personal reasons,  Wessam had been in Berlin together with four other services men to meet Jörg Ziercke, head of the German Federal Police.
In Berlin, however, Wesam al Hassan had also met men of the German intelligence service (BND) and a delegation of Hamas, the armed Palestinian group that controls the Gaza Strip.

What interest had the Lebanese general to talk to Hamas in what would become his last trip?

The rightist newspaper, known with its relations with "neo-conservatives" and defending the Israeli Likud, claimed that the conferees, led by Hassan, main theme was the situation in Syria, and Hamas whose armed rebels are at war against the government in Damascus, and knows the Syrian regime from the inside and has an extensive network of contacts in Syria, both in the cities and regions and especially in the Palestinian refugee camps still controlled by the government.

Moreover, Hamas still have a strong presence in Syria, despite the departure of its political leader, Khaled Meshaal, after 11 years of residence as a special guest protected by the Syrian secret services. In late February, Meshaal, broke with President Bashar al-Assad and left Damascus and now lives between Egypt and Qatar, both countries are enemies of Damascus.
Before leaving Syria, Assad has twice refused to talk to Meshaal. Hamas even through the difficulties of the war continues to maintain a strong presence among the Palestinians in Syria where Hundred thousand Palestinians live in Damascus in the "camp" of the Yarmouk, which has long been transformed into a normal neighborhood.

Consequently Hamas has the potential to become a deadly fifth column inside Syria,
Perhaps it is already the fifth column. The fighters of the rebel group Ahfad al-Rasul, the "Brigade of the descendants of the Prophet", present in the Yarmouk camp and in the area south of the capital are mostly supporters of Hamas (as confirmed by Wednesday, November 28 edition of the Arab newspaper Al Quds al Arabi).

According to the Italian newspaper, before jumping in the air in Beirut, General Hassan was part of the Lebanese who has sided against the Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad (to the point that immediately after the bomb everyone immediately pointed the finger at Damascus) and worked in contact with the Saudi intelligence to offer help to the rebels Syrians.

The German intelligence service have good contacts with Islamist groups in the Middle East - in 2009 took part in the negotiations to free the Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit, captured by Hamas - and therefore know how to accommodate contradictions, especially since it has already played the same role between the Americans and the "Taliban" movement!

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Incoherence: 'Salafis clash with Lebanon's ISF & blame ....Hezbollah'

FLC

"... A dispute erupted between an Internal Security Forces (ISF) unit and the son (14 years) of Salafi cleric Ahmad al-Assir in South Lebanon’s Sidon on Sunday, the National News Agency reported.
According to the report, after ISF members ordered Omar al-Assir to stop his car after failing to produce registration at an entry checkpoint in Sidon, five cars carrying around 13 armed men arrived and freed Omar “by force.”... ,and yet, the story continues to say: "...Ahmad al-Assir, Imam of the Bilal bin Rabah mosque, has ordered Hezbollah to remove banners and flags.The NNA said that Hezbollah took down the banners and flags earlier in the day amid Lebanese military presence in the port city. ..."

 

Two killed in South Lebanon gunfight Published Sunday, November 11, 2012 Shooting in Lebanon’s southern city of Sidon left at least two people dead and three injured Sunday in a gunbattle between supporters of Salafi cleric Ahmad al-Assir and his opponents, media reported. The fighting took place in the neighborhood of Taamir, near Ain al-Helwe. Lebanese radio reported that one of the casualties is Assir’s bodyguard. Earlier in the day Assir’s son, Omar, was stopped at a police checkpoint in Sidon and arrested for not having proper registration papers. Within minutes, five cars of carrying pro-Assir gunmen arrived to the checkpoint and confronted the police, forcing them to release Omar, according to Al Manar. It is not clear whether or how the attempted arrest is related to the gunfight. Tensions have been high in Sidon since the March 14-aligned cleric issued a demand for the removal of Hezbollah and Amal banners throughout the city. Video shows Assir demanding the removal of Hezbollah and Amal banners: Unconfirmed reports say Zayed Daher, a Hezbollah official, was wounded in the fighting. Another unconfirmed report said supporters the Osama Saad, head of the Popular Nasserite Organization which is allied with Hezbollah, were involved in the fighting. A heavy army force has since been deployed to the area. (Al-Akhbar) Video on Assir’s Role in Provoking Sunday’s Clashes   River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of this Blog!

Wissam al-Hassan: A Man Who Had Many Enemies

Urgent investigations conducted by the Information Branch did not show any suspicious activities in the area. But the precision of the information from the UAE led Hassan to treat it seriously. (Photo: Marwan Tahtaht)

 

By: Hassan Illeik

 

Published Tuesday, October 30, 2012

 

The fallout from the assassination of Internal Security Forces (ISF) Information Branch chief Wissam al-Hassan nearly two weeks ago was very similar to that following the series of assassinations that has rocked Lebanon since 2005.

Syria was blamed immediately, and those who expressed doubt were labeled collaborators. March 14 alluded to Hezbollah’s involvement as well. Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea even went as far as accusing Hezbollah directly.

Jumping to conclusions prevents honest dialogue. In reality, prior to his death, Hassan felt threatened by more than one party.

People who knew Hassan heard him in recent years speak about those he thought wanted to kill him. Some of this information was based on analysis, but some of it was also based on data and facts on the ground.

Of course, Hassan had his suspicions regarding Syria’s role in Lebanon. Over the last few months, he became more apprehensive towards Syrian intelligence agencies. He would often mock their structural weaknesses, which became especially obvious following the arrest of former minister Michel Samaha who was indicted for his involvement in "terror plots" in Lebanon on behalf of the Syrian regime.

Hassan also never hid his conviction that Hezbollah, along with Syria, was behind the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri, but he was convinced it was the product of a conspiracy within the organization.

Hassan believed that Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and assassinated Hezbollah military commander Imad Mughniyeh did not have prior knowledge of the killing and were not involved in it in any way.

The intelligence chief made it clear that he feared a certain group within Hezbollah made up of “undisciplined elements who do not obey their leadership.”

This apprehension did not prevent Hassan from cooperating with Hezbollah and even exchanging intelligence on several occasions.

While the Information Branch led the crackdown on Israeli spy networks over the last four years, the Resistance provided information that was crucial to their discovery.

“The are better than us in human intelligence gathering,” he would say of Hezbollah’s intelligence branch.

Hassan knew that the nature of his work made him a target. He often said that his job “left me without any friends.”

A few months ago, Hassan told people close to him about meetings he had with Jordanian officials, including the head of Jordanian intelligence, who he met in Germany, and a minister linked to Jordanian intelligence.

He said that each of them had relayed information – on separate occasions – about discussions with the Israelis regarding the situation in Lebanon.

As a result, both officials told Hassan that the Israelis do not look on him favourably and that he should be careful, even in Europe.

Hassan knew that the Israelis were after his neck. On several occasions, he reportedly said that he did not feel safe in Europe anymore.

He was aware of the damage done to Israel through the unraveling of its spy networks in Lebanon, starting in 2007 when the Intelligence Branch commenced its counter-intelligence operations.

Hassan also received a clear message from the US Congress, which cut back on some of the joint programs between his branch and its American counterparts. On one occasion, several US Senators explicitly informed Hassan that were facing Israeli pressure to stop their assistance to Lebanon.

But the clearest message came from the Jordanian intelligence officer he met with almost a year ago and whose warnings he took seriously.

Earlier this year, Hassan got another warning. In January 2012, he received a letter from the United Arab Emirates’ intelligence body saying they had credible information that a high ranking officer from the ISF would be targeted with a car bomb in Achrafieh on the road between the ISF headquarters and the officer’s safe house.

The information came as a surprise to Hassan, since he believed his safe house in Achrafieh was a secret. Even his closest aides were not informed of its location. He knew that the information from the UAE concerned him personally, the Achrafieh safe house being his own.

All he could do was leak the information to the press, to tell those who wanted to assassinate him that their plot had been discovered.

Urgent investigations conducted by the Information Branch did not show any suspicious activities in the area. But the precision of the information from the UAE led Hassan to treat it seriously.

The information was leaked to the press and treated, as usual, as fodder for internal Lebanese politicking. The Information Branch was accused of fabricating the information to use it to pry communications data from telecom operators.

But for the security officers concerned with the investigation, the issue was critical. Hassan did not know who was behind the plot discovered by UAE intelligence.

He assumed it was related to Syrian intelligence operations. He remained convinced of this until he met a UAE intelligence official who told him that their information points to al-Qaeda, specifically one of their groups operating out of the Ain al-Helweh Palestinian refugee camp.

Wissam al-Hassan knew he had to stay a step ahead of his adversaries, some of whom remained a mystery even to him. He knew his enemies were many and that the last seven years of his life as a top intelligence chief only made him more of a target.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian
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Lebanon’s Red Lines, Bared

Sunday, Oct 28 2012
By Sharmine Narwani

What a difference a week can make in the Middle East.

On October 19, when a car bomb tore through the upscale Christian neighborhood of Achrafiyeh in Beirut killing a major security official, Lebanon shuddered in fear that the era of political assassinations was back.

Politicians and commentators didn’t miss a beat. The murder of Internal Security Forces (ISF) Information Branch head Wissam al-Hassan was compared to the killing of his former boss, ex-PM Rafiq Hariri in 2005. And the Hariri-allied pro-West, anti-Syria, pro-Saudi “March 14” political coalition lined up to deliver a visceral blow to their opponents, just as they had in 2005 when they ejected Syrian troops from Lebanon.

Hassan’s body was not yet cold before his political allies started pointing their fingers at Syria and whipping up fury in the anti-Syrian Sunni enclaves of Lebanon. Young men spilled onto the streets with weapons brandished; some with RPGs and even combat uniforms. Clashes ensued, people died, but still their March 14 leaders did not call for calm.

In a replay of 2005 when hundreds of thousands of Lebanese rose up in the State Department-dubbed “Cedar Revolution” to oust the Syrians, March 14 groups on Sunday called for the masses to rally against Syria and its Lebanese government allies.

Except that not a single Syrian was ever charged by the international UN-backed tribunal that investigated Hariri’s death. And last week there was no evidence that Syria was implicated in Hassan’s assassination either.

But that didn’t stop the political theater at Hassan’s funeral service last Sunday when just a few thousand showed up to participate in what some hoped would be a replay of 2005.
There was no comparison whatsoever.

Instead of the sea of Lebanese flags, unifying slogans like “Freedom, Sovereignty, Independence” and the dazzling marketing and color-revolution choreography of, respectively, Saatchi & Saatchi and Serbia’s Otpor that marked the 2005 event…the scene at Martyr’s Square in downtown Beirut on Sunday resembled a wake for the March 14 coalition.

There was barely a Lebanese flag to be seen. Instead, the throngs held up flags of the Future Movement headed by Hariri’s son Saad, right-wing Lebanese Forces Christian militia flags, Saudi flags, the colonial flag of the Syrian opposition and Islamist flags in black. Radical Muslims rallied alongside radical Christians, their one commonality, revulsion for the Syrian government and its allies Iran and Hezbollah.

The visible awkwardness of these March 14 alliances was impossible to ignore on Lebanese TV that day. Who failed to note the incongruity of a right-wing Christian Samir Geagea supporter standing next to a Sunni youth sporting an Al Qaeda headband?
How can there be a future for a Future Movement so fundamentally at odds within itself, one wondered.

The crowds had little in common, their disparate leaders were smug, the mood was nationally divisive – little wonder then that the event ended with sticks and stones and tear gas. Not to mention a pitiful attempt to storm the Grand Serail and eject the Lebanese government headed by Hezbollah ally and billionaire Sunni, Prime Minister Najib Mikati.

Those few hours on Sunday produced the first post-bombing revelation:

March 14 has nothing to offer Lebanon – they are morally bankrupt, out of ideas, yesterday’s leaders clawing for relevance as the region changes rapidly around them. Their supporters too are just treading water – this grouping exists only in opposition to something; it stands for nothing.

While the bombing had March 14 licking their opportunistic lips, it was their own western allies France, the UK and US (FUKUS) that crushed their political hopes. Without any apparent tactical coordination, FUKUS overrode March 14 publicly, and declared that PM Mikati and his government must stay.

What is surprising is March 14’s utter cluelessness about the way those winds were blowing. Not just FUKUS, but all five UN Security Council permanent members and Ban-Ki Moon’s personal representative in Lebanon weighed in on the side of Mikati’s government.

Not only was the UNSC speaking with one voice, but the speed and decisiveness of their message also undermined a key March 14-FUKUS refrain. In effect, the global powers were recognizing that the Iran and Hezbollah-backed Lebanese government was integral to guaranteeing the country’s stability at a vulnerable time. No longer could this duo claim that these regional players were acting to destabilize Lebanon.

And so another red line is bared. The three main western backers of the Syrian and Lebanese opposition have shown their limits:

It is perfectly okay to sow sectarian strife in Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere, but not if it means destabilization on several of Israel’s borders. One conflict-struck country is manageable in the Levant, but more than that and things can spread like wildfire.

Controlled chaos is fine, but certainly not concurrent with a power vacuum. A powerless Lebanese state will mean loss of control over the critical southern territories along the Israeli border and along the eastern border with Syria – both are hard limits for FUKUS.

The FUKUS states have of course realized that at this critical juncture in Syria, they need levers in neighboring Lebanon. They care not a whit about their allies being in power – a compliant government is far less valuable than one with “access.” The governing March 8 coalition is led by a weak and malleable Mikati, but importantly, he is a route to Iran, Syria and Hezbollah – which counts when regional stakes are this high.

No matter that Hezbollah has just flown a drone over FUKUS-ally Israel in an embarrassing breach of security for the Jewish state. No matter that Israel has been demanding military strikes against Iran just before a US presidential election. No matter that March 14 have been staunch FUKUS allies in both a local and regional geopolitical context against mutual foes Syria, Iran and Hezbollah.

The only thing that counts now is that FUKUS isn’t confident about the outcome in Syria. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has outlasted all their predictions and opposition forces supported by the west are radicalizing in a direction that makes their mentors uncomfortable. If Islamist militants spin out of control in Syria, FUKUS will need to tame that chaos fast, before it spills into allied Jordan and Israel and further disrupts the Turkish and Lebanese borders.

The red lines hurriedly drawn in Lebanon last week have shown regional antagonists some new and unexpected cards. March 14’s diffuse political identity resonates little with the Lebanese, and its interests are diverging from traditional external allies. FUKUS and the UNSC views the Iran, Hezbollah and Syria-backed Lebanese government as a force for stability in the Levant. Western leaders fear loss of control in the Syrian crisis they helped fan. Iran and Hezbollah hold valuable levers for the international community.

We may never discover who killed Wissam al-Hassan, but Lebanon last week was full of revelations nonetheless.

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'In Beirut Blast, US Loses a Top Ally'

'In Beirut Blast, US Loses a Top Ally'

[WSJ] "...WASHINGTON—The assassination of Lebanon's security chief a week ago robbed the U.S. and Europe of one of its closest allies in monitoring and countering the regional activities of Lebanon's Hezbollah, as well as its backers in Syria and Iran, said U.S. and Arab officials.

 

Brig. Gen. Wissam al-Hassan headed intelligence-gathering for Lebanon's police force, the Internal Security Forces, which was among Beirut's primary recipients of U.S. financial aid since mass protests forced Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to remove his troops from the country in 2005.

 

Because of Gen. Hassan's ties to the West, Arab and Western officials said they believed last Friday's car bombing in central Beirut—which killed the security chief and seven others—was a warning from Syria and Iran. Its aim, these people say, was to warn anti-Syrian politicians in Lebanon and the West not to work for the overthrow of Mr. Assad's regime in Damascus.

 

"This is a big blow for the Americans because of Hassan's role inside Lebanon," said a senior Arab diplomat. "He was the top intelligence chief and interlocutor."...

 

In late August, according to Arab diplomats, Gen. Hassan visited Washington, where he held extensive discussions with the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, David Petraeus, and other senior Obama administration officials.

 

The two spy chiefs discussed Syria's efforts to destabilize Lebanon using Hezbollah and pro-Damascus politicians, these officials said. They also discussed Hezbollah's efforts to bolster Mr. Assad's security forces inside Syria, by sending in military advisers and fighters. Hezbollah has denied acting inside Syria.

 

A senior U.S. official praised Gen. Hassan as "a significant figure" but stressed that U.S. intelligence ties to Lebanon go beyond one person. "It would be wrong to overestimate the damage to the U.S. from this one attack,........ His killing doesn't have to be a trigger for even more violence."

Gen. Hassan also maintained close ties to French intelligence....

 

The U.S. has specifically worked with the ISF to deploy Lebanese security officials in areas traditionally dominated by Hezbollah in south Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley...."

Posted by G, M, Z, or B at 12:43 PM

 

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Is There a Link Between the al-Hassan and Hariri Assassinations?

A link between this attack and the 2005 assassination of Hariri must be proven. (Photo: Marwan Tahtah)

 

By: Omar Nashabe

Published Monday, October 22, 2012

 

With foreign intelligence agencies offering to assist in investigating Friday’s assassination of top security official Wissam al-Hassan, the politically delicate situation of the possible involvement of the STL is being discussed.

At a press conference on Saturday, Prime Minister Najib Mikati was asked: “You say that this crime [the assassination of Brigadier-General Wissam al-Hassan] is of the same gravity as the murder of [the late] Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. So why has the case not been referred to the international tribunal, especially when you are speaking of ‘international investigations’?”

Mikati replied: “The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was set up for a specific situation, at a specific time. I did not wish to preempt the issue before discussing it with the international organizations. The decision is clear – it is to cooperate with every foreign and international body, agency and authority. The tribunal is one of the organizations we can resort to for help when needed.”

Besides the clear indication that he will be inviting foreign intervention into Lebanese affairs, Mikati’s reply is not even factually correct. The STL, the international tribunal tasked with investigating the assassination of Hariri, only has jurisdiction over the 14 February 2005 attack, in which Hariri and others died, and dozens were wounded. If the tribunal comes to consider – according to the principles of criminal justice and through investigations carried out by its own public prosecutor – that other attacks in Lebanon carried out between 1 November 2004 and 12 December 2005 are linked to the 14 February 2005 attack, and that their nature and gravity are comparable, then the court will also have jurisdiction over these attacks.

However, if the Lebanese government, in agreement with the UN secretary general and with the approval of the UN Security Council, decides to ask STL prosecutor Norman Farrell to expand his jurisdiction to include attacks that took place in Lebanon after 12 December 2005 – such as Hassan’s assassination – then a link between this attack and the 2005 assassination of Hariri must be proven.

This link would have to include – for example, but not exclusively – a number of the following factors: criminal intent (motive), the aim of the attacks, the status of the targeted victims, the modus operandi of the attacks, and the alleged perpetrators. The government will not be able to reach a conclusion on any such link in a short period of time. The official agencies in charge of the investigation would have to complete the first phase of their mission and place the preliminary information in the hands of the judicial authorities, who can in turn send their report to the cabinet via the justice minister.

Three days after the bombing in Achrafieh, one can discuss some of the preliminary information to determine whether there is any basis for a link between the attacks, though the investigation is a long way from being resolved:

First, it seems that investigating criminal intent will include local parties, as well as regional and international parties. One of the motives for the crime could have been to disable a security/ intelligence apparatus that has proven capable of arresting several persons, some of whom were later convicted in court, for working on behalf of Israeli intelligence services. Hassan’s Information Branch also foiled an operation to transport explosives to Lebanon from Syria, allegedly at the behest of the Syrian government. Possible motives for the attack, therefore, could include regional intelligence services settling scores.

However, examining the motives for the attack against Hariri – according to the STL prosecution’s indictment – and the possible motives for Hassan’s assassination, leads to the conclusion that a connection ought to be ruled out. The international indictment, or arrest warrants resulting from it, do not point to any relationship between the four accused in Hariri’s assassination and the Syrian or Israeli intelligence services.

Second, it seems that the aim of the Achrafieh attack was not just to assassinate Hassan, but also to spread fear among the people in a predominantly Christian area. Some of the attacks that followed the assassinations of 2005 were also aimed at spreading fear among people in areas that belonged to this same sect, without targeting any specific person (such as the attacks in Kaslik, Sadd al-Bouchrieh and Ashrafieh between 2005 and 2007). Undoubtedly, a careful examination of the criminal techniques used in the Hassan assassination will help uncover the motive behind the attack.

Third, the largest number of direct victims of this attack were civilians with no relationship to the target. When it comes to the target himself, one can clearly distinguish the significance of his institutional position from his political, sectarian or religious one. Hassan was an officer in the Internal Security Forces, but despite law number 17/90 forbidding officers of this institution from getting involved in politics, Hassan also played a political role, which almost overshadowed his institutional one. On this basis, we can say that Hassan’s status does correlate with that of Hariri. In addition, Hassan was one of Hariri’s closest companions before the latter was assassinated, because he was in charge of protocol at the time. Hassan had resigned from the security forces, but decided to rejoin them after the Hariri assassination with the aim of establishing a sophisticated security intelligence force. Therefore, it seems that Hassan operated in a more practical and functional capacity than a merely symbolic or superficial one.

This compels a return to the motives of the crime, where it appears that the argument for deactivating the agency Hassan led is stronger than the motive for inciting strife. In other words, Hassan’s security, intelligence and operational position, and his responsibility for essential daily tasks, can help establish the criminal intent. It also permits a distinction from other assassinations, which targeted persons who were playing or had played a political, media or military role, with the exceptions of Major Wissam Eid, assassinated in 2008, and Lieutenant Colonel Samir Shehadeh, who survived an assassination attempt in 2006.

Fourth, as for the modus operandi of the attack, preliminary information indicates that it differed from previous ones. From camera and audio recordings, it appears that the attack was the result of two bombs – not one – as was the case with all other assassinations since 2005, with the exception of the attack against ex-minister Pierre Gemayel, who was shot. As with the previous attacks, it is most likely that the target was being carefully surveilled. But the difference between Hassan and most of the previous targets is that he was the best qualified to protect himself from such surveillance. The founder and director of the most sophisticated intelligence service in Lebanon should have been able to uncover any attempt to infiltrate his service or to monitor his movements.

Fifth, searching for possible suspects in the initial phase should not be limited to the intelligence and security services operating on Lebanese soil that are technically capable of carrying out such an attack. Rather, the investigation should also consider the degree to which this attack benefits each of these services and states.

As for the international tribunal, it seems that most security and government agencies in Lebanon, with Prime Minister Mikati at the forefront, are pointing the finger at Syrian intelligence, not to Hezbollah – the party to which the four men accused by the STL of assassinating Hariri belong.

---

Can the Investigation be Entrusted to the Information Branch?
Assassinated Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan built a sophisticated security-intelligence apparatus that was supposed to be under the authority of the chiefs of staff of the Internal Security Forces’ General Directorate. The Information Branch is considered to be the most sophisticated and effective security apparatus in Lebanon. Its officers and rank and file are highly-qualified as are its technical experts, who underwent training in Lebanon, the US and Europe. As for equipment, Hassan presided over the most state-of-the-art equipment, offices and technology.

However, despite all these qualifications and abilities, professional standards dictate that another apparatus should be placed in charge of investigating the assassination of the agency’s director and founder. Officers at the Information Branch knew Hassan personally, which implies an emotional connection that has to be suspended in criminal investigations.

Tasking officers at the Information Branch with investigating Hassan’s assassination should be avoided – not least of all because Hassan’s movements were a closely-guarded secret, and the trap set for him in a back alley of Achrafieh presupposes that his assassins may have been privy to inside information.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

Wissam al-Hassan and the Information Branch

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Looking Behind and Into the Assassination

Hassan had previously received warnings from Arab intelligence agencies that Israel was upset with him for cooperating with Hezbollah (Photo: Haytham alMoussawi)

By: Ibrahim al-Amin

Published Tuesday, October 23, 2012

Let us try to enter the mind of whoever decided on and carried out the assassination of Wissam al-Hassan.

They (an individual, organization or state) must have considered Hassan to be an enemy who needed to be got rid of. This may have been to punish him for something he did, to prevent him from doing something, or to use the assassination to send a message with political and security overtones to the parties seen as standing behind Hassan. Accordingly, in addition to making the necessary logistical and technical preparations, the killers would have considered the likely repercussions of and reactions to such a move, both if it were to succeed and if it were to fail.

Given Lebanon’s experience over the past decade, any rational person would know that the assassination of someone of Hassan’s stature would have an explosive impact. But this rational person may have decided to proceed with the operation having taken the anticipated fallout fully into account. It is also clear from the nature of the operation that the perpetrator was highly professional. That leaves us with limited possibilities.

First, that Lebanese parties were involved, in collaboration with external parties, because they supposed the direct political fallout from an operation of this magnitude would benefit their political side. The assassination could be expected to bolster the political camp to which Hassan belongs. The political repercussions would, therefore, be highly negative for the perpetrators if they were opponents of March 14.

Second, that the perpetrators’ external political connections enabled them to conclude that the killing would not cause a major change in their domestic political scene, nor even in the regional and international scene as it relates to Lebanon. That implies that they had the capacity not only to execute a plan aimed at eliminating an enemy, but also to ensure that the fallout would remain limited.

Third, the bombing was the work of a party that is hostile to everything in Lebanon, such as Israel. Hassan had previously received warnings from Arab intelligence agencies that Israel was upset with him for cooperating with Hezbollah in uncovering Israeli espionage networks in Lebanon.

Fourth, that al-Qaeda opted to pre-empt an anticipated confrontation between it and Hassan. There have been many indications, including the outcome of his last meeting with the director of the CIA and his aides, that Hassan was a partner in the process of gathering intelligence on groups affiliated to al-Qaeda in Lebanon and the region. He and the Americans agreed to exchange information about the activities of these groups in Syria and Lebanon.

Can any of the possibilities currently being talked about be ruled out?

Yes, though that might displease a great many parties today. There are 1,001 reasons that make Syria an unlikely suspect.

People working in security deem it naive to think Hassan’s assassination was a response to his uncovering of the Michel Samaha case. There are many reasons for that, including the fact, revealed by the crisis in Syria, that the Syrian security establishment is in seriously and dangerously decrepit condition – as evidenced by its failure to take the most basic security measures to prevent repeated attacks on high-level regime figures.

How could such a precise and professional action be carried out by an entity that cannot protect its own centers from simple infiltration? Does everyone remember how the opposition managed to poison senior officers in the national security bureau, and then came back and carried out a multiple assassination by bringing explosives into the meeting room? How can a state which could not find or arrest its own prime minister after he defected and remained inside the country before leaving, suddenly display a high degree of proficiency in a security operation that would have required thorough and professional preparation?

How could someone who demonstrated the utmost stupidity in preparing Michel Samaha’s plan for confronting the regime’s opponents in Lebanon, become highly sophisticated a few weeks later and mount an operation like that which targeted Hassan? In the past, some used to cite the fact that the assassination attempts against Marwan Hamadeh, Elias al-Murr and May Chidiac were botched as evidence that Syria was behind them!

At present, a specialist team is conducting the investigation. The hard evidence available so far is confined to footage of the booby-trapped car being parked, also showing the time, and some distant and unclear images of the individuals who drove it to the location. Investigations are proceeding – and will be kept under wraps for some time – into questions such as:

• How did the perpetrators know about Hassan’s arrival in Beirut the previous evening, and his decision to go to the apartment in Achrafieh which had been exposed some time previously?
• Who were the people who were in a position to know that?
• Are any them linked to the perpetrators, or were they under surveillance, enabling the perpetrators to reach Hassan?
• What about the mechanism of the explosion, the nature of the device, and the bombers’ confidence that they could hit the target with such precision and ease?
• What traces did they leave behind?
• Can communications data help identify them?
• What kind of movements were witnessed in the area recently, and how could the killers operate with apparent ease?

Meanwhile, as some engage in a vile game of exploiting blood, a family has had a massive calamity inflicted on it. One need only look again at the images of Wissan’s two sons at the funeral to appreciate the enormity of the personal tragedy, which alone lives on in memory.

Ibrahim al-Amine is editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

• Secrecy, Confusion Surround Assassination of al-Hassan
• Wissam al-Hassan and the Information Branch

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