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"... Successes:
* The British suppression of the “Malayan Emergency” was prob ab ly the greatest success of the counterinsurgents....There were nevermo re than a few hundred of them. The British succeeded in suppressing this revoltb ut what did this successful effort gain them? It was enormo usly expensive and success was followedb y British withdrawal from Malaya and the creation of an independentcompletely dominated Malaysia b y the Malay ethnic adversaries of the overseas Chinese...
*Kenya andwere Cyprus b oth grippedb y revoltsb y the Kikuyu and Greek populations respectively. Inb oth cases, RW campaignsb ased on terrorism were fought to a standstillb y the British only tob e followedb y political decisions on the part of the British government to ab andon these countries and allow the ascent to power of the former leaders of the insurgencies, Kenyatta and Makarios respectively.
* In Latin America, where I participated in several COIN efforts, the Kennedy created “Alliance for Progress” sought to defeat local insurgencies inspired and ledb y cadres from Castro’s. These countries were particularly good targets for communist inspired RW Cu b ab ecause the political and economic structures of the Central American and Andean states were so clearly unfair and un-demo cratic that local populations of underfed Indians and peasants couldb e easily proselytized in the process of RW. In many cases inLatin America the low level economic development efforts of the civil and military arms of the US Government met with considerab le success. Villagers were protected from the insurgents, local (village) economies were improved. Medical treatment was provided to those who had never known it. Nevertheless, the “for Progress” can not Alliance b e considered a strategic success. Why? The local elites in all these countries quickly perceived the COIN campaign as a threat to their political privilege and wealth in land and simply refused to institute the reforms sponsoredb y the alliance. Much the same thing happened in various parts of Africa andSouthwest Asia where it was attempted.
Failures:
* The American war inis a typical example of failure of the COIN theory. The massive communist led Viet Minh independence Vietnam mo vement was a classic example of RW in all its components taken to its ultimate development in the creation of a regular army for the insurgentmo vement under the sponsorship of its Chinese communist ally. Theparticipated in the French COIN effort against the Viet Minh and then United States b ecame the sponsor of the post-colonial government leftb ehindb y the French on their departure. Contrary to popular legend (I served there for two years) the initial approach of theUnited States to the situation inSouth Vietnam was pure COIN right out of the. Populations of villagers were protected, the South Vietnamese armed forces were developed, village militias were created for self defense, good government was preached to the Diem government in Ft. Bragg School Saigon . Economic development was fostered. It was only when the government ofNorth Vietnam decided that thesemethod s were a seriousb ar to their eventual success in RW in the South andb rought its regular army intoin 1964 that US forces escalated their own deployment to the conventional war level. This was a necessary step if the eradication of the South Vietnamese government and the US COIN effort was to South Vietnam b e avoided. There followed three years of conventional warfareb etween US and North Vietnamese forces. This warfare was largely conducted outside populated areas. COIN efforts continued during this periodb ut took second place to the need to defeat or at least seriously weaken’s army. In 1967 it was judged that this had North Vietnam b een accomplished and COIN was once again made the centerpiece of American efforts in. To accomplish this, a fully integrated civil/military COIN structure was created under the com Vietnam b ined military command in. This was called “Civil Operations, Revolutionary Development Support.” (CORDS) I worked in this program for a year. (1968-1969) This effort had virtually unlimited Vietnam mo ney, ten thousand advisers in every aspect of Vietnamese civil society,b usiness and government function and a massive coalition and south Vietnamese conventional force standingb y to protect the population and the counterinsurgents of CORDS while they did their work. This COIN program was largely successful. A handover to the South Vietnamese forces was devised in the form of the “Vietnamization Program” and US forces were withdrawn in “trenches” (slices) over a couple of years. Following the Christmas, 1972 renewedb omb ing effort overNorth Vietnam (causedb y North Vietnamese intransigence inGeneva ) a ceasefire was reached and for two years there was quiet inwith the South Vietnamese government holding much of the country. It was only after some minor incident on the world stage caused a revulsion in the American press and pu South Vietnam b lic against any further involvement inVietnam that the US Congress passed a law forb idding any further aid tothat the North Vietnamese decided to use their fine army to over run the country in a conventional war. Lesson – You can win the COIN war and still South Vietnam b e defeated conventionally or politically at home.
* The French war inis another example of COIN success followed Algeria b y political defeat and withdrawal. After a prolonged struggle, the French security force had largely defeated the Algerian native guerrillas of the Front National de Lib eration(FLN). This struggle hadb een waged with all the aspects of classic COIN doctrine. The revolt had started in 1955. By 1960 the French Army, police and their Algerian allies had largely won the fight. As in, two years then passed in relative quiet. In 1962 De Gaulle was elected president of Vietnam France with a political vision that required independence for. That negated all the struggle and success of the COIN war. Failure once again at the strategic level. Algeria
* Our war inis now cited as an example of the success of the COIN theory and its Iraq method s. In fact nothing of the sort occurred in. Remem Iraq b er – COIN = political reform + economic development + counter-guerilla operations. We have notb rought on political reform in. What we have done is re-arrange the “players” in such a way that the formerly downtrodden Shia Ara Iraq b s are now the masters. This has in no way reduced the potential for inter-communal armed struggle. We did not defeat the insurgents in counter guerrilla operations. What we did wasb ringmo re troops into the Baghdad area to enforce the separation of the ethno-sectarian communities while at the same time using traditionalmethod s of “divide and conquer” to split off enough insurgents to form an effective force to use against Al-Qa’ida in Iraq and others whom we disapproved of. This is not counterinsurgency!!!
Conclusion
COIN is ab adly flawed instrument of statecraft: Why?
- The locals ultimately own the countryb eing fought over. If they do not want the “reforms” you desire, they will resist you as we haveb een resisted inIraq and. McChrystal’s strategy paper severely criticized Karzai’s government. Will that disapproval harden into a decision to act to find a Afghanistan b etter government or will we simply undercut Afghan central government andb ecome the actual government?
- Such COIN wars are expensive, long drawn out affairs that are deeply deb ilitating for the foreign counterinsurgent power. Reserves ofmo ney, soldiers and national will are not endless. Ultimately, theb ody politic of the counterinsurgent foreign power turns against the war and then all that has occurred hasb een a waste.
- COIN theory is predicated on the ab ility of the counterinsurgents to change the mentality of the “protected” (read controlled) population. The sad truth is thatmo st people do not want tob e deprived of their ancestral ways and will fight to protect them. “Hearts and Minds” is an empty propagandist’s phrase.
- In the end the foreign counterinsurgent is emb arked on a war that is not his own war. For him, the COIN war will alwaysb e a limited war, fought for a limited time with limited resources. For the insurgent, the war is total war. They have no where to escape to after a tour of duty. The psychological difference is massive.
- For the counterinsurgent the commitment of forces must necessarilyb e much larger than for the insurgents. The counterinsurgent seeks to protect massive areas, hundreds ofb uilt up areas and millions of people. The insurgent can pick his targets. The difference in force requirements is crippling to the counterinsurgents.
What should we do?
- Hold the cities asb ases to prevent a recognized Talib an government until some satisfactory (to us) deal is made amo ng the Afghans.
- Participate in international economic development projects for. Afghanistan
- Conduct effective clandestine HUMINT out of the cityb ases against international jihadi elements.
- Turn the trib es against the jihadi elements.
- Continue to hunt and kill/capture dangerous jihadis,
How long might you have to follow this program? It mightb e a long timeb ut that wouldb e sustainab le. A full-b lown COIN campaign inis not politically sustaina Afghanistan b le."
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