Mohamad Shmaysani
13/12/2010
This is how Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) veteran, Jeffrey White, pictures the coming war between Israel and Hezbollah and its allies in his new book, If War Comes : Israel vs. Hezbollah and Its Allies, published by the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Affairs, September 2010.
In this 60-page focus, White offers “a meticulously calculated forecast of the future war” that will “bear little resemblance to the 2006” Israeli aggression on Lebanon. Instead, he continues, this conflict is likely to be broader and much more intense; certainly Israel’s most serious war since 1973, and one that the IDF would have to win, with the potential to transform the wider region both militarily and politically.”
White’s book is supplemented by tables, maps and graphics as he outlines the “capabilities and operational objectives of the two sides” as well as the possible impact on the region’s post conflict military and political environments, taking into consideration what he calls “the potentially game-changing roles played by Syria and Iran.”
IGNITING WAR
White lists a number of circumstances that could ignite such a conflict.
“One side may simply conclude that it is time to act for one reason or another. War could also develop from various incidents, such as violence along the Lebanese border, in Gaza, or in the West Bank. Other activities could produce situations in which escalating tensions and misperception of the other side’s intentions and /or actions lead to a conflict . ”
ISRAEL’S PREPARATIONS
The author highlights Israel’s counter measures (two primary components: countervalue and counterforce) and the higher preparedness of the army today compared to 2006.
White cites a table from Washington DC’s Center for Strategic and International Studies revealing Israel’s Air Force would deploy 15 squadrons with a total of 495 attack warplanes and helicopters in a future war.
To protect its home front, Israel would also deploy eight Patriot batteries, two Arrow II batteries, and two projected Iron Dome batteries, another table shows.
I- WAR WITH HEZBOLLAH
Significantly, White says that among the major Israeli operational challenges would be: Penetrating Hezbollah’s defense in south Lebanon and advancing across the Litani River, suppressing medium-and-short-range rocket fire as quickly as possible (contingent upon successful completion of the previous item), rapidly locating and destroying long-range rocket and missile systems, limiting civilian casualties during air and ground operations, disrupting resupply in southern Lebanon, whether from Syria or central and northern Lebanon.
Special Forces operations would have the objectives to destroy high-value targets, including leadership, missile units/facilities, and headquarters and control centers, disrupting enemy operations, creating fear and uncertainty among Hezbollah leadership and formations, diverting Hezbollah resources, and collecting intelligence.
Major Israeli ground forces, White continues, would likely move into the Beqaa Valley as well, where long-range missiles are presumably stockpiled.
“This would increase the risk of contact with Syrian forces.”
II- WAR WITH HEZBOLLAH AND SYRIA
If war expanded to include direct Syria involvement, White says that the Israeli army’s challenges would increase significantly to encompass: Establishing air superiority over Syria, suppressing Syrian air defenses, conducting offensive air operations against Syrian targets, conducting air operations simultaneously over Lebanon and Syria, and conducting major ground operations in the Golan Heights area and Lebanon simultaneously.
III- WAR WITH HEZBOLLAH, SYRIA, AND IRAN
White’s assessment covers even a wider scope of the war. He says that if Tehran became involved directly, the Israeli army would have to conduct long-range air operations against Iran, and that such a move would divert intelligence and operational resources from the conflict with Hezbollah and Syria.
“To bring the war to a successful conclusion, the IDF would need to master each of these challenges as they arose. If the IDF were forced to confront Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran at the same time, it would face a very serious challenge indeed,” White warned. This is why, he adds, Israel would probably attempt to prevent the conflict from escalating into general war with Syria by employing threats, mobilization, force deployments, and posturing.”
ISRAEL’S GOALS
In White’s outline of the conflict, Israel is estimated to fundamentally alter the military equation with great consequences for the political situation, yet this would not amount to ‘final victory’; it would rather be decisive in the military operational sense. Israel’s goals, according to the author, would be compelling Hezbollah to quit the war under terms favorable to Tel Aviv, reduce Syria’s involvement in the conflict and its support to Hezbollah, and pressure the Lebanese government and military to discontinue their relationship with Hezbollah.
HEZBOLLAH’S WAR PREPARATIONS
White believes that the current threat to Israel is “essentially conventional in structure and purpose” in terms of Hezbollah’s rocket, missile, and anti-tank forces, as is the Syrian military.
He estimates Hezbollah’s rocket/missile stock to have increased from 13,000 to 40,000 of various types, including Scuds and other types with an ability to carry warheads designed to increase casualties through enhanced fragmentation effects.
White also explains that a lack of air defense capability was a key Hezbollah weakness in the 2006 war, so the group no doubt understands the importance of addressing this gap before going to war again.
“Unconfirmed reporting indicates that Syria is also providing Hezbollah with surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, including the easy-to-conceal SA-2, SA-8, and possibly the Sa-24. These weapons pose varying degrees of threat to the Israeli Air Force (IAF).
HEZBOLLAH’S STRATEGY
According to the author, Hezbollah’s strategy in the next war would likely include: Weakening Israel politically, both at home and abroad, as in 2006, weakening the Israeli army’s confidence, combat spirit, prestige, and deterrent capability, weakening the Israeli society by inflicting casualties and damage on civilians and infrastructure, compelling Israel to end the war under conditions favorable to its enemies, increasing its own political role and capabilities within Lebanon and with respect to Israeli-Palestinian issues, demonstrating the effectiveness of the “resistance” concept as a means of dealing with Israel and broadening its support base in Lebanon and beyond, creating the basis for a narrative of Hezbollah victory in the war, preventing a deep Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon, and preserving itself as a political and military force.
“Both offensively and defensively, Hezbollah would aim to continue operations as long as it saw itself in an advantageous position, allowing it to inflict the most political, military, economic, and social damage on Israel,” White estimates.
SYRIA AND IRAN IN WAR
Syria and Iran would, in the meantime, provide communications, command, control, and intelligence, however in case of escalation, Tehran would decide to participate more directly by providing light infantry or special forces in Lebanon while Damascus would confront penetrations of Syrian airspace and engage Israeli warplanes over Lebanon.
White states that Syria has made serious preparations for war with Israel, and in some respects it is well equipped for such a conflict. Damascus has gradually focused its efforts on a combination of offensive tools (primarily missiles and rockets) and defensive equipment, especially antitank and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs).
“Syria has also embedded itself in a complex and only partially understood set of defense relationships with Iran, including a “supreme joint defense commission [..] Iranian involvement in a future war would be based on its connections and commitments to Hezbollah and Syria,” he says
GAZA’S ROLE
White expects Israel’s war in the north to include a ‘Gaza incursion’ which would see Hamas entering the conflict in serious fashion, prompting Israel to ‘finish the job begun with Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009.’
Militarily, he continues, Hamas has increased its ability to participate in another round of fighting with Israel. It has acquired more and longer-range rockets than it had before Cast Lead, giving it the capacity to strike more deeply into Israel, at a higher rate of fire, and for a longer duration. As a result, it could inflict more casualties and physical damage than it did during the last round. White also points out that Islamic Jihad and other groups in Gaza are elements with the ability to fire long-range rockets against Israel.
THE ESCALATION AND WASHINGTON’S PREPARATIONS
White explains that escalation is not just a possibility as ‘various pressure and dynamics would push it toward escalation, with decision makers on all sides being under great pressure to act to achieve their goals and protect their assets and populations.
Ultimately, White believes that the war would be a large-scale, intense conflict waged between Israel and some combination of Hezbollah and its allies, fought in and over Israel, Lebanon and Syria, and lasting weeks.
According to White, Washington should be prepared as well.
“If war comes, the United States, should not necessarily take immediate steps towards ending it quickly. Several important objectives would be at stake in such a scenario: breaking Hezbollah’s military capabilities and reducing its political power; disabusing Syria of the notion that it can act in Lebanon to further its own interests without significant cost; and removing the potent Hezbollah proxy from Iran’s foreign policy arsenal. Only successful IDF operations can achieve those goals. Accordingly, the United States should consider giving the IDF both the time and the political space it needs to carry out those objectives.”
CONSEQUENCES
White warns that given the likely political, military, and economic costs, failure to achieve core objectives would have the most serious long-term consequences for Israel, as compared with the other potential combatants. “If Israel goes to war, it must be demonstrably successful,” he adds.
Although White reflects uncertainty about whether “hostilities” would erupt soon or ever, he points out that the war deterrent appears to weaken and that both Hezbollah and Israel would engage in a serious confrontation that neither can afford to lose.
River to Sea
Uprooted Palestinian
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