Lebanon: "US policy is similar to that of the Bush years – apply short-term pressure and hope for a miracle "

Via Friday-Lunch-Club

"... despite the worrying prospect of yet another political deadlock made worse by forthcoming indictments from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, something far worse than even domestic violence is moving rapidly into focus: another, perhaps climactic, conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. Sadder still is that the Obama administration appears to have no road map, and little courage, for finally addressing the underlying issues and is instead largely relying on the failed policies of the Bush administration.

"... despite the worrying prospect of yet another political deadlock made worse by forthcoming indictments from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, something far worse than even domestic violence is moving rapidly into focus: another, perhaps climactic, conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. Sadder still is that the Obama administration appears to have no road map, and little courage, for finally addressing the underlying issues and is instead largely relying on the failed policies of the Bush administration.

Eleven years ago, a peace agreement between Syria and Israel – that would have led to the disarmament of Hezbollah given the 30,000 Syrian troops in the country – fell apart because, as Israel's top negotiator on Lebanon and Syria, Maj General Uri Sagi, subsequently explained, President Bill Clinton "lied" to the dying Syrian president, Hafez Assad, .....

in 2005, following the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri and the forcing of Syrian troops out of Lebanon, an opportunity for peacefully dealing with Hezbollah's military power presented itself..... with its back against the political wall, Hezbollah went so far as to send an affiliated interim minister, Trade Hamade, to meet with Liz Cheney (the daughter of the then vice-president and overseer of Middle East policy) to work out the terms of a modus vivendi....., instead,... the Bush administration pursued a "with us or against us" maximalist strategy that held direct pressure and confrontation as the most effective – indeed at times the only – means of dealing with "evil".

The results were disastrous and far-reaching. For example, early in 2006, the most popular Christian leader in the country, General Michel Aoun, took almost all his constituency into a political alliance with Hezbollah after the US listened to its "friends" in Beirut and agreed on the wisdom of excluding him from the government – a move without which the latest government collapse would not have been possible.

Then, in July 2006, the Bush administration encouraged the Israelis to turn what was properly a border incident into a full-scale attempt at smashing Hezbollah. Neither the US nor Israel was materially prepared for such a conflict and the idea of smashing a broad sub-section of the Lebanese population (the Shia) was ridiculous in any case.

Far from ending the problem, that action helped to accelerate the ongoing reduction in the deterrent power and prestige of both Israel and the US.

Since then, a new dynamic has been settling in with a bright red line that Hezbollah is clearly intent on crossing: changing the military balance of power between itself (and its allies in the "resistance axis" of Iran, Syria and Hamas) and Israel.

The core idea at work is that as Hezbollah's military capability grows – and it is growing very fast right now according to US, Israeli and Hezbollah officials – at some point Israel will be "forced" to take action, since it is argued by Hezbollah (and many Israelis themselves) that Israel cannot live with armed, adversarial neighbours substantially limiting its calculations and actions and covering its demographically squeezed population with an aura of fear.

Although such a scenario should logically prompt a change (and a softening via peace with Syria) in the joint US-Israeli negotiating position, for various reasons this does not appear to be in the offing (and Hezbollah certainly does not think it is).

Instead, a perusal of Israeli media and thinktank literature over the last few months suggests that as the timetable for a strike against Iran grows longer, the immediate military threat of Hezbollah has actually moved into sharper relief...

Which brings us back to the collapse of the government and the coming tribunal indictments.

The Obama administration seems to believe that in order to stave off the logic of approaching war, it should try to manoeuvre Hezbollah into a tough position, thereby restraining it from pushing at the military red line. According to this thinking, to have accepted a Saudi-Syrian sponsored agreement regarding the Hariri tribunal actually would have only emboldened Hezbollah.

This approach is clearly less triumphal than during the heady Bush years (reflecting the changed balance of power in the Middle East as well as a less violence-focused mindset) but the overall direction is similar: throw whatever short-term pressure tools you have against the problem, rhetorically back up your narrow set of "friends" and hope for a miracle, since productive negotiations are essentially unrealistic – this time less because of "evil" opponents than an immovable Israeli ally.

The problem, however, is that Hezbollah will not be substantially boxed in by an indictment from the tribunal, since its domestic enemies are so militarily weak. Moreover, the party is apparently betting that an Israeli "pre-emptive" strike would overwhelm any domestic opposition, especially given Israel's long history of obtusely, and sometimes wantonly attacking Lebanon as a whole.

Finally, the scent of domestic turmoil and indigenous opposition to Hezbollah is likely to entice Israel further into believing that the time is ripe for a strike against it.

All of which means the Obama administration really only has one good option. The current political breakdown in Lebanon will not be solved without bold steps towards peace that will involve concessions, especially, and perhaps most importantly, via the Syrian track.

In the absence of this mechanism for effectively undermining the resistance axis's desire and political ability to use violence, the logic of war will only continue to gain steam even as Washington and some of its allies bask in the temporary glow of small victories, such as a tribunal indictment of Hezbollah...."

Posted by G, Z, or B at 9:08 AM

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