The Turkish playing with Al Nusra Front اللعب التركي مع جبهة النصرة

Thursday, 12 January 2017

The Turkish playing with Al Nusra Front اللعب التركي مع جبهة النصرة

يناير 10, 2017

It has become clear from the Turkish position which accused Iran and Hezbollah for the responsibility of violating the truce agreement that what the armed groups are saying is not out of what was said by Turkey, and that the organized media campaign led by the groups under the name of the opposition, that was dedicated to talk about the Russian Iranian contradictions is a translation of the policy of Turkey, which tried to suggest that the Russian-Turkish guarantee of the truce is by surpassing Iran, because Iran wants to disable the truce. That Turkish position is related to what the Turkish Foreign Minister has said about the call of Hezbollah to withdraw from Syria.

With this series of the Turkish positions, it becomes understood what was said by the armed groups about the differences between what they have signed on as the text of the truce agreement and what they said that the Syrian country has signed on, after an issuance of a resolution by the Security Council that shows the official text which is not possible for Russia to present what was contrary to it as a text of the agreement for each of Ankara, Damascus, and Tehran. The essential difference between the text which was shown by the armed groups and the text of the resolution of the Security Council is related to the absence of Al Nusra front as a party that is excluded by the provisions of the truce from the text which the armed groups said that they have signed on it, adding that this paragraph has been removed from the suggested text by Moscow and for that they have signed on it.

The only explanation for what is going on is found in what Turkey has used to behave accordingly in the stages of the war in Syria, it is an intelligence way entitled “pushing to traps” and “the game of time” that is mastered by the Head of the Turkish Intelligence Hakan Fidan who has kept his position for many years by the force of his ability to manage the groups affiliated to the thought of Al-Qaeda organization and that branched from it, as necessities for the Turkish strategic security in the intelligence bartering processes. The game is to postpone the moment of resolving of Al Nusra Front as the most prominent force among these organizations, till getting the cost of that boycott and which is not under the negotiation yet. Turkey knows that the groups which it brought to sign the truce agreement do not bear the consequences and the outcomes of signing a truce in which AL Nusra is dealt as an enemy, under almost absolute dominance of Al Nusra over the main parts of the geography which are out of the control of the Syrian country, and where the armed groups are found under the mantle of Al Nusra especially where there are not units of the Turkish army. The Turkish bet here is to get the signature of the factions and to proceed in the truce even through a forged text of the truce. and the bet on the time and pushing to traps till achieving a decisive moment, either because the truce and its political system is exposed to fall, or after achieving the decisive political negotiating moment.

Till that date, Turkey is moving to set the traps for the opposite Russian Iranian bank by transferring the accusations to Russia’s allies, to affect its relation with them, and to show them affected by the truce and from the Russian Turkish convergence, hoping not to win a round or to manipulate Moscow, but to have time to prolong the evasion from the commitment of having a decisive position toward Al Nusra Front, till the truce is actually threatened, or the moment of the decisive negotiation comes and Turkey proposes the cost which it wants in favor of boycotting Al Nusra Front. Till that moment the time is for transferring the complaints and confusing the other party by presenting clarifications and responses till Russia says decisively that Al Nusra front which is excluded from the truce is the party with which the battles are revolving and that is not a violation. Turkey is confident that the groups which it brought to sign the truce do not have the ability to undermine the truce, and that it is able after it made them signing to keep them silent under the title of defending Al Nusra is a scandal.

This means that the Turkish signature on the truce is affecting the northern of Aleppo only, where the military decision in the areas of the dominance of the Turkish army is at the hand of Ankara; other than that will be exposed to be affected, waiting for the new US administration to assume its tasks, and thus the clarity of the coming image of the relation between Washington and Ankara, as well as Washington’s desire to grasp Al Nusra through a higher cost than that paid by Moscow in order to sell it to Moscow in the equations outside the region, or by the American-Russian sharing of the cost wanted by Turkey in relation with its role in the Syrian subsequent government or governments, and in drawing the limits of the Kurdish role.

The call for the Meeting of Astana, and the announcement of the truce have made Turkey achieved a path, so if there are no achievements in the issue of the Turkish presence in Syria and the future of the limits of the Kurdish role under guaranteed ceilings by Washington and Moscow and this does not seem, then the Meeting of Astana will not be a platform for searching the political solution in Syria, but a platform for the political show, and linking the dispute with the next round in which the previous image awaited by Ankara gets clear. Ankara will be sufficient with Astana to record points among the factions in favor of achieving gains for the benefit of its group in the structure of the negotiating delegation or delegations, and by exerting pressure to exclude the Kurds from the participation. More likely Ankara will adopt a modification for the delegation of Riyadh that includes its group and prevents the participation of the Kurds.

This requires a call for the Russian-Turkish- Iranian tripartite to announce officially through a ministerial meeting about the required position from those who want to participate in Astana meeting from the Syrian political and military oppositions through signing on a certified example of a document that states clearly the public disclaimer of any relation with Al Nusra front and the getting out of any participation with it in one geography as a pre-condition for those who want to participate.

Translated by Lina Shehadeh,