ENGAGING SYRIA? US Constraints & opportunities

S0urce

ICG Report on 'how to engage Damascus', full report, here

"...Set in place effective channels of communication, by:

– nominating an ambassador;

– requesting that Syria treat U.S. diplomats respectfully and doing likewise with Syrian diplomats posted in the U.S.;

– establishing a privileged, personal and direct channel between President Obama and President Assad, possible through Middle East Peace Envoy George Mitchell; and

– conducting a relatively early visit by a high-level U.S. military official in order to establish U.S.- Syrian-Iraqi security cooperation.....

The Bush administration employed three principal tools to alter Syrian behaviour: economic sanctions; multilateral political pressure; and democracy promotion.30 Some successes notwithstanding, it is difficult to deny that the policy has failed....

Whether March 14’s sense of U.S. disloyalty was justified or not, officials in Washington conceded that events had dealt a severe blow to their allies’ confidence. One went so far as to analogise the situation to the U.S. encouragement of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 or the 1991 betrayal of Iraqi Kurds.109 There is little dispute that U.S. inaction contributed to March 14’s acceptance of the 21 May 2008 Qatari-brokered Doha accord, which yielded to core opposition demands. In the words of another U.S. official: The backdrop to Doha was that March 14 felt abandoned and had to accept the deal once Hizbollah won. The U.S. was consulted by the Qataris, who constantly asked if the deal was acceptable to us; Rice said it was. Hardliners within the administration held another view, and this is reflected in the very different tones adopted by the State Department and National Security Council in their public statements. State was relaxed, the NSC less so

Since then, U.S. options in Lebanon have further narrowed. There is no realistic option of confronting Hizbollah, at least in the foreseeable future.111 Extending support to March 14 remains official policy, but the coalition’s ability to deliver on its earlier promises is in growing doubt. "March 14 is disoriented. Engagement with Syria is taking place and being condoned by the Lebanese government. Even those policy options could become far more complicated should the current opposition prevail in the June 2009 parliamentary elections. While that likely would lead to a new national unity government in which March 14 holds an important number of ministries, including possibly the prime minister – a post traditionally reserved for a Sunni – Washington inevitably would find it more complicated to deal with.114 Military assistance programs could well come to a halt and institution-building efforts be in jeopardy if Hizbollah were involved, given U.S. legal constraints. Perhaps most significantly, an opposition victory by any margin would strike a psychological and political blow to the March 14 coalition. .......

.....isolation proved short-lived. The first serious cracks were prompted by the 2006 war in Lebanon; more than one Western country concluded that engaging Syria was essential to prevent a far more dangerous escalation.

Prominent Americans, Europeans and Israelis argued strongly for a policy change,123 while European diplomats began visiting Syria at the height of the fighting. In October, the European
Parliament called for dialogue, and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process urged talking to "all parties" involved in the Israeli-Arab conflict. Later that month, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair sent his top advisor, Nigel Sheinwald, to Damascus. Annoying to the Bush administration without being particularly gratifying to the Syrian regime, this ad hoc, uncoordinated European approach yielded little........cracks soon were felt within Washington itself. In December 2006, a prominent bipartisan committee headed by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton released the Iraq Study Group Report. Among its key recommendations was the need to talk to all of Iraq’s neighbours, Syria and Iran included. ....

The challenge is not merely to close the Bush chapterbut to invent a new one.

Bush leaves behind a legacy of additional sanctions and international resolutions that will be impossible to ignore and difficult to undo. Obama cannot simply erase the sanctions, nor will he wish to as they have become an important source of pressure and leverage. For the U.S., the challenge will be to relax them gradually and judiciously, particularly in response to Syrian steps; for Syria, it will be to understand that they cannot be eliminated by an early stroke of a pen and that the country will have to live with these additional constraints for some time to come.

U.S. attitudes have hardened, and official scepticism will outlast the transition. For many in the U.S., including in the new administration, Syria today is associated with actions that led to American casualties in Iraq and to death in Lebanon. That will be hard to erase. A former U.S. official put it as follows: "Syria is a puzzle for the U.S. It remains little known. What is known of it, above all, is its alliance with Iran and the crossborder issue. Syria last was in the news positively, so to speak, eight years ago [when U.S.-mediated peace talks were still ongoing]".206 Moreover, the lesson appears to have been learned in the U.S. that the more Syria is courted, the less pressure it feels to act; conversely, only when Damascus senses Washington’s lack of interest in Syria or focus on the Israeli-Palestinian track will it feel compelled to prove its goodwill. This legacy too likely will result in a cautious, go-slow approach.

Promotion of Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence has become a strong, bipartisan U.S. consensus. Unlike in the 1990s, the U.S. is now adamant that Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs or any infringement on Lebanon’s sovereignty cannot be countenanced..... As a result, there would be great resistance toward any step which would have the perceived or actual effect of undermining Lebanon’s sovereignty and strong negative reaction toward Syrian meddling in its neighbour’s affairs.

The proceedings of the Hariri tribunal could interfere with any U.S.-Syrian rapprochement. As a corollary to the above, bilateral ties might well be affected by the tribunal’s finding of Syrian involvement in the former prime minister’s assassination. If Damascus were to reject the court’s legitimacy and, for example, refuse to turn over a suspect, pressure in the U.S. to retaliate and halt any improvement in bilateral relations would be strong. Added to this is the possibility that the findings of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s investigation into Syria’s alleged nuclear program could further contaminate the atmosphere.(MY NOTES: These two items CAN be ERASED by a STROKE OF A PEN from Washington!)

The regional context will complicate efforts to normalise bilateral ties. As a result of three wars – in Iraq, Lebanon and most recently Gaza – together with the spread of sectarianism, popular radicalisation and deepening inter-Arab polarisation, there are new obstacles to improved U.S.-Syrian relations and an Israeli-Syrian agreement. Syria has grown closer to states and movements with which Washington wishes it would break, and the regime must closely manage those relations even as it considers policy changes toward the U.S. or Israel. As a result, relations cannot be considered a strictly bilateral affair any more than can Israeli-Syrian negotiations;far more than in the past they are deeply connected with and require attention to a host of complex regional issues.....A rapprochement with the U.S. and peace agreement with Israel necessarily will require the regime to undergo a significant strategic readjustment. This would be hard for it to contemplate under any circumstances given the proven usefulness, durability and reliability of its alliances with Iran, Hizbollah and Hamas. It will be virtually impossible to achieve if the regime lacks a clear vision of what it will receive in exchange.

Traditionally pro-American Arab countries could seek to slow down any rapprochement. This is particularly true of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both of which are locked in a cold war of sorts with Syria – the former mainly over Lebanon, the latter principally as a result of the Gaza war. In the absence of quick inter-Arab reconciliation, which is improbable as of this writing, Riyadh and Cairo likely will seek to persuade the Obama administration to move very slowly vis-à-vis Damascus and focus chiefly on the Israeli-Palestinian track; Washington – keen to retain its alliances with traditional Arab partners – is likely to pay heed.

Working with Syria to improve the situation in Iraq has become less of a priority. Unlike the pre-surge situation, the U.S. no longer views conditions in Iraq as rapidly deteriorating and in need of a significant corrective.The argument that the U.S. needs Syrian cooperation – central to the Iraq Study Group report – arguably has far less resonance today, despite a far more sympathetic administration, because the situation appears to have stabilised in the interim. Although Obama’s team probably will seek to fashion a regional strategy to ensure a successful withdrawal, Syrian leverage has been reduced substantially. As a U.S. official put it, "we are doing much better in Iraq now and need the Syrians less; in effect, we are succeeding without them".

Among realistic goals: resuming direct Israeli-Syrian negotiations in the context of a comprehensive peace process; diluting the strategic importance of Syria’s relationship with Iran by strengthening alternative ties (with the U.S., Turkey, France, the UK, the EU); developing trilateral security cooperation between Damascus, Washington and Baghdad; and consolidating achievements in Lebanon (a depoliticised international tribunal)....