Via Friday-Lunch-Club
The Gaza flotilla episode pitted Israel versus Turkey, with Arabs as bystanders and observers. Yet reverberations of the incident have had a keen impact across Arab capitals.The country most negatively affected has been Egypt. Cairo has been a quiet partner with Israel in maintaining the tight blockade on Hamas-ruled Gaza, and Turkey's decision to champion Hamas's cause has exposed this poorly kept secret of Egyptian foreign policy. More important, by offering himself as the selfless Sunni mediator trying to reconcile a nasty fraternal squabble between Fatah and Hamas, Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has -- in one fell swoop -- sidelined Iran's suspect patronage of the rejectionist front and challenged Egypt's role as the dominant external power in Palestinian politics.So far, Egypt has been adrift in dealing effectively with its Gaza problem. Part of this is due to the political immobility besetting Egypt today, as it finds itself consumed with domestic transition. For three years, Egyptian intelligence tried -- and failed -- to secure Hamas-Fatah reconciliation on term favorable to the latter. Now, Turkey will attempt its own form of reconciliation, on terms that would surely not comport with either the Quartet requirements on Hamas or U.S.-Israeli notions of acceptability.Given that Gaza used to be governed by Egypt, it is remarkable how far Cairo's influence has sunk over the years. It was embarrassing that Egypt had to compete with Turkey's regional gambit by dispatching former foreign minister (and current Arab League secretary-general) Amr Mousa to the strip on a visit that effectively lent unprecedented legitimacy to Hamas.Still, Egypt has no interest in ending the blockade completely, ...... Cairo still refuses to allow certain convoys into Gaza and restricts movement out of the strip as well. Whether it will maintain even this semi-opening of Rafah for the foreseeable future is uncertain; the Egyptians are almost surely waiting to see if Israel and the naval blockade can weather the fallout from the flotilla incident. Given how quickly events change in the Middle East, it is a fair bet that something will come along soon to give Cairo cover for reimposing most, if not all, of the pre-flotilla closures.More generally, a bolder and more self-confident Egyptian leadership would be in an excellent position to warn fellow Arabs about the Erdogan's allure as a modern-day Gamal Abdul Nasser, as so many Arab and Western pundits have begin to depict him. Better than anyone, Egyptians (Mubarak & his court) can point out that Nasser was, in the end, a terrible failure. ...... A stronger, more robust Egyptian government would tell Arabs to beware the collective political suicide that Erdogan offers. Washington laments the absence of that government.One obvious implication of Turkey's decisions to side with Iran against Washington in the nuclear standoff and to dismantle its strategic partnership with Israel is that any role for Ankara as a mediator on the Israeli-Syrian peace track is now over, at least as long as Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) is in power. Of course, there is more talk of war than diplomacy on this front in recent days. Just last week, for example, Syrian president Bashar al-Asad told the BBC that war was likely. Whether Asad has the savvy to manage this sensitive moment is unclear.Recent events have also fueled talk about the emergence of a full-fledged "northern alliance" that would include Turkey, Syria, and Iran. Ironically, such a development would almost certainly limit Asad's strategic options and come at Syria's expense. Until now, Damascus has viewed its improving relations with Ankara as a strategic alternative to its growing dependence on Iran. But it would not be to Asad's advantage to find himself as the junior partner in an alliance between regional heavyweights Turkey and Iran. Indeed, the way regional politics are shifting, he may even find himself as a less important player than the fourth leg of the "northern alliance" table, Hassan Nasrallah's Hizballah.
....... the end result for Syria of Erdogan's emergence as a modern-day Nasser is much the same as the emergence of the original Nasser a half-century ago -- it heralds further decline in relevance for the rulers in Damascus.One key implication of the flotilla incident is that despite weakening Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas's image internationally, it did nothing to boost Hamas's standing domestically. Although Abbas visited Washington last week, his relative decline in international standing -- as measured by the relative increase in Hamas's standing -- has been underway for some time. Interestingly, this has been most apparent among non-Arab actors such as Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, Erdogan, and certain former American diplomats, who have been calling for Hamas's inclusion as a legitimate player in any Middle East diplomatic process. The Mavi Marmara incident only added fuel to this movement...."
Posted by G, Z, or B at 3:45 PM
Uprooted Palestinian
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