When the battle of Nahr al-Bared battle erupted, The March 8 forces proposed a solution combining political, security, and legal measures, and declared that the refugee camp must not be harmed. (Photo: Al-Akhbar)
If supporters of the March 8 coalition, or of the resistance, were to look back at the years since 2005 and do a political appraisal of the stages which the struggle in Lebanon has gone through, the conclusion might shock them. The record of the political forces that are supposed to embrace the Lebanese resistance has been one of constant setbacks and failures.
On 8 March, 2005, Syria’s supporters gathered as part of a massive rally in downtown Beirut. The aim was to ensure that the departure of the Syrian army would not be humiliating, and to prevent the scoring of political points against the country. But it backfired. The March 8 rally prompted the opposing camp to mount its biggest popular and political mobilization ever. The pro-Syrian Lebanese government was toppled, and the Syrian army left the country to the backdrop of the massed March 14 protesters, rather than banners reading “Thank you Syria.”
After the resignation of Omar Karami’s government on 28 February 2005, Najib Mikati was appointed to head a Cabinet tasked with preparing for elections. It was under the auspices of this interim administration that the international tribunal was first ushered in.
In anticipation of the elections – and to preserve a modicum of national unity – the quadripartite alliance was formed between Hezbollah, Amal and Future Movements, and the Progressive Socialist Party. At the time, the March 14 camp wanted to undermine Michel Aoun, who had returned to the country and made a powerful comeback. He had the capacity to win over the Christian street, and might have been able to assume full control of the March 14 coalition if not checked. So March 14 and March 8 forged electoral alliances, and Aoun won what he could. The summer 2005 elections culminated in the collapse of the quadripartite alliance in favor of the March 14 camp, after it secured a parliamentary majority. Its electoral allies in March 8 did not receive even one word of thanks.
Although the March 14 parties won control of parliament, they were unable to govern, and the country went to the dialogue table. This resulted in the idea of establishing and funding the international tribunal and the idea of putting the resistance’s weapons up for discussion.
Then, in the summer of 2006, came the war on Lebanon. The Lebanese government proclaimed itself a “resistance government,” while simultaneously conspiring against the resistance. It was protected by the cover provided to it by March 8, which was at the same time trying to disempower along with undermine the resistance.
After the war, representatives of the Shia sect withdrew from the government, rendering it unconstitutional. With them outside, the international tribunal was endorsed, albeit without the signature of the president Emile Lahoud.
The March 8 parties responded with an open-ended sit-in at the Grand Serail. The aim was to besiege it but political interventions led to the protest being relocated and confined to a closed area opposite. The then Prime Minister Fouad Siniora did not bat an eyelid, but shifted the burden onto the Lebanese state, moving into the Serail at public expense.
Sectarian tensions were meanwhile on the boil, and sometimes spilled over, as at the Arab University on 25 January 2007, where there were riots and the Lebanese army was fired upon. At that stage the county became utterly split. Life in the southern suburbs was cut off from Beirut, and some districts of the capital became no-go areas for Shia citizens.
In May 2007, the battle of Nahr al-Bared battle erupted. The March 8 forces proposed a solution combining political, security, and legal measures, and declared that the refugee camp must not be harmed. Over the course of the next three months, the camp was systematically destroyed. Much of it was reduced to rubble which were bulldozed after the fighting.
On 7 May 2008, armed conflict broke out after a long build-up. Instead of a pre-emptive, pinpoint, surgical operation, many civilians on both sides lost their lives, due to unanticipated chaotic conditions. The subsequent negotiations in Doha strengthened the political hand of the March 14 parties after their military defeat, and led to the appointment rather than the election of a president. A major blow was dealt to the Taif agreement, the last thing left to regulate the relationship between the Lebanese sects.
It was at that time, too, that the resistance began losing much of the Arab popular support it had gained in the June 2006 war.
Siniora returned to the premiership after a new president was installed, and another process of preparing for elections began. The March 8 parties expected victory from the opinion polls, but experienced defeat on the ground, and March 14 retained the parliamentary majority.
This time, Saad Hariri was made premier. The March 8 parties demanded their share of executive office but when they changed tack and stripped Hariri of the post, they proved incapable of finding an ally to take his place.
March 14 has not been in great shape either. For every gain it has made it has suffered a setback elsewhere. Both coalitions have suffered from internal corrosion. But their inner convulsions coupled with their political dogmatism have left their respective constituencies in an ossified state. No good can come from that.
Fidaa Itani is an Al-Akhbar columnist on Lebanese affairs and Islamist movements.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
On 8 March, 2005, Syria’s supporters gathered as part of a massive rally in downtown Beirut. The aim was to ensure that the departure of the Syrian army would not be humiliating, and to prevent the scoring of political points against the country. But it backfired. The March 8 rally prompted the opposing camp to mount its biggest popular and political mobilization ever. The pro-Syrian Lebanese government was toppled, and the Syrian army left the country to the backdrop of the massed March 14 protesters, rather than banners reading “Thank you Syria.”
After the resignation of Omar Karami’s government on 28 February 2005, Najib Mikati was appointed to head a Cabinet tasked with preparing for elections. It was under the auspices of this interim administration that the international tribunal was first ushered in.
In anticipation of the elections – and to preserve a modicum of national unity – the quadripartite alliance was formed between Hezbollah, Amal and Future Movements, and the Progressive Socialist Party. At the time, the March 14 camp wanted to undermine Michel Aoun, who had returned to the country and made a powerful comeback. He had the capacity to win over the Christian street, and might have been able to assume full control of the March 14 coalition if not checked. So March 14 and March 8 forged electoral alliances, and Aoun won what he could. The summer 2005 elections culminated in the collapse of the quadripartite alliance in favor of the March 14 camp, after it secured a parliamentary majority. Its electoral allies in March 8 did not receive even one word of thanks.
Although the March 14 parties won control of parliament, they were unable to govern, and the country went to the dialogue table. This resulted in the idea of establishing and funding the international tribunal and the idea of putting the resistance’s weapons up for discussion.
Then, in the summer of 2006, came the war on Lebanon. The Lebanese government proclaimed itself a “resistance government,” while simultaneously conspiring against the resistance. It was protected by the cover provided to it by March 8, which was at the same time trying to disempower along with undermine the resistance.
After the war, representatives of the Shia sect withdrew from the government, rendering it unconstitutional. With them outside, the international tribunal was endorsed, albeit without the signature of the president Emile Lahoud.
The March 8 parties responded with an open-ended sit-in at the Grand Serail. The aim was to besiege it but political interventions led to the protest being relocated and confined to a closed area opposite. The then Prime Minister Fouad Siniora did not bat an eyelid, but shifted the burden onto the Lebanese state, moving into the Serail at public expense.
Sectarian tensions were meanwhile on the boil, and sometimes spilled over, as at the Arab University on 25 January 2007, where there were riots and the Lebanese army was fired upon. At that stage the county became utterly split. Life in the southern suburbs was cut off from Beirut, and some districts of the capital became no-go areas for Shia citizens.
In May 2007, the battle of Nahr al-Bared battle erupted. The March 8 forces proposed a solution combining political, security, and legal measures, and declared that the refugee camp must not be harmed. Over the course of the next three months, the camp was systematically destroyed. Much of it was reduced to rubble which were bulldozed after the fighting.
On 7 May 2008, armed conflict broke out after a long build-up. Instead of a pre-emptive, pinpoint, surgical operation, many civilians on both sides lost their lives, due to unanticipated chaotic conditions. The subsequent negotiations in Doha strengthened the political hand of the March 14 parties after their military defeat, and led to the appointment rather than the election of a president. A major blow was dealt to the Taif agreement, the last thing left to regulate the relationship between the Lebanese sects.
It was at that time, too, that the resistance began losing much of the Arab popular support it had gained in the June 2006 war.
Siniora returned to the premiership after a new president was installed, and another process of preparing for elections began. The March 8 parties expected victory from the opinion polls, but experienced defeat on the ground, and March 14 retained the parliamentary majority.
This time, Saad Hariri was made premier. The March 8 parties demanded their share of executive office but when they changed tack and stripped Hariri of the post, they proved incapable of finding an ally to take his place.
March 14 has not been in great shape either. For every gain it has made it has suffered a setback elsewhere. Both coalitions have suffered from internal corrosion. But their inner convulsions coupled with their political dogmatism have left their respective constituencies in an ossified state. No good can come from that.
Fidaa Itani is an Al-Akhbar columnist on Lebanese affairs and Islamist movements.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
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