It has been almost a decade on the July 2006 “Israeli” war on Lebanon. For the occasion, Hebrew newspaper Haaretz issued a piece wondering whether the aforementioned war was a failure or not:
Was it a success or a failure? The Winograd Commission issued its verdict, and military historians will, no doubt, continue to have their say, but the important point for the “Israelis” at this time is not what was, but what may yet be, and what lessons from that war could be applied to possible future encounters with Hizbullah.
Meanwhile, those who led that war are countering criticism by pointing to the years of quiet on the northern border that followed the UN-brokered cease-fire. A 33-day war, with 164 “Israeli” fatalities [43 civilians and 121 military personnel] that was to be followed by 10 or more years of quiet – is that an equation that signals success, or failure?
In the event of a future encounter with Hizbullah, would such a result be considered to be satisfactory, or even a success? How much should the “Israelis” be willing to pay for intermittent periods of calm after each encounter? This question also faced them in the south, where successive military operations achieved intermittent periods of quiet, and where the Zionist leadership even declared that the aim of such operations was to achieve a few years of respite.
Clearly incapable of completely routing the Arab armies arrayed against it, “Israel” came to consider that their repeated defeat would lead the Arab leaders to conclude that they could not overcome “Israel” on the battlefield. The strategy worked. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 was the fourth and last attempt by a coalition of Arab armies to fight the “Israeli” entity. Is this also an effective strategy against resistance movements like Hizbullah?
Any renewal of hostilities would inevitably result in massive rocket and missile raining on the “Israeli”-occupied cities. This is particularly the case with Hizbullah, which has over 150,000 rockets and missiles in its arsenal. Past blows may be deterring them, but we must not forget that “Israel” is also deterred from taking action against them. Any responsible “Israeli” leader must consider all the consequences of a renewal of the warfare with them.
The 10 years after the Second Lebanon War were a period of mutual deterrence, also influenced by Hizbullah’s deep involvement in the fighting in Syria. But they were also years of massive increase of Hizbullah’s rocket and missile arsenal.
Hizbullah will come to the next confrontation with “Israel” far better prepared and more capable of bringing destruction to the Zionist settlements.
The lesson is clear: Another round of fighting that does not put an end to Hizbullah’s military capability means they will come back for more, better prepared than ever.
Source: Haaretz, Edited by website team
20-06-2016 | 14:1
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