The Hariri tribunal is turning out to be a waste of time, money & effort ...

Via Friday-Lunch-Club

"... Right now, officials of the UN Special Tribunal on Lebanon, the body charged with finding and trying Hariri's killers, are running around the world, cap in hand, pleading for money to keep going.  "We have cash-flow issues," admitted one insider, earlier today....... 

At the time, CBC revealed some of the telecommunications evidence upon which the commission was building its case against certain individuals, as well as an internal document pointing at the head of Lebanese intelligence (Wissam el Hassan) as someone who may have compromised the UN investigations. Since then, however, the political situation in Lebanon has changed dramatically...... But it hasn't met with much success ... Other countries have also waffled, promising to study the issue. In diplomatic language, governments are saying maybe, or no. Not a single Arab country will contribute a cent.

 

Last fall, the U.S. rushed in with $10 million in emergency funding for the tribunal, but at the rate it spends, that will soon be gone. And if America winds up as the tribunal's sole source of funds, it would only feed Hezbollah's claim that the whole thing is a conspiracy by Washington and the Israelis........

The tribunal's perhaps less-than-realistic view is that this is a judicial process, set up by the UN Security Council, that cannot be stopped. The money will come from somewhere and, if necessary, trials will be held in absentia....... Former UN investigators have told CBC News the evidence is mostly circumstantial — intricate telecommunications charts that show which phones called which other phones, but fail to actually put the phones in the hands of Hezbollah operatives. Further, the tribunal, which still operates a small office in Lebanon, concedes that the Lebanese government, meaning Hezbollah, basically knows every move its investigators make before they make it. Sounds like Hezbollah is winning, in other words. In fact, it's beginning to sound as if the whole UN effort might have been a waste of time....."

Posted by G, Z, or B at 4:57 PM

River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian

Tarek Fatah spreads fear and hatred on CBC

The Canadian Charger

More by this author...

Since Tarek Fatah immigrated to Canada in 1987, he tried his hand at politics twice and failed both times, first with the NDP and then with the Liberals. He tried to be a journalist and a writer, but could not find employment. But after 9/11, he landed a good job writing books and articles attacking Canadian Muslims.

In a recent edition of the CBC radio show The Sunday Edition with Michael Enright, Mr. Fatah made a number of irresponsible comments, spreading fear and hatred of Canadian Muslims. Mr. Enright was compelled to draw allusions to McCarthyite scaremongering.

The interview begins with Mr. Fatah saying that he agreed with Defence Minister Peter MacKay’s last-minute decision to cancel a speech by Imam Dr. Zijad Delic, National Executive Director of The Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC), who had been invited to address a Department of National Defence forum on Oct. 3.

He said Dr. Delic is not qualified to give a speech about the role of Muslims in Canada because he’s not a historian:

“The notion that someone who leads prayers should lecture the Canadian military in a history lesson is repulsive to the Canadian military itself. Since when did the Canadian military have to listen to a cleric to understand the concept of history whether it is Christian, Islamic or Judaic.”
Mr. Fatah then defended himself with this unsubstantiated allegation:

“Those officers who wanted him there are themselves military officers who are Muslim, a Pakistani and Egyptian, who used their position in the military caucus at the DND (Department of National Defence) to stage this invitation. Many folks are reluctant, to challenge this. I didn’t migrate to a country 6,000 miles away to escape jihadism and to find them welcome in the Department of National Defence.”

Mr. Fatah levied a very serious charge against DND’s Muslim employees, but try as he might throughout the interview, Mr. Enright was unable to get Mr. Fatah to substantiate it.

With regard to Dr. Delic’s cancelled speech, the text of which was made public, Fatah said the speech came about after the event, and, even if it were the original speech, it would have had no effect: “It was a lot of ‘Can’t we all get along together category of speech’ which means absolutely nothing,” he said.

Fatah neglected to mention that such a speech is the antithesis of “a call to jihad,” but this point was not lost on Mr. Enright:

“[Dr.  Delic talks about how it’s important for] Canadian Muslims to integrate into society, pluralism, while at the same time maintaining their Muslim beliefs and that Canada is an ideal country for this to flourish.”

Fatah ignored these facts as presented by Mr. Enright, and came out with another unsubstantiated allegation: that the doctrine of jihad is being propagated at schools, universities and mosques across Canada.

“There’s only one doctrine required for any man of the cloth in my faith: is he or is he willing to renounce the doctrine of armed jihad, as pronounced by the Muslim Brotherhood, as propagated in almost every urban high school and urban university in this country? Is he going to say that the application of sharia law in the 21st century is inapplicable, cannot be applied, and has to be rejected?”

Mr. Enright continued to press: “You and some of the people in your organization say that Islamists have infiltrated some of the highest reaches of the RCMP, foreign affairs, the government, CSIS, and so how do you know this?”

“I’ve sat with them; I’ve sat in a meeting with senior CSIS and RCMP officials in what is called the cultural roundtable conference, something of that sort, but the Deputy Minister of Security and Safety was sitting there,” Mr. Fatah said. “Guess who was in front of me facing me: the wife of one of the men charged in the Toronto 18, the lawyer for these guys. The amount of hate spilled out toward Canada and Western civilization. All the RCMP and CSIS officers had their heads down because they dare not say anything or they would be accused of being racist.”

If this were true, there are many other inferences one could draw from the RCMP and CSIS officials’ refusal to debate people spouting unreasonable opinions, but this incident recounted by Mr. Fatah in no way gives any indication of “jihadists” infiltrating the highest levels of the Canadian security apparatus.

“If it’s as pernicious as you say, and the infiltration…isn’t important to name the names?” asked Mr. Enright. “Did you report the names to CSIS? Who are these people?”

Mr. Fatah said he did report the names to CSIS, and these names were printed in the National Post, in a story by Stewart Bell two days after the meeting.

His answer was not enough to convince Mr. Enright, who further questioned Mr. Fatah’s allegations. “What’s the difference between suggesting that at the highest reaches…foreign affairs, CSIS, have been infiltrated by Islamists, and Joe McCarthy standing up in 1951 in West Virginia and saying there are 105 communists in the state department.”

“I’m not a senator. I’m at the bottom of the rung. The difference is that he was misusing his power and I’m telling you that these people are known to the military officers of the Canadian Armed Forces, whether junior or senior, who would invite an Imam who has no background in history who heads an organization that has worked for sharia law in this country, who said it’s legitimate to kill any Israeli civilian. Has the Canadian Islamic Congress renounced the doctrine of jihad and sharia law? It is a very simple question. I don’t think people have the courage to ask the question. The responsibility falls on ordinary Muslims like me...to say enough is enough.”

After Mr. Enright pointed out that when Mr. Fatah says these institutions are infiltrated by “jihadists” or people who support the idea of jihad he was scaring the hell out of ordinary Canadians.

Fatah responded: “I hope they do get scared,” and then he gave an example of a gay Toronto MP, whom Mr. Fatah said was hassled by the Islamic community, so the MP invited a representative of the community out to lunch, a deed Mr. Fatah referred to as “being bullied into subservience.”

Mr. Enright said there are other ways to interpret this gesture of generosity, such as a sincere attempt at dialogue to try and resolve the problem.

Because Mr. Fatah presented no evidence of “infiltration of the highest levels of the Canadian security apparatus by Islamists,” after several attempts by Mr. Enright to get him to do so, Mr. Enright tried a different approach.

“Do you expose them by shutting them down or criticizing their arguments?” Mr. Enright asked.
“These Imams have about 500 mosques in this country and captive audiences that dare not stand up and object to them: it’s a one too many speech that’s done every Friday in every mosque,” Mr. Fatah said.

Although he avoided answering the question, Fatah seems to be suggesting that there are 500 mosques across Canada where jihad is being preached on a weekly basis, and no law enforcement officials, whom Mr. Fatah claims are aware of it, are willing to do anything about it.

River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian

Hariri Tribunal Reports Tell a Different Story than CBC Account

An interesting comment, exposing the contradictions in the CBC report. UNIIIC Reports between 2005 and 2007 confirm that the Red team was "identified at the initial stages of the investigation and that signal analysis was a key technique used by the commission."

Therefore, the CBC claim that the telecommunications work done before late 2007 was performed by the Lebanese police, by a DEAD MAN and not by the UN Commission is baseless. "The UN was working in close cooperation with the Lebanese and not, as Mr. Macdonald’s sources suggest, in isolation from them?"

No surprise, in 2005 the direct target was Syria (the state, not only the regime), which shall lead to disarming Hezbollah either by Carrot ( Political Power)) or by the Stick (July war). The outcome was getting Syria out of Lebanon. Consequently, they shifted to blaim Hezbollah by they have no evidence other than the same telecommunications work.

Back to QN comment:

"This contradiction with the documented historical record undercuts the report’s credibility. It is obviously trying to sell you something. And what I think what it is selling is the linkage between the Red team and HA."

"I speculate that the attack on Wissam Hassan is to undermine the ISF’s work on Israeli spies and Israel’s penetration of the Lebanese telecom network. At Nahass’s conference this week, Wissam Hassan was specifically named as helping out in the investigation of Israel compromising HA phone lines. By labelling him an HA accomplice, the whole Israel angle can be explained away."

"The attack on Bellemare and Brammertz are interesting. Whoever fed Macdonald his information must have felt the indictments are not going to come out, or will fail to name HA members. "

"Thus the report serves to indict HA in the media, regardless of the path the STL takes. The whole ‘Getting Away with Murder’ angle is that HA did it, we know they did it, but here’s why the STL won’t indict them. "

"Is someone nervous?"

In case you missed it:

• FRANKLIN LAMB: HOW ISRAEL AND THE US HOPE TO DESTROY HEZBOLLAH
• What Were They Thinking?

****

Hariri Tribunal Reports Tell a Different Story than CBC Account

Posted by Qifa Nabki I spent an hour or so this morning going through previous reports by the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC), in order to see how the historical record tallies with Neil Macdonald’s report about the Hariri investigation for CBC.

As you’ll recall, Macdonald makes the following basic points in his piece:

• The UNIIIC did not begin analyzing telecommunications data until late 2007, because Serge Brammertz (the successor to Detlev Mehlis) refused to authorize this kind of work.
• When they finally got around to looking at phone records, the investigators happened upon the “earth-shattering” discovery of the so-called “red network”: the group of phones carried by Hariri’s hit squad.
• As they soon discovered, however, a young Lebanese police captain named Wissam Eid had already discovered this network and the networks behind it as early as the spring of 2006, and submitted a report to the UNIIIC that detailed his findings. Eid’s work pointed to Hizbullah’s complicity in the crime.
• This report was put into a drawer and did not resurface until the end of 2007, at which point the UNIIIC established contact with Eid. A month later, Eid was dead.

So far so good?

Now, let’s go back to the reports that were issued by the UNIIIC between 2005 and 2007 (a period during which, according to Macdonald’s sources, no telecommunications analysis was carried out by the investigating commission). What we find is a drastically different account of the work that was taking place, and not just under Detlev Mehlis (generally portrayed as an effective investigator) but also under his successor Serge Brammertz (who comes off as timid and incompetent in Macdonald’s account).

The following excerpts are taken from the first eight UNIIIC reports, which cover the tenures of Mehlis and Brammertz. Have a look and let me know what you think:

Mehlis (Syria out)

UNIIIC Report #1 (Mehlis, 22 Oct 2005)

144. Investigations by both the ISF and Military Intelligence have led to six pre-paid calling cards, which telephone records demonstrate were instrumental in the planning of the assassination. Beginning at approximately 1100 hrs on 14 February 2005, cell site records show that cellular telephones utilizing these six calling cards were located in the area stretching from the Nejmeh Square to the St. George Hotel, within a few-block radius and made numerous calls with each other and only with each other. The phones were situated so that they covered every route linking the Parliament to Kuraytem Palace: that is, cellsite records demonstrate that these telephones were placed to cover any route that Hariri would have taken that day. One of the cellphones located near the Parliament made four calls with the other telephone lines at 1253 hrs — the time that Mr. Hariri’s convoy left the Nejmeh Square . The calls — and all usage on the cards — terminated at 1253 hrs on 14 February, a few minutes before the blast. The lines have all been inactive since.

145. Further investigation has revealed that these six lines — along with two others — were put into circulation on the 4 January 2005, after calling number 1456 activated them. They were all activated at the same location in northern Lebanon between Terbol and Menyeh. Since they were first purchased in early January 2005, until the time of the explosion, the lines only had calls with each other. In that time period, until the assassination, there appears to be a correlation between their location and Hariri’s movements, suggesting that they might have been used to follow Hariri’s movements in that time period.

UNIIIC Report #2 (Mehlis, 12 Dec 2005)

65. As previously noted (see S/2005/662, para. 192), telephone analysis has been a central aspect of the present investigation. Since October 2005, the Commission has concentrated on organizing the telephone data received into manageable databases so that it can be more easily accessible for future analysis. That process has involved compiling over 400,000 records from 195 different files (based on requests for telecommunications data) into one central database. Another database contains over 97 million telecommunications records of all the calls in Lebanon between 7 and 21 February 2005. Those two databases will permit a standardized search of any relevant telephone number and its contacts in an efficient manner which will facilitate future telephone analysis projects.

73. The Commission has not had time, in the short period available since the end of October 2005, to investigate meaningfully the following issues that were raised in the previous report: … Identification, location and further contacts related to the ring of prepaid telephone cards, including eight significant telephone numbers and 10 mobile telephones, which are believed to have been used to organize surveillance of Mr. Hariri and carry out the assassination (see S/2005/662, paras. 121 and 148-152).

UNIIIC Report #4 (Brammertz, 10 June 2006)

51. Communications analysis is a major task, with the collection of up to 5 billion records by the Commission currently under way. All must be sifted, sorted, collated and analysed. This work is painstaking in its depth, with any linkage established almost exponentially generating further linkages. The Commission has devoted a project team of analysts and investigators to this task and is acquiring specialized software and hardware to accommodate the project requirements. Such traffic analysis work requires focus. Hence, the Commission is concentrating on the immediacy of the Hariri case and closely associated links with the operation and other relevant issues, and the results of this work are continuously integrated into the broader case components.

52. The traffic and intercept analysis has expanded beyond the immediate utilization of the six subscriber identity module (SIM) cards, referred to in the Commission’s previous reports, on the day of the attack. Complex linkages, associated calls and geographic locations of a broader time period are being scrutinized and added to the overall investigation findings. The communications currently under analysis also have an international dimension, although the Commission is not in a position to make final conclusions about the significance of such calls at this stage.

UNIIIC Report #5: (Brammertz, 25 Sept 2006)

39. The Commission has devoted considerable resources to the analysis and investigation of the communications traffic aspects of the case. This topic has yielded important results, and enables the Commission to establish links that otherwise would not be evident. Much of the work is reactive in nature. However, some of the analytical work is also proactive and speculative, and builds upon known facts and develops investigation themes. It has elicited a number of leads and continues to provide the Commission with better understanding of the communications linkages relevant to the crimes.

40. The links that are being established through the communications work demonstrate a complex network of telecommunications traffic between a large number of relevant individuals, sometimes through intermediary telephone numbers or locations and sometimes directly. A series of investigation leads has been developed as a result of these analyses, which the Commission regards as a priority. Much painstaking work is required to track down each individual connection or link and exempt it from the enquiries or continue with it as a working lead. Similarly, the Commission understands better the preparatory aspects of the attack through its communications analysis; this work remains ongoing in conjunction with timeline analyses, and is one of a number of areas where comparative analysis with the 14 other cases is being pursued. For example, knowledge of the activities of the six subscriber identity module (SIM) card holders who are alleged to have been part of the bombing team, both geographically and in communications terms, has become clearer and more detailed.

41. The Commission has also developed direct and indirect linkages between significant individuals in disparate groups that are relevant from an investigative perspective. Explanations for these linkages are in some cases not immediately apparent, and the Commission is working to understand their relevance to the crime itself, to those potentially linked to it and to other individuals.

42. The international dimension of the communications analysis continues to provide investigative leads, as the Commission develops its knowledge of the complexities of international call routing and receives responses to its requests from States where telephone call traffic has been traced. To date the Commission has engaged 17 States in this aspect of its work, and has received considerable assistance and responses from a number of them.

43. The relevant communications links emanating from within Lebanon or outside the country of those individuals whom the Commission wishes to interview and/or continues to investigate are being systematically reviewed, and the results are providing further investigative leads.

UNIIIC Report #6 (Brammertz, 12 Dec 2006)

43. The Commission has conducted seven interviews in connection with the alleged bombing team and their use of six telephones to communicate on the day of the attack and in the days leading up to it. These interviews have provided new leads that are currently being pursued and will lead to more interviews in the next reporting period. Analysis of the use of other associated subscriber identity module (SIM) cards is also ongoing.

44. The location of the telephones when used and the purposes for which some of the linking numbers were used have revealed the high degree of security-aware behaviour exhibited by the individuals under investigation. Some persons used multiple mobile cellular telephones during a short period of time or registered telephones using aliases. While such compartmentalization of telephone usage makes analysis more complex, it helps to provide an understanding of the modus operandi of the perpetrators.

45. During the reporting period, communications traffic analysis has continued in support of the other investigative projects. This work consists of preparation for interviews of key persons and preparing specific reports on communications between selected individuals. For the purpose of preparation of interviews, data relating to the different telephones used by the interviewee during a certain period of interest are gathered and organized into an exploitable electronic format. The analysis then focuses on the personal contacts and communications links of the interviewee, the use of intermediaries and the frequency, timing, type, duration and location of the calls, as well as international call activity.

UNIIIC Report #7 (Brammertz, 15 Mar 2007)

34. The Commission’s analysis of communications traffic continues in order to support and validate different points arising from the investigations. Much work has been done to support the interviews conducted, in order that respective communications contact with other persons of interest to the case can be discussed with witnesses. Patterns of communications traffic, including frequencies and timings of calls, and linkages and clear associations to others, are all developed and elicit investigation leads.

35. In relation to the six mobile cellular telephone SIM cards allegedly used by the team that executed the operation on the day of 14 February 2005, the Commission has developed further information of interest relating to associated earlier operations, including possible surveillance and reconnaissance activity, possible practice-runs or earlier attempts to kill Rafik Hariri, and other actions undertaken by the team. New areas of interest have emerged from this analysis and are currently being examined.

36. The Commission has also undertaken an investigative project examining the role of the persons using the six SIM cards and activities that can be inferred from their use. This exercise is supported by the Commission’s existing communications traffic analysis projects in relation to the cards. The objective is fourfold: first, to reaffirm the validity of the hypothesis that the cards could indeed have been used by the bomb team to execute its task; second, to establish whether other modes of communication must have been used between the members of the team, and also perhaps with other individuals, in order for the attack to take place; third, to allow the Commission to establish a better understanding of how the crime was committed on 14 February; and finally, to understand further what other activity the bomb team undertook, and what locations it travelled to and why, in the days leading up to the attack.
37. Such extensive analysis enables the Commission to reach a better understanding of the bomb team, its role in the crime and its other activities. This in turn creates further investigative leads geographically and temporally, and pointing to the activities of individuals outside the immediate bombing team the Commission believes were using the six SIM cards.

38. This detailed examination of the activities of the six SIM cards has resulted in a number of significant elements for ongoing investigation. These include, but are not limited to: potential identification of the role of each participant in the preparation, planning, surveillance and actual attack; the bombing team’s anticipation of Hariri’s activities and movements; and possible earlier attempts on Hariri’s life.

39. One working hypothesis is that the bomb team had to ensure that Hariri was indeed dead after the explosion in order for the video claim of responsibility to be delivered and to have resonance with its intended audience. It is possible that the team, and those commissioning the crime, could not afford to deliver a claim of responsibility to the global media if Hariri had survived the attack. Thus, the Commission is exploring the hypothesis that one member of the team, or an associate, was tasked with confirming the death of the principal target as soon as possible and may have contacted someone waiting for the news. Based on existing information, the time frame for this activity would have been within approximately 45 minutes of the explosion.

40. This in turn led to the series of events related to the taped claim of responsibility and the subsequent telephone calls made to media outlets. The Commission is examining the hypothesis that one or more members of the bomb team was responsible for delivering the tape and making the subsequent telephone calls to the media. Other variations on this hypothesis are being explored to establish the numbers of perpetrators who may have been involved on the day of the attack.

UNIIIC Report #8 (Brammertz, 12 Jul 2007)

41. The Commission has consolidated its sizeable holdings of call records, communications data and analyses related to specific time periods, institutions and individuals of relevance to the Hariri investigation. Since its inception, the Commission has acquired more than 5 billion records of telephone calls and text messages sent through cellular phones in Lebanon, as well as communications data from a number of other countries. The Commission has also acquired a very large number of detailed subscriber call records. Since 2005, the Commission has issued more than 300 requests for assistance to support its communications analysis related to the Hariri investigation.

42. The Commission’s communications analysis provides valuable input to the investigations in establishing links between individuals, analysing the behaviour and activity of a number of persons of interest to the investigations and analysing call patterns for specific numbers, times and locations. It is also a very valuable resource in preparing for witness interviews. Given the proven investigative value and potential of communications analysis, the Commission has recently sought outside expertise to help exploit its communications data holdings and analysis. The Commission has also recently acquired new hardware and software, which will allow it to conduct more comprehensive data searches.

43. On the basis of the consolidation exercise, the Commission has confirmed and advanced its earlier conclusions that individuals using six mobile cellular telephone SIM cards acted in a coordinated manner to conduct surveillance on Rafik Hariri in the weeks prior to his assassination. A detailed analysis of the use of these cards on the day of the assassination indicates that these individuals played a critical role in the planning and execution of the attack itself, as demonstrated by their movements and call patterns. The Commission has established the origins of the SIM cards and is finalizing its understanding of the circumstances around the sale of the cards and a number of handsets to the individuals who made use of them in the surveillance of Rafik Hariri. A number of interviews were held during the reporting period to advance this line of inquiry.

46. The Commission has also been focusing on establishing horizontal and vertical links between individuals linked to the crime scene and those who may have been involved in the preparation of the attack or may have had prior knowledge of the attack through the analysis of telephone communications. Several telephone numbers have been identified and scrutinized as a result of this line of inquiry.

**

So, what do you think?

Does this look like the work of an investigating commission that was not engaged in telecommunications analysis?

When I asked Mr. Macdonald about the discrepancies between the statements of his sources and the first Mehlis report, he insisted that all of the telecommunications work done before late 2007 was performed by the Lebanese police and not by the UN Commission. He added that the UNIIIC was “generally aware” of the work being done by the Lebanese, but that “actual telecomms analysis by the commission itself, as I reported, was not authorized until late 2007.”

As others have already noted, this simply does not add up, and the above survey of the UNIIIC reports confirms the contradictions in the CBC account. Even if we accept the testimony of Mr. Macdonald’s sources and assume for a moment that all of the discussions in the UNIIIC reports about communications analysis prior to late 2007 were just made up, how does this explain the suggestion that the discovery of the red network by the UNIIIC was “earth-shattering”?

After all, they had already discussed this network in eight different reports from 2005-2007! And the network was not just discussed under Mehlis. Brammertz devotes pages to the discussion of how the UNIIIC was trying to develop its lead vis-à-vis the red network.

But let’s also assume, just to give Mr. Macdonald’s sources the benefit of the doubt, that it was not the UNIIIC that was investigating the communications traffic, but rather the Lebanese police. How does one then explain how the UNIIIC became privy to the work that the Lebanese were doing (so as to be able to mention it in the eight reports between 2005-07), unless of course the UN was working in close cooperation with the Lebanese and not, as Mr. Macdonald’s sources suggest, in isolation from them?

I will endeavor to get a response from CBC about these questions. Stay tuned.

**

Update 1:

Buried in the comment section of the last post is this gem from RedLeb, who basically says exactly what I said in this post (and much more), but more succinctly. I reproduce his comment in full below:

“It is not enough for Macdonald to say that ‘Mehlis was aware of the ISF’s early telecomms work’. Macdonald’s report, especially the video, emphatically makes the claim that the commission only identified the Red team late in Brammertz’s tenure, and only after much prodding.

However, the commission’s reports are clear that the Red team was identified at the initial stages of the investigation and that signal analysis was a key technique used by the commission.

This contradiction with the documented historical record undercuts the report’s credibility. It is obviously trying to sell you something. And what I think what it is selling is the linkage between the Red team and HA.

The Red team stands out in any signal analysis. It is a closed network, located at the scene of the crime, and ceased to exist immediately after the assassination. By focusing on the slam dunk part of the Eid’s analysis, we are asked to adopt the further linkage of the Red Team to HA.

What is that linkage?

Did someone on the Yellow team call the Hospital and then someone at the Hospital call a government issued HA phone line?

How about if an Israeli agent calls someone at AUH, and then someone at AUH calls AUB? Can I then claim the Dean of AUB is an Israeli spy?

And this whole ‘mathematical genius’ spin. It just sounds like a way to cater to the Leb ego so as to distract our suspicions. Tell me Eid used some special software. Tell me he set up a database. Hell, tell me wrote a computer algorithm to do signal analysis. I will believe you. But a super-mathematical genius who could ‘intuit mathematical patterns’? No. Just… no.

I speculate that the attack on Wissam Hassan is to undermine the ISF’s work on Israeli spies and Israel’s penetration of the Lebanese telecom network. At Nahass’s conference this week, Wissam Hassan was specifically named as helping out in the investigation of Israel compromising HA phone lines. By labelling him an HA accomplice, the whole Israel angle can be explained away.
The attack on Bellemare and Brammertz are interesting. Whoever fed Macdonald his information must have felt the indictments are not going to come out, or will fail to name HA members.

Thus the report serves to indict HA in the media, regardless of the path the STL takes. The whole ‘Getting Away with Murder’ angle is that HA did it, we know they did it, but here’s why the STL won’t indict them.

Is someone nervous?

I think the only factual we get out of the whole report was from Bellemare’s press release in which he stated he is working on the draft of the indictment. So we know that’s coming sooner than later.”

River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian

The Madness of International intelligence

By UP

Today, Ibrahim Al-Amin of Al-Akhbar raised the following questions on CBC report, and UN reaction. ( My translation)

"First: Bellemare break his silence, indirectly admitting the content of CBC report, indicating that the report may threaten lives…..

Second: Usually the concerned UN people don't comment on press reports concerning the Tribunal for Lebanon. For the first time they do. They request CBC not to publish the leaked documents. Such request is an additional sign confirming that the leaked documents are true.

Third: Saad al-Hariri, declares that he trusted and still trusting Wessam Al-Hassan.

His statement reflects, indirectly, his rejection putting Wessam as a prime suspect, thus contradicting his continuous statements about trusting the Tribunal, unless he knows that the Tribunal document is not raising questions about Wessam.

Forth: the CBC report confirms that accusing Hezbollah is based on Telecommunication file done by Wessan Eid prior to 2006 July war…. Which need further investigation on the light of revealed Israeli penetration the Telecommunication Sector?
Fifth: Putting Wessam as a prime suspect, and accusing Hezbollah in the same document, and hinting that Wessam was working for Hezbullah, raise questions about illogical connection, unless somebody wants to keep Wessam away from the Telecommunication file, by putting him a suspect with Hezbollah.
It is certain we are witnessing a mad international intelligence game, where there is no red line."
Almost I raised the same questions yesterday.

May be somebody wants to save the ass of Wessan by keeping him away from the Telecommunication File as Ibrahim hinted? But it could be a message to both Wessam and his boss Saad. Most likely, Bellemare read the message, thus he suddenly broke his silence and warned that CBC report may threaten lives.

Which lives he is talking about? I guess it’s the life of Wessam, and may be the live of Saad if he, as his father did, fail to deliver.

Several times I mentioned the story of Saad's meeting with Cheney after the Murder, where Cheney told him in clear words: You have to deliver or follow your father.

Yesterday, Haaretz, played on the same wave, ignored the 24 phone calls Wessam made prior to Rafiq's murder, and highlighted his phone calls with Hezbollah, to confirm that he was working with Hezbollah, which is not true. Moreover, according to Haartez the "Wave of arrests among officials in Lebanese mobile phone operators - all on suspicions of spying for Israel - also reflects just how close cooperation has become between Lebanese intelligence and Hezbollah." HaaretzWe know about the close cooperation between Lebanese Army intelligence and Hezbollah, and we know that Wessam Joined the wave of hunting spies to save his ass.

Update: Press TV

Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri has rejected the involvement of Hezbollah and Lebanon's head of police intelligence in the murder of former premier Rafiq Hariri.
"I personally think that the media leaks do not serve the course of justice," Hariri told reporters on Tuesday.

He made the remarks after the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) linked Hezbollah and Colonel Wissam Hassan to Hariri's assassination in 2005.

Hassan was in charge of the late Hariri's security in the Lebanese capital, Beirut at the time of the incident.

Referring to the suspicion against Hassan, the Lebanese premier said, "Colonel Wissam Hassan has always had our full trust and continues to have our full trust."

Jumblatt: STL Politically Motivated, Government Should Reject It

24/11/2010

Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt on Wednesday accused a UN-backed probe into the assassination of the country's ex-premier of being politically motivated and urged the cabinet to unanimously reject it.

"This tribunal is aimed at destabilizing Lebanon rather than rendering justice," Jumblatt told AFP. "It would be appropriate at this time for the cabinet to meet and unanimously denounce the tribunal and its (upcoming) verdict)."

Jumblatt said the rumors and press reports surrounding the STL probe and its findings had become "a dangerous soap opera" that threatened Lebanon's stability. "It is clear that the investigators are leaking information and are working for countries that have accounts to settle."

He added that Lebanon's politicians would do better to address mounting extremism in certain regions of the country rather than focus on the Hariri tribunal. "The real danger facing Lebanon is the rise of extremist groups and the political class should stop being distracted by these endless arguments over the tribunal and face the real danger," Jumblatt said.

(AFP)

Hariri Tribunal "undoubtedly" got assistance from Israeli intelligence...

"... The UN commission's resources have been relatively limited, and it is hard to imagine that it did not receive the assistance of other espionage agencies. The potential countries that have spy agencies with the necessary technology is also limited and includes the National Security Agency in the United States, British and French intelligence and, undoubtedly, Israeli intelligence...."

Posted by G, Z, or B at 9:39 AM

River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian