Uprooted Palestinians are at the heart of the conflict in the M.E Palestinians uprooted by force of arms. Yet faced immense difficulties have survived, kept alive their history and culture, passed keys of family homes in occupied Palestine from one generation to the next.
A volley of rockets struck the Camp Taji military base in Iraq on the evening of March 11, killing three US-led coalition service members, two of them Americans and one British, and injuring 12 others. The targeted military base is a large facility located in a rural region approximately 27km north of Baghdad.
After the shelling, Iraqi security forces found the improvised rocket launcher used in the attack in the nearby area of Rashidiya. It was forty 107mm barrels installed on the back of a Kia Bongo truck. Three rockets were still remaining inside the barrel.
There were no immediate claims of responsibility for the attack. However, over the past months US-linked targets have witnessed a number of similar rocket attacks. Most of them led to no casualties. In general, US sources blame Kataib Hezbollah and other Iran-linked groups for these incidents.
The situation became especially tense after the US strike on a convoy of Iraqi and Iranian officers moving near Baghdad International Airport on January 3. The prominent Iranian general, commander of the Qods Force, Qassem Soleimani, was assassinated in this strike. The attack caused a large-scale crisis in the region, and prompted an Iranian retaliatiory missile strike on US military bases in Iraq. Washington swallowed a public attack on its forces by a state claiming that there were no casualties. In the following weeks, these ‘no casualties’ steadily turned into at least 110. All of them, according to the official version, received traumatic brain injury.
Additionally, the Iraqi Parliament accepted a bill demanding US troop withdrawal from the country, which Washington ignored, even threatening Baghdad with devastating sanctions, should Iraq continue to act like it is a sovereign, rather than occupied, country.
Following the attack on Camp Taji, ‘unknown aircraft’, most likely belonging to the US-led coalition, struck positions belonging to Iranian-backed groups near the Syrian-Iraqi border. The surroundings of the Syrian town of al-Bukamal, located on the highway linking Deir Ezzor and Baghdad, became the main target of the attack. Pro-Iranian sources claimed that the strikes caused material damage only.
Meanwhile, US forces in northeastern Syria strengthened their military positions by deploying additional howitzers. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces declared in an official statement that the military buildup was needed to provide US bases with additional protection. Another troop withdrawal announced by the administration of President Donald Trump is apparently successfully ongoing.
Syria’s northwest is also a source of tensions. On March 11, intense fighting erupted among Turkish-backed armed groups in the town of Azaz. As always, the incident was caused by internal contradictions between Turkish proxies who are involved in a wide range of various criminal activities and regularly clash for spheres of influence.
In the region of Greater Idlib, Turkish-backed groups, including those linked with al-Qaeda, are preparing to sabotage another ceasefire deal. They reinforced their positions north of the M4 highway and east of Jisr al-Shughur and declared that they are not planning to withdraw from any areas south of the highway. These statements go contrary to Turkish claims that preparations for the creation of a security zone in the area and the start of joint Turkish-Russian patrols are successfully in progress. Despite these, Ankara continues blaming the Syrian government for supposed violations of the Moscow deal and threatening it with military action should the ceasefire be violated. It seems that Turkey once again seeks to sweep agreements regarding the withdrawal and neutralization of radicals under the carpet, thus pushing the region into a new round of military escalation.
One Russian Airbase Could Take Down Turkey’s Entire Fighter Fleet? New Assessment Shows a Favourable Military Balance in Syria Underlying Moscow’s Success
While much uncertainty remains surrounding what exactly was agreed to in Moscow regarding the ceasefire agreement in Syria’s Idlib province, or how long Turkey intends to adhere to the new ceasefire agreement, it is clear that despite its bellicosity towards Damascus, Ankara has been extremely cautious about provoking Russia or undermining the strong relationship built over the past three years. Positive relations with Russia have remained particularly critical to Turkish interests since 2016 for a number of reasons. Increasingly alienated from the Western Bloc and its Gulf Arab allies, which are strongly suspected of having at least tacitly supported an attempted military coup that year, Turkey needed to quickly diversify its sources of economic and military security. Moving quickly to make amends for the downing of a Russian Su-24 strike fighter a year prior in November 2015, Turkey arrested the F-16 pilots responsible for the attack. Ankara subsequently saw its relations with Moscow quickly improve to the benefit of both sates – from the S-400 deal to growing exchange of tourists.
Russia for its part has a big stick to complement the carrot of positive defence and economic ties, and is capable of reigning in Turkish ambitions over Syria to a large extent accordingly. Alongside sanctions, cutting the flow of tourists and other economic measures, Russia has heavily fortified its position in Syria since November 2015 to deter attacks by Turkey and other potentially hostile parties. It has capitalised on this asset in a number of ways, more conspicuously by deploying Su-35 fighters to intercept Turkish incursions into Syrian airspace and more recently by deploying its Military Police to guard the strategically critical M4 and M5 highways and the city of Sarakeb. These targets were directly in the path of advancing Turkish backed Islamist militias in the first week of March, and with these militants relying heavily on Turkish air and artillery support to advance and take ground from the Syrian Arab Army, deployment of Russian personnel in tandem with the opening of negotiations drew a line under how much Moscow was willing to tolerate the jihadist push into Syrian territory.
What it is important to keep in mind is not only that Turkey needs Russia far more than vice versa – but also that, in regards to Syria, the balance of power between the two parties remains extremely one-sided. While NATO’s willingness to overtly support Turkey should it provoke an armed conflict with Russian forces remains highly questionable, an assessment of the military capabilities of both parties shows a tremendous Russian advantage in the field in the event of an armed conflict – with the far smaller size of Russian units in Syria compensated for by overwhelming technological supremacy. Underlining this often-missed point, I would strongly recommend the following video which assesses the outcome of a potential air war between Russian units at Khmeimim Airbase and the entire Turkish Air Force. This includes assets deployed to the airbase from December 2015 in response to the Turkish attack on the Russian strike fighter, such as Su-35 air superiority fighters and S-400 and S-300V4 surface to air missile systems.
A further lesson one can take from this assessment is why Turkey appears so eager to upgrade its air fleet in short order – either with the F-35 or with some combination of Russian Su-57, Su-35 and MiG-35 jets, having shown interest in all three. Negotiations to acquire the Su-35 in particular, the oldest of the three designs which has been in service since 2014, was reported in October 2019 to have reached its final stages. Given the precedent set by Russia’s Su-35 deal with Egypt, which was signed in 2018 but not announced until March the following year, it remains possible that a deal has already been made for transfer of the fighters to the Turkish Air Force to complement its S-400s.
The latest agreement of ceasefire between the Russian President and the Turkish madman Erdogan explicitly excludes combating terrorists. Erdogan doesn’t consider al-Qaeda as a terrorist group, he invested heavily in this organization especially in Syria and lately in Libya.
A Turkish column of troops entered the Syrian Idlib province on the second day of the ceasefire through Kfar Lucin, some sources reported another Turkish forces column crossed the borders into Idlib, while the Turkish-sponsored Nusra Front (al-Qaeda Levant) declared their rejection of the ceasefire and the agreement.
Erdogan instead of separating the radical head-choppers of al-Qaeda from the moderate head-choppers of al-Qaeda as per his own commitment he obliged himself to in September 2018, he beefed up those terrorists in numbers and gears, both types of them, supplied them with advanced weapons, and when they were defeated despite this support he merged the Turkish Army soldiers within the ranks of these terrorists hoping the Turkish soldiers would serve as human shields to save the terrorists, and that is exactly what resulted in the killing of dozens (29, 38, 62, or most likely 109 depending on the source) of them by the Syrian Arab Army who were bombing the gathering of al-Qaeda terrorists on 27th of February, last month.
The killing of their soldiers, the al-Qaeda human shields, was used by the Turks as a justification to attack the Syrian Arab Army units and their allies in Syria to allow al-Qaeda terrorists regain the territories they lost, momentarily, using the Russian strange stand down which left the SAA without the agreed air cover, yet Erdogan instead of only licking the bone offered by President Putin, he actually ate the bone and wanted more which resulted in increased escalation with the SAA and the IRGC issued their chilling warning to the TSK (inseparable Turkish Army and al-Qaeda).War or Peace: Turkish backed Terrorists, Erdogan’s Decision on Idlib
Twenty violations of the ceasefire regime were recorded by the Russian Reconciliation Center in Hmeimim, 19 by the Turks; the Nusra Front rejection of the ceasefire agreement and increase of the Turkish human shields soldiers into Idlib, all are signals of a coming showdown unless someone cuts the tree under the Turkish madman and allow him the free fall he needs and hopefully a bang to his head would wake him up or allow someone smarter to take over in Turkey and save what could be saved in that country before it’s too late and hundreds more of their troops get sardined and sent back in boxes, or whatever is left of them. The SAA is more than determined to clean the country to the last inch from the terrorists and their supporters.
On the other side and where Erdogan forces lost the battles, the Aleppo – Damascus M5 Artery returned to life and hundreds of vehicles took the chance to travel using the once backbone of the Syrian economy and social life, it saves them 3 hours of driving when they had to take side roads to avoid the targeting by the Turkish-sponsored terrorists of al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
The 6 kilometers both sides of the Aleppo – Latakia M4 artery is in the works as per Russian sources, after a week they are supposed to start patrolling this highway jointly with Turkish patrols to ensure the implementation of the second article of the latest ceasefire agreement. This is a more serious test for the Turkish ability to meet their commitments, the terrorists are cornered near Zawya Mountain not far from the M4, and under the threat of their shelling using the advanced weapons they received from NATO member state Turkey.
Russian Military Police in Syria – Archive
Will Erdogan get a new chance after this when, not if, the truce is seriously breached? Nobody knows what he offered President Putin in their 3 hours closed meeting before joined by the delegations of both countries in their last summit, and nobody will be able to understand what is there left to offer by the Turkish madman.
We reported earlier from our sources within the Turkish top brass about a brewing military coup, Erdogan is aware of this as well, he’s racing time to achieve anything to regain some popularity among the Turks, nobody envies him on any front.
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بالنار قبل التفاهمات، ثبّت الجيش السوري وحلفاؤه سيطرتهم على طول الطريق الدولي حلب – دمشق وأمّنوه شرقاً وغرباً. كما تمكّنوا من إبعاد خطر المسلحين عن مدينة حلب بالكامل، ولاحقوهم إلى أقصى ريفها.
أما التفاهم، فيُنتظر أن يتمّ بموجبه فتح الطريق الدولي حلب – اللاذقية أمام المدنيين بعد أسبوع. وعلى رغم بدء سريان وقف إطلاق النار، إلا أن المنطقة تبقى مرشّحة لجولة جديدة من الاشتباكات، حيث لا اتفاقات نهائية، ولا حلول جذرية، في حين يبقى ثابتاً عدم انسحاب الجيش من أيّ نقطة وصلها، على عكس ما كانت تطالب به تركيا.
على رغم انعقاد قمة موسكو، التي جمعت الرئيسين الروسي فلاديمير بوتين والتركي رجب طيب إردوغان، أمس، إلا أن العمليات العسكرية لم تتوقف في منطقة إدلب، خصوصاً من جهة المجموعات المسلحة والقوات التركية. وفي حين كان يتشاور الرئيسان حول مصير المنطقة التي تزايد فيها التصعيد العسكري في الأشهر الأخيرة إلى مستويات قياسية، هاجمت الفصائل المسلحة مدعومة بغطاء ناري تركي كثيف محيط مدينة سراقب في ريف إدلب الجنوبي الشرقي، من دون أن تتمكّن من تحقيق أيّ نتائج. إذ استطاع الجيش السوري صدّ الهجمات، كما قصف مرابض المدفعية التركية، ما أدى إلى مقتل جنديين تركيين وإصابة 3 آخرين. كذلك، شنّ هجمات مدفعية وصاروخية وجوية ضدّ العديد من أهداف المسلحين في ريف إدلب الجنوبي. ونشرت وكالة «سانا» الرسمية مشاهد جوية تظهر قيام الجيش باستهداف دقيق لمواقع المسلحين في إدلب، في وقت بدا فيه لافتاً انخفاض وتيرة التحركات التركية العسكرية، جواً وبرّاً، باستثناء الدعم المدفعي والصاروخي للمسلحين.
وعلى رغم محاولات المسلحين العديدة تحقيق مكاسب ميدانية في الوقت الضائع قبيل بدء سريان وقف إطلاق النار منتصف ليل الخميس – الجمعة، إلا أن الخريطة الميدانية بقيت على حالها، وعلى أساسها ثُبّت وقف إطلاق النار، وما حوله من تفاهمات بين موسكو وأنقرة. وكما كان متوقعاً، توصّل الطرفان إلى قرار بالتهدئة الميدانية، وتفاهم يخصّ فتح الطريق الدولي حلب – اللاذقية (M4) (راجع الأخبار في 2 آذار 2020).
تؤكد مصادر عدة متابعة أن «هذا التفاهم مرحلي، وليس اتفاقاً نهائياً»
وتبنّى الرئيسان الروسي والتركي وثيقة مشتركة تشمل عدة نقاط، أُطلقت عليها تسمية «البرتوكول الإضافي للمذكرة حول إرساء الاستقرار في منطقة إدلب لخفض التصعيد والمؤرخة بيوم 17 أيلول 2018». وجاء فيها أن «لا حلّ عسكرياً للنزاع السوري، الذي يمكن تسويته فقط نتيجة لعملية سياسية يقودها وينفذها السوريون بأنفسهم بدعم الأمم المتحدة، وفق القرار 2254 الصادر عن مجلس الأمن الدولي». ولعلّ أهمّ نقاط الوثيقة التي ستُترجم مباشرة هي وقف إطلاق النار على طول خطوط التماس القائمة اليوم، بالإضافة إلى «إنشاء ممرّ آمن عرضه 6 كيلومترات شمالاً، و6 كيلومترات جنوباً، من الطريق (M4)»، على أن «يتمّ تنسيق المعايير الدقيقة لعمل الممرّ الآمن عبر قنوات الاتصال بين وزارتًي الدفاع للاتحاد الروسي والجمهورية التركية في غضون 7 أيام»، علماً أن فتح «حلب – اللاذقية» كان مطلباً اساسياً لدمشق وموسكو وطهران، وهو مكرّس في «اتفاقات سوتشي» التي كانت تتهرّب أنقرة من تنفيذها. كما اتّفق الطرفان على تسيير دوريات مشتركة بدءاً من 15 آذار/ مارس الجاري على الطريق نفسه، على الجزء الممتدّ بين ترنبة (غربي سراقب) وعين الحور (شمال شرقي اللاذقية)، بمسافة تصل إلى 70 كم. والأهمّ من ذلك هو تثبيت خطوط التماس الحالية، مع ما يعنيه الأمر من فتح الطريق الدولي حلب – دمشق (M5) كاملاً، وإبقائه تحت سيطرة الجيش السوري.
لكن في المقابل، ثَبّت التفاهم الجديد وجود القوات التركية على طول خطوط التماس، جنباً إلى جنب مع مسلّحي الفصائل، ابتداءً من دارة عزة شمالاً، وصولاً إلى تقتناز ومحيطها جنوباً شرقيّ مدينة إدلب. وهذا ما قد يفتح مجالاً لجولات جديدة من الاشتباك بين الجيشين السوري والتركي في المنطقة، على غرار ما حصل في الأيام الماضية. إذ تؤكد مصادر عدة متابعة أن «هذا التفاهم مرحلي، وليس اتفاقاً نهائياً، وبالتالي فإن عودة العمليات العسكرية محتومة مستقبلاً، ما يعني مواجهة جديدة مع الجيش التركي».
وبانتهاء هذه المرحلة من العمليات العسكرية، عبر بدء سريان وقف إطلاق النار، يكون الجيش السوري وحلفاؤه قد سيطروا منذ بداية عملياتهم في أرياف حلب (الجنوبي – الجنوبي الغربي – الشمالي الغربي) وريفَي إدلب (الشرقي – الجنوبي) في أوائل العام الحالي، على ما يقارب 215 قرية وبلدة وناحية. كما يكونون قد تمكّنوا من تأمين طريق دمشق – حلب الدولي، بعد أن حرّروا مسافة ما يقارب 100 كم من هذا الطريق. ووفق خريطة السيطرة هذه، باتت المساحة التي استعادها الجيش السوري تُقدّر بحوالي 1900 كم مربّع.
سينفق المحللون والإعلاميون الأتراك والمؤيدون لتركيا، ومثلهم المعادون لسورية ولمحور المقاومة، جهداً ووقتاً لتظهير نتائج القمة التي جمعت الرئيس الروسي فلاديمير بوتين بالرئيس التركي رجب أردوغان، كانتصار تركي روسي على حساب سورية، لأن أحداً لن يستطيع القول إن روسيا خسرت. فالأفضل أن يلجأ المشككون والمعادون إلى تصوير القمة كتقاسم مصالح روسيّ تركي على حساب سورية، لكنه سيكون من الصعب أن يمتلك أحد من هؤلاء جواباً على أسئلة من نوع، أين أصبح تهديد أردوغان بعملية عسكرية اختار لها اسم درع الربيع وحدّد لها موعداً وهدفاً هو إعادة الجيش السوري إلى النقاط التي كان فيها قبل بدء عملياته العسكرية؟ وأين أصبح الحديث عن إخراج الجيش السوري إلى ما وراء نقاط المراقبة؟ وماذا عن الطريق الدولية التي تربط حلب بدمشق، التي باتت بيد الجيش السوري بعد معارك ضارية كانت أهمها معركة سراقب؟ وأين مصير الأحياء الشمالية والغربية لحلب التي صارت بيد الجيش السوري؟
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القراءة البسيطة لنتائج القمة، تقول إن ما تناوله الاتفاق يطال ما لم يُنجزه الجيش السوري من تطبيق تفاهم سوتشي بالقوة، فالاتفاق تجاهل كلياً ما أنجزه الجيش السوري، مكرساً أن هذا الجزء من مناطق خفض التصعيد ليس على طاولة التفاوض، وأن المطروح هو الاختيار بين ان يواصل الجيش السوري مع حلفائه مدعوماً بالنار الروسية ما تبقى من تطهير لمناطق يسيطر عليها الإرهاب بحماية وشراكة الجيش التركي، خصوصاً في مناطق تأمين الطريق الدولي بين حلب واللاذقية، أو أن يقوم الرئيس التركي لحفظ ماء وجهه بتجديد تعهّده بالتعاون لتنفيذ هذه المهمة التي تلكأ بتنفيذها، عبر ضمان فتح الطريق من جهة، ومواجهة الجماعات الإرهابية من جهة أخرى. وهنا يمكن بدء النقاش فقط، فما مضى قد مضى وما كُتب قد كُتب، وما قبل سراقب غير ما بعدها.
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النقاش المجدي فقط هو حول ما إذا كان أردوغان سيلتزم هذه المرّة بموجباته أم سيعود للمراوغة والتلكؤ، والرهان على المتغيرات والخداع، وتاريخ أردوغان حافل بمثل هذه الرهانات الخاطئة، ولا يوجد عاقل يستطيع أن يقول إن الوفاء بالتعهدات من خصال أردوغان، فكيف إذا كان مرغماً، لكن ما يجب وضعه في الحساب كمتغير جديد على أردوغان وفريقه قراءته جيداً، هو أنها المرة الأولى التي يأتي فيها التفاهم الروسي التركي ليكرس نتائج نصر عسكري سوري بالمباشر الميدانيّ وليس بالحصيلة الإجمالية السياسية للتفاهمات، ويقلص مسافة الجغرافيا والزمن وفقاً لنتائج هذا النصر، فما تمّ حسمه حسم وانتهى، وما بقي فهو مفتوح لخياري العودة للحسم أو فتح المجال لفرصة، ويعلم اردوغان هذه المرة أن الموازين التي ستحكم المعارك المقبلة ستكون أشد اختلالاً لصالح الجيش السوري والحلفاء، وستكون روسيا أشد انخراطاً بصورة علنية فيها، وربما لا تكون فرصة بعدها، وإن كانت فستكون لمساحة أضيق في الجغرافيا والزمن، بما يتناسب مع خطة القضم والهضم التي يعتمدها الجيش السوري منذ بدء معركة حلب الأولى قبل ثلاثة أعوام، وتدحرجت بعدها الانتصارات.
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السياق الوحيد الذي تفتحه تفاهمات موسكو واضح، وهو استعادة الدولة السورية لكامل جغرافيتها، وصون وحدتها وسيادتها، وفتح الباب لتراجع تركي تحت سقف الإقرار بهذه المعادلة، لأنها الإطار الذي لا تراجع عنه لبناء استقرار قابل للحياة من جهة، ولضمان تبديد الهواجس التركية تجاه الملف الكردي من جهة أخرى، ويبقى اتفاق أضنة مطروحاً على الطاولة.
In an article published by RT, Scott Ritter, a former US Marine Corps intelligence officer, stressed that his week’s meeting between Presidents Putin and Erdogan in Moscow was cast as preventing a war between Russia and Turkey in Syria.
Ritter, who served in the Soviet Union as an inspector implementing the INF Treaty, considered that the meeting between the Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Erdogan, accompanied by their respective senior national security advisers, in Moscow on March 5 aimed at negotiating the terms of a ceasefire that would bring an end to heavy fighting in Syria’s Idlib province that threatened to draw their two nations into direct military conflict.
“After more than six hours of meeting, a new agreement, packaged as an ‘additional protocol’ to the ‘Memorandum on Stabilization of the Situation in the De-escalation Area as of September 17, 2018’ (better known as the ‘Sochi Agreement’), was agreed to by both parties.”
“Over the course of a week, from February 27 through March 5, Syria’s Idlib province transitioned from being ground zero for a war between the Syrian army and allied forces, and heavily armed groups opposed to the rule of Syrian President Bashar Assad, into a geopolitical powder keg that threatened to pull the Turkish and Russian militaries into direct conflict with one another. On March 1, Turkey, following up on threats previously made by President Erdogan to drive the Syrian Army and its allies back to the line of demarcation set forth in the original Sochi Agreement, unleashed a major offensive, dubbed “Operation Spring Shield” and involving thousands of Turkish troops fighting alongside anti-Assad formations.”
According to Ritter, this operation soon fizzled; not only was the Turkish advance halted in its tracks, but the Syrian Army, supported by Hezbollah and pro-Iranian forces, was able to recapture much of the territory lost in the earlier fighting.
“Faced with the choice of either escalating further and directly confronting Russian forces, or facing defeat on the battlefield, Erdogan instead flew to Moscow.”
“The new additional protocol, which entered into effect at midnight Moscow time on Friday, March 6, represents a strategic defeat for Erdogan and the Turkish military which, as NATO’s second-largest standing armed force, equipped and trained to the highest Western standards, should have been more than a match for a rag-tag Syrian Army, worn down after nine years of non-stop combat.”
“One of the major reasons behind the Turkish failure was the fact that Russia controlled the air space over Idlib, denying the Turks the use of aircraft, helicopters and (except for a single 48-hour period) drones, while apparently using their own aircraft, together with the Syrian Air Force, to pummel both the Turkish military and their allied anti-Assad forces (though neither side has officially confirmed the Russians bombing the Turks – that would be a disaster for the talks).”
“In the end, the anti-Assad militants were compelled to take shelter within so-called ‘Observation posts’– heavily fortified Turkish garrisons established under the Sochi Agreement, intermingling with Turkish forces to protect themselves from further attack. Operation Spring Shield turned out to be a resounding defeat for the Turks and their allies.”
“The agreement also focuses on another critical, yet unfulfilled, aspect of the original Sochi agreement – the guarantee of safe passage along the strategic M4 and M5 highway corridors connecting the city of Aleppo with Latakia (M4) and Damascus (M5). The inability and/or unwillingness on the part of the Turks to follow through with this provision was the major impetus behind the current Syrian offensive in Idlib. Indeed, the Syrian Army was able to gain full control of the M5 highway and was in the process of doing the same for the M4 highway when the Moscow agreement brought an end to the fighting.”
“Under the terms of the additional protocol, the new zones of de-escalation will be defined by the frontlines as they currently exist, securing the hard-won advances made by the Syrian Army and embarrassing Erdogan, who had promised to drive the Syrians back to the positions as they existed at the time of the original Sochi Agreement. Moreover, the M4 highway will now be buffered by a 12-kilometer security zone (Six kilometers on each side), and will be jointly patrolled by Turkey and Russia, guaranteeing secure passage for commercial vehicle traffic. These patrols will begin on March 15, which means the Turks have ten days to oversee the evacuation of anti-Assad militants from this corridor–in effect, pushing them back north of the M4 highway, which was the goal of the Syrian offensive to begin with.”
“While couched as a ceasefire agreement, the additional protocol produced by the Moscow summit between Putin and Erdogan on Thursday is a thinly disguised instrument of surrender, the writer concluded, “The Syrian government got everything it was looking for by launching its offensive, and the Turks and their anti-Assad allies were left licking their wounds in a much-reduced Idlib pocket.”
Early on March 5, the Israeli Air Force carried out a series of airstrikes on targets in the Syrian provinces of Homs and Quneitra. According to the Syrian military, the attack was conducted from Lebanese airspace at 00:30 local time. Israeli warplanes used two civilian flights of Qatar Airways as a cover for their strikes. The Syrian side claimed that it had intercepted all the hostile missiles. However, ground explosions were reported in Quneitra. Therefore, at least some of them in fact did hit their targets.
The previous Israeli strikes on Syria took place on March 2 and February 23. On March 2, an Israeli attack helicopter destroyed a vehicle in the province of Quneitra after Israeli troops in the Golan Heights had reportedly come under sniper fire. On February 23 Israeli warplanes targeted positions of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group in Damascus.
‘Entirely by chance’ the increase of Israeli military actions in Syria came amid the escalation of the Syrian-Turkish conflict in Idlib.
On March 4, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the Turkistan Islamic Party and other al-Qaeda-linked groups supported by the Turkish Army made another attempt to recapture the town of Saraqib, located on the M4-M5 highways crossroad, from the Syrian Army. Despite the intense artillery and air support from Turkey, al-Qaeda members failed to achieve their goal.
Supporters of the 25th Special Forces Division and Hezbollah deployed there claim that Turkish-led forces suffered notable losses in the clashes but provide no particular numbers. Video evidence from the ground confirms that pro-government forces recaptured a T-90 battle tank that they had lost earlier in the same area.
Syrian troops also entered the village of Afis north of Saraqib but failed to fully secure it. The village remains contested. If Turkish-led forces keep control over it, they will be able to carry out attacks on vehicles moving via the M5 highway from Saraqib to Aleppo.
Earlier on the same day, 2 Turkish soldiers were killed and 6 others were injured in Syrian Army artillery fire in eastern Idlib. In response, the Turkish military tried to shoot down a Syrian Su-22 warplane bombing al-Qaeda positions west of Saraqib. Turkish supporters claim that an anti-air missile was launched by an F-16 fighter jet. However, most likely this was a MANPAD launched from one of Turkey’s so-called ‘observation posts’ in the area. During the past weeks, Turkish soldiers were repeatedly spotted launching MANPADs at Syrian and Russian aircraft. The Russian Defense Ministry officially says that Turkish observation posts have merged with terrorist bases and have been used to carry out attacks on government-controlled areas. Nonetheless, Turkish soldiers surrounded by the Syrian Army continue enjoying safety and receiving supplies. This is another demonstration of the fact that modern conflicts often take strange forms.
Setbacks in southern and eastern Idlib forced Turkey and its proxies to shift the focus of their military efforts. Late on March 4, Turkish-backed al-Qaeda forces attacked positions of the Syrian Army in western Aleppo. By the morning of March 5, they had captured the village of al-Sheikh ‘Aqil and al-Rraqim Hilltop. The control over these positions will allow them to shell the western suburb of Aleppo city more effectively.
Since the start of Turkish military actions in Idlib in February, the Syrian military had shot down 13 Turkish military UAVs, pro-government sources claim. According to them, this number includes 7 Bayraktar TB2 and TAI Anka combat drones. It should be noted that only a part of these claims has been confirmed by visual evidence.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham militants tried to stage a chemical provocation in eastern Idlib, but poisoned themselves, the Russian Defense Ministry reported on March 4. According to the report, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham members were planning to stage the incident on March 2nd during the Syrian Army advance in the western part of Saraqib by blowing up canisters with a chemical substance, but a canister leak caused casualties among the militants themselves.
Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan had decided to attack Russia, Iran and Syria when he sent his army to Idlib and bombed Russian and Iranian allies on the Idlib front. The Turkish president is feeling strong and believes he is holding many good cards to play against his Russian counterpart President Vladimir Putin. He trusts he is in a position to bomb Iran’s allies, despite the fact that they hold armed drones, precision missiles and experienced Special Forces that can hit Turkey very hard in the case of war.
The conflict Erdogan envisions between Russia, Iran and Syria on one side and Turkey on the other would suit the US and Israel. They would be happy to see Presidents Putin and Erdogan sinking into the Syrian quagmire and Hezbollah losing more men in the Levant. Negotiations, intense battles and attempts to reshuffle the military situation are taking place behind the scenes. President Erdogan is trying to improve his military position on the ground before his meeting with President Putin in Moscow tomorrow Thursday- but to no avail. Stormy negotiations can be expected.
President Erdogan is not in a position to bang his fist on the table. At the time Russia is receiving Erdogan a tweet by the Russian Foreign Ministry reminds him how Russia defeated the Ottoman Empire and forced it to sign the Treaty of San Stefano in March 1878 in Constantinople. It has accused Erdogan of altering Syrian demography after occupying the Afrin province and Tal Abyad, forcing the departure of over 350,000 Kurds and the relocation of Turkmen militants and their families instead.
The battle of Idlib follows many secret talks before the struggle and reflects serious disagreements between Turkey on one side and Russia, Iran and Syria on the other. Erdogan was ready to negotiate and clear the roads linking Damascus and Aleppo (M5) and Aleppo and Latakia (M4) but in exchange, he asked for concessions in north-east Syria that were rejected. Turkey tried to stop the Syrian army and its allies and wanted to reach the gates of Aleppo. The current battle for Idlib, the “mother of all battles”, follows many secret talks which are the necessary context for understanding the current Turkish war on Syria and Syria’s response. For the first time, Syria has dared to hit the Turkish army directly- this has never happened before in the modern history of Syria.
Turkey is more isolated than it has ever been. It has lost its privileged position within the US by buying the S-400 and hosting the Turkstream pipeline selling Russian gas to Europe. It has lost European respect by organising the transfer of over 110,000 Syrian and other nationalities’ refugees to the borders, allowing them to reach the borders with Greece and refusing to close the Turkish borders to prevent the crossing. This Turkish blackmail is not winning friends on the European continent, especially since Erdogan is at the same time asking for more money to compensate the refugees’ presence in his country.
Arab countries are standing with Syria against Turkey. Libya’s eastern-based government linked to General Khalifa Haftar inaugurated the opening of its embassy in Damascus. Saudi Arabian, Egypt, and the Emirates are showing solidarity with President Assad against the Turkish-Qatari-Muslim Brotherhood alliance. A strong message was delivered during the battle of Idlib where for the first time the Syrian and Turkish armies face each other on the battlefield.
Erdogan is also losing support from Putin by bombing the Syrian army, trained by Russia, and damaging Syrian military effectiveness honed with Russian help. When Moscow closed an eye to Turkey’s desire to avenge the killing of 33 Turkish soldiers and officers in south Idlib, Erdogan responded with a disproportionate bombing which angered Russia and the allies that suffered the most. In response, Iran threatened to hit back against more than a thousand Turkish troops within the 14 Turkish observation points located within liberated Syrian territory and guarded by Hezbollah and Iranian IRGC forces.
Putin is not completely losing his relationship with Erdogan, nor is it Russia’s intention to declare war on Turkey. In recent days, during a private meeting between Iranian and Turkish officials in Ankara, Iranian officers explained that “Iran and Russia believe that any war with Turkey will serve the US and Israel who would happily watch and contribute to fuelling the animosity between both sides.” US special representative for Syria James Jeffery said his country is ready to provide ammunition to Turkey in its Idlib battle. However, US defence secretary Mark Esper ruled out US intervention in favour of Turkey in Idlib.
In Idlib, Turkey seems to have lost hope in the capacities of tens of thousands of jihadists to hold the ground notwithstanding years of fortifications, tunnel digging and building stronghold positions in the cities along the Damascus-Aleppo (known as the M5) and Aleppo-Latakia (M4) roads. These jihadists are made up of a mixture of foreign fighters from dozens of different countries but mainly from the Tajik, Uighur, Turkmen and Arab jihadists fighting under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (former ISIS, former al-Qaeda in Syria, former al-Nusra) fighting under different banners: from al-Qaeda (Hurras al-Din), Jund al-Aqsa to Ahrar al-Sham and many other names.
Hezbollah stopped an attack aiming to take back el-Eiss and from it to reach the gates of south Aleppo last Friday. The Turkish army bombed Hezbollah and Zul-fiqar brigade (Iranian IRGC, Fatimiyoun and Zeinabiyoun) at Talhiya to allow jihadists supported by Turkey to push into a corridor from Binnish and Taftanaz towards Talhiyah and from it to Rasm al-Is, Rasm al-Saharij, El-Eis strategic hill until al-Hader. Notwithstanding the Turkish intensive bombing to clear the road for jihadists and the killing of nine Hezbollah and over 66 wounded, the jihadists did not manage to get through. Hezbollah and their allies from the Zulfiqar brigades held their ground and stopped the advance.
Russia grounded its Air Force for 48 hours after the killing of 36 Turkish soldiers and officers (officially Turkey has declared 41 killed so far). The lack of air coverage surprised the allies of Russia who have anti-air missiles but were not expecting the Russians to abdicate their agreed role. Turkey managed to stop the Syrian army and its allies’ advance for 48 hours. However, all areas lost to the Turks were recovered within 48 hours. The battle of Saraqeb was the harshest. Hezbollah and the Zulfiqar brigade never withdrew from the east side of the city, while jihadists controlled the west side.
Following the Turkish “disproportionate bombing”, as described by the Russian generals in Syria, Moscow ordered its Air Force commanders to escort a dozen Syrian anti-air batteries to the front line to protect Syrian troops from any Turkish bombing. Syria brought the Tor-M1 and its Pantsir system and took measures to reduce the casualties caused by the Turkish drones.
Syria and its allies carried out (exceptional) night attacks liberating the strategic city of Saraqeb and held their positions in it. Hezbollah and Iran tripled the number of forces along the 70 km (M5 and M4) front against Turkey and its jihadists. Russia made 27 air attacks against Saraqeb and resumed air bombing in support of its allies.
Russia declared it could no longer “guarantee the safety of the Turkish aviation in Syria after Damascus shuts Idlib airspace”.The Syrian air defence systems downed around 7 Turkish drones. The Syrian army is showing dauntless courage by standing and bombing the Turkish military and fighting it face to face. Syrian artillery pounded Turkish positions and killed close to a dozen Turkish soldiers on the battlefield. President Bashar al-Assad’s decision to stand up to Turkey is something not even his father Hafez dared to do.
This is a response to Turkey’s killing and wounding of a large number of Syrian soldiers. Syria has been at war for nine years and has withstood significant losses. On the other hand, Turkey has one of the most prominent NATO armies with the most advanced means. A small and reduced Syrian army has now managed to kill Turkish soldiers on the battlefield, to destroy Turkish tanks and down their drones.
Turkey halted its direct bombing against Hezbollah and the Zulfiqar brigade. Iran and Hezbollah threatened to hit Turkey if the bombing continued. Close to 2000 Turkish officers and soldiers are now positioned, under Hezbollah and Iran’s ‘protection’, in 14 observation posts inside Syrian controlled areas, where they receive supplies locally. A meeting between the Iranians and the Turkish army and an exchange of messages took place between Hezbollah and Ankara, explaining that any clash between the two will bring the Levant and Turkey into a comprehensive confrontation that no one could win. The battle in Syria should not be against Turkey, and Erdogan needs to understand that the presence of his troops on Syrian territory is not acceptable.
Moscow moved its military police and special forces into Saraqeb to draw a line on any possible Turkish intention to attack the city again. The Turkish army attacks have yielded nothing, and the Syrian army and its allies are gaining momentum and have the upper hand. What is pushing Erdogan to fight with his own army alongside the jihadists for the control of two roads which it had previously agreed to de-escalate and declare a demilitarised zone in 2018?
According to decision-makers in Syria, President Erdogan asked his Russian counterpart to allow his forces to occupy an area 50 km deep in north-east Syria. At the start, Russia did not react to the Turkish advance to replace the US forces who decided to limit its presence in Syria to stealing Syrian oil, i.e. around the oil wells in north-east Syria. When the US redeployed, Russia asked Turkey to halt its operations in al-Hasaka and Raqqa provinces. Erdogan then lowered his request, asked for a 30 km deep buffer zone.
Russia has good ties with the Kurds and wants to see Syria united and all foreign forces leaving Syria. Erdogan said he was ready to clear the M5 and M4 in exchange for the control of Ayn al-Arab (Kobane). Putin refused and agreed with Iran and Damascus to remove jihadists along the M5 and M4 by military force. Erdogan felt he was cut out of the deal because his jihadists did not hold their ground, and proved to be an incapable military force against Syria and its allies. This is why the Turkish army was pushed into the battle, supported by drones, F-16s, precision missiles and artillery. Today it is fighting on behalf of the jihadists that, according to Sochi agreement, should have been eliminated by Turkey more than a year ago.
Turkey wants to bring back the deployment of forces on the ground to where they were before the Idlib battle and is calling for the respect of the Astana agreement but from a weaker position. In fact, it is too late for that; deals have a short life in Syria! Ankara will have to accept the status quo and prepare to lose Idlib without further concessions in the Kurdish area. This does not mean Erdogan will accept and surrender without a fight all the Syrian territories he has occupied without a fight. The Putin-Erdogan meeting will probably not end all differences, and much may have to be postponed until the forthcoming Putin-Erdogan-Rohani meeting this month in Tehran.
Erdogan seems to have forgotten the help Putin and Rohani gave him during the 2016 failed coup-d’état. He is showing recklessness and wrongly believes his potential partners are weak. The Turkish president is prioritising his territory-expansion ambition over his commercial and partnership relationship with Russia and Iran. The Turkish army is grinding its teeth over Idlib. The Ottoman Sultan never defeated the Russian Czar in the past and he certainly won’t succeed now in Syria…
Proofread by: C.G.B. and Maurice Brasher
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