Uprooted Palestinians are at the heart of the conflict in the M.E Palestinians uprooted by force of arms. Yet faced immense difficulties have survived, kept alive their history and culture, passed keys of family homes in occupied Palestine from one generation to the next.
BEIRUT, LEBANON (12:00 P.M.) – For the last 48 hours, the Syrian and Russian air forces have been conducting reconnaissance missions over the Idlib Governorate, as their aircraft capture important images of the enemy whereabouts and defensive positions.
According to a source in the Hama Governorate, the Syrian Arab Army and their Russian partners have intensified their reconnaissance missions for the purpose of intelligence gathering, amid reports of a new offensive inside Idlib.
In July, the Syrian Arab Army sent a large number of reinforcements to the Idlib Governorate, which prompted the Turkish military and their allied militants to rush troops to these front-lines in the Jabal Al-Zawiya region.
However, the offensive was put on hold, along with future operations inside the Jabal Al-Akrad region of the Latakia Governorate.
It now appears that the Syrian Army is once again moving forces back to the southern countryside of the Idlib Governorate, as the SAA awaits the green light to launch a new operation along the southern and eastern fronts of Idlib.
Should a new offensive commence, the Syrian Army will likely concentrate on the areas along the M-4 Highway (Aleppo-Latakia), specifically, the key town of Ariha and the Jabal Al-Zawiya region.
Russian and Syrian forces eliminated 327 ISIS militants during a joint security operation that took place in the desert areas of Homs and Deir Ezzor from August 18 to August 24.
According to the Russian side, strikes of the Syrian Air Force, the Russian Aerospace Forces, field artillery and actions of special forces units in the desert also allowed to eliminate 134 shelters, 17 observation posts, 7 warehouses and 5 underground storage areas belonging to ISIS terrorists.
The operation came in response to a series of successful ISIS attacks on pro-government forces in the Homs-Deir Ezzor desert. One of these attacks, near Deir Ezzor city on August 18, led to the killing of Russian Major-General Vyacheslav Gladkih. Taking into account the numbers provided by the Russian side, the August 18-24 operation likely delivered a powerful blow to ISIS cells hiding in the desert. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the ISIS threat was fully removed.
As long as areas not controlled by Damascus remain, ISIS will always have a place to hide and restore its forces.
On August 25, a Russian military vehicle was targeted with an RPG along the M4 Highway, during the 25th Turkish-Russian Joint Patrol. No Russian personnel received serious injures. According to photos from the site, a BTR-80’s wheel was damaged during the attack. This became the second attack on a joint Turkish-Russian patrol in southern Idlib in a week. The previous one targeting a Turkish military vehicle took place on August 17.
The regular attacks on Russian-Turkish patrols in southern Idlib reveal that the de-escalation process is not going very well. In fact, al-Qaeda-linked groups still keep a dominant position in the ‘opposition-controlled’ Idlib and have not been separated from their ‘moderate’ allies.
On August 14, Russia even temporarily suspended joint patrols with Turkey in the area due to Ankara’s inability to guarantee the security of patrols and fulfill its obligations under the de-escalation deal. It appeared that the decision had been reversed, as they began again on August 17, however the attacks resumed shortly thereafter.
In these conditions, the continuation of joint patrols by Turkey and Russia apparently puts its forces involved in such actions in danger. If the threat of al-Qaeda-linked radicals is not addressed, militants bolstered by the previous successes will likely increase their attacks on these patrols even further.
Early on June 14, the Russian Aerospace Forces reportedly carried out airstrikes on positions of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham near the villages of al-Bara and Deir Sunbul in southern Idlib. Since the signing of the new de-escalation agreement with Turkey on March 5, the Russian military has halted active operations in Greater Idlib. Nonetheless, it continued isolated precise strikes on high value terrorist targets.
The June 14 airstrikes followed the creation of a new coalition by several al-Qaeda-linked groups operating in the region: Horas al-Din, Ansar al-Din, Ansar al-Islam, Liwa al-Muqatlin al-Ansar and Tansiqiyat al-Jihad. The coalition, dubbed “Fa Ithbatu”, is in fact an expanded variant of another al-Qaeda-linked coalition, Ghurfat Eamaliat wa-Harid al-Mu’minin. This very faction recently conducted a large attack on Syrian Army positions near Tanjarah and Fattirah killing several soldiers and destroying at least one BMP infantry fighting vehicle.
Therefore, despite the claims of pro-militant propaganda that militant groups are uniting their forces in order to fight back the possible aggression of the ‘bloody Assad regime’, the creation of Fa Ithbatulikely reveals preparations for more aggressive actions against government forces.
The Turkish leadership, which is also committed to pushing propaganda about the ‘evil Assad regime’, clearly understands the real situation on the ground. So, it has continued expanding the network of observation posts along the M4 highway in southern Idlib in an attempt to keep the situation under control. The most recent Turkish observation posts were created near the villages of Farkia, Bsanqul, Kafer Shalaya, Urum al-Jawz and Mareian. Nonetheless, even these extensive efforts did not allow Turkish forces to at least create the image of order in the so-called opposition-held area.
On June 13, fighting erupted between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and a local armed group in the village of Salqin near the Turkish border. The conflict started after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham members assaulted a displaced civilian from Ma`arat al-Nu`man for setting a food stand near their shop. The fighting stopped only after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham deployed large reinforcements to the village. This was just the most recent incident in a long pattern of violence, which has been ongoing in the militant-held areas.
On June 14 and June 15, warplanes of the Syrian Air Force bombed ISIS hideouts near the town of Uqayribat in southeastern Hama. Last weekend, the Syrian Army, the National Defense Forces and Liwa al-Quds launched an anti-ISIS operation in the very same area. The operation came in response to ISIS attacks near the town on June 11 and June 12. However, it is unlikely that limited security operations in the desert area, which are being conducted by government forces, will fully remove the ISIS threat from the region.
أثارت تصريحات الجنرال كينيث ماكينزي قائد القيادة الأميركية المركزية الوسطى تساؤلات كثيرة عن نعت منطقة غرب آسيا بالغرب المتوحش، والتحذير من تعاظم القوة الإيرانية، والصعود الصيني المقلق، والدور الروسي الانتهازي الذي أظهر براعة في سورية، وسوْق الملاحظات بضرورة إدارة الولايات المتحدة الأميركية لغرب آسيا المتوحش، وهي في طور التفاوض على طريقة الخروج من المنطقة، وهنا مكمن السؤال في ما قاله أمام التحديات التي تمرّ بها الولايات المتحدة الأميركية من ارتباك في إدارة الملفات الخارجية، والانقسام الداخلي بين إدارة ترامب والقيادة العسكرية، وخلافه مع بعض حكام الولايات، والتظاهرات والاحتجاجات ضدّ التمييز العنصري وعنصرية الشرطة، بدور ترامب الرئيسي في تسريع تظهيرها وتفاقمها، بكذبه وغطرسته وعنجهيته وعنصريته وسياساته الفاشلة الداخلية والاقتصادية وفي مواجهة جائحة كورونا، التي أدّت إلى زيادة العنف وتفاقم الاضطرابات وإفلاس وإغلاق آلاف الشركات، وازدياد نسبة الفقر والبطالة ليكون تعداد العاطلين عن العمل أكثر من 40 مليون مواطن أميركي، رغم استمرار العبث في منطقة الشرق الأوسط من خلال الإصرار على فرض الحصار والعقوبات الجائرة، وتردّي الأوضاع الاقتصادية، وتجويع الشعوب وإثارة الفوضى في غير مكان؛ كسباً للوقت واللعب على عامل الزمن، آملا بتحسين الظروف لتمرير جزءاً من صفقة القرن بضمّ الضفة الغربية، قبل الوصول للحظة انتخابات الرئاسة الأميركية.
تَعتبر أنظمة الدول الخليجية الرجعية وفي مقدّمتها السعودية والإمارات نفسها جزءاً من تلك الأجندة، علّها تحافظ على عروشها التي بدأت معالم انهيارها بالوضوح تحت وطأة الأزمة الاقتصادية والافلاس وانهيار أسعار النفط بالتشبيك مع جائحة كورونا ومشاكلها وانقساماتها الداخلية، وعدم إمكانية الخروج من حرب اليمن بماء الوجه.
ففي ظلّ أزماتها وخسارة مقومات أمنها القومي المالية والدينية فقدت الدعم والحماية الأميركية المباشرة، إلا من صفقات الأسلحة التي تفرغ ما تبقى في الخزائن والاحتياطات بمزاعم درء الخطر الإيراني، وأوراق الاعتماد الوحيدة لضمان الحفاظ على العروش في جعبة كيان العدو الصهيوني، باستمرار ركوب قطار التطبيع بكلّ صفاقة، وليس آخرها مقدار الذلّ في هبوط الطائرة الإماراتية الثانية في مطار بن غوريون بمزاعم تقديم المساعدات لقطاع غزة والضفة الغربية دون تنسيق مع الفلسطينيين الذين رفضوها جملة وتفصيلا بعزة واباء، لمشهد ذلّ آخر فيما فضحته مجلة «ناشيونال انترست» عن رغبة الأنظمة الخليجية بنسج علاقات اقتصادية واستراتيجية أكبر مع (إسرائيل) من وراء الكواليس، وليطلّ صباح يوم الجمعة الوزير الإماراتي يوسف العتيبة بمقالته الحصرية لصحيفة «بديعوت أحرنوت» لمغازلة الكيان الصهيوني بتفاصيل مبادرات بلاده بالانفتاح والعلاقات الاقتصادية والعمل المشترك والدعوة للمشاركة في معرض «الاكسبو» الدولي المخطط إقامته في دبي العام المقبل، وتكريس أسس التطبيع واعتبار (إسرائيل) فرصة وليست عدواً، لدمجها في المنطقة.
يتخلل هذا المشهد المأساوي تنامي الوعي العربي في رفض مشاريع الأجندة الصهيوأميركية، وخاصة في تونس والسودان نحو تغييرات قد يكون، وسيكون الانتصار السوري بالتحرير الكامل حجر الرحى لانتصار خيارات الشعوب العربية المقاومة، وبتبلور قيادات ثورية تقود نضالاتها.
في خضمّ هذه التفاصيل والانشغال الأميركي والأوروبي باضطراباته الداخلية، يتقن أردوغان سياسة اللعب على الحبال، واستثمار فائض القوة التي يشعر بها بعد تقدّم حليفته حكومة الوفاق الليبية بمواجهة الجنرال خليفة حفتر الذي تدعمه روسيا، لاستثمارها بسياسة ديكتاتورية قمعية في الداخل التركي، ومحاولة تكريس احتلال إدلب السورية اقتصادياً وعسكرياً أمراً واقعاً، بضخ كميات كبيرة من العملة التركية وفرض التعامل بها، وربطها بالتعاملات التجارية والرسوم الجمركية للبضائع العابرة من الحدود، وبمسار متصل في تعزيز بيئة حاضنة لوجودها بفرض منهاجها التعليمي المدرسي، وزيارة وزير الداخلية التركي سليمان صويلو في سابقة أولى لمخيمات النازحين في إدلب، بالتوازي مع استمرار التحشيد العسكري التركي بآلاف الجنود والآليات في مناطق التماس مع خطوط انتشار الجيش السوري، ونشر بطاريات دفاع جوي في مطار تفتناز، قد تكون لفرض منطقة حظر جوي في وجه الطائرات السورية والروسية، واستمرار دعم وجود مجاميع العصابات الإرهابية التكفيرية في مناطق قريبة من نقاط المراقبة التركية، وهجومها على مواقع الجيش السوري، ومنع فتح طريق حلب – اللاذقية الدولي (M4)وتسيير الدوريات (الروسية – التركية) المشتركة عليه بحجج واهية بقطع المجموعات المتشدّدة للطريق وتخريب جزء منه، ضاربة بعرض الحائط تعهداتها لروسيا بالالتزام بتنفيذ آليات وبنود بروتكول موسكو واتفاق سوتشي، دون استبعاد الصدام العسكري مع القوات الروسية والجيش العربي السوري.
في كلّ هذا المشهد يحاول رجب طيب أردوغان وكعادته الكذب والمناورة لحجز مكان ودور قادم يوفر له أوراقاً ثمينة على طاولة التفاوض والتسويات، يقدمها كبطاقة اعتماد للداخل التركي وبما يدعي من أمن تركيا القومي.
باعتقادنا أجراس معركة إدلب الأخيرة تقرع لتنهي العربدة الأردوغانية، وتدق ناقوس إنهاء حياته السياسية، مع ما تمّ توقيعه خلال الأيام القليلة الماضية على اتفاق إيطالي – يوناني بشأن ترسيم الحدود البحرية لكبح الجماح التركي وتقويض فرصته بالقرصنة النفطية والغازية البحرية، لنطلّ في الختام وبتنامي وتعاظم قدرات وإمكانيات محور حلف المقاومة على مرحلة عنوانها الخروج الأميركي من غرب آسيا، وتكريس الانتصارات العسكرية والاقتصادية، وتغيير وجه المنطقة، والعين على فلسطين إلى مشهد حزم المستوطنين الصهاينة حقائبهم.
Early on June 5, the Israeli Air Force conducted strikes on a Syrian military facility near Masyaf. The strikes were conducted from Lebanese airspace. The Syrian Air Defense Forces intercepted several missiles, however the rest hit their targets. The bombed facility, which is run by the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, is reportedly involved in the development and manufacturing of missiles.
Two improvised explosive devices exploded near a joint Russian-Turkish patrol moving along the M4 highway in southern Idlib on June 4. The explosions happened when the patrol was passing the militant-held town of Arihah. However, they caused no damage to military vehicles or casualties among Turkish or Russian personnel. Despite the incident, the 15th joint patrol became even longer than all the previous ones. It started in the government-held town of Tronba bypassed Arihah and reached the village of Kafer Shalaya.
The slowly but steadily expanding length of Russian-Turkish patrols is a visual confirmation of the implementation of the de-escalation deal reached by Moscow and Ankara. At the same time, the full implementation of the deal still faces serious difficulties due to the presence of terrorist groups in the area. For example, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham militants are still in control of Arihah and recent developments show that they are not planning to sit there idly.
Ankara understands this and its forces continue expanding a network of observation posts along the M4 highway to secure the patrols. Recently, the Turkish Army set up positions near Bsanqul, Kafer Shalaya, Urum al-Jawz and Mareian. Nonetheless, without proactive measures to put an end to the terrorist threat, the situation cannot be changed strategically.
Just recently, a new wave of violence rolled across the militant-held part of Greater Idlib after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham detained a member of another radical militant group – Houras al-Din. The militant was detained when he was collecting taxes from locals for military purposes and kept in a Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-run prison in Jisr al-Shughur. Later, Houras al-Din fighters stormed the prison and freed their counterpart.
Earlier, Houras al-Din and the Turkistan Islamic Party criticized Hayat Tahrir al-Sham for having too soft a stance towards the Russian-Turkish de-escalation agreement in southern Idlib. Tensions, caused by the internal struggle for influence and resources, often grow among Idlib militant groups during the ceasefire phases of the conflict. Therefore, if some power wants to unite them and use them as at least a relatively homogenous force, a new escalation would be very useful.
A part of the M4 highway between the towns of Ayn Issa and Tell Tamir in northeastern Syria has been reopened for civilian traffic. This chunk of the highway is located close to the contact line with the Turkish-occupied area. In previous months, the constant threat of attacks by Turkish-led forces disrupted the movement of civilian vehicles in the area. However, now, the highway is reopened under the supervision of the Russian Military Police. This step will contribute to the strengthening of commercial and social ties between the cities of Aleppo and Hasakah, and the stability in the region, in general.
The reopening of the M4 highway in northeastern Syria did not occur without incidents. Just a few days ago, on May 23, US forces briefly blocked a Russian Military Police convoy east of Tell Tamr. Pro-Damascus sources say that the US-led coalition may try to oppose the restoration of commercial and social links between the government-controlled part of Syria and the areas that remain in the hands of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces.
At the same time, the Syrian Army, the National Defense Forces and their allies continued operations against ISIS in southern Raqqah, western Deir Ezzor and southern Mayadin. The anti-ISIS efforts were coordinated with the combing operation led by Liwa al-Quds and the National Defense Forces in the countryside of Palmyra. Despite this, ISIS cells still remain active on the both banks of the Euphrates and in the desert area between Palmyra and al-Tanf.
The Turkish military reportedly deployed an MIM-23 Hawk medium-range air defense system in the vicinity of the town of Almastumah in southern Idlib. Earlier in 2020, Turkey sent several MIM-23 Hawk systems to Idlib to support its attack on the Syrian Army there. Now, Ankara is apparently working to strengthen the air defense and EW capabilities of its contingent deployed in the area. According to different sources, the number of Turkish troops in Greater idlib varies from 7,000 to 10,000.
Despite the large Turkish military presence, radical groups have a freedom of actions in their attempts to consolidate their efforts to oppose the implementation of the de-escalation agreement in southern Idlib. Houras al-Din and the Turkistan Islamic Party, both groups allied with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, united their propaganda efforts in the push against the implementation of the de-escalation deal and the expansion of the Russian-Turkish troops within the agreed to security zone on part of the M4 highway in southern Idlib. Right now, these groups are conducting no notable offensive operations or attack on the Syrian Army. Nonetheless, they are actively recruiting new members and training them in the camps created across the region. In these conditions, a new round of escalation is just a matter of time.
Dear friends, during the past 2 weeks, there were signals of the growing confrontation between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as well as the intensifying coordination between Turkey and Russia in Greater Idlib.
The region of Greater Idlib remains the main source of tensions in Syria.
The March 5th ceasefire deal reached by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow allowed an end to be made to the open military confrontation between the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian Army. However, as of mid-April, the main provisions of the deal have yet to be implemented. Members of al-Qaeda-linked groups still enjoy freedom of movement across Greater Idlib and keep their positions with weapons and heavy equipment in southern Idlib.
The safe zone along the M4 highway, the creation of which was agreed, has not been created. All Russian-Turkish joint patrols have been conducted in a limited area west of Saraqib and have just been a public move needed to demonstrate that the de-escalation deal is still in force.
Ankara turns a blind eye to regular ceasefire violations and other provocative actions by militant groups and their supporters. Additionally, it has continued its military buildup in Idlib. The number of Turkish troops in the region reportedly reached 7,000, while the number of so-called ‘observation posts’ exceeded 50. Meanwhile, Turkish-affiliated media outlets ramped up a propaganda campaign accusing the Assad government of killing civilians, of ceasefire violations, of using chemical weapons and of discrediting the de-escalation agreement by calling it the surrender of the goals of the so-called Syrian revolution.
On the diplomatic level, neither Turkey nor Russia demonstrate open antagonism, but statements coming from the top military and political leadership of Turkey regarding the conflict in Syria demonstrate that Ankara is not planning to abandon its expansionist plans or aggressive posture towards the country.
These factors set up a pretext for and increase the chances of a new military escalation in Idlib. However, this time the conflict is likely to lead to at least a limited military confrontation between the Turkish and Russian militaries. Both sides have troops deployed in close proximity to the frontline, including the expected hot point of the future escalation – Saraqib.
Possible phases of escalation are the following:
Without the full implementation of the Moscow de-escalation deal and neutralization of radicals, the military situation in southern and eastern Idlib will continue to deteriorate. Militants, inspired by their impunity and the direct protection of the Turkish Army, will increase their attacks on the positions of Syrian forces and their Russian and Iranian allies. These attacks will gradually increase in scale until they provoke a painful military response from the Syrian Armed Forces. Militants, surprised at this blatant ceasefire violation by the bloody Assad regime, will continue their attacks, now justifying them by the right of self-defense. G_4 (A) Turkish diplomats and media outlets will immediately accuse the Assad government of violating the word and spirit of the de-escalation deal and will claim that the “unjustified aggression of the regime”, which is supported by the Russians, led to the killing of dozens of civilians and will film several staged tear-jerkers from Idlib to support this. The so-called ‘international community’ led by the Washington establishment and EU bureaucrats will denounce the aggression of the Assad regime and its backers.
In the face of the continued and increased attacks from Idlib armed groups, the Syrian Army will have two options:
To retreat from their positions and leave the hard-won, liberated areas to the mercy of Turkey and its al-Qaeda-affiliated groups;
To answer the increased attacks with overwhelming force and put an end to the ceasefire violations by radicals.
It’s likely that the Syrians will choose the second option. The military standoff in Idlib will officially re-enter a hot phase. The previous years of conflict have demonstrated that militants cannot match Syrian troops in open battle. Therefore, if the Turkish leadership wants to hold on to its expansionist plans, it will have no choice but to intervene in the battle to rescue its proteges. Syria and Turkey will once again find themselves in a state of open military confrontation.
As in previous escalations, the Turkish military will likely opt to start its military campaign with massive artillery and drone strikes on positions of the Syrian Army along the contact line in southeastern Idlib and western Aleppo. Special attention will be paid to the area of the expected confrontation between Syrian troops and Turkish proxies: the countryside of Saraqib, Maarat al-Numan and Kafr Nabel. Turkish forces will not be able to stop the Syrian Army advance without taking massive fire damage to their infrastructure and to the forces deployed in these areas. Such strikes will also result in further escalation because they will pose a direct danger to the Russian Military Police in Saraqib and Maarat al-Numan, and to Russian military advisers embedded with the Syrian units, which are deployed in southeastern Idlib.
If Turkish strikes target Russian positions and lead to notable losses among Russian personnel, Moscow will be put in a situation where they will be forced to retaliate. Since the start of the military operation in Syria in September 2015, the Russian Armed Forces have concentrated a capable military group in the country protected by short- and long-range air defense systems and reinforced by Bastion-P coastal defense and Iskander-M ballistic missile systems. Additionally, the Russian Black Sea and Caspian Fleets and Russian long-range aviation have repeatedly demonstrated that they are capable of destroying any target on the Syrian battleground and thus also in any nearby areas.
The Russian retaliatory strike will likely target Turkish military columns in close proximity to the frontline as well as Turkish depots, positions of artillery, armoured vehicles, and material and technical support points in Greater Idlib.
If, after the Russian strike, the Turkish leadership does not halt its aggressive actions and its forces continue attacks on Russian and Syrian positions in Syria, the escalation will develop further.
The second wave of Russian retaliatory strikes will target Turkish military infrastructure along the border with Syria. HQs and logistical hubs in the province of Hatay, which were used to command and supply its Operation Spring Shield, will immediately be destroyed. The decision to deliver strikes on other targets along the border will depend on the success of Turkish forces in their expected attempt to attack Russia’s Hmeimim airbase and put it out of service.
Another factor to consider is that should Turkey appear to be too successful in their attack on the Hmeimim airbase, they risk losing their entire Black Sea fleet. While theoretically the Turkish naval forces deployed in the Black Sea are superior to the Russian ones in numbers, the real balance of power there tells a different story. The combined means and facilities of the Russian Black Sea fleet, the Caspian Sea fleet, air forces and coastal defense forces deployed in the region would allow Moscow to overwhelm and sink the entire Turkish Navy. On top of this, Russia, unlike Turkey, is a nuclear power.
Turkey’s NATO allies have already demonstrated that they are not planning to risk their equipment or personnel in order to support Erdogan’s Syrian adventure. Furthermore, a new round of complaints to the UN or demonstrative sanctions will be no help to any destroyed Turkish airbases or to a fleet resting deep underwater.
Ankara will have to find a diplomatic way to de-escalate the confrontation before it gets to this point. The format of this diplomatic solution and the consequences, which Turkey will have to suffer for its military adventure, will depend only on the moment, when the Erdogan government understands that it’s time to stop.
. لم نكن نتوقع أن تنفذ تركيا بروتوكول موسكو الإضافي الذي «منحها» هدية كبرى هي وقف إطلاق النار في ريف إدلب وتجميد العمليات القتالية على طرفي خطوط التماس التي رسمتها بنادق رجال الجيش العربي السوري وأقدامهم التي لو تابعت الحركة القتالية لكانت وصلت إلى الحدود مع تركيا وطوت صفحة الإرهاب في إدلب وريفها. فتركيا امتهنت منذ أن فتح لها باب استنة وأعطيت فرصة عضوية المثلث الراعي للمسألة السورية ميدانياً، ومن ثم سياسياً، سياسة النكول والابتزاز وتلمّس الطرق إلى حيث يؤكل الكتف بأقل جهد ممكن.
أما روسيا التي منحت تركيا هذه الهدية العظيمة بعد ان كانت وجهت عبر رئيسها بوتين لأردغان رسائل المهانة والإذلال في قصر الكرملين في موسكو، فقد ظنت ان الرسائل القاسية معطوفة على العطية التي حملها لها بروتوكول موسكو من شأنها أن تغيّر السلوك التركي في سورية وأن تتجه تركيا بشكل جدي هذه المرة ليس إلى تنفيذ بروتوكول موسكو فحسب، بل وكل الاتفاقات السابقة بدءاً من مخرجات استنة وصولاً لاتفاق سوتشي. وهذا يعني بالفهم الروسي توقف تركيا عن السير بمشروعها الخاص في سورية والذي يشمل اقتطاع أرض وتهجير سكان وتغيير ديمغرافي للمناطق الحدودية ووضع اليد على ثروات طبيعية وعرقلة الحركة الاقتصادية والصناعية في الشمال السوري. وكلها أمور تستحق بالفهم الروسي التضحية لضمان حل يحفظ الحقوق السورية دون ان يغضب تركيا او يستفزها.
بيد ان الميدان السوري شهد بعد بروتوكول موسكو مناورات تركية وتذاكياً من نوع جديد، حيث عملت تركيا هذه المرة باستراتيجية الباطن والظاهر المتناقضين او المتعاكسين، ففي خطابها مع الروسي كانت تؤكد المرة تلو المرة على التزامها ببروتوكول موسكو بما في ذلك طي صفحة المطالب بتراجع الجيش السوري بعيداً عن الخطوط التي وصل اليها إثر انتصاراته في عملياته العسكرية الأخيرة، كما وفتح الـ M4 الذي يربط حلب باللاذقية وضمان أمن الحركة عليه بتسيير الدوريات المشتركة الروسية التركية والسير قدماً بتفكيك الجماعات الإرهابية المسلحة المناهضة للحل السياسي، ومن جهة ثانية كانت توجّه جبهة النصرة وغيرها من الإرهابيين المتطرفين من تركمان وإيغور وسواهم لقطع طريق M4 ومنع تسيير الدوريات المشتركة عليها مع ضمان عدم استعمال القوة ضدهم. وفي النتيجة ربحت تركيا بـ»تذاكيها» وأبقت الطريق مقطوعة وجاءت الأيام بعد ذلك لتغيّبها عن جدول الأعمال المشترك لروسيا وتركيا.
لكن تركيا لم تكتف بما حصلت عليها، بل قادها غدرها إلى خرق وقف إطلاق النار ومهاجمة الجيش العربي السوري في سهل الغاب عبر تنظيمات إرهابية متطرفة جلها يعمل بأوامر المخابرات التركية ما يثبت أن تركيا مستمرة في مشروعها الخاص الذي لم تتراجع عنه، حيث لا يوجد أي دليل او أي قرينة تشير إلى هذا التراجع او توحي به، لا بالعكس فإن كل ما تقوم به تركيا ميدانياً يثبت استمرارها على السير قدماً فيه. وهي إذا توقفت فترة فإنما يكون توقفها لعائق ميداني لا علاقة له لا من قريب او بعيد بقرار تركي استراتيجي او مراجعة للسياسة التركية في سورية.
شنّ الهجوم الإرهابي في سهل الغاب شمالي غربي حماه، وإسقاط قرار وقف إطلاق النار عملياً وتمكّن المهاجمون من السيطرة على مساحة جنوبي خط التماس القائم (رغم أنها صغيرة ومحدودة) معطوفة على الإخفاق في فتح طريق الـ M4 مواكبة مع التصعيد التركي ضد الحكومة السورية، كلها وقائع وسلوكيات تدعو إلى وقف الرهان على سياسة تركية يمكن أن تكون صادقة ونظيفة ووفية لتعهداتها وتستحق أن يكون لها شرف الانضواء في منظومة إقليمية دولية لرعاية الحل في سورية.
وإذا كانت الحسابات الروسية تحول دون الانتقال في العلاقة مع تركيا من العمل المشترك إلى المواجهة والعداء الآن، وأن إيران تجد ان حسن التعامل مع تركيا يروّضها ويقلل الخسائر التي يفرضها الحل الذي لا تشارك فيه تركيا، فإن الحسابات السورية تبقى مقروءة من منظار أخر يوحي بأن سورية لا تستطيع أن تنتظر إلى ما شاء الله لإنجاز تحرير إدلب ووضع حد للإرهاب العالمي فيه، ولا تستطيع أن تعطي وقتاً إضافياً لتركيا لتعميق مشروعها الخاص في سورية بشكل يصعب معالجة آثاره ومفاعيله، ولذلك نرى أن الوقت الآن لا يلعب لصالح سورية التي تحتاج بإلحاح لطي صفحة إدلب والتفرغ لصفحة الشرقي الشمالي السوري حيث الاحتلال الأميركي وظاهرة الانفصال الكردي وتلاعب اليد التركية. وهي حالة مركبة فيها قدر من التعقيد تُفضل معالجتها بالتفرغ الميداني والسياسي حتى لا تتزاحم المؤثرات فتعرقل الحل.
لكل ذلك يبدو أن سورية ستجد نفسها وقريباً جداً مضطرة لاستئناف القتال والعمل باستراتيجيتها الناجعة القائمة على التحرير بالوثبات المتتالية، وهي الاستراتيجية التي مكّنتها من تحرير أكثر 5000 كلم 2 في ريفي حلب وحماه وأدت إلى السيطرة على طريق الـ M5 وأظهرت الوهن التركي في مواجهة الجيش العربي السوري وحلفائه وأجبرت أردوغان على أن يستغيث ببوتين استجداء لوقف إطلاق النار، أما روسيا فتجد نفسها مضطرة لأكثر من سبب لمواصلة دعم وإسناد الجيش العربي السوري في عملياته تلك، خاصة أنها فهمت مغزى الزيارة الإيرانية لدمشق مؤخراً.
فالسلوكيّات التركية في سورية باتت تبرّر العودة السورية لاستئناف التحرير بالقوة واجتثاث الإرهاب بكل مسمّياته وأشكاله من إدلب وتُضاف إليها الظروف الإقليمية والدولية هذه المرة التي تعزز هذا الاتجاه وتؤكد عليه إذ إنها اليوم في أفضل الأحوال التي تساعد على إطلاق هذه العمليات. فتركيا تحت وطأة ضغوط وبائية وسياسية واقتصادية داخلية فضلاً عن غرقها وانشغالها في ليبيا ما يمنعها من الدخول في مواجهة واسعة في سورية، وأميركا تنفذ في المنطقة إعادة انتشار عسكري، صحيح أنه لن يصل إلى الانسحاب منها، لكنه يشير إلى خفض في قواتها المنتشرة حالياً وأوروبا مشغولة عن العالم بوباء كورونا الذي لم تسيطر عليه حتى الآن. كل ذلك لا يطرح السؤال هل سيتخذ قرار تحرير إدلب بالقوة العسكرية، بل متى سيوضع هذا القرار موضع التنفيذ؟ الذي نتوقعه قريباً.
Dear friends, during the past 2 weeks, there were signals of the growing confrontation between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as well as the intensifying coordination between Turkey and Russia in Greater Idlib.
The region of Greater Idlib remains the main source of tensions in Syria.
The March 5th ceasefire deal reached by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow allowed an end to be made to the open military confrontation between the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian Army. However, as of mid-April, the main provisions of the deal have yet to be implemented. Members of al-Qaeda-linked groups still enjoy freedom of movement across Greater Idlib and keep their positions with weapons and heavy equipment in southern Idlib.
The safe zone along the M4 highway, the creation of which was agreed, has not been created. All Russian-Turkish joint patrols have been conducted in a limited area west of Saraqib and have just been a public move needed to demonstrate that the de-escalation deal is still in force.
Ankara turns a blind eye to regular ceasefire violations and other provocative actions by militant groups and their supporters. Additionally, it has continued its military buildup in Idlib. The number of Turkish troops in the region reportedly reached 7,000, while the number of so-called ‘observation posts’ exceeded 50. Meanwhile, Turkish-affiliated media outlets ramped up a propaganda campaign accusing the Assad government of killing civilians, of ceasefire violations, of using chemical weapons and of discrediting the de-escalation agreement by calling it the surrender of the goals of the so-called Syrian revolution.
On the diplomatic level, neither Turkey nor Russia demonstrate open antagonism, but statements coming from the top military and political leadership of Turkey regarding the conflict in Syria demonstrate that Ankara is not planning to abandon its expansionist plans or aggressive posture towards the country.
These factors set up a pretext for and increase the chances of a new military escalation in Idlib. However, this time the conflict is likely to lead to at least a limited military confrontation between the Turkish and Russian militaries. Both sides have troops deployed in close proximity to the frontline, including the expected hot point of the future escalation – Saraqib.
Possible phases of escalation are the following:
Without the full implementation of the Moscow de-escalation deal and neutralization of radicals, the military situation in southern and eastern Idlib will continue to deteriorate. Militants, inspired by their impunity and the direct protection of the Turkish Army, will increase their attacks on the positions of Syrian forces and their Russian and Iranian allies. These attacks will gradually increase in scale until they provoke a painful military response from the Syrian Armed Forces. Militants, surprised at this blatant ceasefire violation by the bloody Assad regime, will continue their attacks, now justifying them by the right of self-defense. G_4 (A) Turkish diplomats and media outlets will immediately accuse the Assad government of violating the word and spirit of the de-escalation deal and will claim that the “unjustified aggression of the regime”, which is supported by the Russians, led to the killing of dozens of civilians and will film several staged tear-jerkers from Idlib to support this. The so-called ‘international community’ led by the Washington establishment and EU bureaucrats will denounce the aggression of the Assad regime and its backers.
In the face of the continued and increased attacks from Idlib armed groups, the Syrian Army will have two options:
To retreat from their positions and leave the hard-won, liberated areas to the mercy of Turkey and its al-Qaeda-affiliated groups;
To answer the increased attacks with overwhelming force and put an end to the ceasefire violations by radicals.
It’s likely that the Syrians will choose the second option. The military standoff in Idlib will officially re-enter a hot phase. The previous years of conflict have demonstrated that militants cannot match Syrian troops in open battle. Therefore, if the Turkish leadership wants to hold on to its expansionist plans, it will have no choice but to intervene in the battle to rescue its proteges. Syria and Turkey will once again find themselves in a state of open military confrontation.
As in previous escalations, the Turkish military will likely opt to start its military campaign with massive artillery and drone strikes on positions of the Syrian Army along the contact line in southeastern Idlib and western Aleppo. Special attention will be paid to the area of the expected confrontation between Syrian troops and Turkish proxies: the countryside of Saraqib, Maarat al-Numan and Kafr Nabel. Turkish forces will not be able to stop the Syrian Army advance without taking massive fire damage to their infrastructure and to the forces deployed in these areas. Such strikes will also result in further escalation because they will pose a direct danger to the Russian Military Police in Saraqib and Maarat al-Numan, and to Russian military advisers embedded with the Syrian units, which are deployed in southeastern Idlib.
If Turkish strikes target Russian positions and lead to notable losses among Russian personnel, Moscow will be put in a situation where they will be forced to retaliate. Since the start of the military operation in Syria in September 2015, the Russian Armed Forces have concentrated a capable military group in the country protected by short- and long-range air defense systems and reinforced by Bastion-P coastal defense and Iskander-M ballistic missile systems. Additionally, the Russian Black Sea and Caspian Fleets and Russian long-range aviation have repeatedly demonstrated that they are capable of destroying any target on the Syrian battleground and thus also in any nearby areas.
The Russian retaliatory strike will likely target Turkish military columns in close proximity to the frontline as well as Turkish depots, positions of artillery, armoured vehicles, and material and technical support points in Greater Idlib.
If, after the Russian strike, the Turkish leadership does not halt its aggressive actions and its forces continue attacks on Russian and Syrian positions in Syria, the escalation will develop further.
The second wave of Russian retaliatory strikes will target Turkish military infrastructure along the border with Syria. HQs and logistical hubs in the province of Hatay, which were used to command and supply its Operation Spring Shield, will immediately be destroyed. The decision to deliver strikes on other targets along the border will depend on the success of Turkish forces in their expected attempt to attack Russia’s Hmeimim airbase and put it out of service.
Another factor to consider is that should Turkey appear to be too successful in their attack on the Hmeimim airbase, they risk losing their entire Black Sea fleet. While theoretically the Turkish naval forces deployed in the Black Sea are superior to the Russian ones in numbers, the real balance of power there tells a different story. The combined means and facilities of the Russian Black Sea fleet, the Caspian Sea fleet, air forces and coastal defense forces deployed in the region would allow Moscow to overwhelm and sink the entire Turkish Navy. On top of this, Russia, unlike Turkey, is a nuclear power.
Turkey’s NATO allies have already demonstrated that they are not planning to risk their equipment or personnel in order to support Erdogan’s Syrian adventure. Furthermore, a new round of complaints to the UN or demonstrative sanctions will be no help to any destroyed Turkish airbases or to a fleet resting deep underwater.
Ankara will have to find a diplomatic way to de-escalate the confrontation before it gets to this point. The format of this diplomatic solution and the consequences, which Turkey will have to suffer for its military adventure, will depend only on the moment, when the Erdogan government understands that it’s time to stop.
Voltaire, actualité internationale, n°191
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