Military Analysis: Russian Coastal Troops – Russian military to be reequipped with Iskander-M missile systems in 2019

Military Analysis: Russian Coastal Troops

01.01.2019

This analysis was originally released by SouthFront on December 12, 2018:

Introduction

The Russian Navy includes, in addition to its surface, submarine, and aviation forces, Coastal Troops which are a separate branch of service within the Navy. Their mission is providing protection for naval bases as well as forces and facilities on the coastline against enemy naval, air, and amphibious attacks.

Coastal Troops, in turn, include two types of forces: coastal missile units, and naval infantry. Main organizational structures are brigades, regiments, and battalions.

Coastal Missile Forces include stationary and mobile missile systems and coastal artillery units.Their task is to destroy surface ships, coastal facilities, amphibious task forces, and protecting naval bases and their land facilities, as well as ground forces operating in coastal regions. Moreover, CMF may be used to destroy enemy naval bases and ports.

Drills at the Balitc Fleet’s range in Kaliningrad Region

Naval Infantry is also a type of coastal forces specially prepared for amphibious operations, protection of naval bases, important shore facilities and sectors. Naval Infantry units may operate independently to seize enemy bases, ports, and sectors of the coastline. When the main component of the amphibious task force consists of Ground Forces units, Naval Infantry forms the first wave in order to seize a bridgehead and allow the main force to disembark.

The total strength of Coastal Forces varies from 17 to 35 thousand troops, according to various estimates. This is due to each Naval Infantry and Ground Forces brigade strength being different, due to their unique missions. Naval Infantry is likely not stronger than 12,000 troops. Here one should note that starting in 2017, Coastal Forces started including army corps, operational-level formations whose mission are offensive and defensive operations on a single operational direction. Motorized rifle units of the army corps are used to cover and defend naval bases and their approaches. In some cases, MR units may be used as a reserve for Naval Infantry units (200^th MR Brigade assigned to the Northern Fleet Coastal Forces). The main task of Naval Infantry are amphibious operations to seize bridgeheads for the main amphibious force, and seizing enemy naval bases.

Now we shall discuss the most important fleets.

Northern Fleet

Nuclear powered battlecruiser Pyotr Veliky, the flagship of the Northern Fleet.

Russia views the Arctic as the most important resource base of the 21^st century, with strategic importance. Therefore protection of Arctic shelf, the Northern Maritime Route, and the north-western passage are all of crucial importance, since in the past NF was concentrated in the western part of the Arctic region, while its operational zone did not extend to the west of Taimyr peninsula. In December 2014, Russia formed the Northern Fleet Unified Strategic Command (USC) headquartered in Severomorsk. Its mission is the protection of Russian economic interests in the Arctic, from Murmansk to Anadyr. NF USC ensures a unified command for surface, submarine, air, coastal, and air defense forces.

NF Coastal Forces include 1 Naval Infantry brigade, 1 rocket and artillery brigade, and 2 motor rifle brigades. The rocket and artillery brigade covers the nuclear submarine base, while the Naval Infantry has the mission of seizing or preventing the seizure of a bridgehead in the region. The 14^th Army Corps has been formed in April 2017 to protect Russian interests in the Arctic, with the 80^th and 200^th Separate Motor Rifle Brigades. They have the mission of operating in the second echelon behind the NI brigade, or to defend the Arctic coastline independently.

Black Sea Fleet

Guided missile cruiser Moskva, the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet

BSF has the mission of ensuring Russia’s security in the southern direction. January 2017 saw the 126^th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade, 127^th Reconnaissance Brigade, 8^th Separate Coastal Artillery Regiment organized into the 22^nd Army Corps, whose task is to be ready “to launch counterattacks in collaboration with other units on the peninsular, chiefly with the use of strike aviation and all types of artillery”.

BSF Coastal Forces include many heterogeneous units. The 810^th Naval Infantry Brigade has the mission of seizing or preventing the seizure of a bridgehead. The 127^th Reconnaissance Brigade conducts special operations. The 126^thBrigade is used to provide reinforcements for other units and is the core of the 22^nd Army Corps.

The 11th Separate Coastal Rocket and Artillery Brigade protects Novorossiysk. The 15^th Separate Coastal Rocket and Artillery Brigade protects the main BSF base in Sevastopol. The 854^th Separate Coastal Rocket Regiment collaborates with the 15^th Brigade. The 9^th Separate Artillery Regiment reinforces the 126^th Brigade, and some of its units protect the Perekop crossing into the Crimea. The 382^nd Separate Naval Infantry Battalion provides security in the Azov Sea region.

Baltic Fleet

Sovremennyy-class destroyer Nastoichiviy, the flagship of the Baltic Fleet

BF missions include protecting Russia’s interests in the Baltic Sea region, protecting its economic zone and shipping, and conducting joint operations with other Russian naval forces (mainly the Northern Fleet in north Atlantic) in the global ocean.

The Baltic Fleet includes the 336^th Guards Separate Naval Infantry Brigade, whose mission is to seize or prevent the seizure of a bridgehead. The 152^nd Guards Separate Rocket Brigade strikes enemy command points and infrastructure. The 244^th Guards Separate Artillery Brigade protects Kaliningrad against an attack from the sea. The 25^th Separate Coastal Missile Regiment of the Naval Infantry protects Kaliningrad against an attack from the sea. The 7^th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment and 79^th Guards Separate Motor Rifle Brigade reinforce BF forces in the region. All of these units, except for the 336^th Brigade, are part of the 11^th Army Corps tasked with protecting the Kaliningrad Defense Area in the event of worsening of the international situation. The 336^th Brigade is operationally subordinated to the fleet HQ.

Pacific Fleet

Guided missile cruiser Varyag, the flagship of the Pacific Fleet

PF ensures Russia’s security and interests in the Asia-Pacific Region. Its main missions are:

• Protecting economic zone and industrial activity areas, interdicting poaching;
• Supporting naval strategic deterrent in permanent readiness;
• Ensuring the safety of shipping;
• Political missions in economically-important regions (ship visits, business visits, joint exercises, international peacekeeping, and others).

PF Coastal Forces include 2 Naval Infantry brigades, and one each missile and missile-artillery brigade. Each approach (Vladivostok and Kamchatka) is covered by a Naval Infantry and missile/artillery brigade.

Caspian Flotilla

Gepard-class frigate Dagestan, the flagship of the Caspian Flotilla

CF zone of responsibility extends to the Caspian Sea region, where it is the most powerful naval force. The main mission is protecting state interests and preventing terrorism. Coastal forces include 2 NI battalions, which have been organized into a NI regiment, and one missile battalion.

Conclusions

Given the importance of Northern, Black Sea, Baltic fleets for Russia, and following an analysis of the information cited above, the following characteristics of Coastal Forces’ organization for each fleet become apparent.

Bastion missile system

Baltic and Black Sea fleets have the task of preventing potential adversaries’ naval operations in their respective seas. Given the small size of these seas, it is difficult to operate large enemy naval task forces there. The range of tactical and operational readiness exercises involving land and naval forces and rehearsing offensive operations and rapid deployment of forces on European territory cannot but cause concern in Russia. Therefore these seas are covered by small missile ships, diesel submarines, coastal missile batteries, aviation, and air defenses. It is a de-facto implementation of the A2/AD (anti-access area denial) concept, where short-range ballistic missiles, air defenses, and anti-ship cruise missiles create a zone where enemy forces cannot operate without risking destruction. The Baltic Fleet has fully implemented this concept. This is so far the only fleet whose Coastal Forces have not only anti-ship missiles (Bal, Bastion systems) but also short-range ballistic missiles (Iskander). As far as Crimea is concerned, in addition to Bal and Bastion it boasts 4 battalions of S-400 air-defense systems located in Feodosiya, Evpatoria, Sevastopol, and on the border with Ukraine. Media reported that at least one Bal system has been sent to the Kerch area in early December 2018, after the incident with Ukrainian gunboats and Russian Maritime Border Guards south of the straits.

Bal coastal defense system

Northern and Pacific fleets face a very different situation. The huge size of the seas adjacent to the Northern Arctic and Pacific forces these navies to have ships capable of operating far from own bases. In this case the emphasis is on submarine and surface forces. It does not appear possible to apply the A2/AD concept by deploying ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles, the flight time from land airbases is too great, and a large Coastal Forces grouping of Naval Infantry or motor rifles is an economically and demographically unaffordable proposition.

Although the 14^th Army Corps cannot be compared to the 14^th or the 22^nd Corps when it comes to composition or strength, it does include formations unique in the entire Russian Armed Forces (the 80^th and 200^th MR Brigades) capable of operations in the far north. They have suitably adapted equipment for extremely low temperatures, and an appropriate training regimen.

It’s worth adding a few words about the Caspian Flotilla. The city of Kaspiysk will see the construction of a naval base with extensive support infrastructure, to be completed by 2022. This city was not chosen by accident, since it’s convenient for basing ships and naval infantry which have direct access to the open waters of the Caspian to accomplish their missions. Considering the geographical aspects of the sea, the flotilla acquires importance as an invulnerable strike asset, capable of exerting regional non-nuclear strategic deterrence. One should also consider the fact that the battalion which was located in Astrakhan (in the north of the Caspian) was relocated closer to its center, and both battalions were combined into a regiment. This will have a positive impact on training, deployment speed, and readiness to perform assigned missions.

When it comes to weapons, coastal rocket and artillery units possess missile systems and artillery capable of effective action against enemies within effective range of their weapons. Naval Infantry also has sufficiently modern weapons. Meanwhile, there are many organizational problems. The existing Naval Infantry force can carry out only a limited range of missions: tactical amphibious landings (or a single operational-level one), defending 2-3 large land bases, anti-amphibious defense of 1-2 most vulnerable coastline sectors. The number of brand new missile systems is still too low to ensure effective coast defense. The Pacific Fleet situation is wholly unsatisfactory. It has the smallest Coastal Forces component. It’s possible it’s due to the selection of priorities in Russia’s Naval Doctrine, which places emphasis on the Arctic and Atlantic. However, the Russian Far East has colossal resources, particularly in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf. At the same time the region has low population and is rather isolated from the country’s main industrial regions. This situation is made worse by the rapid economic and military expansion of neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region, exerting considerable influence on economic, demographic, and other processes in the region.

Also a few words about the amphibious fleet. While small vessels are being gradually replaced with new ones, there are grounds for pessimism when it comes to big ships. Some Project 1171 ships have been in service for half a century. Most of the Project 775 ships have been in service for 30 years, some over 40 o rmore.

Development Directions

Given the current situation, there are two viable and inter-related concepts for Coastal Forces: A2/AD and “coast vs. fleet”. The Russian Navy will be able to perform operational missions in the world ocean only after the next 10-15 years relying only on the well-developed coastal infrastructure, all types of coastal defense systems, and also on reliable defense of naval bases against attack from land or sea. It will not be possible to restore Russian Navy’s required qualitative and quantitative strength in a more rapid fashion. Therefore the following measures should be implemented.

Coastal Missile/Artillery Forces. Rearm with modern anti-ship missiles, increase number of brigades to a number sufficient for overcoming enemy task force air defenses.

Russian Naval Infantry

Naval Infantry: Include at least 2-3 MR brigades in Pacific Fleet’s Coastal Forces, which would operate as a second echelon for Naval Infantry as in the Northern Fleet. Form at least one more Naval Infantry brigade in the Northern Fleet, and add another MR brigade to the second echelon.

As far as Coastal Forces future is concerned, in the near future one should complete the development of the future coastal missile system capable of firing more than one missile type and deploying it with coastal missile units. Naval Infantry brigades should improve their ability to operate in various climactic conditions through training and specialized equipment for Arctic operations and provision of universal amphibious vessels. In the longer term, there are plans to create a high-mobility amphibious combat vehicle for operations in all climate zones and regions, including Arctic, and develop automated missile systems to engage aerial, submarine, and space targets.

Conclusion

One may draw the conclusion that Russia’s political leadership is worried by the increase in strength of adversary forces on its maritime frontiers. As a result, we have seen an extensive deployment of Coastal Forces in the northern, western, and southern theaters. The fact that half of these units were formed in the last few years is only an additional indicator. Given the inability to renew the Navy in a short time, forming army corps within fleets and providing the latest anti-ship missile systems are currently the only way to preserve the country’s integrity and sovereignty.

Reference Information

Current State of the Coastal Forces

Organizational Structure (without support units)

Pacific Fleet

40^th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy). Formed in 2007 from the 40^th Separate MR Brigade. Covers the north-eastern direction.

155^th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Vladivostok). Together with the coastal missile and artillery units, it is the core of the fleet’s amphibious forces. Formed in 2009 from the 165^th Naval Infantry Regiment of the 55^th Naval Infantry Division.

71^st Separate Coastal Missile Brigade (Smolyaninovo, Maritime Province). Formed in 2014. Provides protection for Vladivostok naval base. It has been receiving Bal missile systems since 2014, and has received a battalion of Bastion missiles in 2016.

520^th Separate Coastal Missile/Artillery Brigade (environs of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy). Formed in 1992. Uses Bastion anti-ship missiles. Frequent winner in live-fire competitions, earning the Navy Supreme Commander Prize.

1532^nd Separate Air Defense Missile Regiment (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy). Being rearmed with S-400.

Northern Fleet

61^st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (village Sputnik, Murmansk region). Formed in 2014 on the basis of a Naval Infantry regiment of the same number. Part of the 14^th Army Corps of the Northern Fleet.

80^th Separate MR Brigade (Arctic) (village Allakurti, Murmansk region). Formed in 2014. Its mission is to control territory between Murmansk and the Novosibirsk Islands in operational collaboration with units from VDV and Naval Infantry from the Pacific Fleet.

200^th Separate MR Brigade (Arctic) (Pechenga). Subordinated to the Northern Fleet in 2012, serves as the reserve for the 61^st Brigade with the task of covering the land component of Russia’s norther border. In spite of being a MR unit intended to operate on land, brigade’s reconnaissance units are fully airborne-qualified.

536^th Separate Missile/Artillery Brigade (Snezhnogorsk, Olenya Guba). Protects NF submarine forces, being rearmed with Bastion.

Black Sea Fleet

810^th Guards Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Sevastopol). Formed in 1967. This unit has actively participated and is participating in regional and local armed conflicts.

126^th Separate Coast Defense Brigade (Perevalnoye, Simferopol region). Formed in 2014 from the 36^th Separate Coast Defense Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

127^th Reconnaissance Brigade (Sevastopol). Formed in 2015.

11^th Separate Coastal Missile/Artilery Brigade (Utash, Anapa). Formed in 2014 from the 40^th Separate Coastal Missile Regiment. Armed with Bastion and Redut missile systems, and Bereg artillery systems.

8^th Separate Coastal Artillery Regiment (Simferopol). Formed in 2014. Armed with Msta-S howitzers, Smerch MRLs, Khrizantema-S SP ATGMs.

854^th Separate Coastal Missile Regiment (Sevastopol). Armed with Rubezh.

382^nd Separate Naval Infantry Battalion (Temryuk, Krasnodar Krai). The only NI unit on the Sea of Azov.

1096^th Separate Air Defense Missile Regiment (Sevastopol). Armed with Buk-M2, planned rearmament with Buk-M3.

Baltic Fleet

336^th Guards Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltiysk, Kaliningrad region). Formed in 1979 from NI regiment of the same number.

152^nd Guards Separate Missile Brigade (Chernyakhovsk, Kaliningrad region). Part of the BF Coastal Forces since 1997. Rearmed with Iskander in 2017.

244^th Guards Separate Artillery Brigade (Kaliningrad). Armed with Bereg.

25^th Separate Coastal Missile Regiment of the Naval Infantry (Donskoye, Kaliningrad region). Formed in 1960, armed with Rubezh, being rearmed with Bal and Bastion since 2016.

7^th Guards Separate MR Regiment (Kaliningrad). Part of Coastal Forces since 2002.

79^th Guards Separate MR Brigade (Gusev, Kaliningrad region). Part of Coastal Forces since 2002.

22^nd Guards Separate Air Defense Missile Regiment (Kaliningrad). Armed with Tor SAMs.

Caspian Flotilla

The battalions listed below have been combined in December 2018 into the 177^th Naval Infantry Regiment based in Kaspiysk, Dagestan:

414^th Separate NI Battalion (Kaspiysk, Dagestan). Formed in 1999 out of subunits detached from various fleets.

727^th Separate NI Battalion (Astrakhan). Formed in 2009 from the 77^th Separate NI Brigade. Main mission is the protection and defense of Caspian Flotilla facilities.

46^th Separate Coastal Missile Battalion (Kaspiysk, Dagestan). Armed with Bal.

Coastal Forces Weaponry

Missile and Artillery Systems

Redut. Used against all types of surface ships.
Rubezh. Used against all types of surface ships.

3K60 Bal. Used to control territorial zones and straits, protecting naval bases and other coastal infrastructure and facilities, defending coastline against amphibious assault. An all-weather system with fully autonomous guidance effective against hard-kill and soft-kill systems.

3K55 Bastion. Used against all types of surface ships and radar-reflective land targets, effective against hard-kill and soft-kill systems.

A-222 Bereg. Used to strike small and medium surface ships, including fast ones with speeds up to 180km/hr, in immediate proximity to the coastline. May also be used to strike land targets.

Click to see the full-size image

Structure

Redut: Each battalion has 5-6 batteries, 3 SPU-35B per battery.

Rubezh: Each battalion has 4 3S51 SP launchers, 4 reloaders, and an optional 40V6 surveillance radar.

3K60 Bal: Each battalion includes up to two command point vehicles, up to 4 SP launchers with 8 Kh-35 (3M24) missiles each, up to 4 reloaders.

3K55 Bastion: Each battalion includes 4 K-340P SP launchers with two Oniks missiles each, 1-2 command vehicles, 1 support vehicle, 4 reloaders.

A-222 Bereg: Each battalion has 2-3 batteries of 1 A-222Ts1 command post, up to 6 A-222B1 artillery systems, 1-2 A-222D1 support vehicles.

Naval Infantry Weapons

MBTs: 250 (Mainly T-72 variants).
APCs: 1000, incl. 200 MTLB, 100 BTR-80, 600 BTR-82.
IFVs: 400 BMP-2.

SP Artillery: 365, incl. 95 2Sp, 50 2S3, 18 2S19, 30 2S9, 12 2S23.
Towed Artillery: 124, incl., 50 2A36, 50 2A65, 24 2B16.
MRLs: 36 9K51

Large Amphibious Ships

Project 11711: 1 ship

Displacement 5500 t, speed 18 kn, range 3500 miles. May carry 13 MBTs, or up to 36 APCs/IFVs and 300 troops.

Proect 1171: 4 ships
Displacement: 3400t, speed 17kn, range 4800 miles at 16 kn. May carry 22 tanks or 50 APCs and 313 troops (Vilkov and Filchenkov: 400 troops).

Project 775: 15 ships.
Displacement 2900t, speed 17.5kn, range 3500 miles at 16 kn. May carry 13 tanks or 20 APCs, 150 troops.

Small Amphibious Ships and Cutters

Project 1232.2 Zubr: 2 hovercraft

Displacement 555 tons, speed 63 kn, range 300 miles at full speed. May carry 3 tanks, 10 APCs, up to 140 troops, or up to 500 when no vehicles carried.

Project 21820 Dyugon: 5 vessels.
Displacement 280 t, speed up to 35 kn at wave height up to .75m, range 500 miles. May carry 2 tanks or 4 APCs, or up to 90 troops.

Project 11770 Serna: 12 vessels
Displacement 105 t, speed 30kn, range 600 miles. May carry 1 tank or 2 APCs or 90 troops.

Project 1176 Akula: 12 vessels
Displacement 107t, speed 11.5kn, range 330 miles. May carry 1 tank or 1 APC or 50 troops.

Amphibious vessels by Fleet

Click to see the full-size image

Russian military to be reequipped with Iskander-M missile systems in 2019

By News Desk

2019-01-02

The missile troops of the Russian Ground Forces will be fully reequipped with the Iskander-M missile systems in 2019, the Russian Defense Ministry said in a statement on Tuesday.

“In 2019, the process of reequipping the missile troops of the Russian Ground Forces with the Iskander-M missile systems will be completed. In accordance with the state defense order, the manufacturer will hand a unit of the Iskander-M systems over to the Western Military District,” the statement reads.

Senior lawmaker: Russia did not test Iskander-M missiles with range violating INF Treaty

The Iskander-M ballistic missile systems are capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 500 km, destroying multiple-launch rocket systems, long-range artillery guns, aircraft and helicopters at aerodromes, command posts and communications centers. The complex is capable of outmaneuvering any air defenses.

About 200 new types of weapons will be tested at the Kapustin Yar range in Russia’s southern Astrakhan Region in 2019.

“In 2019, about 200 new types of weapons are planned to be tested, which is commensurate with the 2018 number and half as many as in 2017,” the statement reads.

According to the ministry, the number of tests carried out at the site has been growing in the past two years. “As steps are being taken to implement the state rearmament program, the range of tested items will expand in the two years to come,” the Defense Ministry stressed.

Improving the protection of military facilities and testing weapons ranging from intelligence equipment to precision weapons guidance systems will be among top priorities, as well as the development of methods to test advanced weapons and military hardware.

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شخصية العام: نائل البرغوثي

 عبد القادر عقل

•   الإثنين 31 كانون الأول 2018

رفض البرغوثي عرض الإبعاد عن فلسطين وقَبِل الإقامة الجبرية في رام الله (أي بي أيه )

سلفيت | يبدأ عام جديد في حياة كل الناس، وعام آخر يقرّب نائل البرغوثي من السنة الأربعين في السجن. أكثر من نصف عمر القضية الفلسطينية قضاها «جنرال الصبر» أسيراً. ارتاح فيها لثلاث سنوات فقط، بين 2011 و2014، وهذا الأصعب: أن تتنشّق الحرية، أن تتعرّف إلى وجوه أصدقائك القدامى، أن تتعرّف إلى الحاسوب والإنترنت… وفجأة ينتهي الحلم. هذا الرجل تعلّم أن يتشبّث بحقوقه ويرفض المساومات. فمنذ الصغر، عندما حاول زميل الدراسة أخذ كتاب التاريخ منه، قاوم بكلّ ما يمكن للطفل أن يقاوم، كما رفض اقتراح المعلم تقسيم الكتاب إلى جزءين. اعتُقل وهو فتى، طالب في الثانوية العامة، لتمرّ عليه 34 عاماً، ثم سنوات الحرية الثلاث، ثم سبع سنوات من الأسر ليصير عمره الآن 62 عاماً، ولا يزال يواجه حكمه القديم: المؤبّد. ومع أنه يعلم تمام العلم أن لا حرية من القيد إلا بصفقة تبادل جديدة تشمله، فإن «جنرال الصبر» هو عنوان عائلته المُقاتِلة التي لا تستقيل من الأجداد إلى الأحفاد، منذ سجن نائل وعمر وفخري في 1978، إلى دم صالح في 2018، وبينهما أجيال من الشهداء والأسرى، آخرهم الشهيد صالح الذي شارك في تنفيذ إطلاق نار قرب مستوطنة «عوفرا»، وسط الضفة.

«أتمنّى الاستلقاء ساعة فقط تحت شمس قريتي كوبر وفوق ربيعها». سرٌّ صغير نقله الأسير الفلسطيني نائل البرغوثي، لوالدته، أثناء إحدى زياراتها إليه في سجون العدو. ومع أنه حقّق أمنيته بعد 34 عاماً، لم يكن أبوه أو أمه على قيد الحياة عندما خرج ليشهدا تلك اللحظة. ليت الوجع انتهى هنا، إذ لم يكمل ثلاث سنوات من «الحرية المشروطة»، حتى لاقى أسوأ مصير يمكن أن يتعرّض له أسير محرّر. فما إن تنفّس الصعداء عقب «صفقة شاليط» عام 2011، حتى أعاد العدو اعتقاله في 2014. هذا ملخّص سيرة «أقدم سجين (سياسي) في العالم»، يدخل عامه الـ 39 في السجن، فصلت ما بينها سنوات في «سجن أكبر، سماؤه بلا قضبان»، كما يصف.
قبل سبع سنوات، في تبادل «وفاء الأحرار» الكبير، كان بإمكان نائل أن يتّخذ قرار الإبعاد، شأنه شأن عدد من الأسرى المُفرَج عنهم آنذاك، ويجنّب نفسه هذا المصير، لكنه كان سيحرم ذاته تحقيق أمنية الاستلقاء تحت شمس كوبر. لذلك قال: «اقتراح الاحتلال إبعادنا خارج فلسطين مرفوض، ولن نقبل إلا العودة إلى عائلاتنا». ما إن خرج في 11/10/2011، ولم يمرّ سوى اثني عشر يوماً، حتى حقّق أمنية والدته وعَقد قرانه على الأسيرة المحررة إيمان نافع (من قرية نعلين غربي رام الله). وفي حفلة زفافه، قال لوسائل الإعلام: «كما ترون: عرس وطني، وإن شاء الله يكون امتداداً لعرسٍ أكبر بتحرر (باقي) إخواننا الأسرى».

اعتقُل نائل في 1978 وتحرّر في 2011 ثم اعتُقل في 2014

في لقاء آخر (23/11/2011)، يسأله محاوره عبر التلفزيون: «كيف بدت لك قريتك، وما هي مشاعرك بعد 33 عاماً في السجون». ينسى «أبو النور» نفسه وهو يصف قريته التي رفض أن يُبعَد عنها، مسهباً في الحديث عن «سحر الطبيعة» الذي بدا أن له حصّة واسعة في شخصيته. يستدرك: «لم أتنسّم حريتي كلياً، فأبناء شعبي تنقصهم حقوقهم، وحياتهم ليست طبيعية كباقي العالم، إنني أعيش في سماء بلا قضبان، وحريتي منقوصة رغم أن الوضع مريح نوعاً ما». في ختام اللقاء، يصفه المذيع بـ«الأب الروحي للحركة الأسيرة»، لكنه يعترض بشدة: «عفواً، لست الأب الروحي، خلفنا وبعدنا جاء عشرات الجنود المجهولين، يجب تسليط الضوء على الأسرى كافة».

سنوات «الحرية»

مقابل رفض نائل الإبعاد، فُرضت عليه الإقامة الجبرية في محافظة رام الله والبيرة، وكان ممنوعاً عليه أن يخرج من حدودها. صحيح أنه لم ينل المساحة التي نالها مَن قَبِل الإبعاد أو أُجبر عليه، لكنه نجح في نيل أمنيته بالاجتماع مع عائلته وتوأم روحه، قريته كوبر، وضريحَيْ والديه، كما نفّذ وصية والدته. استثمر البرغوثي سنوات الحرية المؤقتة في دراسة التاريخ في جامعة القدس المفتوحة، كما شارك شقيقه عمر الفرحة بزفاف نجل الأخير، الشهيد صالح (منفذ عملية فدائية قرب مستوطنة «عوفرا» الشهر الماضي).

رغم «حريته» المنقوصة، شارك في الفعاليات المتضامنة مع الأسرى في رام الله، كما بقي حريصاً على الحضور في المناسبات الاجتماعية، وزيارة ذوي الشهداء، ومنهم عائلة الشهيد عبد الحميد حامد في بلدة سلواد، شرقي رام الله، رغم مرور 28 عاماً على استشهاده. وبينما كانت الشمس في كبد السماء خلال تموز/ يوليو 2013، أصّر نائل على أن يحمل على كتفيه جثمان رفيق أسره أحمد أبو السكر، طوال التشييع، إذ قال: «أبو السكر حمل قضية فلسطين 27 سنة في السجون، فلنحمله 27 دقيقة على الأكتاف».

أيضاً، عاد نائل الشغوف بالأرض وطبيعتها الساحرة إلى تقاليد المزارع الريفي، ليحقّق أمنية من أمنيات السجن، فزرع عشرات الأشجار بيديه في حديقة أمام منزله واعتاد الاعتناء بها يومياً، كما التقط صحافيون صوراً له أثناء تربيته بعض الماشية. مرّت تلك الأيام كحلم جميل لم يتخيّل نائل، وعشرات المحرّرين، أن ينتهي بسرعة، عقب إعادة اعتقالهم عام 2014 في ردّ فعل واسع على قتل ثلاثة مستوطنين إسرائيليين في الخليل. منذ ذلك الوقت، قضى «أبو النور» ثلاثين شهراً بتهمة «التحريض عبر إلقائه محاضرة»، وبعد انتهاء المدة، أعاد العدو إليه حكمه السابق بالمؤبد، بذريعة «ملف أو تهمة سرية».

خارج الزمن

على مدار 34 عاماً، رفض العدو الإفراج عن «جنرال الصبر» في صفقات التبادل كافة، فاكتفى «أبو اللّهب» بتقديم التهاني إلى رفاقه المحرّرين الذين سبقوه، ومنهم شقيقه عمر الذي نال حريته أول مرة في 1985 خلال صفقة أبرمتها «الجبهة الشعبية ــــ القيادة العامة». ولم يشهد التاريخ أن نائل البرغوثي تخلّف عن أي إضرابٍ جماعي للحركة الأسيرة منذ اعتقاله في 1978، إذ بدأ إضرابه الأول عن الطعام لثلاثة أيام للمطالبة بتحسين جودة الطعام التي تقدمه إدارة السجون (يُعدّه الأسرى الجنائيون وغير الأمنيين). وجراء رفض الإدارة طلبهم، أضربوا عن الوجبات الغذائية المطهُوَّة لنحو نصف عام، واكتفوا بالخبز واللبن والفواكه وما شابهها من الأصناف غير المطبوخة، ثم رضخ العدو في النهاية وسلّمهم المطبخ.

قالت الوالدة لابنها في وصيتها: «ليت إيمان نافع تكون من نصيبك يا نائل!» (أي بي أيه )

يقول مُقرّبون إن نائل بدأ حياته يافعاً مقبلاً على دراسة الفكر التقدمي اليساري، لكنه سرعان ما تحوّل إلى العسكرة منخرطاً في صفوف «الكتيبة الطلابية» التابعة لـ«فتح»، إذ وجد فيها ما يلبّي عنفوانه وحماسته، وبقي كذلك حتى 1992، عندما اتجه نحو الالتزام الديني، واختار أن يُكنّى بـ«أبو النور». مع توقيع اتفاق «أوسلو» وتَسلّم السلطة الفلسطينية (1994)، نُقل نائل إلى سجن بئر السبع بعدما مكث أحد عشر عاماً في سجن جنيد في مدينة نابلس، قضى ثماني سنوات منها في زنزانة واحدة. بعد نقله بمدة قصيرة (1995)، قرّر العيش داخل أقسام حركة «حماس».

خلال أحد أيام 1997، فوجئ البرغوثي بعصفور يرتجف ويلتقط أنفاسه الأخيرة ولا يقوى على الطيران، محاولاً أن ينفض عن نفسه غبار سجن نفحة. أمسك الأسير الإنسان بالأسير العصفور ونفخ في منقاره، وأمدّه بقطرات الماء، ثم تنفّس العصفور وحلّق عالياً. يصف أسرى محرّرون نائل بـ«الرجل الوحدوي»، و«القارئ النهم»، و«واسع الاطلاع وكثير الإلمام في موضوعات شتى». ويقولون إن هذه الشخصية الآسرة للرجل الصابر تمتزج بالتواضع وتغلب عليها روح الفكاهة.

«المدرسة البرغوثية»

«درهم شرف خير من بيت مال». هذه المقولة كرّرتها أم نائل، فَرحة، لابنيها على مدى سنوات، وقالتها في الزيارة الأخيرة لنائل. ولما بَلَغتها أمنية ابنها في الاستلقاء على بساتين قريته وتحت شمسها، قالت لمراسل صحيفة «هآرتس» العبرية: «شو رأيك أخطفك، بس شوي، عشان أبادلك بنائل». بعدها، زرعت «الحجّة فرحة» شجرة ليمون باسم نائل في كوبر، وواظبت لسنوات على إحضار عبوات المياه لسقايتها من سجن نجلها، بل قطفت ثمرها ومرّرته إليه في السجن، قبل أن يمنَع العدو إدخال الليمون. وما إن لحظ نائل تعبها من نقل المياه من السجن، والليمون إليه، حتى توقف عن طلبه سقاية الشجرة.

توفّي والده في 2004 ووالدته في 2005 وتزوّج بأسيرة محررة

ذات مرة، تعمّد أحد جنود العدو تكرار المناداة على والدته محرّفاً اسمها: «فرخة! فرخة»، فردّت عليه:«فرخة! بس أنجبت ديوك يلعنوا أبوك». لم تعرف فرحة الكلل أو الملل، وجابت غالبية سجون العدو لزيارة ابنَيها نائل وعمر، كما خاضت معظم الإضرابات خارج السجون تزامناً مع إضراب أبنائها في الداخل. في 18/10/2005، انتظر الشقيقان نائل وعمر صوت والدتهما في برنامج الأسرى عبر إحدى الإذاعات. كانت وصاياها الأخيرة على الملأ: «درهم شرف ولا بيت مال يا حبايب قلبي… ليت إيمان نافع* تكون من نصيبك يا نائل!». ثم بعد يوم توفّيت الأم.
قبلها بسنة، أي في 2004، كانت زيارة الأب، صالح، الأخيرة لنجله نائل بعد منعٍ استمرّ سنوات. وبعدها توفّي الأب وتلقّى نائل وشقيقه عمر (المُعاد اعتقاله آنذاك) الخبر المفاجئ. آنذاك، ساق القدر الأخوين إلى الالتقاء في «معبار بئر السبع»، وبينما لهيب الشوق ينطفئ، عادت نار الفراق، إذ همس زميلٌ أسيرٌ في أذن الآخر: «المُسنّ بالثياب الزرقاء والعصا (صالح) لم يأتِ للزيارة… لقد مات!». أما الشقيقة الوحيدة لنائل، وكان عمرها 12 عاماً عند اعتقاله، فتزوجت وصار لديها أولاد ثم أحفاد، قبل أن يتحرّر هو في «صفقة شاليط». والآن عاد عمر، «أبو عاصف، إلى السجون مجدداً عقب استشهاد نجله صالح المحتجز جثمانه.

في مؤتمرٍ صحافي في التاسع عشر من الشهر الجاري، طالبت العائلة بالكشف عن تفاصيل ما حدث لنجلها صالح (استشهد في 12/12). ثم قرأ رئيس «هيئة شؤون الأسرى» السابق عيسى قراقع، رسالة «جنرال الصبر» لعائلته، إذ قال فيها:

«نُعزيكم باستشهاد صالح البرغوثي فارساً مقاتلاً، وأسال الله الفرج لأخينا أبو عاصف وابنه، وستتشرّفون بأنكم كنتم من الذين قدموا أرواحهم فداء للحرية وللقدس، ونشدّ على أياديكم وسنبقى على عهد الشهداء».

* إيمان نافع: أسيرة تحرّرت عام 1997، وكانت قد اعتُقلت في 1987، وحوكمت بالسجن 15 عاماً ونصف عام، بتهمة التخطيط لعملية فدائية.

أنقر على الصورة لتكبيرها

«القسام» لنائل: ستعانق الحرية من جديد

في الثامن عشر من الشهر الماضي، أرسل نائل البرغوثي من داخل سجنه رسالة بمناسبة مرور 38 عاماً على اعتقاله، لم يفصل بينها سوى «الحرية غير المكتملة». يقول أبو النور: «أصدق التحيات والمحبة أبعثها لكم من خلف 38 جداراً هي سنوات الأسر التي لم تحجبني عنكم… نعيش الأمل الذي يظلّلنا بقبس من نور الشهداء»، مضيفاً: «من خلف 38 عاماً، أقول لكم إن الشعب الذي أراد الحياة لن ينال إلا النصر». وجاء في الرسالة أيضاً: «الاحتلال لن يستطيع زرع الخذلان في نفسنا، لأننا نستند إلى جدار الله أولاً، ثم جدار كلّ من سار بخطى واثقة على درب من صنع الكرامة والعزة لأمتنا من المحيط إلى الخليج».

بعد يومين من رسالته، ردت «كتائب القسام»، الذراع العسكرية لحركة «حماس»، عبر تغريدة للمتحدث باسمها أبو عبيدة: «التحية الجهادية لأسطورة السجون وأيقونة المقاومة والصمود نائل البرغوثي، ونقول له: كما كسرنا القيد في وفاء الأحرار، سنكسر أنف المحتل وستعانق الحرية من جديد بإذن الله».

الطفولة والسجن: من «أبو اللهب» إلى «أبو النور»

المكان: قرية كوبر، شمال غرب رام الله، وسط الضفة المحتلة. الزمان: الثالث والعشرون من تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 1957. الحدث: صالح البرغوثي وزوجته فَرْحة على موعدٍ مع قدوم المولود الثاني لهما، نائل. ما إن بلغ هذا الطفل الرابعة من عمره، حتى سافر لأول مرة في حياته إلى الأردن مع أمه، لزيارة خاله المريض علي. وفي العام نفسه، زار المملكة مجدداً لتهنئة خاله بالإفراج عنه من السجون الأردنية.
بدأ نائل دراسته الابتدائية في مدرسة كوبر، لكنه في المرحلة الثانوية انتقل إلى بلدة بيرزيت، شمال رام الله. هناك، طلب من أساتذته تحويل اسم مدرسته إلى «مدرسة الثورة»، في وقت كانت فيه أجواء «حرب حزيران» 1967، أو ما تُسمّى «النكسة»، تحفر عميقاً في وعي كل فلسطيني، كما كانت «حركة التحرير الوطني الفلسطيني» (فتح) قد أعلنت انطلاقتها آنذاك.
في 1972، كانت أولى محطات العمل الثوري الفعلي للبرغوثي، إذ انخرط مبكراً في التظاهرات، ونجح في إنشاء علاقات مع الشباب الثوار الذين يكبرونه سناً في جامعة بيرزيت. ومن أبرز المسيرات الطلابية التي تقدّم صفوفها تظاهرة منددة باغتيال العدو «الكماليْن وأبو يوسف النجار» في بيروت عام 1973، ثم مسيرات يوم الأرض في 1976.

«أبو اللهب» هو اللقب المؤقّت الذي لازم نائل منذ السبعينيات حتى بداية التسعينيات، وأُطلق عليه لشهرته في إشعال إطارات السيارات خلال المواجهات في بيرزيت، لكنه تمكن في وقت قياسي من تجاوز مرحلة التظاهر والعمل الجماهيري (خلال سنتين فقط) إلى الكفاح المسلح. اعتقله العدو أول مرة في كانون الثاني/يناير 1978، وزَجّ به في سجن رام الله، لكن أُطلق سراحه بعد صموده، وجراء إخفاق المخابرات الإسرائيلية في توجيه لائحة اتهام إليه.

ثم في نيسان/أبريل التالي، وجد نائل نفسه في التحقيق مرة أخرى داخل السجن نفسه لأربعة أشهر. وبعد 12 يوماً، اعتَقل العدو شقيقه الأكبر عمر وابن عمه فخري، وحُكم على ثلاثتهم بالسجن المؤبد بتهم «قتل ضابط إسرائيلي شمال رام الله، وحرق مصنع زيوت داخل الأراضي المحتلة عام 1948، وتفجير مقهى في القدس المحتلة». داخل قاعة محاكمتهما، رفض الشقيقان وابن عمهما الاعتراف بشرعية محكمة العدو والإقرار بالذنب أو طلب الاستعطاف، فبدأ صراخ القاضي العسكري، وضرب بيديه على الطاولة صارخاً: «مؤبد مؤبد مؤبد». في تلك اللحظة، وقف الثلاثة وغنّوا: «ما بنتحول ما بنتحول يا وطني المحتل… هذي طريقنا واخترناها وعرة بنتحمل»، لتعلو فوقها زغاريد أمِّ «أبو النور» فَرْحة.

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A two part Pepe Escobar report on the China, Pakistan and the new Great Game

December 30, 2018

by Pepe Escobar (cross-posted with The Asia Times – here and here – by special agreement with the author)

The new Great Game on the Roof of the World

On top of the graceful Baltit Fort, overlooking the Hunza Valley’s Shangri-La-style splendor, it’s impossible not to feel dizzy at the view: an overwhelming collision of millennia of geology and centuries of history.

We are at the heart of Gilgit-Baltistan, in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, or – as legend rules, the Roof of the World. This is an area about 70,000 square kilometers (27,000 square miles) crammed with spectacular mountain ranges and amidst them, secluded pristine valleys and the largest glaciers outside of the Polar region.

The location feels like vertigo. To the north, beyond the Batura Glacier, is the tiny northeast arm of Afghanistan, the legendary Wakhan corridor. A crest of the Hindu Kush separates Wakhan from the regional capital Gilgit. Xinjiang starts on Wakhan’s uppermost tip. Via the upgraded Karakoram highway, it’s only 240 km from Gilgit to the Khunjerab Pass, 4,934 meters high on the official China-Pakistan border.

What used to be called the Russian Pamir, now in Tajikistan, can be seen with naked eyes from one of the peaks of the Karakoram. To the east, past Skardu and an arduous trek that may last almost a month, lies K2, the second highest peak in the world, among a mighty group north of the Batura Glacier (also known as Baltoro), which is 63km long.

The receding Hopper Glacier in northern Pakistan. Photo: Asia Times

To the south lies Azad (“Free”) Kashmir and slightly to the southeast what locals define as Indian-occupied Kashmir. The former King of Kashmir agreed to be part of India after Partition in 1947 but troops were airlifted to the northern state and after a year of fighting, India went to the UN. A temporary ceasefire line was established in 1948 and runs down from the Karakoram towards the Nanga Parbat – the killer mountain, dividing Kashmir into two virtually sealed halves.

Massive mountain ranges

Driving across the Karakoram Highway (see part 2 of this report) we were face to face with three massive mountain ranges running in different directions. The Karakoram roughly starts where the Hindu Kush ends and then sweeps eastward – a watershed between Central Asian drainage and streams flowing into the Indian Ocean.

The ancient Silk Road is seen above the Karakoram Highway. Photo: Asia Times

Driving across the Karakoram Highway (see part 2 of this report) we were face to face with three massive mountain ranges running in different directions. The Karakoram roughly starts where the Hindu Kush ends and then sweeps eastward – a watershed between Central Asian drainage and streams flowing into the Indian Ocean.

The Himalayas start in Gilgit and then run southeast through a cluster of high peaks, including the Nanga Parbat, directly on the Islamabad-Gilgit air route (flights by turboprop only take off if weather around the Nanga Parbat allows).

Strategically, this is one of the top spots on the planet, a protagonist of the original Great Game between imperial Britain and Russia. So it’s more than appropriate that here is exactly where a protagonist of the New Great Game, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship project of the New Silk Roads, or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), actually starts, linking western China’s Xinjiang to the Northern Areas across the Khunjerab Pass.

Karakoram politics

CPEC is the supreme jewel in the Belt and Road crown, the largest foreign development or investment program in modern China’s history, loaded with way more funds than years of US military aid to Islamabad.

And we are indeed in Ancient Silk Road territory. Looking at the millenary trail parallel to the Karakoram, lovingly restored by the Aga Khan Development Foundation, it’s easy to picture the great Chinese traveler Hiuen Tsang traversing these heights in the 7th Century, and naming them Polo-le. The Tang dynasty called it Great Polu. When Marco Polo trekked in the 14th Century, he called it Bolor.

Early last month, I was privileged to drive on the upgraded Karakoram Highway along CPEC all the way from Gilgit to the Khunjerab, and back, with multiple incursions to valleys such as lush, pine-forested Naltar, Shimshal (manufacturers of sublime yak wool shawls), Kutwal and receding glaciers, such as Hopper and Bualtar.

The Karakoram Highway was originally conceived in the 1970s as an ambitious political-strategic project able to influence the geopolitical balance in the subcontinent, by expanding Islamabad’s reach into previously inaccessible frontiers.

Now it’s at the heart of a trade and energy corridor from the China-Pak border all the way south to Gwadar, the port in Balochistan in the Arabian Sea a stone’s throw from the Persian Gulf. Gwadar looks likely to be a crucial springboard to China becoming a naval power – active from the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf and on to the Mediterranean, while CPEC, slowly but surely, aims to change the social and economic structure of Pakistan.

Previous Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif, the controversial “Lion of the Punjab”, was an avid CPEC supporter after he won the 2013 elections. At the time current Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, winner of elections held in July, had already polled second nationwide and rose to power in the strategic Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province – straddling the area between Islamabad and the tribal belt.

Sharif, in June 2013, when he was about to enter negotiations with the Chinese, was lauding what would become CPEC as an infrastructure scheme that “will change the fate of Pakistan”. So far that has translated mostly into new hydroelectric dams, coal-fired power stations, and civil-nuclear power. The China National Nuclear Corporation is building two 1,100 MW reactors near Karachi for nearly $10 billion, 65% financed by Chinese loans. This is the first time that the Chinese nuclear industry has built something of this scale outside of their country.

More than a dozen CPEC projects involve power generation – Pakistan is no longer woefully energy-deprived. These projects may not be as sexy as high-speed rail and pipelines, which could arrive much later; after all CPEC in its planned entirety runs to 2030.

Of course, monumental business decisions will have to be addressed; the staggering cost – and state of the art engineering – involved in building a railway parallel to the Karakoram; and the fact that oil pumped via a pipeline from Gwadar to Xinjiang might cost five times more than via the usual sea lanes all the way to Shanghai.

A map shows the route of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Photo: Wikimedia Commons/ Wanishahrukh

What Imran wants

Imran Khan is way more cautious than Sharif, who had a “China cell” inside his office and commanded the Pakistani Army to set up a 10,000-strong security force to protect China’s CPEC investments.

But Khan knows well about the firepower behind CPEC: the Silk Road Fund, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), CITIC, Bank of China, EXIM, China Development Bank. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) projects that BRI could mobilize as much as $6 trillion in the next few years. What Khan wants is to negotiate better terms for Pakistan.

China’s ambassador to Pakistan, Yao Jing, never tires to stress that Pakistan’s serious debt problem relates to the initial phase of CPEC, due to the massive import of heavy machinery, industrial raw materials and services.

As I learned in Islamabad in various discussions with Pakistani analysts, Khan actually wants to expand CPEC and prevent it from leading Islamabad towards an unsustainable debt trap. That would mean tweaking CPEC’s focus away from too much infrastructure development to technology transfer and market access for Pakistani products. Financing for agriculture projects, for instance, could come via CPEC’s Long Term Plan, which unlike the so-called Early Harvest Plan does not come with a price tag attached and can be negotiated freely between Islamabad and Beijing.

According to a 2016 IMF report, $28 billion in projects included in Early Harvest will be completed by 2020: $10 billion to develop road, rail and port infrastructure, and $18 billion in energy projects via Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), with Chinese firms using commercial loans borrowing from Chinese banks.

CPEC though is an extremely long-term endeavor. Other CPEC investments in energy and transportation infrastructure financed by China will be finished only by 2030.

A new CPEC emphasis on industrialization via technology transfer would allow Pakistan to produce some of what China imports. That would imply reneg otiating the Pakistan-China Free-Trade Agreement (FTA), getting to the level of preferential treatment that China offers to ASEAN. Essentially, this is what Imran Khan is aiming at.

Hail the Ismailis

Gilgit-Baltistan is the safest place in the whole of Pakistan. Here, there’s no “terror threat” by the Pakistani Taliban or dodgy al-Qaeda or ISIS spin-offs. Major spoken languages are Shina and Burushaski, not Urdu. The population is overwhelmingly composed of Ismaili Shi’ites – like Karim Shah, an encyclopedia of Central and South Asian history and culture reigning over a cave of wonders in Gilgit where anything from authentic heads of Gandhara Bodhisattvas to 18th Century silk Qom carpets from a Persian royal family can be found.

Karim Shah and his cave of wonders in Gilgit. Photo: Asia Times

We spent hours talking about Khorasan, the original Kipling-esque Great Game, Col. Durand (who drew the Durand Line separating Pashtuns on both sides of an artificial border), the Kashmir question, the astonishingly complex geo-eco-historical system of the Northern Areas, and of course, China.

Shah imparted the impression – confirmed by other traders – that the local population may see some tangible CPEC-related benefits, but does not know exactly what Beijing wants. Chinese visitors – engineers, bureaucrats – are remote; tourism has not picked up yet, as in the case of the Japanese, who have been Northern Areas enthusiasts for decades. Thus, an improvement in Xi Jinping’s “people-to-people exchange”, a key component of BRI, seems to be in order.

Legend rules that Hunzakuts, the inhabitants of the glorious Hunza Valley, are descendants of three soldiers of Alexander the Great who married beautiful Persian women of high aristocracy. While Alexander campaigned along the Oxus, the three couples traveled across the Wakhan corridor, discovered the marvelous valley, and settled down.

The tolerant Islam they came to practice centuries later is impervious to Gulf proselytizing. When I crossed an austere village by the Karakoram, visibly out of place, my Ismaili driver Akbar noted that these were “Sunni Wahhabis”.

Finding Gandhara art in Gilgit made perfect sense. Gandhara historically formed a sort of fertile and irrigated triangle between the Iranian plateau, the Hindu Kush and the first peaks of the Himalayas. Between the 6th Century BC and the Islamic invasions, it was the crossroads of three cultures: India, China and Iran. And it was here that an extremely original Greco-Buddhist art and culture flourished, way after Greek power had waned.

A Gandhara Bodhisattva head in Karim’s shop in Gilgit. Photo: Asia Times

The Kashmir question

As a new 21st Century crossroads, CPEC faces stern challenges – from geology (constant landslides and floods in Gilgit-Baltistan) to wobbly security in Balochistan, threatened by a combination of separatist and religiously or politically manipulated movements. I was not able to visit Gwadar and the south of CPEC even though contacts in Islamabad supplied military sources with an application for a NOC (No Object Certificate, as it is known on Pakistan) weeks in advance. The military response: too “sensitive”, as in dangerous, for a lone Western journalist, especially in the aftermath of the Aasia Bibi case.

China will need to find a way – perhaps via negotiations inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – to mollify India on CPEC’s route straddling Kashmir.

In 1936 the British made a deal with the Maharaja of Kashmir, getting Gilgit on lease for 60 years. But then came Partition. At the time the Kuomintang – in power in China, before Mao’s victory – was engaged in secret negotiations to restore Hunza’s fabled independence as a new state allied with China. But the Mir of Hunza finally decided to join the newborn Pakistani nation.

Few may remember that, during the 1950s, way before the India-China border war in 1962, there was trouble on the China-Pakistan border, when Beijing seized 3,400 square miles of Kashmir, including parts of old Hunza, whose Mirs always recognized Chinese suzerainty. When the British had first seized Hunza in 1891, the Mir actually fled to China.

This puts into perspective some fabulous documents preserved at Baltit Fort, like China-Baltistan trade agreements and a picture of Zhou EnLai visiting the fort in the early 1960s.

It’s also fascinating to remember that at the time Zhou Enlai already thought about Karachi – no Gwadar at that time – connecting to an “ancient trade route, lost to modern times, not only for trade but for strategic purposes as well”. Xi Jinping has definitely read his Zhou EnLai thoroughly.

Historic trade agreements between China and Baltistan. Photo: Asia Times

Nowadays, the President of Azad (Free) Jammu and Kashmir, Sardar Masood Khan, always stresses that “unlike Indian propaganda”, the Pakistani side is “thriving politically and economically”, and CPEC could also be beneficial for Indian Kashmir. As it stands, this remains a red line for New Delhi.

Once in a lifetime chance

At the National Defense University in Islamabad, I was shown a paper by Li Xiaolu, from the Institute of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University of the PLA detailing how Beijing hopes that “by opening China’s west to Central and South Asia, building better transportation infrastructure, and by encouraging trade with South and Central Asian countries, the development of manufacturing, processing and industrial capacities in Western China can be promoted”.

Now compare it with road and rail infrastructure improved across Pakistan being able to turn the whole nation into an actual trade corridor, while the Pakistani Navy improves its defense in deep-sea waters with Gwadar positioned as a third naval base and offering support for Chinese ships across sea lanes close to the Middle East and Northern Africa.

No wonder Chinese analysts share a virtual consensus about traditional Chinese wisdom favoring unity for prosperity – a key plank of CPEC and BRI – and prevailing over containment and confrontation.

For CPEC to work, Beijing needs three things: a political solution for Afghanistan, which is already being worked out inside the SCO, with China, Russia, India, Pakistan and Iran (as an observer) directly involved; stable relations between India and Pakistan; and certified security across Pakistan.

Beijing is actively encouraging closer connectivity between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the Quetta-Kandahar railway and the Kabul-Peshawar highway. CPEC is actually expanding from the Karakoram to the Khyber Pass, trespassing the artificial Durand line along the way.

In contrast, multiple factions in Washington continue to twist all possible faultlines to thwart these projects, with a propaganda campaign designed to portray BRI as a swamp of corruption, incompetence, a “debt trap” and “malign” Chinese behavior.

Yet among all BRI corridors, material progress across CPEC is more than self-evident. I saw every village in the Northern Areas with electricity and most of them linked by fiber optics, a stark contrast to when I traveled a severely dilapidated Karakoram, twice, two decades ago.

Pakistan now has a once in a lifetime chance to harness its geographical location – with borders intertwining centuries of history and culture with Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Middle East – to set itself up as a key bridge between the Middle East and both the Mediterranean and Western China.

Rumors abounded in Islamabad that Imran Khan is aiming for an international standard university in the capital, positioned as a center of study and research tracking the new mosaic of an emerging multipolar world. Young people power will be more than available, like Jamila Shah, currently at the National Defense University, doing a masters in Peace and Conflict Studies, and working with an NGO, the International Rescue Committee. Jamila, from Hunza, in Gilgit-Baltistan, is the face of Pakistan’s future.

Jamila Shah. Photo: Asia Times

Still hostage to a corrupt oligarchy, cartelized industries, falling exports (60% of which are textiles), and with almost half of their youths aged from five to 16 out of school, Pakistan faces a Sisyphean task.

Economist Ishrat Husain has correctly noted that Pakistan’s model of “elitist growth” must be replaced by “shared growth”. Enter a modified CPEC opening the path ahead, hopefully like those cargo trucks defying the slippery, snowy Khunjerab full blast.

Trade on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Photo: Asia Times

Up next: On the road in the Karakoram 

On the road in the Karakoram

On the Pakistani side, a wooden house serves as a small customs office fronted by “the highest ATM in the world” – though you try a foreign credit card at your peril. The Chinese side boasts an intimidating, metal-plated James Bond-esque structure with no humans in sight.

This is ground zero of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the point where the revamped, upgraded Karakoram Highway – “the eighth wonder of the world” – snakes away from China’s Xinjiang all the way to Pakistan’s Northern Areas and further south to Islamabad and Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea.

From here it’s 420 kilometers to Kashgar and a hefty 1,890 km to Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. But going south is where the fun really begins.

World’s highest ATM. Photo: Asia Times

Traveling the Karakoram from Gilgit, the capital of the Northern Areas, to the Khunjerab and back is an exhilarating road trip along CPEC and its spin-offs. And it’s a crazy carousel.

Psychedelic Pakistani trucks, Chinese container road warriors – some trying to subdue the Khunjerab without chains on their tires – packed minivans plying the Hunza-Xinjiang route, Silk Road motels, the smell of curry interfacing with the best apricot juice in the world, roadside butchers, shacks advertising themselves as “Silk Road Investment & Credit Society Ltd,” many a Pak China Gateway Hotel, checkpoints consisting of a roadside table and a bunch of papers kept from flying away by pebbles, stashes of yuan crisscrossing rupees and dollars and messy, multi-level “people to people exchanges.”

A Chinese container truck ploughs over the snow without chains on its tires. Photo: Asia Times

It’s one of the greatest road trips on earth. And in geopolitical terms, it may be the greatest.

Mind the yaks

Karakoram North starts at the environmentally protected Khunjerab National Park, where yaks roam freely on the road and ibex and marmots are easily spotted nearby. But there are no Marco Polo sheep, much less snow leopards. (Though local Ismailis insist a few dozen reside in the park.)

Yak and sheep roam the highway. Photo: Asia Times

The first serious pit-stop in the Karakoram is Sost, which used to be the Pakistani border in the old days – as when I traveled the road, twice, 20 years ago by jeep from Kashgar. Now, the bustling trade entrepot is the HQ of the Silk Road Dry Port Sost. Chinese lorries unload their cargo and Pakistani trucks take up the relay to transport the merchandise all across the nation. It appears modern and well-organized. Everything proceeds smoothly.

Entrance to the dry port at Sost. Photo: Asia Times

Snaking south, we pass right under the spectacularly receding Passu Glacier. In a nearby village, a funeral is in progress, with the crowd taking over the road alongside yaks and buffalos and interrupting traffic at will.

The receding Passu Glacier by the Karakoram. Photo: Asia Times

The upgraded Karakoram is an apotheosis of Pak-China Friendship Tunnels – all exhibiting the obligatory commemorative billboard extolling a geopolitical friendship soaring “higher than the highest mountain.”

One of the many Pak-China tunnels. Photo: Asia Times

This is CPEC in effect. It is astonishing when compared to the recent past. Between the Hunza and Gilgit rivers flowing parallel to impeccable asphalt worthy of an autobahn, a fiber optic cable runs all across the Northern Areas.

Chinese engineering has performed miracles. Around 160km south of the Khunjerab we drive around Attabad Lake, which totally submerged the road after a landslide in January 2010. For over five years there was simply no China-Pakistan overland trade, although some went via Kashgar-Gilgit flights. The solution by the China Road and Bridge Corporation had to be a tunnel – completed in 2015.

Attabad Lake, now negotiated via tunnel. Photo: Asia Times

Trade along the Karakoram is bound to pick up – after years at less than 10% of total China-Pak trade, which tends to flow especially from Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces, not Xinjiang. Some stretches of the highway remain prone to constant landslides, rockslides or floods, which require a number of 24/7 rescue and maintenance teams. These are Pakistani, while the SUVs of the police in the Northern Areas have been supplied by China.

The heart of the New Silk Roads, or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure projects are road and railway lines. These do not cost a fortune per se; the expense is in the construction costs for bridges and tunnels. Russia spent over $4 billion on its Kerch Strait bridge to the Crimea. New Silk Road costs will be exponentially higher. Tunnels can be way more expensive than bridges.

Where the Himalayas rise

From the Karakoram it’s sometimes possible to catch a glimpse of the formidable Nanga Parbat – Kashmiri for “Naked Mountain,” later nicknamed the “Killer Mountain.” It has never been climbed in winter, and is actually a series of ridges which anchors the western Himalaya range, culminating in an ice crest at 8,126 meters above sea level. That is the ninth highest peak in the world and the second in Pakistan after K2.

Heading into the mighty Nanga Parbat (on the right). Photo: Asia Times

As we approach Gilgit, the road signs – in English, Mandarin and Russian – say 468 km to Abbottabad (site of the Osama bin Laden endgame) and 583 km to Islamabad. Way down south, in less mountainous terrain, I’m told the odd rockslide gives way to occasional floods.

South of Gilgit, the Chinese once again are in frantic building mode, attacking the road starting from the Karakoram to the strategic Mecca Skardu. The road, according to local Ismailis, should be ready before 2020.

Where the Karakoram, Hindu Kush and Himalayas meet. Photo: Asia Times

And then, on a bend of the revamped highway, the intersection of the Karakoram, the Hindu Kush and the Himalayan mountain ranges – bordering the confluence of the Gilgit River with the Indus, now flowing south all the way to the Arabian Sea – spreads before us. Nearly 85% of the Indus discharge happens between May and September, out of snow and glacial melt, propelling the monsoons. Abdul, the painter of the Karakoram, is applying the finishing touches to a white-clad viewing point.

Abdul: Painter of the Karakoram Highway. Photo: Asia Times

The China-Pak embrace

The building of the original Karakoram – an engineering tour de force – took no less than 27 years and claimed the lives of over 1,000 Chinese and Pakistani workers.

The Karakoram Highway is much more than a road; it’s a rolling, graphic emblem of the China-Pakistan geopolitical embrace, surmounting all manner of economic, cultural, geological and security barriers over decades to the benefit of a strategic objective. And the strategic objective now is CPEC as the flagship BRI project.

At the recent opening ceremony of the China International Import Expo in Shanghai, where he was guest of honor, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan described CPEC, including the Karakoram highway, as a “vital link” for China and Pakistan with the Middle East and Central Asia. “CPEC is a mechanism to connect China, the Middle East and Central Asia that also opens ways for fresh investment and paves the way for new markets,” he said.

Khan also reassured his hosts – as well as domestic public opinion – that his new government is engaged in deep, meaningful reforms to ensure transparency and accountability; virtual ghosts as far as Pakistani business is usually concerned.

“Pakistan has an array of resources, minerals and renewables amidst the most diverse landscape,” Khan said, adding that his country is a leading exporter of sports goods, medical instruments and IT products, and has promising, 100 million-strong human resources under the age of 35. So, the potential is immense.

Islamabad is all in on completing CPEC up to 2030, with projections of up to 3% added to annual GDP growth, as industrial output is bound to rise with more electricity courtesy of CPEC investments and more production coming from Chinese-style Special Economic Zones.

CPEC’s Long-Term Plan (2017-2030), released one year ago, defines four priorities in Pakistan: Gwadar Port; energy projects; transport infrastructure (as in upgrading of the Karakoram); and industrial cooperation. Imran Khan’s government (see Part 1 of this report) is aiming for Pakistan to position itself, via CPEC, as the key hub uniting the overland Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road.

The big plan

This implies, geopolitically and economically, an even stronger, trans-regional, China-Pakistan alliance in contraposition to India and Washington. The US reaction to BRI in 2018 was to unleash a whispering campaign to try to discredit it. Beijing, for its part, expects India and Pakistan to at least discuss their political differences inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

From now on, China’s far west and south – Xinjiang and Yunnan – have to become the top drivers of the Chinese economy. Upgrading their road, rail and energy infrastructure and closely linking them to South Asia and Southeast Asia is essential for China to keep growing – all that boosted by crucial energy connectivity via a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, an oil pipeline from the Caspian in Kazakhstan, further massive gas shipments from Siberia, and, further down the road, a possible gas pipeline from Gwadar port to Xinjiang parallel to the Karakoram.

Will it work? The Karakoram, Hindu Kush and Himalayas have seen it all come and all go over multiple millennia. So why not? The upgrading of the greatest geological and geopolitical road trip on earth is a start.

Karakoram Highway checkpoint. Photo: Asia Times.

A New Year of Victory for Syria

Hussein Samawarchi

In just a few hours, the year will end. And, what an ending it is!

Syria, our beautiful Syria, spearheaded more than just a military victory against terrorists ranging from long-haired degenerates wielding machetes at women’s necks to Kippah-wearing F-16 pilots unleashing bombs at children.

The country that stood by the Islamic Republic when the whole world supported Saddam Hussien in his vicious military campaign realized, then, that international pressure, no matter how fierce, should not divert it from righteousness. The same country stood by the Lebanese Resistance and turned a deaf ear to offers promising endless riches and geopolitical gains because Lebanon was fighting not just for its own survival, but for the honor of Arabs. This same Syria made sure that its moral compass always pointed towards Palestine. Administration after administration of US Zionist puppets have tried every possible Machiavellian approach to get the Syrians to abandon the Palestinians’ rights. Sometimes by means of threats and sometimes by offering a dominant regional role; nevertheless, the Syrian compass’s true north never pointed anywhere but towards al-Quds.

The events unraveling towards the end of 2018 have proved, once again, how a country, with its people and leadership, that refuses to give in does not only win, but also causes its enemies to collide with each other. This wise policy of patience and treating those who erred unknowingly as a father would treat a beloved son who went astray has caused the Americans to lose all hope in realizing a victory and with the wiser Kurdish leaderships seeing this, the Neo-Ottoman ambitions are also hitting a dead-end. The French launched political bombs on the Americans and the Americans, themselves, are too busy having an internal political fallout to respond properly to the French.

The dramatic act of fake unity that was put up by a few Arab regimes among themselves against Syria has also begun to crumble away with each of the conspiring parties speeding to reconcile with a country they tried to break down not so long ago. There is a race for who makes the first state visit and who re-opens the first diplomatic mission and then who is the first to acquire an approval from the Syrian civil aviation authorities to operate a schedule to Damascus International Airport. They have even started Twitter fights on the ministerial level.

Syria has accomplished the victory which led to all this and more. The countries that so eagerly allowed the refuse part of their populations to grow their hair and run to Syria for the purpose of creating an Israeli sponsored Caliphate of the Medieval ages, have been all but begging of the victorious Syrians to finish those terrorists off where they stand and not allow them to be repatriated.

Only the truly blind, or otherwise mentally challenged, will not acknowledge the fact that Syria’s victory is a broader one of the alliance it represents in its territory and the region. Friendship and brotherhood are not mere romantic concepts. Syria stood by Iran and the Lebanese resistance when it was needed to and they, in turn, answered the call when Syria needed them. It won without the Arab League’s help; it actually won despite the Arab League’s animosity.

Let Syria’s victory be a lesson to some, and a reminder to all, that even when 80 countries gang up against one, if they are doing so with malicious intentions then they will fail miserably. The heroic Syrian army had troops to spare for the national campaign effort of the reforestation of the country. This is how fast they are bringing their country back to normalization; they are doing it as their aggressors fight over the bigger portion of Yemen’s strategic sites. Little do they know that they will not get a single inch of Yemen.

Happy New Year dear Syria. Tomorrow we celebrate it in Manbij and next year in Majdal Shams.

Source: Al-Ahed News

River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian   

The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Blog!

Happy New Year from Gilad Atzmon

December 30, 2018  /  Gilad Atzmon

Everything you need to know about Zionism, Controlled Opposition, The Post Political and Athens vs. Jerusalem so you are ready for 2019.

https://youtu.be/SRX55nHmuUQ

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River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian   

The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Blog!