Uprooted Palestinian: SALAM ALQUDS ALAYKUM – سلام القدس عليكم

Sunday, 1 March 2020

IRANIAN FORCES IN SYRIA WARN TURKISH MILITARY OVER RECENT DRONE STRIKES ON GREATER IDLIB

July 29, 2017 photo, a Hezbollah fighter stands at a watchtower at the site where clashes erupted between Hezbollah and al-Qaida-linked fighters in Wadi al-Kheil or al-Kheil Valley in the Lebanon-Syria border. (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)

The Iranian Consultative Center in Syria, an operations room commanding Iranian forces in the country, revealed on February 29 that several of its fighters were killed in the recent Turkish drone and artillery strikes on Greater Idlib.

In an official statement, the center said the Turkish military attacked Iranian-backed troops near the Aleppo-Damascus highway, known as the M5. The Turkish strikes were meant to support an attack by al-Qaeda-affiliated militants on the highway.

According to the center, the Turkish side was asked through mediators to halt its strikes. However, it went on, killing several Iranian-backed fighters.

In what appears to be a warning, the center said its forces could attack Turkish troops in Greater Idlib, but the order from the political leadership is to not fire at them.

“The Iranian consultative center, and the Mujahedeen of the resistance front, call on the Turkish forces to act rationally in the interests of the Syrian and Turkish peoples, reminding the Turkish people that their sons have been present for a month in the range of our forces and we could take revenge, but we did not do so in response to the orders of our leadership, and we call on them [Turkish people] to pressure the Turkish leadership to reform its decisions,” the statement, that was shared by the U-News agency, reads.

Earlier, Lebanese sources revealed that nine fighters of Hezbollah were killed in recent Turkish drone strikes on Greater Idlib. An Iranian field commander was also killed in the strikes.

Turkey’s aggressive moves in Greater Idlib are apparently provoking Syria’s allies. Any more escalation by Ankara could lead to a serious military confrontation in the region.

More on this topic:

River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian

The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Blog!

الأسد وأردوغان … والفخ الاستراتيجيّ

ناصر قنديل

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لطالما فرح الرئيس التركي رجب أردوغان وتبادل أنخاب النصر مع أركان حكمه، لدى تلقي الأنباء عن تقدّم الجماعات المسلحة في الجغرافيا السورية، سواءٌ أكانت جماعات الأخوان المسلمين أم تنظيم القاعدة أم تنظيم داعش، فما ليس صناعة تركية منها يسلّم بالمرجعية التركية، ومن لا يسلّم بهذه المرجعية له مصالح عضوية مع تركيا، ومن ليست له مصالح عضوية مع تركيا له مصالح حيويّة أو ظرفيّة تتيح لتركيا التصرف كضابط إيقاع لحرب السيطرة على سورية. فهي ليست ضابط الإيقاع الداخلي فقط، بل ضابط الإيقاع الخارجي أيضاً، حيث الدول المنخرطة في هذه الحرب من أميركا إلى دول الناتو وصولاً لـ»إسرائيل» ودول الخليج، والدول العربية التي تسلّم الأخوان الحكم فيها كمصر وتونس، ترتضي لتركيا هذا الدور، عن قناعة أو مصلحة أو تسليم بالتوازنات الدولية المحيطة بتفويض تركيا إدارة الحرب. وأردوغان الذي عاش أحلام السلطنة ورفع شعار العثمانية الجديدة، نظر منذ اليوم الأول لحرب السيطرة على سورية بصفتها حرب السلطنة والعثمانيّة الجديدة معاً، أي حربه كشخص ومعبر لمشروعه الذي باعه للأتراك واعداً إياهم باستعادة أمجاد وعظمة الماضي الاستعماري الإمبراطوري، محولا حزب الأخوان في العالم إلى مجلس قيادة لهذا المشروع، الذي نظرت إليه واشنطن بديمقراطييها وجمهورييها، كمشروع يوازي في بعده الاستراتيجي في آسيا ما مثله مشروع الاتحاد الأوروبي في أوروبا شرقها وغربها في التسعينيات، وبعدما تعثر المشروع الأصلي لفرض الهيمنة عبر حربي العراق وأفغانستان، لتكتمل بثنائية الاتحاد الأوروبي والعثمانيّة الجديدة ميمنة وميسرة زعامة القرن الحادي والعشرين في فرض الهيمنة الأميركية على العالم.

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خلال سنوات الحرب الأولى كان الكثير من محبي سورية يتساءلون عن سبب التروي الذي يطبع سياسات الرئيس السوري بشار الأسد في اللجوء إلى القوة العسكرية، ومنحه الكثير من الفرص للحلول السياسية والإصلاحات الدستورية، رغم كلامه الواضح عن حرب ومؤامرة ومحوريّة دور الجماعات الإرهابية فيما سمّي بـ “الثورة السورية”، كما كان الكثيرون يتساءلون حول ما إذا كان الانفتاح السوري على تركيا قبل الحرب كان فخاً استراتيجياً نصبه الرئيس التركي للرئيس السوري، تمهيداً للحرب المضمرة، لضرب المناعات السورية بوجه تركيا وتوفير الفرص للتغلغل في البيئات السورية المختلفة، وكان الجواب على السؤالين هو، فلننتظر النهايات وعندها يظهر الكمين الاستراتيجي ومَن وقع فيه، ويضحك كثيراً من يضحك أخيراً.

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الصمود والصبر شكّلا سمة تعامل الرئيس السوريّ وقيادته وجيشه مع الهجمات الشرسة والقاسية التي تعرّضت لها سورية خلال سنوات 2011 – 2015، والهدف أخذ يتوضح بالتدريج، وهو خلق القناعة لدى أغلبيّة كافية من الشعب السوري بأن ما يراه أمامه ليس ثورة ولا حركة إصلاحية بل مشروع إرهابي موجّه من الخارج لإسقاط سورية الوطن والدولة وليس تغيير شكل السلطة فيها، وصولاً لتفتيت سورية وتغيير موقعها وتدمير مكانتها وعمرانها وتاريخها ووحدتها، وبالتوازي خلق القناعة واليقين لدى حلفاء مستهدَفون مثل سورية عبر الحرب عليها، وفي طليعتهم قوى المقاومة وعلى رأسها حزب الله ومن خلفه إيران، بأن الحرب على سورية هي حرب “إسرائيل” تُخاض بالوكالة عبر تركيا، وهي حرب تغيير موقع سورية كعمق استراتيجيّ لحركات المقاومة، لتشكيل بيئة أخوانيّة تحيط بفلسطين تحكم مصر وسورية والأردن وتتحكم بفلسطين، تلتزم ما ظهر أنه سياسة الأخوان تجاه الاحتلال مع حكمهم لمصر، لكن الرئيس السوري وهو يخوض غمار هاتين المعركتين السياسيتين، ويمنحهما كل الاهتمام ويرصد تطوّر مواقف شرائح الشعب السوري والحلفاء في قوى المقاومة وإيران، ودرجة تطوّرها بقياس هذا التقدير لماهية الحرب ووظائفها، ويقدم في سبيل الفوز بهاتين المعركتين على المبادرة تلو الأخرى لتظهير جوهر أهداف الحرب، وعدم وجود فرص لتلافيها بتقديم الإصلاحات والمبادرات السياسية، كان أمامه سؤال استراتيجي حول نضوج روسيا لموقف يقرأ الحرب كاستهداف لأمنها، وقطعاً للطريق على دورها المتطلع للنمو، ومنعاً لها من الوصول إلى البحر المتوسط، وعزلها وراء المضائق التركيّة، ومحاصرتها بدول تحكمها العثمانية الجديدة، إذا قيّض لها الفوز بسورية؟

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في مرات كثيرة كان بعض مَن في القيادة في سورية يستغرب قبول الرئيس الأسد للاستجابة لمبادرات تطلبها موسكو، ويرون فيها تنازلات غير مبررة، سواء في السياسة تحت شعار الحلول السياسية، أو في الميدان تحت شعار وقف نار أو عفو عن مسلحين، أو هدنة يدركون أن الجماعات المسلحة ستستثمرها لترتيب أمورها والعودة للقتال من مواقع أفضل، وكانوا يكتشفون لاحقاً أن الهدف كان السير على إيقاع البطء الروسي في صياغة الاستنتاجات، وفهم سياق الأحداث، لأنه إذا كانت الحرب التي شنت للسيطرة على سورية تكاد تكون حرباً تركية، فإن النصر في هذه الحرب سيتقرّر بالجواب على السؤال “أين تقف روسيا منها؟”. وبمثل ما كان الرئيس الأسد يدرك أن شل التفكير الأميركي بالتورط بالحرب سيتكفل به حضور وجهوزية سورية وقوى المقاومة وإيران لجعل كل مواجهة مع أميركا تهديداً لأمن “إسرائيل” ووجودها، كان واضحاً لديه أن نهاية الأطماع التركية تتوقف على مدى وضوح حتمية تحوّلها إلى مشروع مواجهة مع روسيا. وعلى هذه الثنائية بُنيت الاستراتيجية التي خاض الأسد صموده وصبره بانتظار تبلورها، وبني السعي لتحقيق النصر على ضبط الإيقاع السياسي والعسكري بما يساعد في إنضاج شروطها.

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خلال معارك حلب، ومن بعدها الجنوب السوري، وبينهما الغوطة ودير الزور، كانت تتحقق معادلات الأسد وتتبلور بوضوح، لكن الأكيد كان أن معركة إدلب ستبقى مختلفة، وستكون هي الفاصلة، ولذلك بُنيت خطط تحرير إدلب وحساباتها، وتوقيتها والموقف من المبادرات السياسية بخصوصها على السعي السوري للتطابق مع الحسابات الروسية والتوقيت الروسي والقراءة الروسية والمهل الروسية، حتى جاءت ساعة الصفر وصار على أردوغان أن يقرر ويختار بين مواجهة مباشرة مع روسيا، بينما الجيش السوري جاهز معنوياً وعسكرياً لخوض غمار مواجهة ترفعه لمقام الجيوش الأولى في العالم، أو بين أن يرتضي الهزيمة لمشروعه وهو يدرك أنها نهايته السياسية. ومهما كان خيار أردوغان فهو اليوم يتلمّس أن لا ناتو ولا سواه جاهز للقتال لأن الحرب لم تعد حرب أحد سواه، وأن الشعب والجيش في تركيا لا يرون سبباً للتورط في مواجهة مكلفة بلا قضية، وأن الجيش والشعب في سورية يتوقان لهذه الحرب مع إدراك ما فيها من تضحيات، وأن روسيا سئمت المراوغة والأكاذيب والتذاكي واللعب على الحبال والتلاعب بالكلام والتفاهمات، وأن ساعة الحقيقة قد حانت.

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كمين استراتيجيّ، مَن نصبه لمَن؟

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River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian

The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Blog!

CAN CHINA CONFRONT AND DEFEAT THE U.S. NAVY?

South Front

This video is based on the analysis “Can China Confront and Defeat the U.S. Navy?” released by SouthFront on January 4, 2020

China is on pace to achieve regional naval supremacy by the year 2025. This has been a long-term goal of the Chinese national and military leadership, the foundations of which were laid out in the early 1990s.

Chinese naval supremacy, and the absolute necessity of it on at least a regional basis, is tied not only to the development and security of the maritime segment of One Belt-One Road, but also access to China’s growing presence on the African continent. The modernization and expansion of the Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been conducted in parallel with the fortification of islands in the South China Sea and the establishment of military bases in and around the strategic Horn of Africa and the Strait of Hormuz. After centuries of isolationism, internal strife, a devastating cultural revolution and later an economic boom, China is now on the cusp of global expansion. This will not just be a limited or one-dimensional expansion, but one of economic, military and even cultural dimensions.

In contrast to the U.S. leadership of recent decades, the national and military leadership of the Chinese Communist Party has been diligent and focused on implementing long term programs. While both the military industrial complex of the U.S. and the authoritarian communist systems of government of these respective nations both breed rampant corruption, social and economic inequality, and a multitude of dysfunctionalities, the Chinese system is inherently more singular in focus, as all authoritarian regimes are. While one could reflect on U.S. foreign policy over the past forty years and determine that it has been quite haphazard, disjointed and even schizophrenic in nature, the opposite must be said of China. This fact becomes readily apparent when contrasting the development and expansion of the PLAN and that of the U.S. Navy.

A U.S. Navy in Disarray

It can rightly be asserted that the U.S. Navy is a force struggling to define its core mission and strategic focus as the year 2020 begins. Since the dissolving of the Soviet Union, the U.S. military industrial complex has encouraged a wasteful bureaucracy, an inept and overly confident civilian and military leadership, to invest vast sums of money in a growing wish list of high-tech weapons aimed at achieving full spectrum dominance over every possible adversary. Little thought was apparently given to the opportunity cost of investing in such programs, and how they would be employed in a broader national defense strategy. The U.S. Navy stands out as the worst example of these failures and is poised at a crossroads today.

After the Soviet Union disappeared as its chief adversary on the high seas, the U.S. Navy maintained its age old obsession with the aircraft carrier, and utilized its many aircraft carrier strike groups (ASG) to great effect in attacking any disobedient nation that lacked a robust navy or air defense system. While the modern ASG proved effective at power projection against weaker adversaries, its viability in a modern maritime environment heavily contested by a peer adversary has yet to be established. The U.S. Navy has decided to ignore this obvious fact and has continued to embrace the ASG as the cornerstone of naval strategic planning well into the future.

The U.S. Navy has maintained ten ASGs and launched the latest generation of aircraft carriers in the form of the Gerald R. Ford CVN-78 in 2013. Although commissioned in 2017, the carrier has yet to reach operational readiness and has been plagued by many technical problems with its most essential combat systems. The CVN-78 is the most expensive warship ever constructed, with current unit cost approaching $14 billion USD.

While the U.S. has invested vast sums of money, energy and focus in developing a massive new class of aircraft carrier, it has done very little to improve the one asset most crucial to the carrier, the carrier airwing that it carries into battle. Instead of committing to develop aircraft tailored to specific functions, the Navy chose to embrace the one-size-fits-all concept of the F-18 Super Hornet. In addition, the service also committed to this concept to a much larger degree, in throwing its support behind the F- 35 Joint Strike Fighter. Neither the F-18 nor the F-35 rectify rectifies the combat range deficiency now inherent in the aircraft carrier airwing. In short, an ASG will become a target of both land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) and even land-based Chinese aircraft equipped with anti-ship guided missiles, long before the ASG can achieve striking distance with its carrier borne aircraft. This problem becomes even more glaring when one considers the scenario of a Chinese battle group forward deployed and operating within range of its own land-based Anti-Air Warfare assets.

What has the U.S. Navy done to modernize and improve its surface warfare vessels over the past two decades? Not surprisingly, the service embraced new ship designs that were long on high-tech promise, yet did not fit into a specific, traditional and vital function within the broader strategic framework of the service. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program and Zumwalt DDG-1000 programs were ill-conceived at the outset and resulted in two classes of vessels that consumed vast amounts of funding, time and energy that could have been used to improve upon traditional, proven warship designs. At an approximate unit cost of $350 million USD per LCS and $8 billion per DDG-1000, both vessels have proven long on cost and short on capability.

The Arleigh Burke class DDG is arguably the backbone of the U.S. Navy and is a highly effective and proven warship. The latest upgrade to the design, the Flight III, will not begin production until sometime between 2023 and 2029. A multi-purpose frigate vessel program known as the FFG(X), meant to pick up where the LCS failed, has yet to reach an advanced design phase. There are currently five contenders for the new FFG(X) proposal.

At the same time, there is no replacement at all planned for the aging Ticonderoga CG-47 class cruiser. The Ticonderoga class CGs perform a vital AAW and surface warfare function in the established U.S. Navy carrier strike group structure. The only other navy in the world fielding a similar warship is China’s, with the introduction of the first Type 055 class in 2018.

A Chinese Navy in Ascent

While the United States Navy struggles to identify its purpose and maintain its preeminence in the 21^st century, the PLAN has embarked on a robust program of modernization and expansion based on sound strategic principles and proven technology.

China has produced a long list of modern, capable classes of warships in recent years. Not only has the PLAN designed, constructed and put a new generation of warships into operational service in the past two decades, it has engaged in an ambitious ship building program that has seen these vessels fielded at an unprecedented rate. Standardized designs for corvette, guided missile frigate (FFG), guided missile destroyer (DDG), large guided missile destroyer/cruiser (CG), landing platform dock (LPD), landing helicopter dock (LHD), and logistical support vessels of multiple classes have all been adopted and fielded in significant numbers in the past 20 years. Running in parallel to this, the PLAN has also developed a fledgling aircraft carrier program, including the 100% indigenous Type 001A Shandong. Such a feat is unparalleled in modern naval history.

The question must immediately be asked; why would a nation engage in such an ambitious program to transform and expand its naval warfighting capabilities in such totality? The answer is obvious. It intends to use this capability. But in what fashion and to what end?

In order for the Chinese nation to complete and secure the ambitious Old Belt-One Road economic trade corridor and to ensure the economic prosperity of the country into the next century, a sizeable navy of unparalleled capability will be required. Such a naval force is currently in an advanced state of completion, yet a further 5 years are likely required before the PLAN will be in a position to fight and win against a determined U.S. naval effort to confront it through force of arms.

If current production levels are maintained, the PLAN will field an impressive force of major surface warfare, amphibious warfare and aircraft carriers by 2025. By this time, major surface warfare combatants will include 50 x Type 056 Corvettes, 30 x Type 054A Frigates, 18 x Type 052D Destroyers, and 8 or more Type 055 Destroyers. The amphibious warfare fleet will be comprised of approximately 38 x LSTs, 8 x Type 071 LPDs, and at least 2 x Type 075 LHDs. The Type 001 Liaoning and Type 001A Shandong will both be operational, while the first of the much more capable Type 002 CATOBAR carriers will likely have reached operational status as well. These warships will be supported by no less than eleven logistics support and underway replenishment vessels and four garrison support vessels of modern design.

A major strategic advantage that China has achieved over the United States is that it has built the most robust and productive shipbuilding industry in the world. China has been ranked as the world’s top shipbuilder for 5 years now. The United States by contrast, ranks tenth. The gross tonnage of vessels of all types produced in Chinese shipyards; however, is 77 times greater than the total produced by U.S. shipyards.

The Greater Strategic Picture

It is important to view the development of both navies within the larger context of the respective geopolitical strategic positions of both countries. China undoubtably enjoys a stronger position today than it did a decade ago, while the opposite must be said for the United States. Not only has China gained greater political and economic influence on a global scale, but it has moved to secure military supremacy in all areas along its national borders, and increasingly within its expanding maritime territory. By contrast, the United States has lost both political and economic influence in many regions of the world, largely through its own failed policies

China has managed to develop greater economic ties with nations that have decided to participate in the One Belt-One Road project, which has also afforded them a greater political influence over these nations. China has negotiated the establishment of military bases, mostly logistical support facilities for its growing navy, which will also allow for the deployment of rapid reaction forces to deter and interdict threats to the One Belt-One Road trade corridor. China continues to solidify its presence on the Africa continent. The military base established in Djibouti, and fleet support agreements established in Gwadar, Pakistan and the African nation of Tanzania provide the resources needed to be able to exert military force if required to back up Chinese economic and political efforts on the continent.

Although the U.S. maintains numerous military bases and facilities in Africa to secure its own strategic interests in the region, it lacks the same political and economic influence that China has established. The U.S. military has been aiding a number of nations in Africa to battle Islamic extremist insurgents, but has made little investment in those nations in a broader sense, and thus exerts far less influence.

Although outside of the maritime sphere of influence of China, the nations of Europe have increasingly responded favorably to the promised benefits of the One Belt-One Road trade project. On a political and military level, China has largely remained out of European affairs. The same cannot be said for the United States.

While the Obama administration began the disastrous, multifaceted war against the Russian Federation, the Trump administration has only expanded it, while antagonizing its most traditional European allies in the process. The Trump administration appears to have doubled down on the failed Ukraine policies of its predecessor, increased U.S. military presence on the European continent, and has leveled trade tariffs on key allies. By propping up the phony Russian threat narrative with increased military deployments, the United States is squandering vast sums of money and diverting large contingents of front-line fighting forces to confront an enemy it knows to be a threat conceived through its own propaganda alone.

China has responded to the U.S. led effort to internationally isolate Russia, by leveraging its position to provide an alternate market for Russian goods. It has supplied political support for Russia on the world stage and has increased military cooperation with Russia in key regions where both nations share an interest and are forced to confront the United States. Both nations have increased bilateral cooperation in developing the northern arctic shipping route and have conducted joint naval exercises in the maritime regions of Europe, Asia and the Indian Ocean. Iran most recently joined the two in joint exercises in the Indian Ocean.

Can the PLAN Win?

A scenario where the PLAN and U.S. Navy engage in open conflict is improbable at present, yet not impossible. Although China has strengthened its position to such a degree in the South China Sea that no other nation, including the United States can change the strategic realities that exist there today, increasing interaction between PLAN and U.S. warships may lead to a tragic encounter. U.S. freedom of navigation patrols are largely symbolic in nature and do not present any real threat to Chinese interests in the region, yet they do require a response Such a situation could lead to a confrontation where an accident occurs, or an overzealous vessel commander makes a decision that leads to a military engagement which could escalate in a very short window of time.

It is most probable that China will do everything possible to avoid such a situation at present. This may not be the case after 2025, when the PLAN enjoys a much stronger position relative to the U.S. Navy and its allies in the Asia Pacific. China will occupy the central position, enjoy regional guided ballistic missile supremacy and be able to take advantage of land-based air assets in support of its navy. Surveillance and early warning facilities established on various artificial island and atolls will by then be fully operational.

If fire was exchanged between a U.S. warship and PLAN warship in the South China Sea, and the incident was not immediately deescalated, the U.S. vessel would inevitably be destroyed. The PLAN would suffer significant casualties in the exchange without doubt. China would immediately move to deny all access to the region through its already robust Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities. The United States would then have to decide what level of sacrifice would be acceptable to the state and the American public in rapidly deciding upon its level of military response. The authoritarian Chinese state would find this decision much easier to make.

The U.S. seventh fleet would be hard pressed to mount any immediate military response, beyond mounting a retaliatory attack via attack submarines forward deployed in the region. Any large effort mounted to attack Chinese island garrisons in either the Spratly or Paracel islands would be met with overwhelming force by a combination of anti-ship guided ballistic missiles, submarine, surface and air attack. It is hard to see any such scenario taking place, without the confrontation elevating to a full-spectrum war of global proportions. Most regional allies of the United States would calculate that such an outcome would render overwhelmingly negative results and would not outweigh the tragic loss of one or two U.S. warships and their crews.

Assuming that a hot war could be avoided, a new cold war would inevitable result between an ascendant China and a U.S. in decline. If current military, economic and political trends continue from the present through 2025, China will only strengthen its strategic position both regionally and globally, while the opposite will likely be the case for the United States. It is important to note that the leadership of both nations see such a conflict as undesirable and not inevitable, yet miscalculations, mistakes and poor judgement can scuttle any grand plans. History is unequivocal in this regard and must be analyzed and understood to avoid repeating disaster. We ignore the lessons of history at our peril, yet a current period bereft of insightful, measured and reasonable leadership in Washington, does not bode well for avoiding what may prove to be an unavoidable conflict between two global superpowers.

River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian

The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Blog!

Russian analysts: Erdogan's arrogance could lead to large-scale war that would harm Turkey's interests

Saturday, 29 February 2020 20:46

Moscow,(ST)- Boris Dolgov, senior researcher at the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences has stressed the need to put an end to the crimes and arrogance of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Syria’s north.

He stressed in an interview with a SANA correspondent in Moscow today that the Turkish regime’s actions in Idlib are unprecedented and they violate all international agreements concluded previously between Russia and Turkey as well as all international conventions. He stressed that escalation in that region threatens of the outbreak of a large-scale war that harms the interests of Turkey and the Turkish people in the first place.

In turn, member of the Russian Writers Union, Khaled Elias pointed out in a similar interview that Erdogan and his supporters are the ones who embraced and sponsored terrorists from all over the world and who stood behind this brutal attack on Syria.

He added that Turkish regime’s mercenaries in Aleppo behave as thieves because they have dismantled and stole Aleppo’s factories and industrial workshops and smuggled them to Turkey with the knowledge of Erdogan himself.

Elias indicated that the terrorists and their Turkish sponsors are currently using shoulder-fired US anti-aircraft missiles systems in Syria, stressing that the Syrian Arab army’s response to the Turkish attacks is a fair response, because it was the Turks who crossed the border, entered Syrian territory and supported the terrorists there.

For his part, Alexander Kuznetsov, Deputy Director of the Russian Institute for Political and Military Analysis, stressed that the Turkish actions are rejected from the viewpoint of international law because Turkey launches hostile actions against a neighboring country and interferes in its affairs.

The Russian expert called for obligating Turkey to implement what was agreed upon with Russia, pointing out that the Turkish soldiers who were killed in Idlib were participating in the terrorists’ combat operations on the Syrian lands, and this behavior violates Syria’s sovereignty.

Amal Farhat

River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian

The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Blog!

Are Russia and Turkey on a collision course?

THE SAKER • FEBRUARY 28, 2020

[this analysis was written for the Unz Review]

The murder of the Iranian hero-martyr General Soleimani created a situation in which a war between Iran and the Axis of Kindness (USA/Israel/KSA) became a real possibility but, at the very last minute, Uncle Shmuel decided that he had no stomach for a full-scale war against Iran. Wise decision.

This, however, does not at all imply that the AngloZionist Empire decided to stand by idly, far from it. The need to take quick and determined action became particularly acute following the huge anti-US demonstrations in Iraq (well over one million people in the streets!) which directly put at risk the US occupation (the MSM would call it “presence”) in both Iraq and Syria.

At the same time, Turkish President Erdogan’s refusal to remove all the “bad terrorists” from the Idlib province eventually resulted in a joint Syrian-Russian offensive to liberate the province. That offensive, in turn, clearly infuriated the Turks who warned of a major military operation to prevent the Syrians from liberating their own country.

This begs the question: are Russia and Turkey really on a collision course?

There are certainly some very worrying warning signs including a number of very harsh statements by Erdogan himself, and a suddenly re-kindled Turkish interest for the US “Patriots”.

On the ground in Idlib, the Turks have clearly provided the “bad terrorists” with a lot of support including equipment, MANPADs, tanks and armored personnel carriers. The Turks actually went as far as sending special forces to assist the “bad terrorists” directly. Finally, from footage taken by Russian and Syrian drones, and even the “bad terrorists” themselves, it appears undeniable that Turkish MLRS and regular artillery provided the “bad terrorists” with fire support.

Both sides also agree that a number of Turkish personnel were killed (they only disagree on how many and what these Turks were doing in Syria).

Finally, and most ominously, there is even a video circulating on the Internet which appears to show a US “Stinger” being fired by the “bad terrorists” at a Russian aircraft which, thank God, managed to evade it (unlike 2 Syrian Army helicopters which were shot down).

So the first conclusion that we can come to is that the Turks are already engaged in combat operations against the Syrians. For the time being, these combat operations are just below the threshold of “credible deniability”, but not by much. For example, if the Turks had shot down a Russian aircraft you can be pretty certain that the Russian public opinion (which has still not forgiven Erdogan for the downed Su-24) would have demanded that the Russian Aerospace Forces massively retaliate (just as they have every time Russian military personnel have been killed) kill scores of Turks.

The Russian position is very straightforward. It goes something like this:

The Turks committed to remove all the “bad terrorists” from the Idlib province, leaving only the “good terrorists” who are committed to a ceasefire and a political peace process in place. That did not happen. In this case, the Syrians clearly have to do themselves what the Turks refused (or could not) do. The Russian military presence in Syria, and the Russian military operations, are all absolutely legitimate and legal: the legitimate government of Syria invited the Russians in, and the UNSC agreed to back the Syrian peace process. Thus the Russian Aerospace Forces’ strikes against the “bad terrorists” are absolutely legal. Furthermore, Russia very much deplores the presence of regular Turkish units among the “bad terrorists” which is both illegal and very unhelpful. Finally, the Russian Aerospace forces have no way to determine who sits in which tank, or who provides artillery cover for the operations of the “bad terrorists”. Thus, if Turkish military personnel are killed in Syrian or Russian operations, this would be entirely the fault of Ankara.

So far the Turkish military operation has been rather unsuccessful and limited.

But Erdogan is now promising a major attack.

Will that happen and what can the Turks really do?

First and foremost, Turkey does not have the means to enter into a full-scale conflict with Russia. Turkey cannot do that for political, economic and military reasons:

Political: the simple truth is that Turkey (and Erdogan) desperately need Russian political support, not only towards the West, but also towards Iraq, Iran or Israel. Furthermore, Erdogan has now clearly deeply alienated the Europeans who are fed up with Erdogan’s constant threats to open the “refugees” spigot. As for the Turks, they have already known for years that the EU will never accept them and that NATO will not support Turkey in its (very dangerous) operations in Iraq and Syria.

Economic: Turkey’s economy really suffered from the sanctions introduced by Russia following the shooting down of the Russian Su-24 by Turkish aircraft (backed by USAF fighters). What was true then is even more true now, and the Turkish public opinion understands that.

Military: the past years have been absolutely disastrous for the Turkish armed forces which were purged following the coup attempt against Erdogan. This sorry state of affairs is indirectly confirmed by the very poor performance of Turkish forces in Syria.

What about a conflict limited to Syria?

Again, Turkey is in a bad position. For one thing, the Syrians and, even more so, the Russians control the airspace above Idlib. The Turks are so frustrated with this state of affairs that they have now reportedly asked the US to deploy Patriot missiles in southern Turkey. This is a rather bizarre request, especially considering that Turkey purchased S-400s from Russia or how pathetically the Patriots actually performed (recently in the KSA and elsewhere before that). This, by the way, might well be a case of fake news since, apparently, there are no Patriots available for Turkey even if the US agreed to sell.

Then there is the bellicose rhetoric we hear from Erdogan. For example, he recently declared that:

“The regime, backed by Russian forces and Iran-backed militants, are continuously attacking civilians, committing massacres and shedding blood, (…) I hereby declare that we will strike regime forces everywhere from now on regardless of the [2018] deal if any tiny bit of harm is dealt to our soldiers at observation posts or elsewhere.”

That kind of language is, of course, very dangerous but, at least so far, the Turkish operation has been both limited and unsuccessful. Syrian President Assad was not impressed and declared that:

It also means that we must not rest idle, but prepare for the battles to come. As a result, the battle to liberate the Aleppo and Idlib countryside continues regardless of some empty sound bubbles coming from the north (vain threats from Erdogan), just as the battle continues to liberate all of Syrian soil, crush terrorism and achieve stability.

In the meantime, in Iraq, the US has apparently dug-in and categorically refuses to leave. In practical terms this means that the Iraqis will have to step up their anti-US campaign both politically (more protests and demonstrations) and militarily (more IEDs, convoy attacks and, probably soon, drone, cruise missile and ballistic missile attacks on US targets in Iraq). I don’t believe that the US will be able to sustain that kind of pressure in the mid to long term, especially not in an election year (which promises to be hellish anyway). Right now, the Idiot-in-Chief seems to think that threatening Iraq with “very big sanctions” is the way to restore good relationships. In reality, all this will do is to further inflame anti-US feelings in Iraq and the rest of the region.

Then there is the tactical situation. Please check these two maps: (click on map for a higher resolution)

The part in red shows the government controlled areas. The light blue (or light green on the 2nd map) show the Turkish deployment. The part in olive green (or darker green on the 2nd map) shows the parts of the Idlib province which are still under Takfiri occupation. Finally, the small region around Tell Rifaat are controlled by the Kurds.

The Syrian forces, backed by Russia, have now pushed back the latest Turkish+Takfiri attack north and west of Aleppo and they are now attacking the southern tip of the Takfiri occupation zone around the Zawiya mountain and highlands, see here:

The Syrians have options here. They can either gradually push north, or they can try to envelop the Takfiri forces in a “cauldron”. Finally, the Syrians would score a major victory if they succeeded in regaining control of the highway between Aleppo and Latakia (in blue on the map).

As for the Turkish-backed Takfiris, they are pushing very hard towards Idlib, so far with only moderate and temporary successes (they typically take a location at hugecost in lives and equipment and then cannot hold on to it as soon as the Syrians and Russians bomb the crap out of their newly conquered positions).

All of this is taking place while Syrian, Russian, Turkish and US patrols are regularly meeting, often in rather tense situations which could quickly escalate into a firefight or, even worse, an open battle. There is also the risk of an incident in the air since these four nations also conduct air operations over Syria. And, just like in the case of the ground operations, Syrian and Russian air operations are legal under international law, Turkish, US or Israeli operations are not and constitute an act of “aggression” (n.b: the highest crime under international law).

So far, the various negotiations between the parties have not yielded any result. This might change on March 5th when a conference on Syria attended by Turkey, Russia, France and Germany will meet (probably in Istanbul) to try to find a negotiated solution. Considering that Turkish soldiers are killed every day and already that 2 Syrian helicopters have been shot down, this might be too late to avoid an escalation.

I will conclude here by posting a (minimally corrected) machine translation of a Russian translation of a text originally written by a Turkish political commentator and translated into Russian by a Telegram channel: (emphasis added)

Russia’s strategy from the very beginning was to return full control of Syrian territories to Assad. And Moscow was implementing its plans, getting closer to the goal step by step. As long as Damascus will not take Idlib, the operation will continue. You don’t need to be an expert in this field to understand this. This is obvious. Someone says that Erdogan’s trip to Ukraine played a role in the offensive operations of Damascus. In fact, this visit is the result of the Syrian army’s offensive. The Turkish President went to Kiev just after tensions rose between the Turkish armed forces and the Russian side. Erdogan is in Ukraine made statements that have caused irritation in Moscow.

Turkish diplomacy was at an impasse. We discussed for a long time that you can’t put all your eggs in one Russian basket. And they said: we will buy the S-400, build a nuclear power plant, and develop tourism. And Putin was made a hero in our country. And now the defense Secretary is talking about buying American patriot air defense systems. And the President is talking about acquiring Patriot. “We did not succeed with Russia, we will get closer to the United States” – this is not how foreign policy is done. We need consistency in foreign policy. It is not appropriate for a country with a strong military power to change sides between world powers once a week.

What we are still discussing these days: we need to get closer to Europe and the US against Russia. These discussions worry our entrepreneurs who work with Russia. The tourism sector is concerned. Without Russian tourists, our tourism sector cannot fill all the volumes and make a profit. We have not yet been able to resolve these issues, and we are discussing a clash with Russia. Let’s remember what happened after Turkey shot down a Russian plane. Our tourism sector could not recover for two years. What to expect from a military clash. We have to talk about it.

The goal of our state: to live in peace on our land, and keep all the troubles away from yourself, while doing this to attract new troubles – this is not an indicator of a good military strategy or a well-thought-out diplomatic strategy. Everyone should understand this.

The risk for Erdogan is obvious: in case of a serious confrontation with Russia (and Syria AND Iran, don’t forget them!), the consequences for Turkey might be severe, resulting in a sharp rise in anti-Erdogan feelings in Turkey, something he can hardly afford.

And that brings us to the current US/NATO/CENTCOM posture following the assassination of General Soleimani I mentioned in the beginning of this article. The risks of a quick and dangerous escalation involving the US and Iran are still extremely high. The same can be said for the risks of a resumption of anti-US attacks by Iraqi Shia forces. Then there are the conflicts in both Afghanistan and Yemen, which Uncle Shmuel probably would prefer to end, but has no idea how. In these countries a rapid escalation could occur at any time, especially following Iran’s officially declared goal to kick the US out of the Middle-East. And now, there is a risk of major escalation between Turkey, Syria and Russia: such an escalation would have a major potential to suck in the US forces in the region, even if nobody does so deliberately (or if the Iranians do that very deliberately).

Right now Uncle Shmuel is busy with a strategic PSYOP trying to get Russia and Iran into a conflict (see this propaganda piece for example). That will not work, as both the Russians and the Iranians are waaaaaaay too savvy to fall for such primitive things. The US also tried to instigate riots inside Iran, but they quickly petered out (as did the rumors about the US deliberately shooting down the Ukrainian airliner).

The Middle-East is impossible to predict, it is too complex and there are too many possible factors which influence the situation. Still, my guess is that the March 5th conference, assuming it takes place, will force Erdogan to back down and re-pledge his commitment to bringing back security to the Idlib province. That is, as far as I can see, the only way for Erdogan to avoid an embarrassing military defeat with possibly very serious political consequences.

Conversely, should there be an open clash between Turkey and Syria+Russia, then I don’t see NATO intervening to back Turkey. At the most, the US/NATO can send forces to “protect” Turkey and equipment, but in both cases these would not be effective (the problems of the Turkish military are too big to be solved by such mostly symbolic actions). While some more rabid countries (Poland, Netherlands, UK and, of course, the USA) might be tempted to get a major NATO action going against Syria and, through that, against Russia, the mentally saner EU countries have exactly zero desire to end up in a war against Russia, not over the Ukraine, and not over Syria.

Thus while Erdogan is desperately trying to pit the US against Russia, this will not work, especially since this latest pro-US “zag” will only further alienate Iran (and the rest of the region). I predict that after the March 5th conference, Erdogan will be forced to resume his “friendship” with Putin and basically cave in.

If that does not happen, for whatever reason, an escalation will be pretty close to inevitable.

PS: Colonel Cassad (aka Boris Rozhin) has published on his blog an interesting article which looks at a theory which, apparently, is popular in the Middle-East and Russia. This theory says that what is taking place is a gigantic show, a deception, in which both Russia and Turkey appear to be at odds, but in reality are working hand in hand to disarm the Takfiris and exchange territory. Here are, in his opinion, the possibly indications of such a collaboration: (machine translated and minimally corrected)

After some formalities, Turkey resumed joint patrols with the Russian military in Rojava, which is carried out in a routine manner.
Russia has increased the quota for the supply of Turkish tomatoes to Russia despite the fact that Russia threatened to block the supply of Turkish tomatoes.
US did not give Turkey patriot missile, which was described in the Turkish media referring to anonymous sources in the Turkish government. No actual support from the United States and NATO, Turkey has not received.
Despite the fact that the SAA was not going to stop the offensive and continued to surround the Turkish observation points, Turkey has effectively given Assad’s carte blanche for all of February, stating that no major combat operation will be initiated before the beginning of March.
The main chain of the new observation points were deployed by Turkey to the North of highway M-4. The southern direction is not actually strengthened. Attempts to cover the Kafr will Sagna or Kafr Nabl were not undertaken, although this is more important points than Nairab.
The bulk of the Pro-Turkish militants were drawn to Idlib and Carmine, while the southern front was actually exposed for Assad there is a situation of maximum favour for liberation dozen cities and towns.
The battle of Niravam turned into a week-long meat grinder, where the militants engaged in stupid frontal assaults against Syrian positions with heavy losses but capturing Neirab, there is virtually nothing on the operational level, they did not win – losing people and most importantly – time.
The Russian and Turkish military keep all channels of communication and exchange information, including on the movement of Turkish columns. The Russian military help to supply the surrounded Turkish observational points in the rear of Assad.
Moscow and Ankara have repeatedly stressed that not to seek a military conflict with each other, preferring to seek resolution of disputes through diplomatic means.

And Rozhin adds:

Why all this may be part of a backroom deal? Because such a scenario would allow Turkey to look like a defender of Idlib, which is in strong opposition to the plans of Assad and Putin. At least visually. As for Assad and Putin, they can claim to have liberated part of the Idlib province. The battle of Niravam in this logic allow Erdogan to save face before “in the interests of peace and security,” to sign a new deal with Russia with a new line of demarcation, which officially has already been discussed at negotiations in Moscow on 17-18 February. Officially, the Turks rejected it. But it’s official. And if we assume that the agreement already exists and this just fixed sight 5 March, while Assad released another piece of Idlib and the militants “An-Nusra” will be partially disposed in the battles with the SAA in Idlib and in the southern frontal attack on the front under Niranam. In favor of this version may indicate the previous experience of transactions between Russia and Turkey, when Ankara loudly growled at Assad, but de facto did not prevent the Assad regime to clean up the enclaves and win the battle for Aleppo. Against this version can play what the Turks themselves are suffering losses in manpower, and further concessions to Russia may undermine Erdogan’s positions in Idlib, so he tries to bargain.

I personally doubt this version, if only because this is a very tricky and dangerous way to get things done, and because of the many threats and even ultimatums Erdogan is constantly spewing. A more likely explanation for all of the above is that 1) the Takfiris are desperate and are running out of steam and 2) the Turks are afraid of a serious confrontation with Russia. Rozin concludes:

I think that by March 5 the question of whether there is was a secret deal or not will finally be clarified, since Erdogan’s threats are all focusing on early March, at which point he will have to either attack or chose to play the role of peacemaker, which “diplomatically” stopped the advance of Assad.

Here I can only agree with him.

River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian

The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Blog!

Ansarallah forces score big advance in northern Yemen as they approach strategic city

By News Desk -2020-02-29

BEIRUT, LEBANON (4:00 P.M.) – The Ansarallah forces scored a new advance in northern Yemen on Saturday when their troops captured an imperative district in the Al-Jawf Governorate.

According to the latest reports from the front, the Ansarallah forces have reached the city-center of the Al-Ghail District after capturing the mountains surrounding this area earlier in the week.

The Ansarallah forces are now rapidly advancing east towards the strategic city of Hazm, which is also the administrative capital of the Al-Jawf Governorate.

Making matters worse for the Saudi-backed troops in the area, primarily the Islah forces, they find themselves on the verge of being besieged, as the Ansarallah fighters attempt to close the gap east of the city.

Should the Islah forces lose Hazm, this would mark the first time in over two years that the Ansarallah forces have captured an administrative capital in Yemen.