[Unembargoed] DNI Dennis Blair: "...We are not clear if Iran will eventually decide to build a nuclear weapon ..."

Wednesday, 3 February 2010

[Unembargoed] DNI Dennis Blair: "...We are not clear if Iran will eventually decide to build a nuclear weapon ..."

Friday-Lunch-Club

Dennis Blairs "Annual Threat assessment", here

".... We continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that bring it closer to being able to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so, ...... We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons. .... We continue to judge Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence it ....... Tehran, which undoubtedly consider Iran’s security, prestige and influence, as well as the international political and security environment, when making decisions about its nuclear program,....... (however) Iran's growing inventory of ballistic missiles and its acquisition and indigenous production of anti-ship cruise missiles provide capabilities to enhance its power projection,.... as an integral part of its strategy to deter—and if necessary retaliate against—forces in the region, including US forces....
In Iraq, we expect Iran will focus on building long-term influence by trying to ensure the continued political dominance of its Shia allies, expand Iran’s political and economic ties to Iraq, and limit Washington’s influence. We assess Tehran continues to train, equip, and fund select Iraqi Shia militant groups.
In Afghanistan, Iran is providing political and economic support to the Karzai government, developing relationships with leaders across the political spectrum, and providing lethal aid to elements of the Taliban to block Western—especially US—entrenchment in the country. Tehran likely will continue to provide reconstruction, humanitarian, and economic initiatives intended to bolster Afghan stability. Iran also will seek to expand its influence at the expense of the United States and other competitors, and to work with Kabul on border security and counternarcotics initiatives.
In the Levant, Tehran is focused on building influence in Syria and Lebanon and expanding the capability of key allies. Tehran continues to support groups such as Hizballah, HAMAS, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which it views as integral to its efforts to challenge Israeli and Western influence in the Middle East.
• Hizballah is the largest recipient of Iranian financial aid, training, and weaponry, and Iran’s senior leadership has cited Hizballah as a model for other militant groups. Iran also provides training, weapons, and money to HAMAS to bolster the group’s ability and resolve to maintain its armed resistance to Israel and opposition to Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.
Syria
Bashar al-Asad has strengthened his hold on power in Syria since becoming President in June 2000, and his standing has been augmented by his perceived success in weathering regional crises and international pressure, and by the regime’s ability to highlight Syria’s relative insulation from violence in Iraq. Within Syria, Asad has preserved the pillars of regime control established by his father while gradually using personnel turnover to appoint loyalists and expand his power base.
• Syrian leaders continue to exploit “resistance” to Israel and rejection of US pressure to unify Syrians in support of the regime, despite broad dissatisfaction with economic conditions, some disappointment at the lack of political reforms, and quiet resentment by the Sunni majority at domination by the Alawi minority.
• Damascus remains generally uncooperative with the IAEA investigation of its covert nuclear efforts following the destruction of its secret nuclear reactor in September 2007. Syria also maintains a chemical weapons programs and an active missile program, with some missiles that can reach 700 kilometers.
The Syrian regime continues to wield significant influence in Lebanon, arming and funding its allies, while simultaneously taking steps toward normal state to state relations.
Syrian relations with the Maliki government in Iraq remain strained following Baghdad’s accusation that Syrian-based Ba’thists are behind the 2009 bombings of several government ministries there. Overall we assess that Damascus will continue to seek improved political and economic ties to Baghdad, while also permitting foreign fighters, Ba’thists, and other Sunni oppositionists to transit or operate within Syria. Damascus probably will, however, act against terrorist and foreign fighter elements it perceives as a threat to the Asad regime. ...."