“The question isn’t, ‘Who killed Wissam al-Hassan?’ The question is, ‘Who sold Wissam al-Hassan?”
Friday 9 November 2012
The Future Movement Without Wissam al-Hassan
The assassination of Gen. Wissam al-Hassan has begun to cast it
shadow over the workings of the March 14 camp, and particularly within the
Future Movement.
It has led to heightened security measures for
Lebanese Forces (LF) leader Samir Geagea, who ordered more security at his main
headquarters and for his entourage. These measures were extended to all
leadership figures in the organization whose members feel it was Hassan who
played the key role in information-gathering.
The Phalange party has long been on the alert. There is a deep-seated feeling
that the family of former president Amin Gemayel is under constant threat. The
precautions taken by MP Sami Gemayel in particular show the extent of these
worries. Although in this case, they do not stem from the same calculations as
the LF’s worries, even if the two overlap at times.
There is general apprehension among Christian figures in the March 14
coalition. Acting on Geagea’s advice, the prominent leaders among them have
taken extra security measures. Geagea focused on what he termed the “pivots and
keys” – those important figures who wield electoral clout, or whose absence
would weaken March 14 in various other respects.
The same approach has been used with other figures. Marwan Hamadeh, the
former telecommunications minister, has been persuaded that he is a permanent
target, as his elimination would weaken the Druze element that keeps the country
in balance thanks to the acrobatics of Walid Jumblatt.
The real beefing up of security is within the Future Movement, where the
security machine has been mobilized on several fronts.
Included are measures to protect the Internal Security Forces (ISF) commander
General Ashraf Rifi, Colonel Imad Othman (who replaced Hassan as head of the ISF
Information Branch), as well as other ISF and army officers and commanders in
Beirut, the north, and the Bekaa.
The central concern is for the protection of former prime ministers Fouad
Siniora and Saad al-Hariri. The Future Movement’s forward thinkers believe that
there would be chaos without Siniora – given his pivotal role as manager and
communicator – and that the removal of Hariri would deal a fatal blow to Future
and destroy the entire March 14 coalition.
Outside Lebanon, a different kind of security effort is underway. It seems that
Arab and Western players are assessing the impact of Hassan’s absence on the
ISF’s work, and also on the networks of informers active inside the state and
political parties. These could be severely compromised, given that Hassan used
to provide them with a security umbrella as well as financial support.
Most striking in this regard is the spate of personnel transfers and changes
that have been quietly taking place. It seems that some of these steps are in
accordance with advice Hassan had earlier offered, but was not heeded for
reasons related to balances within the Future Movement. Others are moves Hassan
had previously blocked, but are now being pushed through in his absence. It has
reached the point of absurdity in some cases.
Ultimately, there is a different and deeper reason for all this worry,
especially among Hariri’s entourage. It has to do with the role they have been
playing in Syria. Their involvement in the conflict there broke through all
ceilings. The state of delirium that prevailed during Future MP Uqab Saqr’s
latest interview on Future TV indicated that these people know that important
security players in the region are preparing for the next phase, and that this
might make it necessary for dirt that was previously swept under the rug to be
cleaned up.
That was reflected in a campaign of highly damaging leaks of information
about the direct involvement of Hariri’s entourage in the Syria conflict. If the
information coming from Paris, Ankara, Amman, and Abu Dhabi is correct, we
should reconsider Suleiman Franjiyeh’s remark about Hassan’s assassination:
Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic
Edition.
The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of this Blog!
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