The battle in Gaza did not rely solely on advances in the Resistance factions’ military capabilities. Developing their own telecommunication network, similar to what Hezbollah did in the July 2006 war in Lebanon, also played a major role as it enabled coordination on a large scale and contributed to reducing the number of casualties among Resistance fighters.
Gaza – The Palestinian Resistance’s own telecommunication network contributed in an unprecedented manner in reducing the number of casualties among Resistance fighters according to field commanders who were conducting the war through the use of the telecommunication network.
The ability of Palestinian factions to use their private telecom network set a new precedent in the history of the struggle against the Israeli occupation in the Palestinian territories. The internal telecom network helped prevent Israeli intelligence from having access to private communications between the Resistance fighters and from eavesdropping on them. In the past, this helped uncover a lot of the secrets and tactics adopted by the military wings of the Palestinian factions.
Al-Akhbar sheds light on the role of the private landline telecommunication network that the Palestinian Resistance established after the first war on Gaza in the winter of 2009. While it was not used effectively during the next war in November 2012 because it was not fully equipped yet, Resistance fighters confirmed that they completely relied on it to establish communication between the signal corps and the field commanders during the last war.
An official and telecommunication engineer in al-Qassam Brigades – the Khan Younis Division, nicknamed Abu Umair, said that the private telecom network was one of the most effective tools used in revealing the fate of 25 fighters trapped in an underground tunnel along the eastern border of the southern province. He explained: “When the communication between us and the fighters in the tunnel at the eastern border of Khan Younis was cut off, and as the temporary ceasefire was announced on August 10, we went with civil defense personnel to guide them to where the fighters were. When we found the terminal end of our land communication cable, we connected it to a communication device and were able to establish contact with them until they were rescued. Six fighters who had died during the confinement period that lasted 22 days were also pulled out.”
Abu Ahmed, a commander in the armored unit in the northern province of the Gaza Strip, said that he was able to call family and friends through an internal communication point set up in his home throughout the 20 days of his absence at an advanced garrison point near the border with what used to be known as the colony of Eli Sinai. He said that during previous military confrontations, it was impossible for him to check on his family “because the price of making a call through a mobile phone is our lives.”
In an interview with Al-Akhbar, Abu Ahmed said that the Resistance’s private communications network reduced the number of casualties, especially if we take into consideration that wireless communication was and continues to be subject to intelligence surveillance. He said that “establishing a private communications network for the Resistance was no less important than manufacturing rockets or preparing for the battle that was waged in Gaza for over a month.”
The al-Qassam Brigades commander pointed out that demands of the battlefield required adopting an alternative to Senao phones (long-range cordless phones) and cell phones that were the only means of communication available to the Resistance, and which “the Israelis were able to intercept with their advanced technology.” Abu Ahmed said that the communication engineers checked the switchboards daily throughout the war on Gaza for over 30 days to make sure they are safe and have not been compromised. He stressed that the network made evident the Israeli failure to eavesdrop on the Resistance.
According to security sources, Israel depends on two main sources for the intelligence gathering needed for its war against Palestinian Resistance movements: Human sources such as recruiting agents, and electronic sources that rely on state of the art technology.
These sources said that “Unit 8200 in the Shabak [ Israel’s internal security service] tracks wired and wireless communication devices,” arguing that what helps the unit carry out its work is the fact that the Palestinian communication network in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is connected to its own network. They pointed out that the main switchboards of the Palestinian communication network are automatically linked to their Israeli counterpart the Bezeq. While the two mobile networks - Jawwal and Wataniya - are linked to the Israeli Orange network.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
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