It did not take long for internal tensions in the recently-formed international coalition to appear. Recent events reveal a Saudi-Turkish competition over regional leadership in this coalition for which the war on the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) may only represent the first phase. Between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wahhabi mantle, allies are scurrying to reserve an ascendant position.
Istanbul – It was enough for Washington to declare its intention to train 5,000 members of the armed Syrian opposition in one of the military bases in Saudi Arabia to raise Ankara’s ire with Washington, which cannot do without Turkey in its declared war on ISIS.
Turkey shares a 900 kilometer (560 miles) border with Syria and a 360 kilometer (223 miles) border with Iraq. It is a member of NATO and has the second largest army within the organization. The most critical role that Turkey could play in this war has to do with its extensive relationship with the armed groups fighting in Syria from the beginning of the crisis.
The remarks made by US Vice President Joe Biden, in which he held Turkey and Saudi Arabia responsible for the emergence of ISIS, al-Nusra Front and other terrorist organizations, came as proof of the tension in Washington’s relationship with its allies. Biden’s remarks were followed by an escalation on the part of Turkey, expressed in its insistence on the need to establish a buffer zone and a no-fly zone in northern Syria. This reflected Ankara’s insistence on holding onto the “moderate Syrian opposition” card in order to continue to have a final say in the next stage regarding the future of the Syrian regime by deciding its fate and that of the country in general.
Over the past few days, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu continued to talk about the need “to get rid of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” alongside US plans to fight ISIS. Erdogan accused Assad of coordinating and cooperating with ISIS on one hand and with the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) on the other when he declared that “Assad was behind the recent protests in Turkey.” This is an attempt by Erdogan to win the support of the Turkish people for his future military projects in Syria and to convince Washington of the validity of Ankara’s assessment of the situation in the Levant and the region which, in his opinion, would prompt increased US coordination with Turkey only.
The US state department’s statement that Ankara agreed to train the “moderate Syrian opposition” was an attempt to cover up the Turkish insistence on this demand, which Saudi Arabia seems to have realized the danger it poses on the Kingdom.
Riyadh responded on another front when Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal issued a fiery statement against Assad, and more importantly, against Iran. Information had emerged prior to this statement about a new arms deal between Washington and Riyadh worth $1.2 billion.
A more important bargaining chip for Saudi Arabia with the US administration is talk about pumping more barrels of oil per day and a willingness to cut down oil prices to $80 a barrel in a new attempt to prove Saudi importance to the United States. It is not clear, however, if this tempting offer is enough for the US. Washington has continued its dialogue with Tehran to resolve the nuclear issue knowing full well that Iran – the most important element in the war against ISIS – will not abandon its strategic ally in Damascus, just like Russia which, itself, holds many regional and international bargaining chips.
It has become evident for Washington, Saudi Arabia and their Gulf allies that Tehran, too, has a lot of bargaining chips, that are more effective and relevant than the Hezbollah card. Perhaps this is clearly reflected in the Houthis seizing control of the Yemeni capital Sanaa and other cities without a notable international reaction. The significance of this development lies in the fact that Yemen shares a 2,000 kilometer (1,242 miles) border with Saudi Arabia and controls the Strait of Bab al-Mandeb. The Houthis are around the corner from the waterway considered the southern gateway to the Red Sea and a strategic corridor for oil supplies to Europe.
In a related political context, the outcome of the emergency meeting of the opposition Syrian National Coalition’s leadership in Istanbul was the most important diplomatic defeat for Saudi Arabia. Ahmed Tohme was reelected as prime minister of the interim Syrian government despite objections by the leadership of the coalition – which is loyal to Saudi Arabia – to this election. This means a return to Turkish and Qatari control over the coalition. Ankara realizes that its control of the coalition puts it in a stronger position to bargain with the US against Saudi Arabia. It has become evident that the defeat of Saudi Arabia’s supporters and Turkey’s control of the Syrian opposition in its present and future formations will mean a lot for Riyadh and its main allies, Cairo and Abu Dhabi.
Saudi Arabia knows that Ankara along with Doha will continue, through former Iraqi Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, to count on Sunni tribes in Syria and Iraq as long as US scenarios consist of dividing Iraq and later Syria. Ankara wants these scenarios to serve its strategic interests politically, economically and ideologically too. US support for Turkey means at the same time adopting the Muslim Brotherhood mantle on the Arab, regional and international levels and therefore approving of the Turkish-Kurdish alliance based on the future map of the region.
This will mean more economic interests especially in light of “Sunni” control in Iraq and Syria – including by ISIS and the Kurds – over areas rich in oil, gas and water with Turkish sources, that is, the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers.
This information proves that the international coalition against ISIS will not be strong and cohesive as long as ideological differences between Turkey and Saudi Arabia rage on despite Washington’s effort to reconcile them quickly under the pretext of “the common danger of ISIS that threatens Saudi Arabia first.” Ankara, on the other hand, might see in ISIS a valuable opportunity to achieve many of its regional projects, especially in light of what appeared to be an organic relationship between ISIS and Turkey’s Ottoman history and geography. In addition to the common Turkish-ISIS dream of a Muslim Empire, a dream that Turkey believes it is incapable of achieving without getting rid of Saudi Arabia’s role and influence.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
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