Link
"Europe and the United States care much more about the nuclear impasse than they do about Iranian democracy. But the two issues are not entirely separate. The international community -- or just the West -- may decide that sanctions, by widening the split between the hardline rulers and the people, would affect the strategic reasoning of Iran's leaders
One of the great difficulties in inducing Iran to change its nuclear policies is that Khamenei and his associates seemingly believe that the West will pursue the overthrow of the Islamic Republic no matter what happens. Ahmadinezhad, on the other hand, seems more optimistic; he thinks the international community will allow Iran to pursue its present policies, and therefore welcomes engagement because he expects the West to capitulate. That eventuality, however, seems unlikely.
If the Iranian regime were willing to agree to a nuclear deal that is acceptable to the West, the United States and its allies might well be prepared to abandon the Iranian democratic movement. This consequence, however, may not be too problematic for the Iranian democratic cause. Iran's leaders may be reading the situation correctly: they worry that the incentives proposed by the West, such as enhanced economic interaction and opportunities for Iranians to cooperate with their Western colleagues, are in fact a Trojan horse. Indeed, if a resolution to the nuclear impasse led to a greater opening of Iran to the outside world, the outcome might well be a strengthening of all the elements in Iranian society that undermine the hardline regime's grip on power"
No comments:
Post a Comment