Iran: 'PKK to trap Turkey'

Iran has launched a military operation, invading Iraqi territory in the Kandil Mountains, where the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), the Iranian branch of the PKK, are based.

In the past two weeks, PJAK claimed that a high-ranking Iranian general had been killed during the fight. It seems that Iran’s operation against PJAK was successful, as the acting leader of the PKK, Murat Karayılan, said PJAK would not conduct terrorist acts on Iranian soil. Karayılan further stated that he would advise PJAK to withdraw its militants and replace them with PKK militants. While Karayılan’s strategic offer was on the table, the official Iranian press agency leaked information to the effect that Iranian forces had captured him. The Anatolia news agency reported on Sunday that the Iranian parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee chairman, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, had said Karayılan had been captured by Iranian security forces. The PKK quickly denied the news, and pro-PKK TV channel Roj TV claimed that it will broadcast a recent interview with Karayılan to show that he has not been arrested by Iranian forces. But the interview that Roj TV showed was an old one in which Karayılan does not make any references to recent events. To make things more complicated, the Iranian Foreign Ministry denied the report, saying Karayılan is not in their hands. A day later Mr. Boroujerdi corrected his statement, saying: “What I said about the arrest of a PKK leader came from reports published earlier by the Turkish media. Those reports must be verified by the authorities.” With regard to such possibilities, one needs to ask whether Iran is capable of arresting a high-profile PKK leader, a plain answer to which is “yes.” Iran long ago penetrated very deep into the PKK that it is even believed to have influence over high-ranking PKK leaders. Second, throughout the 1990s Iran was site to PKK activity, which enabled Iranian intelligence organizations to obtain useful information about how the PKK operates. Further, it seems as though the PKK is currently undecided as to whether to resume an intensified fight or lay down its arms, in the event that the Turkish state can craft a peace plan with Abdullah Öcalan, the organization’s imprisoned leader. At such a time, it is likely that Iranian intelligence agencies may even receive tips from factions opposed to Karayılan and hoping to get rid of him. Given the fact that the PKK and PJAK are adopting new strategies these days, it is likely that the leaders of the two organizations meet often, which would make it easier for Iranian intelligence to bust a meeting and arrest them. The question is: Why would an Iranian official speculate about such information if Iran really did not arrest Karayılan? If the Iranian regime, which feels the need to demonstrate its capabilities these days, really caught Karayılan, why don’t they reveal the truth and declare a decisive victory? Normally, when a high-profile person like Karayılan is arrested, intelligence agencies first calculate the costs and benefits of leaking information about the arrest. In Iran’s case, especially after engaging in an operation against PJAK, it would be a great boost of morale for Iranian security forces to declare such a victory. It would be a good opportunity for Iran to demonstrate its capabilities. On the negative side, it would result in a reaction from Kurdish minority groups within Iran that could lead to massive street demonstrations, which Iran does not want. If they did not arrest Karayılan, but still circulate such information, there must be a reason why Iran is doing that. The likely reason is its strategic calculations about the outcome of the recent developments in the Middle East. We know that Iran is well aware of the fact that developments in Syria aren’t helping Iran’s interests for two major reasons. First, by launching an operation against PJAK, which had declared a cease-fire long before Iran’s offensive, Iran was hoping to ensure that PJAK will not be used as a destabilizing element in the coming months, because Iran calculates that if the Syrian regime falls, the next stop for the “Arab Spring” is Tehran. Secondly, and most importantly, Turkey is distancing itself from the Assad regime, which Iran supports, and is getting closer to the West. Iran doesn’t like this because it considers Turkey a gateway to the rest of the world. By launching a military operation against PJAK and circulating the idea that it may have captured one of its leaders, Iran could be seeking to stir up the Turkish public’s anxiety against the PKK and create a political climate that would force the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government to conduct its own cross-border operations against the PKK. If the AK Party government were to launch a cross-border operation targeting the Kandil Mountains and PKK camps in northern Iraq, Iran is well aware of the fact that the Kurdish population in Turkey would organize large public demonstrations in the streets, which in turn would force Turkey to launch a massive crackdown against Kurds and in the end have to potential to bring Turkey down to level of the Iranian regime and the Assad regime in Syria. Unfortunately, the tone of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government seems to suggest that Turkey may make the mistake that Iran is excitedly waiting for.

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