Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (L) and Hamas leader Khaled Meshal talk before an signing ceremony for an agreement in Doha 6 February 2012. (Photo: REUTERS - Stringer)
Things have changed for Hamas.
The head of its political bureau, Khaled Meshal, has taken to shuttling between Qatar, Egypt, and Sudan, in addition to making occasional visits to Syria, Jordan, and Tunisia. While this was happening, there was a considerable amount of debate within the movement. Such debates have largely been influenced by the evolving Arab political order in light of the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region. Relations with Iran and Syria are also an issue, as are Hamas’ internal affairs.
Insiders have related what happened at the latest meeting of the movement’s Consultative Council, its senior leadership body, which this year was held in Sudan.
Meshal presented his report on the leadership’s work over his preceding term. Meshal normally makes concise and brief presentations. This time, however, he expounded at length about the implications for Hamas in relation to transformations underway in the Arab street. He concluded by reaffirming that resistance is the sole and certain option for liberating the land of Palestine.
Meshal then sprang a surprise. He announced that after 16 years as head of the political bureau, he believed the time had come for all leadership responsibilities to be assumed by other people. He added that he could hardly call for changes in other leadership posts without himself taking the initiative, and asked to be relieved of the task of heading the political bureau.
Those present treated the move as a genuine surprise. Some expressed appreciation of what was described as a “bold step, unprecedented for young leaders of revolutionary movements.” But in their reactions, principled and emotional responses combined with political and organizational considerations. A majority view emerged that existing conditions make it incumbent on Meshal to remain in office, and that now is not the time for the movement to make sweeping leadership changes – whether at the top of the political bureau or other senior levels.
Follow-up meetings were later held by other key Hamas bodies, including jailed prisoners and leaders inside the Occupied Territories. The outcome was that they also told Meshal they wanted him to remain in his post.
Most crucial in this regard was the reported response of the commander-general of the Izzedin al-Qassam Brigades, Muhammad Daif. He asked the military wing’s representative to the military leadership, Ahmad al-Jaabari, to inform all concerned – from Meshal himself, to rivals such as Mahmoud al-Zahhar and Mousa Abu-Marzouq, to proposed consensus candidate Ismail Haniyeh – that Hamas’ military wing does not think this is the right time to make changes on such a scale, and that it supports keeping Meshal in his job.
The military wing wields significant influence both within Hamas and on the ground. It sought to put an end to a simmering debate within the movement sparked by rumors about impending leadership changes. It had become clear to all, especially the military wing, that senior Hamas leaders were behind most of these rumors, and related leaks to the media. This occurred despite a prior agreement to address such matters in the middle of the year when the movement’s congress is due to be held along with new leadership elections.
On the political front, the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt and Tunisia, and its growing influence in Libya, Yemen, and other Arab countries, have fuelled extensive discussions within the Palestinian movement.
While Hamas’ leaders stress that its final position will always hinge on the issue of resistance, its status and thinking are bound to be affected. There is a strong current of opinion within the movement which wants to harness the Islamists’ successes in support of the resistance option.
Others have advised, instead, that Hamas take advantage of its Palestinian partner’s current weakness to join it in pursuing a peace deal. The idea is that this would bestow full legitimacy on the movement – Arab as well as Palestinian, and official as well as popular – and thus force the outside world to have dealings with it.
The discussion becomes more complicated in relation to the impact of developments in the Arab world on attitudes regarding Syria and Iran.
Hamas leaders confirm that there is a freeze in the official relationship with Syria at the top level. President Bashar Assad has on numerous occasions refused to meet with Hamas leaders, reportedly because he believes that it has “failed to stand by the regime against the conspiracy which Syria is facing.”
However, Hamas leaders say that their latest round of meetings resulted in a reaffirmation of their position toward Syria.
These leaders summed up this reaffirmation as follows: Hamas will preserve its strong relationship with the regimes in Syria and Iran, and with other resistance forces, particularly Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad.
These groups and states have been actively engaged in providing support to the resistance which goes beyond taking a political position. Hamas acknowledges that the regime in Syria extended strong and practical backing to the resistance in Palestine, particularly during the Israeli assault on Gaza three years ago. This support has not been forgotten by the Damascus-based Hamas leaders, nor by the military wing in Gaza itself. Therefore, Hamas is expected to reciprocate this stand with a very high degree of loyalty.
Hamas leaders say that soon after demonstrations began in Syria, they relayed their concerns that plans were being hatched to use the protests to launch an international campaign against the country.
These concerns were shared during direct discussions with the Syrian president, and with allies in Iran and Lebanon. Hamas advocated a political solution, based on the regime initiating reforms to address and contain public demands. It was thought this would help bring on board the patriotic and Islamic opposition, and isolate oppositionists linked to Western parties that want to undermine Syria and the resistance forces. Hamas also contacted Arab and Turkish Islamist leaders and urged them not to push toward a confrontation that would lead to civil war in Syria.
As for relations with Iran, Hamas leaders affirm that military and financial support programs remain in place. This includes increased provision of arms and equipment, the supply of new types of weapons into the Gaza Strip, and specialist training courses held for hundreds of cadres in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. The movement has also taken advantage of the changes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya to improve its military procurement.
Hamas denies there has been a halt to Iranian financial assistance. It says reports to the contrary were merely a mistaken attempt to explain a technical hold-up. But this was quickly remedied, and the reasons for it are known by both the Iranian and Palestinian sides. Iran continues its financial support to Hamas, and its provision of military and security assistance to the movement’s military wing.
Leaders in Hamas confirm that a decision has been made not to be based permanently in Syria. Permanent residence by Hamas leaders in Cairo or Amman has meanwhile been ruled out by the Egyptian Supreme Council and the Jordanian authorities.
The Qataris and Turks provide logistical facilities to the movement’s leaders, but on the proviso that their activities are confined to the political side of things.
The bigger question becomes: Is Hamas willing to be confined to the political side of the Palestinian struggle?
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
The head of its political bureau, Khaled Meshal, has taken to shuttling between Qatar, Egypt, and Sudan, in addition to making occasional visits to Syria, Jordan, and Tunisia. While this was happening, there was a considerable amount of debate within the movement. Such debates have largely been influenced by the evolving Arab political order in light of the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region. Relations with Iran and Syria are also an issue, as are Hamas’ internal affairs.
Insiders have related what happened at the latest meeting of the movement’s Consultative Council, its senior leadership body, which this year was held in Sudan.
Meshal presented his report on the leadership’s work over his preceding term. Meshal normally makes concise and brief presentations. This time, however, he expounded at length about the implications for Hamas in relation to transformations underway in the Arab street. He concluded by reaffirming that resistance is the sole and certain option for liberating the land of Palestine.
Meshal then sprang a surprise. He announced that after 16 years as head of the political bureau, he believed the time had come for all leadership responsibilities to be assumed by other people. He added that he could hardly call for changes in other leadership posts without himself taking the initiative, and asked to be relieved of the task of heading the political bureau.
Those present treated the move as a genuine surprise. Some expressed appreciation of what was described as a “bold step, unprecedented for young leaders of revolutionary movements.” But in their reactions, principled and emotional responses combined with political and organizational considerations. A majority view emerged that existing conditions make it incumbent on Meshal to remain in office, and that now is not the time for the movement to make sweeping leadership changes – whether at the top of the political bureau or other senior levels.
Follow-up meetings were later held by other key Hamas bodies, including jailed prisoners and leaders inside the Occupied Territories. The outcome was that they also told Meshal they wanted him to remain in his post.
Most crucial in this regard was the reported response of the commander-general of the Izzedin al-Qassam Brigades, Muhammad Daif. He asked the military wing’s representative to the military leadership, Ahmad al-Jaabari, to inform all concerned – from Meshal himself, to rivals such as Mahmoud al-Zahhar and Mousa Abu-Marzouq, to proposed consensus candidate Ismail Haniyeh – that Hamas’ military wing does not think this is the right time to make changes on such a scale, and that it supports keeping Meshal in his job.
The military wing wields significant influence both within Hamas and on the ground. It sought to put an end to a simmering debate within the movement sparked by rumors about impending leadership changes. It had become clear to all, especially the military wing, that senior Hamas leaders were behind most of these rumors, and related leaks to the media. This occurred despite a prior agreement to address such matters in the middle of the year when the movement’s congress is due to be held along with new leadership elections.
On the political front, the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt and Tunisia, and its growing influence in Libya, Yemen, and other Arab countries, have fuelled extensive discussions within the Palestinian movement.
While Hamas’ leaders stress that its final position will always hinge on the issue of resistance, its status and thinking are bound to be affected. There is a strong current of opinion within the movement which wants to harness the Islamists’ successes in support of the resistance option.
Others have advised, instead, that Hamas take advantage of its Palestinian partner’s current weakness to join it in pursuing a peace deal. The idea is that this would bestow full legitimacy on the movement – Arab as well as Palestinian, and official as well as popular – and thus force the outside world to have dealings with it.
The discussion becomes more complicated in relation to the impact of developments in the Arab world on attitudes regarding Syria and Iran.
Hamas leaders confirm that there is a freeze in the official relationship with Syria at the top level. President Bashar Assad has on numerous occasions refused to meet with Hamas leaders, reportedly because he believes that it has “failed to stand by the regime against the conspiracy which Syria is facing.”However, Hamas leaders say that their latest round of meetings resulted in a reaffirmation of their position toward Syria.
These leaders summed up this reaffirmation as follows: Hamas will preserve its strong relationship with the regimes in Syria and Iran, and with other resistance forces, particularly Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad.
These groups and states have been actively engaged in providing support to the resistance which goes beyond taking a political position. Hamas acknowledges that the regime in Syria extended strong and practical backing to the resistance in Palestine, particularly during the Israeli assault on Gaza three years ago. This support has not been forgotten by the Damascus-based Hamas leaders, nor by the military wing in Gaza itself. Therefore, Hamas is expected to reciprocate this stand with a very high degree of loyalty.
Hamas leaders say that soon after demonstrations began in Syria, they relayed their concerns that plans were being hatched to use the protests to launch an international campaign against the country.
These concerns were shared during direct discussions with the Syrian president, and with allies in Iran and Lebanon. Hamas advocated a political solution, based on the regime initiating reforms to address and contain public demands. It was thought this would help bring on board the patriotic and Islamic opposition, and isolate oppositionists linked to Western parties that want to undermine Syria and the resistance forces. Hamas also contacted Arab and Turkish Islamist leaders and urged them not to push toward a confrontation that would lead to civil war in Syria.
As for relations with Iran, Hamas leaders affirm that military and financial support programs remain in place. This includes increased provision of arms and equipment, the supply of new types of weapons into the Gaza Strip, and specialist training courses held for hundreds of cadres in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. The movement has also taken advantage of the changes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya to improve its military procurement.
Hamas denies there has been a halt to Iranian financial assistance. It says reports to the contrary were merely a mistaken attempt to explain a technical hold-up. But this was quickly remedied, and the reasons for it are known by both the Iranian and Palestinian sides. Iran continues its financial support to Hamas, and its provision of military and security assistance to the movement’s military wing.
Leaders in Hamas confirm that a decision has been made not to be based permanently in Syria. Permanent residence by Hamas leaders in Cairo or Amman has meanwhile been ruled out by the Egyptian Supreme Council and the Jordanian authorities.
The Qataris and Turks provide logistical facilities to the movement’s leaders, but on the proviso that their activities are confined to the political side of things.
The bigger question becomes: Is Hamas willing to be confined to the political side of the Palestinian struggle?
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
Uprooted Palestinian 
The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of this Blog!
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