Can the Syrian Opposition Regain Its Independence?

Monday 19 March 2012

Can the Syrian Opposition Regain Its Independence?

Published Monday, March 19, 2012

Most people concerned with developments in Syria have strong feelings about recent events there. This need not prevent them from using their minds. Reason does not diminish the feelings or humanity of those who discuss what is happening Syria. And reason is required in large doses by those who behave as if they are in control of the street, of the daily actions of the opposition, or the decisions of the foreign governments, and others who have the resources – whether media, arms, diplomatic, security, or financial – to exert enormous influence on the public.

Reason is needed in order to present a realistic picture of the Syrian scene. Being realistic does not entail abandoning one’s desire for change. It might even strengthen it. But it does mean not pushing the people on the streets to take steps and choices that lead to an inferno in which there can be no victors.
This call for reason is not directed to the opposition activists on the ground. They know that ground best. It is directed at those seated in faraway places who allow their political imaginations and assessments to run wild as they select the slogan for the day. It is they, unfortunately, who appear in the media to air their viewpoint and the expectations it brings, and – more dangerously – direct calls to the activists on the ground to do this, that, or the other...

In the year since the Syrian crisis began, some of the activists on the ground have undergone a rethink, which could be thought of as realistic in terms of their reading of what is going on . They may differ in their views, expectations, and ideas about what needs to be done from now on. But their assessment of what has happened over the past year reflects, above all, the fact that that they live in the midst of it.
Activists do not need the situation in Syria to be misrepresented. That does them no good at all. And if they are unable to see the bigger picture, that is likely because their political experience is embryonic, and they are failing to appreciate the difference between the desire and the capacity to achieve an objective.

The crisis has two facets. One is domestic, and concerns a struggle that will not cease before major, and perhaps radical changes to the regime, its institutions, and the country’s decision-making mechanisms occur. The other is external, and relates to the American-led Arab and Western attempt to get rid of Syria as a key member of the alliance opposed to the US, Israel, and their allies. The players in each want different things. But they have a shared enemy – the regime – and a common means – the people – of pursuing their objectives.

With that in mind, a calm reappraisal of the past years’ developments would take note of the following:
Many imagined that the Syrian regime was like those in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, or Libya. Syrians and Arabs alike, and governments and people around the world, shared the belief that the regime would not last more than a matter of weeks, and would collapse as happened elsewhere. This was based on a notion which was insistently depicted as fact: that the vast majority of the Syrian people want to get rid of the regime, and that its supporters are a small minority who will soon melt away. One year on, it has transpired that the regime was not like the others after all and that the confrontation was not going to be straightforward.

Many, both inside and outside Syria, believed that warnings about Syria’s sectarian, confessional, and ethnic complexities were merely part of a fear-mongering campaign by the regime. One year on, they wake up to a national, sectarian, and confessional divide that extends into the heart of the opposition itself.

Many behaved as though the popular tide could be turned by means of a media game combining the truth with lies. They thought the pressure thus exerted on public opinion would be sufficient to shake the ground beneath the regime, or pull the rug from under its members and institutions. But the game of fabrication, exaggeration, and misrepresentation was taken to such lengths that the media outlets concerned lost their role and effectiveness. Yet the regime remains cohesive, while the world’s most powerful intelligence agencies desperately look for Syrian officials or diplomats to persuade to defect, offering them financial inducements that could pay for the development of an entire village in the Homs countryside.

Many turned a blind eye to the actual regional and international dynamics at play. They underestimated the importance of the support provided to the Syrian regime by the likes of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Russia, and China. The opposition was completely dismissive of this. Opposition figures began mouthing off and offering deals, without really comprehending the interplay of factors that makes it in these countries’ and parties’ own interest to prevent the overthrow of the Syrian regime. Thus, the opposition now finds its options blocked, whether diplomatic (at the UN), military (via foreign intervention), or economic (further sanctions etc).

Many – especially in the offshore opposition, but also some of the home-based opposition – made the mistake of constantly upping the ante. This made them hostage to their own slogans: from rejecting the idea of gradual change, to rejecting the principle of dialogue, to prohibiting contact with intermediaries with the regime, to ruling out any transitional period. They used to think that the more they raised their voices and the ceiling of their demands, the more they were squeezing the regime. But in reality, they were exerting pressure on the people, by pushing those who were participating in the protests to take steps that were beyond their capacity and power. This resulted in some of them taking up arms, on the grounds that it was no longer possible to confront the regime with bare chests. The outcome was the pantomime of the Free Syrian Army and the arming of hundreds or thousands of citizens. They found they needed to use extremist language to attract recruits and inflame passions – only for everything collapsed within a matter of days.

Many insisted that the regime has no genuine popular support and fell prey to their own deception. They would speak of brutal repression of small demonstrations in rural areas, but would not explain why the major cities failed to join the protests. They would simply cite security, as though the city-dwellers are not Syrians or the regime is tougher on security in the towns than in the countryside. This does not mean that everyone who stays at home supports the regime. But the heightening of tensions, and the escalation of the violence from crackdowns to battles and car-bombs, means that the those who go out to show their support for the regime do not do so because they are forced to, as is claimed by many.
Today, one year after the unrest began, it can be said that the regime has been forced to introduce a number of new laws and changes to the constitution, and to constantly seek other means of containing the opposition. This is all to the credit of the protests. Accordingly, rational and farsighted oppositionists need to appreciate that the Syrian people’s struggle has achieved results and that a step backward needs to be taken in order to advance several steps forward.

A step backward, today, means seeing things for what they are, preserving Syria’s unity, preventing division, acting to put an end to sectarian and confessional mobilization, ensuring that Syria is not used in regional and international power-struggles, and avoiding the death of more innocent civilians or soldiers in a futile march of folly.

This can be done by the opposition regaining its national identity, becoming independent of foreign conspirators, and reconnecting to the people with a discourse that is concerned with Syria’s national identity and not just the identity of its regime.

Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.