USIP: "Iraq: Syrian and Saudi Perspectives"

Source

Overview

"...Throughout our extensive consultations with Syrian leaders, as well as interviews with foreign policy experts, diplomats and business people, it was clear that Iraq by itself is not a top concern. Syrians tend to view Iraq as one element in an integrated, comprehensive view of the entire region, including other crises (mainly Israel-Palestine and Lebanon) and their relations with other regional players (particularly the U.S.). Our discussions about Iraq inevitably covered these other subjects, particularly due to the war in Gaza, which was at its peak during the Study Mission. In keeping with this more integrated outlook, Syrians still tended to discuss Iraq in terms of U.S.-Syria relations.

Even specific questions about the Iraqi government tended to elicit responses about the U.S. Syrians still see Washington as the dominant player in Iraqi politics. They seem not to have fully absorbed the implications of the U.S. withdrawal commitments and the newly empowered Iraqi government. ...This could indicate that they are skeptical about the degree to which the improvements in Iraq of the past two years are sustainable and about U.S. commitments to withdraw.

President Assad indicated his support for a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces accompanied by a conference of all political factions (excluding Al-Qaeda) in order to draft a new constitution. Many Syrians the group encountered appeared uninformed about certain recent developments in Iraqi politics. They described Iraq as cut off, even mysterious to outsiders, and not well integrated into the rest of the region. Nonetheless, Syria has begun to engage with Iraq. Syria has an ambassador in Baghdad and there have been high-level visits between the countries. One Syrian analyst read these moves as a signal to the Iraqi Sunnis -- particularly the resistance -- that the Iraqi government is legitimate and that they should take part in the political process. In general, however, Syria has

relatively limited influence in Iraq, and almost no ability to project power and influence into Iraqi political, security or economic affairs, particularly when compared to Iraq’s more powerful neighbors Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran—states that have the means and the capability to be more involved on the ground. Still, Syria is by no means unimportant. It exerts influence in indirect and less costly ways, for instance by playing host to both a range of Iraqi opposition figures and the largest and most diverse community of Iraqi refugees. President Assad emphasized that Syria’s principal concern vis-à-vis Iraq are maintaining its territorial integrity. ........They described relations with Iran as based more on common interests, as currently configured, rather than on ideology or a shared vision for the region.

The group encountered considerable curiosity about President Obama and a strong desire for improved relations with the U.S., even amidst the Gaza crisis. Specifically, it heard a great deal about common interests, whether in terms of stemming the spread of Islamist militancy and sectarianism, a stable and unified Iraq, or a comprehensive Arab- Israeli settlement. There was also much talk (and hope) that Syria and the U.S. could turn a new page with the new administration, the return of an American ambassador and the relaxation of sanctions. ...Damascus remains cautious and watchful. In our conversations about Iraq, they made it clear that Damascus and Tehran do not see eye to- eye. Although not stated explicitly, the group detected an undercurrent of ambivalence about Syrian-Iranian ties, which remain grounded on interests and pragmatism, rather than a shared vision for the region.

Specific Issues

Iraq blowback:

The top concern expressed about Iraq was that assertive ethnic and sectarian identity and Islamist extremism could spill over from Iraq. Syrians were quick to blame the U.S. for unleashing these currents in Iraq and were emphatic in describing how this has worked against common U.S. and Syrian interests. Syrian officials claimed to deal "with Iraqis as Iraqis," while other powers in the region (whom they did not name but presumably meant Saudi Arabia and Iran) promoted the interests of Sunnis and Shia and thereby fueled sectarianism in Iraq and in the region.
Conversely, they lauded Turkey’s efforts to deal with Kurdish militancy, and several analysts interviewed described the two countries’ efforts on Kurdish issues as in sync. The regime believes that Kirkuk and its disputed status has the potential to spark a regional conflict and listed it among Syria’s top concerns with regard to Iraq.

Lebanon.

Foreign fighters.

The movement of jihadi fighters across the Syria-Iraq border seems to have been reduced but not eliminated completely. It is likely the case that in the immediate, post-Saddam period, Syria actively facilitated the movement of jihadi fighters into Iraq, possibly calculating that it would keep the U.S. military tied down and engaged in a costly war. Promoting instability in Iraq and fanning the flames of Islamist militancy and sectarianism were always against long-term Syrian interests due to the risk of blowback. However, the regime likely calculated that these interests were worth sacrificing in the face of a hostile U.S. government they believed was intent on regime change in Syria.

As for the foreign fighter movement that continues, Syrian officials and analysts described security on the Iraqi border in terms of Syrian, rather than Iraqi, security. Syria

faces its own internal threat from Islamist militants. Keeping these groups from harming the regime and disrupting internal stability takes precedence over keeping fighters out of Iraq. "You think of this as a border security issue," our group was told, "(we) think of it as a city

security issue." In other words, it is easy to see why Syria might allow some movement across the border: either to keep these militants out of Syria, to maintain intelligence access to militant networks, or to avoid provoking a violent response bydenying passage.

Despite the Syrian regime’s angry public response following the U.S. military operations in Syrian territory in October 2008, the issue was rarely brought up in our meetings. The group did hear complaints that the U.S. does not treat Syria as a partner in combating Islamist militancy—a clear mutual U.S.-Syrian interest, according to some interviewees—but rather sees Syria as merely "the bad guy." Pressed on the prospect of greater Iraqi-Syrian cooperation on the border, President Assad and others argued that there remained a serious capacity problem on the Iraqi side.

(more on Syria & Saudi Arabia, here)

Posted by G, Z, & or B at 11:14 AM