Via Ftiday-Lunch-Club
Oxford Analytica: excerpts:
"... Saad al-Hariri's tactic of biding his time in responding to the STL tensions, hoping for a regional solution, has become unsustainable amid an escalating crisis. He has therefore toughened his position, reiterating his support for the STL. Hariri cancelled a November 3 cabinet meeting, most likely to head off a vote on the issue of 'false witnesses', whereby Hizbollah and its allies have been pushing for an investigation that might discredit the STL -- and implicate officials close to Hariri....
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has shown signs of shifting towards the opposition, although has not yet voted against Hariri on anything substantial. However, the risk that he and his bloc (nine to eleven MPs) might do so on this issue may be contributing to the prime minister's delays. The delays probably serve Jumblatt's interests as well, since he can maintain an ambiguous stance without alienating either side. In response to Hariri's decision to cancel a cabinet meeting, Hizbollah and its allies boycotted the last National Dialogue session on November 4. There is a possibility of further cancellations and boycotts, threatening institutional paralysis.
Regional Situation. The domestic crisis has been compounded by the inability of regional players to reach a deal on how to respond to the indictments. There have been mixed signals as to whether the regional entente regarding Lebanon still holds ...Yet both sides have repeatedly stated that the agreement is still in place....
However, given the shifting messages, the strength of any regional agreement on the stability of Lebanon is questionable, increasing the risk that it will collapse when the indictments are issued. The intransigent position taken by Hizbollah and Hariri's decision to persist in his support for the STL leave little room for domestic negotiation. Rumours are circulating about a possible military takeover by Hizbollah in the event of the indictment of its members. Yet this would be a last resort and remains unlikely:
Hizbollah's threats of a violent backlash are probably intended to persuade the international community to withdraw its support for the STL. Violent clashes are likely to be part of this strategy to increase pressure, both on foreign players and on Hariri.... Clashes following the indictments are unlikely to be significant enough to represent a game-changer.
Soft coup? Hizbollah might consider a 'soft' takeover involving its ministers and those of its allies resigning, calling for a new government, and paralysing Hariri's cabinet. Such a move could lead to the collapse of the government.The balance in parliament could possibly shift in favour of the opposition, if Jumblatt's bloc and several allies of Hariri's March 14 coalition who are close to Syria could be persuaded to join it. March 14 has 72 seats, and requires 64 for a majority; the opposition currently holds 56. A change of the balance in parliament would strengthen Hizbollah's position in negotiations for the next government. Even if Hizbollah does not form a government (and even if the government does not collapse), such a move could paralyse governmental institutions, making them unable to comply with the STL's demands.
Syria. Either scenario requires Syria's support. However, Damascus has been very vague in its position regarding possible responses to the STL; Syrian officials openly oppose the STL, while maintaining their support for Hariri's government and political stability in Lebanon. Syria has similarly asserted its commitment to the Saudi-Syrian agreement while maintaining its strategic alliance with Iran....,
Syria is in a win-win situation. Despite its declared support for Hariri's government, his destabilisation may be in its interest. Moreover, the more threatening Hizbollah becomes, the more Riyadh believes an alliance with Syria is necessary. Syria could choose to take no significant action in the event of a takeover or government destabilisation....,
it is likely that Hizbollah will refrain from resorting to any drastic action. This is largely because the STL has no means of enforcing its decisions on the ground. Should it issue arrest warrants, Hariri will be reluctant to act on them, since he has lost most of his political clout and it could amount to political suicide. The individuals indicted are not likely to need to travel where they would be at risk of arrest. The fact that Hizbollah has been so vocal in its opposition to the tribunal and rejected Hariri's early attempts to find a compromise (such as his offer to declare the indicted members 'rogue elements' of the movement) suggests that it may not consider the tribunal a genuine threat, beyond politics ...
While it might see an opportunity to weaken its opponents by withdrawing from government, Hizbollah's strategy may instead be to preserve the current arrangement, and continue to use the issue of the STL to weaken the government further and to embarrass Hariri. It could also use the issue as a pretext to challenge UN resolutions relating to Lebanon..."
Posted by G, Z, or B at 8:57 AM
Uprooted Palestinian
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